Tag Archives: Crimea

Harper Democracy vs Putin Democracy

This week in the Netherlands, Stephen Harper loudly decried the actions of the Putin government in Russia. He said that it was bad that the Russians were blocking a number of MPs from coming into Russia, but that one of the members of that group was denied entry because he was Ukrainian. He thought that was even worse if I understood his statement correctly.

I have to agree with Steve here. I think it is wrong to block someone or a group from doing a fact finding mission or even just a visit because of their ethnicity or because they are members of a foreign government that is currently at odds with the Russian government. If the Russians want to send a group to say oversee one of our elections, I say let ‘em in. I’d be curious what they’d have to say about how we do things versus how they do things.

But Steve is being a tad hypocritical here.

Let me explain. In the House of Commons, a Bill to change some of the rules that govern our elections is currently in Committee. A number of people who want to speak to the Bill are being denied the opportunity, not based on ethnicity, but because of their politics.

Elizabeth May (the Leader of the Green Party), as well as members of the Bloc Quebecois, and Independent Members of the House of Commons are being denied the opportunity to question witnesses or even speak to the matter of the so called Fair Elections Act. The Opposition Parties, the NDP and the Liberals are willing to hear Elizabeth May’s words, but the Harper Party, the majority on the Committee are not.

Basically the Harper Party is telling Elizabeth May and those other MPs “We don’t like your politics, you can’t speak here.” How different is that from the Russians telling Canadian MPs that they don’t like our politics, so those MPs should just bugger off?

Not very different at all.

The people who live in the ridings represented by these Democratically elected Members of Parliament are being denied a voice on this Bill. Not very Democratic at all, is it?

No, it appears that the Harper Party’s view of Democracy is not all that different than that of the Putin Party. We’ll get on fine as long as you recognize that everything We say is right, and everything You say is wrong.

The Russian backed referendum in Crimea echoes what we see in the House of Commons on a regular basis. The Crimean referendum was whipped up and voted on in record time. There was no debate, there was no questioning the referendum, the question put to the Crimean people was ludicrous…

Crimea should join the Russian Federation:___
Crimea should declare independence :___

What if you wanted Crimea to maintain its ties with the Ukraine?

Shut up, we don’t like your politics, you can’t vote here.

Back here in Ottawa, the Fair Elections Act was sprung on the House in a similar matter, rushed through to Second Reading and had Time Allocation slapped on it before anyone really had time to take a breath.

A new record?

No, a tired old record played over and over again by Lord Stephen and his Party of Minions.

The imposition of Time Allocation took away the right of the Members of the Green Party, the Bloc, and the independents to speak to the bill while it was at Second Reading. Again, Democracy denied to those people who sent the wrong Party to the House.

Oh, but didn’t Elizabeth May give a speech at Second Reading? Yes she did, but only because the Liberal Party donated the time to her. The Harper Party doesn’t want to hear what she has to say.

Maybe Steve and Vlad should sit down and have a nice chat. I’m sure they’d both be surprised by how much they have in common. Steve likes fishing and Vlad is a hunter, they both adore photo ops and like to be seen in action pictures (with guns–thankfully Steve keeps his shirt on though), and they both like to railroad things through and then look surprised when people challenge their methods.


Now before I sign off, if anyone wants to rant about how evil the West is in terms of the Ukraine and try and make the Russians look good, let me put it this way… both sides have dirty hands in this, you can’t see a White Hat anywhere when it comes to the situation in the Ukraine and Crimea. The ones that are going to be hurt are the everyday people of those regions, the ones that go to work, pay their taxes, and try to make ends meet.

Kind of like how we’re going to pay the price when the “Fair” Elections Act gets rammed through here.



Will #Harper’s #cdnpoli Lies re #Crimea #Ukraine Lead to War with #Russia?

There are several burning questions with no clear answers. We will explore the subject and present some grossly overlooked facts that preceded the current seemingly manufactured crisis situation in Crimea. Before things spiral into the abyss it’s very important that everybody keep cool heads considering time and time again we are told by the Harper Government that the Canadian Government is acting for the benefit of the “Ukrainian people”.

Does a lie become the truth by simply repeating it over and over?

Is Stephen Harper and John Baird’s opaque “Cold War” lies and misrepresentation of the facts regarding Ukraine leading to war with Russia or is this just self-fulfilling grandstanding by the PMO or simply a dangerous campaign stunt aimed at pandering for votes hatched within the Harper Party itself?

Is the Canadian media’s lack of due diligence in omitting facts by repeating press releases from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and reports from RFE/RL’s Ukraine/Russia/Middle East dis-information propaganda arm Radio Svoboda fueling an unnecessary rush to war?

Do these events truly signify that the Harper Government has officially ceded Canada’s sovereignty and turned over control to foreign entities?

Unfortunately there is to this point no recognition of events leading to the formation of the Government Harper’s going to visit – overturning of an agreement made on 21 February 2014.

An action motivating the Russians, but to this point totally ignored in the words of John Baird – though not in those of Christopher Westdal, a former Canadian ambassador to both Ukraine and Russia.

Does re-directing the narrative away from Kiev and towards Crimea change the facts?

This is very troubling since it really brings into question the legitimacy of Stephen Harper and John Baird among others. Another troubling aspect is the complicity with which the Canadian media conglomerates have decided to report on the subsequent events. Not only that, but if there was a voice within Ottawa that knew the truth, the secretly passed lifelong gag order officially titled “Order Amending the Schedule to the Security of Information Act P.C. 2014-165 February 28, 2014” that was quietly announced on 12 March 2013 via the Canada Gazette website would see them imprisoned for up to 14 years.

On Friday, February 21 there was agreement on positive directions for the Ukraine as related in the following live blog coverage article via the Guardian:

Ukraine crisis: deal signed in effort to end Kiev standoff
Shiv Malik and Aisha Gani in London and Tom McCarthy in New York theguardian.com, Friday 21 February 2014 23.01 GMT

The signed agreement has been translated and is now available on the German Foreign ministry’s website.

Here it is in full:

Concerned with the tragic loss of life in Ukraine, seeking an immediate end of bloodshed and determined to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, We, the signing parties, have agreed upon the following:

1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted,signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

3. Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

4. Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

5. The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

6. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation.

Kyiv, 21 February 2014


President of Ukraine: Viktor Yanukovych

For the Opposition: Vitaliy Klichko, UDAR, Oleh Tyahnibok, Svoboda, Arsenij Yatseniuk, Batkivshchyna

Witnessed by:

For the EU – Poland: foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski; Germany: foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier; France: foreign minister Laurent Fabius

For the Russian Federation – Vladimir Lukin, special envoy

Updated at 3.27pm GMT

source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-president-claims-deal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev

download/view: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf

The agreement was officially delivered by the Embassy of Ukraine to Canada on 21 February 2014:

February 21, 2014 an Agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine was signed in Kyiv
21 February, 22:58 Embassy of Ukraine to Canada

In result of negotiations President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders Arseniy Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok and Vitali Klitschko have signed an agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine.

The Agreement provides:

– Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now.

– Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

– Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

– Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014.

– New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

– Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

– The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence.

– The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

– Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

– Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force.

– After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine.

– The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

The negotiations was also attended by representatives of the European Union – German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Head for Continental Europe at the French Foreign Ministry Eric Fournier and also Russian human rights commissioner Vladimir Lukin.

source: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/18110-21-lyutogo-cr-u-kijevi-pidpisano-ugodu-z-vregulyuvannya-krizi-v-ukrajini

The agreement was officially accepted and recognized by John Baird on behalf of Canada on 21 February 2014:

Canada Welcomes Agreement in Ukraine

February 21, 2014 – Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement on the current situation in Ukraine:

“Canada welcomes the agreement reached today between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders, including the Maidan council, to bring an end to months of repression and violence and hold early presidential elections.

“Canada will remain vigilant in monitoring progress under the agreement and stands ready to promote the full implementation of its commitments. We note the steps taken toward releasing former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison and continue to call for this to happen immediately.

“The measures on travel bans and sanctions announced yesterday by Prime Minister Stephen Harper will be calibrated to respond to the degree to which the Ukrainian authorities adhere to both the spirit and the letter of today’s agreement.

“All Canadians mourn the lives lost over the past several days. We remain committed to ensuring Ukraine’s path toward democracy and to ensuring that the lives were not lost in vain.”

For a full list of actions taken to date by Canada in response to the situation in Ukraine, visit Canada’s Response to the Situation in Ukraine.

– 30 –

For further information, media representatives may contact:

Media Relations Office
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada
Follow us on Twitter: @DFATDCanada

Date Modified: 2014-02-21

source: http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2014/02/21c.aspx?lang=eng

The reaction? “EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement” U.S. said “We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise”:

22 February 2014 EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement

The White House welcomed the signing of an accord between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders Friday.

“We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise, and offer the support of the United States in its implementation,” said White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in a statement released to the press.

The agreement calls for early elections and a new government.

Following the signing, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) restored the 2004 constitution.

Russia, a strong supporter of Yanukovych, was not a signatory to the agreement.

The White House again called for those responsible for the violence to be held accountable, saying it was prepared to “impose additional sanctions if necessary.”

Carney added that the U.S. will stand with the Ukrainian people “as they work to restore peace, security, and human dignity across the country and determine the future course of their nation.”

– The European Union has welcomed the agreement reached on Friday between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders.

In a written statement, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said he welcomed the agreement, describing it as a necessary compromise for a democratic, peaceful way out of the crisis.

Rompuy said the EU continues to stand by Ukraine.

“The agreement was facilitated by the important work of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and based on the persistent efforts of the last two months by High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Fule,” he added.

French President Francois Hollande also welcomed the agreement and called for a “full and timely implementation of the deal.”

“After the unacceptable, intolerable and unjustifiable violence that has plunged Ukraine into mourning in recent days, France calls for the full and timely implementation of the deal that has just been signed,” he said.

Three European foreign ministers – France’s Laurent Fabius, Germany’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski – brokered the peace deal and praised Yanukovych and the opposition for their “courage” in agreeing to end the standoff.

The agreement stipulates a return to the 2004 Constitution within 48 hours and calls for early presidential elections.

The crisis-ending agreement is expected to help end EU sanctions against Ukraine, which were agreed on during yesterday’s extraordinary meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels.

Dozens were killed in violent clashes on Thursday, according to a statement from Ukraine’s Health Ministry.

Mass anti-government protests began in November when Yanukovych refused to sign a free trade agreement with the EU amid pressure from Russia.

– Germany FM expresses cautious optimism after Ukraine deal

Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has welcomed an agreement signed today between Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders, but warned that difficulties lay ahead.

“This might have been the last chance to find an exit and end the violence,” Steinmeier said.

“Not all of the problems are solved,” Steinmeier cautioned, but added that the agreement opened the way for a political solution to the crisis.

“There is reason to look forward with confidence,” he said.

Steinmeier, together with France’s Foreign Minister Fabius Laurent and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski carried out marathon talks with the government and the opposition after deadly clashes broke out early Thursday morning.

The three welcomed the agreement and called for an immediate end to the violence.

“The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland welcome the signing of the agreement and commend the parties for their courage and commitment to the deal. We call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation in Ukraine,” said a joint statement released by the German Foreign Ministry.

Germany’s government spokesman Steffen Seibert said Friday, “This might be the last chance for a political process to come out of this deep crisis in Ukraine.”

“We are witnessing a terrible human tragedy. Dozens of deaths within a few hours,” Seibert noted. He also said that it was the duty of all to ensure that the protests remain non-violent, adding, “It is the duty of the Ukrainian government to create the conditions for nonviolence and an opportunity for peaceful free expression.”

Seibert said the German government strongly condemned the week’s violence and Chancellor Angela Merkel was shocked by the events.

He said Merkel had a phone conversation with Viktor Yanukovych yesterday and convinced him to receive the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland as moderators of talks between the government and the opposition.

source: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/163552/eu-u-s-germany-and-france-welcome-ukraine-agreement.html

Yet the next day overthrow of the agreement and installation of a new President was accepted and is being supported as though there had been no agreement:

Putin’s frustration with West begins to show [Video]

The Globe and Mail | Mar. 04 2014

The Globe’s senior international correspondent Mark MacKinnon explains why the West should not expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to ease tensions over Ukraine.

source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/putins-frustration-with-west-begins-to-show/article17278684/

Christopher Westdal on Ukraine talks [Video]
World | Mar 14, 2014 | 9:37

CBC speaks to former Canadian ambassador to Russia and Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441788499/

Ukraine ambassador on de-escalating Crimea tensions [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 9:02

Vadym Prystaiko comments on a controversial referendum in Crimea as Russia amasses troops at the border

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441749317/

John Baird on Ukraine aid [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 8:21

Foreign Affairs minister discusses Canada’s $220M million loan for Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441750880/

PM Harper to visit Ukraine [Video]
Politics | Mar 14, 2014 | 21:10

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird says Prime Minister Stephen Harper will travel to Kyiv next weekend

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2442000351/

Further Research

Manufacturing Discontent Propaganda 101. Just rinse, recycle and repeat the past…

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union: Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, December 9, 1969 Mentions a FY 1970 budget of $13,130,000 for the Radio Liberty Committee

103. Memorandum for the 303 Committee 1
Washington, December 9, 1969.

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

[1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR.
Secret; Eyes Only.]

4. Alternatives

A. The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination. On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which the program is trying to promote.

B. It could also be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities. In this event the efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American “subversion” would lose some of their credibility. This argument, however, is negated by the fact that suspicions of U.S. intentions are so deeply ingrained that any change in U.S. policy toward the emigration would have minimal impact on the conservatives. Moreover, a source of support for those in the Soviet Union who are sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration would be removed and the Soviet authorities would be able more easily to foist their own version of events on the people and be under less pressure to make reforms.


United States Policy Options

A. High Profile Support
The United States could reverse field and follow a more vigorous pro-émigré policy, which might take the form, for example, of (i) more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré activities and objectives, (ii) extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving U.S. Government assistance; (iii) adoption for the first time of a policy of open support for the independence
of national minority areas like the Ukraine.

—Blatant support of anti-Soviet émigré activities would suggest the determination of the Administration to follow a tough policy toward the USSR, exploiting any vulnerability, in the event that the USSR does not become more cooperative on major issues in dispute.
—Any substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might have some feedback in terms of defections, in acquisition of information, and in stimulating dissension inside the USSR;
—United States identification with the independence of national minority areas would strike a responsive chord in an area like the Ukraine and could strengthen nationalist resistance to Russian domination.


Minority Repression

Among many of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union, dissent is vocal and widespread. It is also vigorously repressed. In the Ukraine, the arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965 and 1966, and subsequent repressions, have been vigorously protested by leading Ukrainian scientists, artists, and writers, including Oleg Antonov, one of the Soviet Union’s leading aircraft designers.

The contempt of the Baltic people for Soviet rule remains as strong as ever. It is no longer expressed in hopeless armed resistance, as it was twenty years ago. Instead, these small nations manifest a vigorous determination to preserve their national cultures. Even the local Communist Party apparatus has sought to assert a degree of autonomy. In Estonia many works of Western literature that have never been published in Russian are printed in the native language. Two of the major underground documents recently proposing alternatives to the Communist dictatorship originated in Estonia.

source: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus1969.pdf [pdf]

NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine
R. Craig Nation
Elihu Root Professor of Military Studies
Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
June 2000


1. The New NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was conceived and maintained during the decades of the Cold War as an association for collective defense in the face of a clear and present external threat. With the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, NATO appeared to many to be an alliance without a mission. In an era of revolutionary transformations, where the familiar certainties of bipolarity no longer held sway, the future of the Alliance was inevitably placed in discussion. Immanuel Wallerstein, speaking from the far left wing of the American political spectrum, pressed the conclusion to its logical extreme: “A Cold War instrument, it is not clear why NATO is now needed … The United States should stop obstructing the creation of a European army, allowing NATO to wither away.”1

The American commitment to European defense lies at the heart of the transatlantic bargain that defines NATO. It is an expensive commitment, which absorbs nearly half of total U.S. military spending.2 Washington reacted to the end of the Cold War by significantly reducing its troop presence in the European theater, lowering the number of effectives from over 300,000 in 1991 to approximately 100,000. Simultaneously, however, it made clear that at the institutional level no other organization could substitute for the Atlantic Alliance as the anchor of a new European security order. From a European perspective, though the imminent d0anger of the Cold War period was no longer in place, as a forum for defense cooperation and a means for keeping the U.S. engaged in the Old Continent the Alliance remained essential.

Survival demanded adaptation, and at its Copenhagen session in 1991 the North Atlantic Council took a first step toward revitalization with a declaration on “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe” that reiterated collective defense and transatlantic cooperation as essential responsibilities.3 As if in answer to Wallerstein, the need to keep other European security forums subordinated to NATO leadership was clearly stated, a priority that coincided with the U.S.’s March 1992 Defense Planning Guidance concept, which specified that “we [the U.S.] must attempt to prevent the emergence of any kind of exclusively European defense forces, that could finish by threatening NATO.” 4

The Atlantic Council summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 culminated a first phase of adaptation. The Council sought to redefine NATO’s military responsibilities with the publication of a New Strategic Concept that encouraged the creation of multilateral formations, coined the phrase “interlocking institutions” to emphasize the complementary role of other leading European institutions (such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Western European Union, and the Council of Europe) in the security sector, and placed a new emphasis upon mobile forces and peace operations.5 NATO’s “intact validity” as the keystone in Europe’s security arch was clearly stated.6 Finally, the Council sought to confront the potential for a security vacuum to develop in post-communist central Europe by announcing the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for formal association between NATO and the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe.7

At Rome the Alliance staked a course toward expanded out of area commitments and engagement to the east. Much of its subsequent development has been consistent with that course. In Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997 the NACC was reestablished as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), with “increased ability to give focus and weight to discussions concerning multilateral political and security-related issues.”8 With 46 members (19 NATO full members plus 27 partners) the EAPC has become a vital pillar of NATO’s aspiration to play an inclusive, pan-European role.

The NACC’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was launched at NATO’s Brussels summit in January 1994. Today, under EAPC auspices, it too has expanded to include partnership programs with 27 partners. PfP seeks to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, democratic control of armed forces, and readiness to operate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under UN or OSCE auspices as well as with NATO. It includes ambitious NATO/PfP national and “In the Spirit of PfP” exercise programs and NATO School SHAPE programs open to partner participation. Over the years it has become ever more ambitious, establishing the norm that partners should be contributors as well as recipients, moving from broad-based multilateral dialogue to bilateral relations between individual partners and the Alliance in the form of Individual Partnership Programs, and establishing a Planning and Review Process to draw partners closer to the Alliance by helping them to meet interoperability standards.9

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords assigned NATO forces, designated as an Implementation Force (IFOR) and after renewal of the mandate as a Stabilization Force (SFOR), significant peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1999, after diplomatic pressure failed to convince Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to call off his campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO waged a full-scale air war to impose a peace settlement. Since June 1999, Kosovo has been occupied by a NATO-led Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), with extensive responsibilities for maintaining public order. In 1997 the Alliance also launched a first round of enlargement by agreeing to bring Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the fold as full members, and adopted a Membership Action Plan to assist new candidates in their efforts to prepare for eventual affiliation.10

These varied initiatives had a purposeful logic. The new NATO would not be limited to collective defense responsibilities, but rather actively engaged in peace keeping and peace enforcement operations on Europe’s unstable periphery. It was moreover pledged to future rounds of enlargement on the basis of an “open-door” approach defined by rigorous accession criteria. Not least, the Alliance was committed to a process of internal reform and adaptation that sought to strengthen its European pillar and accentuate its character as an inclusive, collective security forum. NATO’s fiftieth anniversary observances in Washington during April 1999 marked an important culmination for these trends, formally welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new members and promulgating an ambitious new Strategic Concept.11

2. NATO, Russia, and Ukraine.

The Russian Federation articulated strong objections to NATO’s enlargement decision. In part to placate these discontents, and in part to sustain the momentum of enlargement by making the process more inclusive, NATO paralleled its accession talks with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with an attempt to craft special relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv. NATO’s ties with Russia and Ukraine may be depicted as a triangle, with each leg representing a significant set of bilateral interactions. But the relationship as a whole has a larger importance, and is integral to the effort to recast NATO’s post-Cold War responsibilities.

The Russian Federation has been in a state of perpetual crisis since the breakup of the USSR in 1991, and its international stature has declined radically. Russia nonetheless retains all the objective attributes of a great world power. With 80 percent of former Soviet territories it remains the world’s largest state, and largest single national repository of strategic raw materials. It is the world’s second ranking nuclear power, and despite the much publicized decline of its conventional forces, is still a major conventional military power. Russia has inherited the Soviet Union’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and possesses a critical geostrategic situation, at the core of the Eurasian heartland.

Ukraine has a population of 52 million, renowned agricultural potential, important coal, mineral, and timber resources, a substantial industrial infrastructure, and an important geographical position between the Russian Federation, the Black Sea, and central Europe. Though its experience of independence has been difficult and to some extent disappointing, it is widely viewed as a pivotal state in a region undergoing fundamental transformations.

NATO’s ties with the Russian Federation, burdened by a legacy of rivalry and distrust, are of particular salience. The Alliance’s agenda for a transformed Euro-Atlantic security order cannot be fulfilled without Russian engagement. Ukraine defines a “European Choice” as the central pillar of its foreign policy, but it is constrained by a legacy of backwardness, and by a complex relationship with its Russian neighbor. Though it is a troubled polity, as a major regional power Ukraine is too important for the Alliance to ignore.

At the very origin of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay is reported to have quipped that it was founded “to keep the Russian out, the Germans down, and Americans in.”12 None of these observations are relevant to the Alliance’s role today. Europe is no longer dependent upon the United States for core security in the way that it once was. Russia is not capable of projecting a geostrategic threat comparable to that once posed by the Soviet Union. A stronger and more purposeful Germany, willing and able to play its natural role as a bridge between East and West, would serve everyone’s best interests. As analysts like Wallerstein correctly point out, under the altered circumstances of the post-Cold War, the traditional premises of collective defense and containment are no longer sufficient to support the imposing edifice of Atlanticism.

Revolutionary changes in the security environment have not made the Alliance irrelevant, but they have posed new priorities. The fundamental challenge of the current era is not deterrence, but rather engagement on behalf of a greater Europe and Euro-Atlantic community “whole and at peace.” NATO has come toward that challenge by launching a process of internal reform, redefining core missions, and committing to enlargement. The cultivation of special relations with Russia and Ukraine, former enemies situated well outside of the Alliance’s traditional area of competence, is an integral part of the effort. If these relationships develop and prosper, the Alliance’s potential as a collective security forum can be realized to the full, and its vocation as a “zone of peace” will be greatly expanded. With Russian support, the enlargement process can go forward gradually and consistently, without becoming a source of geostrategic friction. Not least, a NATO-Russia partnership could become a critical pillar of a new world order actually worthy of the name. Positive association will provide incentives for Russia’s ongoing domestic transformation, and eventually allow the doors of the Alliance to be opened to Russia itself.

NATO’s effort to create and sustain special relationships with Russia and Ukraine faces significant challenges, but much is at stake. Should the effort fail, Europe risks to see the emergence of a new line of division between East and West that will inevitably become a source of strategic tension. Success will mean a major step toward the promise of a more peaceful world order for which victory in the Cold War once seemed a harbinger.

Ukraine Between East and West

1. A Pivotal State?

Western policy toward Ukraine has moved through several phases. Speaking in Kyiv during August 1991, on the very eve of the Soviet breakup, U.S. President George Bush cautioned Ukrainians that “freedom is not the same as independence,” and that Americans “will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”13 After 1991, relations were dominated by the problem of the arsenal that Ukraine had inherited from the USSR, which briefly made it the world’s third-ranking nuclear power. Kyiv’s reluctance to cooperate with the nuclear non-proliferation regime (to sign the non-proliferation treaty and the START I agreement, to associate with the Lisbon Protocols, and to commit to a process of denuclearization) created considerable tension.14 In the wake of Ukraine’s bout with hyperinflation in 1993-1994, pessimistic evaluations and predictions of imminent breakdown were widespread.15

With the U.S. shift toward a more assertive Russian policy after the “Zhirinovskii Shock” of December 1993 (when the Liberal Democratic party led by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii won the largest tally in voting by party list for the lower house of a new Russian parliament), and especially following the election of new Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in June 1994, Ukraine’s stature improved considerably. Kuchma committed Ukraine to denuclearization, sought to revitalize a domestic reform agenda, and strove for balanced relations between Russia and the West.16

From 1994 onward Ukraine has enjoyed the status of privileged partner, and the commitment “to see an independent, secure, democratic Ukraine survive, succeed and prosper” has been inscribed as a vital interest.17 Ukraine has come to be perceived as a “pivotal” state–one of a handful “whose futures [are] poised at critical turning points, and whose fates would significantly affect regional, and even international, stability.”18 As “the linchpin of stability in post-communist Eurasia,” it has become a centerpiece of Western policy.19

The case for casting Ukraine as a pivotal rests upon four premises. The first is that the consolidation of Ukrainian sovereignty is essential to prevent the recreation of something like the former Soviet superpower around its Russian core. Russian national security policy clearly articulates the goal of voluntary re-association of former Soviet states.20 As long as Kyiv maintains a commitment to full sovereignty, however, the premise of “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia is likely to prevail.21 “The West,” notes Taras Kuzio, “has increasingly come to understand and appreciate the strategic significance of Ukraine as the main post-Soviet country capable of preventing the re-emergence of a new Russian-dominated union.”22

Second, the point at which Russia comes to understand that Ukraine cannot be either won over, subverted, or subordinated to some kind of renewed association is also the point at which Moscow will be forced to abandon imperial fantasies and commit to the arduous but essential tasks of democratization and domestic reform. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the fundamental political struggle underway within post-communist Russia “is over whether Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a distinctly Eurasian and once again an imperial state,” and “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes and empire.” 23 Ukraine’s progress in consolidating sovereignty is thereby defined as the key determinant of the geostrategic orientation of its menacing Russian neighbor.

Third, a stable Ukraine is perceived to be important in its own right, as a large and potentially powerful state that cannot be allowed to become detached from a process of modernization and development in the region as a whole. Ukraine borders on no less than seven central and eastern European states, all of which confront comparable challenges of democratization, adaptation to the world economy, and institutional reform. Its transformation is an integral part of post-communist transition in the central European corridor stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Ukraine has been associated with the Central European Initiative since June 1996, it is an associate of the Forum of Black Sea Cooperation, and it pursues close bilateral relations with its regional neighbors. Ukraine’s historical and cultural ties with Poland and Russia make it a potential bridge between East and West.24 “In time,” writes Adrian Karatnycky, “a stable and democratic Ukraine, linked to democratic Europe, could act as a conduit for democratic ideas to the east; a Western-oriented Ukraine, with its large Russian population, could engage Russia to the West.”25

Finally, Ukraine is increasingly perceived to be critically situated in the emerging battle to dominate energy transport corridors linking the oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian basin to European markets. The economic viability of Caspian resources has yet to be conclusively demonstrated, but considerable competition has already emerged over the construction of pipelines. Whether Ukraine will provide alternative routes helping to diversify access, as the West would prefer, or “find itself forced to play the role of a Russian subsidiary,” remains to be seen.26 Its relevance in the effort to exploit the Caspian energy knot is not in doubt.

A heightened perception of Ukraine’s strategic importance has been manifested in intensified military-tomilitary contacts with both the U.S. and its key allies. Since 1996 Ukraine has been the third leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid, after Israel and Egypt, in addition to receiving considerable World Bank and International Monetary Fund support, and the largesse has borne fruit. In 1993-1994, with its economy in tatters, separatist movements on the rise, and relations with the Russian Federation in a downward spiral, the potential for a Ukrainian civil war, or external conflict with Russia, was widely assessed as acute.27 Today, the threat of overt hostilities seems to be minimal. Ukraine has moved peacefully through two democratic electoral cycles. >From June 1996 it has been governed on the basis of a democratic constitution. In September 1996 Kyiv began to issue its own national currency (the hyrvnya), and in January 1997 it published a National Security Concept that emphasized the goal of integration with the Western post-Cold War security system. 28 Ukraine retains considerable support from a potent diaspora, and it has established a strong international profile.

2. Ukraine’s Dilemmas of Sovereignty.

Despite these accomplishments, Ukraine remains a troubled polity, whose prospects for long-term stabilization are cloudy. Although the country possesses great potential wealth, its legacy from seventy years of Soviet power has been heavy.

Ukraine’s economy was closely integrated with the Soviet command system, and it has inherited almost all of the flaws associated with that system in full measure. The agricultural sector continues to suffer from a bitter experience under Soviet power, including a cumbersome collective farm structure that has proven difficult to dismantle. Much of Ukraine’s industrial infrastructure is outmoded and non-competitive, energy-intensive, and highly polluting. A significant portion of Soviet military-related industries were located in Ukraine, and this sector, which was formerly highly protected, has been hit hard by the loss of Soviet markets. The years of independence have seen chronic disaffection and demoralization among the industrial work force. There is also a near total energy dependence upon former Soviet suppliers, particularly the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.29

Under post-independence Prime Minister Vitold Fokin Ukraine adopted a go-slow approach to reform, on the premise that its first priorities must be the consolidation of independence and nation-building. The result was a virtual economic meltdown in 1993-1994, including hyperinflation and collapsing living standards. In September 1994 Kuchma worked out a Systematic Transformation Facility with the IMF, and in the early years of his tenure applied it with some success. The recent past has seen considerable slippage, however, and overall Ukraine’s economic transition has been abysmal, including a 60 percent decline in GDP since 1991. Privatization has not been decisively advanced, large state budget deficits have become chronic, state subsidization of non-profitable enterprises remains the norm, and living standards continue to decline. Dislocations occasioned by economic hardship will remain a possibility, and some analysts foresee little economic future for Ukraine beyond the status of an “agricultural periphery to a more advanced Russia.”30

Lacking any real experience of independent statehood prior to 1991, Ukraine has also confronted the difficult challenge of building and sustaining a national identity. Underdeveloped national consciousness has been manifested by an aggravated and sometimes antagonistic regionalism. 31 The most serious tensions have derived from a divide between Ukraine’s westernmost districts, committed to an agenda for a strongly delineated Ukrainian national idea, and the heavily Russified eastern and southern regions whose population has tended to favor closer association with the Russian Federation. According to the census of 1989, 22 percent of Ukraine’s population is of Russian descent. A significantly higher percentage may be classified as Russified Ukrainians, for whom the Russian language (or a Russian-Ukrainian melange) continues to serve as a primary vehicle of communication (nearly 50 percent of the Ukrainian population cites Russian as its first language). Fully aware of the potential problem represented by their country’s large Russian minority, the governments of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma have striven, with some success, to propagate an agenda for an inclusive Ukrainian civic nationalism. 32 Strongly contrasting regional identities persist, however, and in the event of a severe national crisis could become fonts of instability.

The Russian factor in Ukrainian domestic politics is focused in several distinct areas. First in order of extent is the Donbas, the densely populated heart of eastern Ukraine and its mining, metallurgical, and chemical complexes. The five districts of eastern Ukraine contain 34 percent of the country’s population, but they are responsible for over 45 percent of total industrial production. Only 32 percent of residents list Ukrainian as their mother tongue, compared to 66 percent who name Russian. In the core districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, native speakers of Ukrainian number 3 percent and 7 percent respectively. Since 1992, a local political agenda has been cultivated calling for the elevation of Russian to the status of an official language, dual citizenship arrangements, open borders, and closer association with the Russian Federation.

Southern Ukraine also contains districts with a significant Russian profile. The Black Sea littoral around the cities of Odesa and Kherson was originally settled by Russians in the era of Catherine the Great, and given the designation “New Russia,” a term of reference that has found resonance with contemporary Russian nationalists.

The Crimean Peninsula, historically a part of Russia and only annexed to Ukraine at the behest of Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 (to honor the three-hundredth anniversary of Russian-Ukrainian association) is probably the most significant focus for Russian nationalism inside Ukraine. Approximately 70 percent of Crimea’s population of 2.7 million is Great Russian, 22 percent Ukrainian, and 8 percent indigenous Crimean Tatars. Russian nationalism has been powerfully manifest in Crimea, and has found an echo within the Russian Federation, particularly around the status of the port city of Sevastopol. The Russian national movement in Crimea has not, however, been overtly supported by the Russian state. Elections in the spring of 1994 brought the pro-Russian Republican Movement of the Crimea to power behind president Iurii Meshkov, but Moscow refused to rally behind the movement’s separatist agenda and looked away as Kuchma pushed Meshkov aside and abolished the Crimean presidency in March 1995.

Western Ukraine presents a strong contrast to the Russified east and south. Focused on the city of L’viv, whose baroque central square is regaled by a statue of the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz, dominantly Uniate Christian, attached historically to the central European cultural zone, and only brought within the confines of the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, western Ukraine functions as the motor of an assertively anti- Russian Ukrainian national consciousness. Under Gorbachev, the Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika (Rukh) based in western Ukraine became the driving force of an Ukrainian independence movement. Since Kuchma’s election in 1994 over Rukh candidate Viacheslav Chornovil the movement has split, with one wing evolving into an almost purely western Ukrainian regional party, calling for an aggressive Ukrainianization of national institutions and greater distancing from the Russian Federation.

Ukraine contains other, smaller pockets of local and regional identity. The Zaporizhzhia district north of the Sea of Azov has a large, politically mobilized Cossack population. The Trancarpathian region (the Zakarpatska district) contains a complex ethnic mix, including a large Ruthenian minority that has resisted Ukrainianization. Chernivtsi district, formerly part of the Habsburg domains and only detached from modern Romania during the Second World War, also defends an autonomous regional identity and central European vocation. None of these smaller sub-regions is likely to threaten national unity on its own. The multiple fault lines that fracture Ukraine, however, could become considerably more unstable against the background of a generalized national or regional crisis.

A yearning for order and lost security are powerful forces pushing a portion of Ukraine’s electorate toward extremist alternatives. By 1996, one-third of the Ukrainian population was asserting support for a “Pinochet style” regime and some cities even saw the birth of Pinochet fan clubs. In the parliamentary elections of 29 March 1998, the Communist party of Ukraine became the country’s largest party with 28 percent of the vote, in a parliament (Verkhovna Rada) dominated by parties of the left, and in the 1999 presidential vote communist candidate Simonenko carried 40 percent of the national tally.33 Kravchuk and Kuchma have responded to these trends in approximately the same manner as their Russian counterparts, by crafting a presidential regime in which the executive branch possesses extraordinary power that it uses to override a hostile but effectively impotent parliamentary assembly. Like Russia, Ukraine is structured as a corporatist regime, where powerful collective entities and interest groups, working hand in glove with the presidential entourage and “party of power,” combine to constitute a power elite. Kuchma has been successful in neutralizing opposition through a combination of cooptation and divide and conquer tactics. His personal entourage has come to consist almost entirely of old friends and associates from Dnipropetrovsk, and his regime has become renowned for pervasive corruption. Kuchma’s reelection was marred by abusive use of the national media on behalf of the incumbent and coerced bloc voting, and procedures were criticized by OSCE and Council of Europe observers.34 If democratization remains a watchword of Western strategy, the case of Ukraine might give security planners pause.

3. Relations with Russia.
Of all the challenges that independent Ukraine confronts, its relationship with the Russian Federation is the most significant, both for its own future and for the future of central and eastern Europe.35 Ukraine, like Europe as a whole, cannot be secure if confronted by a hostile Russia. But Moscow will not easily be persuaded to abandon all pretenses to a “privileged” relationship with its former eastern Slavic dependency.

Economic relations between Russia and Ukraine are significant for both sides. Levels of interdependence at the moment of independence were high. Ukraine, for example, furnished over 65 percent of Soviet metallurgical capacity and 40 percent of agricultural resources, while nearly 80 percent of Ukrainian energy resources derived from Soviet sources. Dependence on Russian energy sources was to some extent balanced by the fact that the main pipeline connecting Russian natural gas fields to the European market transits Ukraine, but Kyiv is also heavily reliant upon transit revenues. Since independence, Russia has not shied away from using Ukraine’s energy dependency, the substantial debt that it has brought in its train, and general commercial dependence, as a source of strategic leverage. Kyiv has sought to reduce that leverage by negotiating higher transit fees for natural gas transfers, converting Odesa into a Black Sea oil terminal to allow diversification of supply, and rationalizing a highly inefficient oil refining capacity. The result of Russian pressing and Ukrainian resistance has been a considerable amount of strategic friction.

The issues of sovereignty over Crimea and control of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol have been particularly troublesome. On 28 May 1997 the Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental Black Sea Accords granted Moscow outright possession of 50 percent of the fleet, allowed it to purchase an additional 32 percent of the Ukrainian share in exchange for Ukrainian debt relief, and granted Moscow a twenty year lease (with the option to renew for an additional five years) over naval facilities in Sevastopol, with Ukraine retaining possession of one bay.36 On 31 May 1997 a Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership extended mutual guarantees of territorial integrity. These agreements were in principle a breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian relations, providing a blueprint for resolving the thorny issue of the fleet in the context of de jure Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. Despite the best of intentions, however, some things have been left unclear. The question of Sevastopol has great emotional resonance with Russian national opinion and has become a cause célèbre for the nationalist rightwing and its allies in the State Duma. It would be surprising if at some point in the future it was not raised again. There are also important strategic issues at stake, which technical agreements over access cannot resolve. Some kind of permanent naval basing in Crimea is vital to a continued Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. There is significant in-place military shipbuilding capacity in Sevastopol that Moscow will be loath to give up. And Crimea remains an important source of leverage in bilateral relations.37

Less concretely, but perhaps most fundamentally, a potent strain of Russian national sentiment continues to regard Ukraine as an inseparable part of a larger family of eastern Slavic nations, artificially separated from the Motherland by hostile Western powers seeking “the weakening of Russia’s strategic and economic situation in Eurasia.” 38 The most consistent expression of an alternative agenda in contemporary Russia is the geopolitical school, which portrays the entire Eurasian land mass as an organic whole within which Russian hegemony and the elusive “Russian Idea” have been historically sanctioned sources of unity and order. According to the argument, the disbanding of the Soviet imperium, inspired by the vain idea of “joining” the West, has led to a national catastrophe that only a renewed Eurasian orientation can reverse.39 Ukraine is regarded as an integral part of the eastern Slavic cultural space and of the Eurasian heartland. It is indeed a “linchpin” of regional order, but one that Russia is urged to reclaim as part of a long-term strategy to reassert itself as a protagonist in world affairs. So long as Ukraine remains economically fragile and socially unstable, such aspirations will have an objective foundation. It has been easy to make the case for Ukraine’s pivotal status as the “keystone” in the central European arch of post-communist states in transition, but difficult to define a convincing agenda for progressive change.40 Until considerably more progress toward democratic consolidation and economic reform has been made, the possibility of civil unrest, regional conflict, and backsliding on the issue of sovereignty cannot altogether be ruled out. Though the dire forecasts of 1994 have not come to pass, Ukraine’s global balance of eight years of postcommunist transition is negative, and dramatic improvement is not in sight.41

Ukraine’s fragility creates a certain imbalance in Western strategy, which rests upon a rhetorical commitment to democratic consolidation, but which must deal with a weak state not always amenable to external direction. Alexander Motyl suggests that, although Ukraine’s transition has not been notably more troubled than those of other post-communist polities in the central European corridor, it must nonetheless be described as “a mess.”42 A central question for Western policy is whether it is prudent to place so much strategic weight upon an arch in such a state of disrepair.

4. Ukraine and the West: The Role of NATO.

Despite its many problems, Ukraine clearly aspires to draw closer to the West. Russia is and will remain too weak to use coercive means to force any kind of “regathering” of purportedly Russian lands. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has revealed severe limitations as a forum for regional cooperation, and with Western encouragement Ukraine has become an active member of the so-called GUAAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) inside the CIS seeking to balance Russian influence. Bilateral relations between sovereign state actors are likely to continue to dominate the international relations of post-Soviet Eurasia. On this level, the Russian Federation can hope to exercise considerable leverage in defense of its national interests. It cannot realistically aspire to block an ongoing process of engagement with Western institutions.

Ukraine’s relationship with these institutions, and particularly the European Union (EU) and NATO, is mixed. Kyiv has repeatedly stated that its long-term strategic goal is integration with Europe. But Ukraine is a weak state, ill-prepared to contemplate full membership in European forums in the foreseeable future. The EU, with its agenda for enlargement already overloaded, has purposefully kept Ukraine at a distance.43 NATO has stepped into the breach, and in the process become Ukraine’s key institutional link to a larger European reality.

NATO has sought to address the dilemma of engaging a strategically vital but structurally fragile Ukraine by crafting a special relationship, parallel with but not identical to that defined for Russia by the May 1997 NATORussia Founding Act.44 The idea seems originally to have been put forward by the Ukrainians themselves, inspired by the fear “that Ukraine would be the compensation Russia received for acquiescing in NATO’s inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.”45 It was enthusiastically greeted by the Alliance, and has been pursued in a pragmatic, purposeful, and generally successful manner.

The Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, concluded on 9 July 1997, differed from the Russian prototype in important ways. Unlike the Founding Act, it involved no formal or informal concessions from either side, and in its original form created no standing body equivalent to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. It was in essence a political declaration that pledged the signatories to consultation and cooperation, without specifying what forms these initiatives would take.46

NATO’s special relationship with Ukraine has been enthusiastically pursued by both sides. In May 1997 a NATO Information and Documentation Center was established in Kyiv, where it has become a focal point for explaining the benefits of association with NATO to the general public. In December 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding on civil emergency planning was concluded, defining terms of cooperation in disaster preparedness and relief. Enthusiastic participation in PfP exercises has been a cornerstone of the relationship. Over 5000 Ukrainian officers have taken part in PfP activities to date, a number of interoperability directives have been fulfilled with PfP financial assistance, and a PfP Training Center is under construction at Yavoriv.47 A NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv facilitates PfP activities, and in March 2000 the Ukrainian parliament approved the PfP Status of Forces Agreement and its additional protocol, as well as the Open Skies Treaty promoting transparency in arms control. The dynamic of NATO-Russian relations has mandated the creation of an institutional focus for cooperation, designated the NATO-Ukraine Commission and broadly paralleling the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Achievements have been acknowledged by the January 2000 visit to Kyiv by NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, and by a March 2000 session of the North Atlantic Council conducted in the Ukrainian capital.

The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been free from most of the political tensions that have marred NATO-Russian relations. Ukraine has expressed a commitment to political neutrality that for the moment precludes aspirations to full membership, and Russia has not articulated strong objections to cooperation at lower levels.48 Moscow and Kyiv have in fact shared certain understandings concerning the role of NATO in the region, including opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of new member states, support for the evolution of the Alliance from a military organization devoted to collective defense toward a political forum devoted to collective security, and an agenda for the gradual construction of a pan-European security system into which NATO can be incorporated as a significant, but not necessarily dominant part.49

Neither dialogue with the EU nor the Ukraine-NATO Charter can serve as panaceas for Ukraine’s unresolved problems, or be considered as ends in themselves. The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been successful because it has unfolded within clearly defined limits. By cultivating a special relationship with Ukraine with excessive zeal, the Alliance would risk to reinforce Russia’s sense of alienation and exposure, thereby conjuring up the very kinds of assertive behavior it seeks to prevent. By pressuring Kyiv to function as the keystone of a NATO-led containment posture (or giving the impression that something like this is occurring) it could exacerbate instability within Ukraine itself, and East-West division internationally. In the absence of egregious Russian misconduct, NATO’s strategic challenge is not to “win” Ukraine, but to provide reliable security assistance to a weak polity struggling to reinforce its sovereignty and a focus for the aspirations of a “European Choice.”

Ukraine is and will remain militarily exposed. It has surrendered its nuclear arsenal at Western insistence and is under pressure to foreswear the manufacture of medium range (300-500 kilometer) ballistic missile systems.50 Much of the country is a broad plain that lacks natural defensive barriers and is open to invasion from three sides. Though Kyiv was successful in establishing viable national armed forces in the wake of the Soviet breakup, subsequent military reforms have been half-hearted. Today’s Ukrainian armed forces are chronically underfunded, severely demoralized, plagued by a disproportionate number of officers in the ranks, and still not effectively subordinated to civilian control. Downsizing continues (750,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Ukraine in 1991, by 1998 force levels were at 360,000, and current plans call for a draw down to 320,000). Given the weak national economic base, the Ukrainian armed forces nonetheless remain large and unwieldy, “characterized by inertia and a general adherence to the status quo.”51 Ukraine has for the time being been denied the option that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have pursued–to reduce and restructure its national forces to complement rather than replicate NATO’s capacity in the context of a realistic prospect for eventual full membership.52

Meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine can only be provided by NATO, but there will be serious political and operational constraints to any large-scale use of Alliance forces in the Eurasian steppe. Moscow has committed itself to a national military strategy that emphasizes reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons in a phase of conventional weakness.53 Assertive military commitments in areas immediately contiguous to the Russian border will therefore pose considerable risk. Moscow is willing and able to assert meaningful pressure in close proximity to its frontiers, and in the central European corridor it can be counted upon to do so if vital interests are perceived to be at stake. Zero-sum competition for Ukraine’s heart and mind is therefore a dangerous game. “Washington’s inclusion of the region near Russia’s borders as vital US security interests or targets for expanding US influence,” writes Sergo Mikoyan, “will make managing regional conflicts in these areas more difficult, if not impossible.”54

A good example of such difficulties was provided by the August 1997 joint military exercise scheduled to be conducted under Partnership for Peace auspices and designated “Operation Sea Breeze.” The operation was originally scripted, at Ukrainian request, to depict a landing by alliance forces on the Crimean coast near Sevastopol in response to a secessionist threat. After vehement Russian protests, objections from the Crimean regional parliament, and demonstrations in the streets, the exercise was called off and rescripted.55 Deploying and sustaining ground forces in a hostile environment in southern Ukraine would be difficult under the best of circumstances. In the real world, impetus to undertake such a deployment would break down quickly in the face of strong political objections.

Bolstered by U.S. forward deployments, NATO forces have the capacity to respond to a Ukrainian request for assistance in the direst emergencies. This capacity is important and needs to be maintained and cultivated–the centrality of NATO in planning for military contingencies in Eurasia remains intact. In the absence of a real and present Russian threat, however, efforts to recast Ukraine as a geopolitical barrier are neither prudent nor necessary.

Russia has not manifested any desire to retake Ukraine by assault, and the ramifications of any such attempt would be devastating. Although they are complex and sometimes contentious, social and cultural relations between Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine and across the Russian-Ukrainian state boundary, with the partial exception of western Ukraine, are also essentially benign. Worst case scenarios involving communal or interstate violence are always possible, but highly unlikely.

Post-communist Ukraine is too fragile domestically to function as “an embattled outpost of the West.”56 Attempts to mobilize Ukraine against Russia would contribute to domestic division and make the task of nationbuilding more difficult. They are also likely to provoke unpalatable international consequences. Russian responses to Ukrainian attachment to NATO need not be limited to central Europe. The Russian periphery is vast, and an important strain of geopolitical analysis emphasizes the need for an eastern orientation and the cultivation of strategic alliances with India, China, and the Islamic Middle East. “Winning” Ukraine at the price of reinforced strategic partnership between Russia and China would not be a good bargain for the West.57

NATO’s best option is to reiterate support for the consolidation of sovereignty within Ukraine and the other new independent states and to engage on behalf of military modernization and security cooperation, but to avoid creating illusions about the prospects for full association until such time as national standards can be realistically achieved, and the regional security environment, including relations with Russia, has stabilized. This is best stated straightforwardly, rather than disguised behind false premises. Association with NATO is a positive option for Ukraine and the West, but full membership is for the moment neither practicable (Ukraine is nowhere near being ready to meet NATO membership criteria) nor politically desirable.

The most serious threats to stability today are located within Ukraine itself, in the potential for social and political unrest provoked by economic stress and political frustration. Cooperation in the security sector should not blind Western strategists to the long-term importance of encouraging democratization, development, and the growth of civil society as prerequisites for national consolidation. NATO’s policies toward Ukraine should be designed first of all to support these goals.

The economic instrument of power will be crucial. Efforts to encourage appropriate international aid and assistance, promote investment, and sponsor Ukraine’s integration with the world economy have often been frustrating, but they cannot be abandoned. In comparison with the extent of IMF, World Bank, governmental and private assistance set aside for the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s needs are modest and they can be met. Incentive packages tied to continuing reform effort will be an important impetus for positive change. Military support, including miliary-to-military contacts, nation assistance, and security assistance programs, can also make a contribution. The U.S. has taken the lead in this regard, concluding military support agreements with a number of new independent states including Ukraine in July 1993, Azerbaijan in July 1997, Kazakhstan in November 1997, and Georgia in March 1998. The U.S. and Ukraine have conducted senior leadership visits and exchanges as well as port calls; organized student visits between U.S. and Ukrainian military schools and colleges (under the IMET program); and pursued a partnership program between the Ukrainian National Guard and the National Guard of California. Ukrainian officers attend officers training programs at the George Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and over the past five years Ukraine has been an important contributor to U.N. and CIS peacekeeping operations. Together with Azerbaijan and Georgia it is preparing a specialized peacekeeping battalion. These varied initiatives reflect a serious commitment to help with a painful process of military downsizing and modernization. If sustained, they will also help to keep Ukraine anchored to the West as a security partner.58

The Russian Federation

1. The New Russia.

The Russian Federation that emerged in 1992 from the ruin of Soviet power was stripped of nearly all the elaborately constructed defenses that its Soviet predecessor assumed as a natural right. The USSR was a force unto itself in international affairs, and it left behind few if any real allies. Soviet military power was the product of an extraordinary mobilization that could not be maintained indefinitely. Under the successor regime of Boris El’tsin the Russian armed forces were drawn into domestic political struggles as an ally of the “party of power,” partially discredited as a result, starved for funds, and in effect allowed to languish by a mistrustful leadership for whom international stature was not a high priority. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the central European buffer bought so dearly during the Second World War was swept away. Simultaneously, declarations of independence in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia led to the surrender of nearly all the territorial acquisitions of Russia’s imperial and communist leaders from the seventeenth century onward. Viewed in conventional terms and from Moscow’s perspective, the break up of the USSR was a strategic disaster that left Russia ill-prepared to engage with a victorious and assertive Euro-Atlantic community.

El’tsin’s reform-oriented supporters originally sought to address the growing imbalance of power through bandwagoning association with a triumphant West. According to new Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s transition would make it an integral part of an enlarged community of Western states stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” committed to a strategic partnership with the U.S., but without sacrificing the prerogatives that geostrategic weight, cultural tradition, and economic potential made its just due.59 These were extravagant hopes, and they would soon be proven vain. Suspicion of Russia’s intentions and concern for its long-term potential were too deeply rooted in the West to dissipate overnight. Russia was too big and too troubled to integrate into existing Western institutions without fundamentally changing their nature. At the same time, Russia’s reduced stature made it difficult for her to attract substantial concessions in exchange for strategic allegiance. For its own part, Moscow yearned for a symbolic parity with the leading Western powers that her underlying power indices did not justify nor in fact permit.

Russia’s unprecedented rapid retreat from great power status has reduced her importance in the context of Western grand strategy, but with over 20,000 nuclear warheads, the great northern kingdom remains too potent to ignore.

2. Russia and NATO.

The strategic evolution of the Atlantic Alliance has been at the core of Russian concern over current Western security policy. Between 1948 and 1989, central Europe was transformed into something like a prepared battlefield for the third world war. In spite of intense militarization, however, the Soviet Union’s western marches were relatively stable. NATO’s intentions, declared and in fact, were strictly defensive. Moscow’s greatest concern was not a conventional military threat, but rather the potential spill over effect of instability within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet glacis in central Europe, built around the 20-plus divisions of the Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany, was formidable, and an adequate guarantee against external aggression. On these terms, and despite chronic wrangling, Moscow could coexist comfortably with a hostile but essentially passive NATO.

The original aspirations of Soviet reformers in the Gorbachev era were summed up by the popular phrase “the Common European Home.” 60 So certain was Gorbachev of the declining relevance of force in an interdependent world, of the need for cooperative forums for the pursuit of mutual security, and of his country’s European vocation, that he was willing to accept widely disproportionate arms reduction agreements and unilateral concessions in order to bridge the East-West divide.

Moscow’s inability to realize these aspirations during the first decade of post-Soviet reform may be ascribed to two causes. First, and most essential, is the travail of transition within Russia itself. The corrupt, demoralized, quasi-authoritarian, and war-torn regime that El’tsin has bequeathed to his successors has little that is positive to offer. Until such time as its internal demons are put to rest it will be condemned to watch from the sidelines as the European project unfolds.

Western policy also shares some of the responsibility for Russia’s failure. Though the West has maintained a rhetorical commitment to “partnership” with the new Russia, it has not sustained pro-active policies sufficient to overcome Russia’s suspicions about the real intentions of its former Cold War rivals. The Russians’ institution of choice as the foundation for a new European security order was the OSCE, where the Russian Federation is fully represented and U.S. influence is to some extent diluted, and whose idealistic charter (the 1990 Charter of Paris) is grounded in the premises of mutual security.61 NATO’s activist agenda from 1990 onward effectively precluded the possibility for the OSCE to evolve in this direction. In place of an inclusive but weak and unthreatening OSCE, whose main function would be to provide a forum for dialogue and consensus building, the Western community elevated an ambitious, U.S.-led, only partially representative, and militarily potent Atlantic Alliance bearing the legacy of adversarial relations inherited from the Cold War.

Moscow could not have been expected to rejoice in the perpetuation of what it has consistently viewed as an unrepentant Cold War rival. It nonetheless took up a seat at the NACC in December 1991, and, with some reluctance, joined the PfP in June 1994. The precipitating event in the transformation of Russian threat perceptions was the emergence of the agenda for NATO enlargement.

So far as the decision to enlarge can be reconstructed, it seems to have derived from a meeting of U.S. President William Clinton with Lech Walesa of Poland and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. during April 1993; to have been embraced by a small group of presidential advisors and pushed through the interagency process behind the scenes; and to have been promulgated as policy without any kind of public debate or consensus in place at the January 1994 NATO ministerial in Brussels. The decision was affected by a U.S. desire to address the concerns of key European allies, but driven forward by U.S. domestic political concerns.62

The decision to expand the Alliance also contained important symbolic and strategic implications. Territorial adjustments and shifts in spheres of influence normally follow decision in warfare. The absorption by NATO of what had once been a Soviet-dominated buffer zone seemed to be a clear vindication of the West’s claim to “victory” in the Cold War. Russia’s position has been that its own leaders took the initiative to end the Cold War, and that a tacit agreement not to enlarge NATO into the area of the former Warsaw Pact was an integral part of the negotiations that allowed for the peaceful unification of Germany. Part of the strategic logic of enlargement has always been that of deterrence against the potential revival of a Russian threat, interpreted in Moscow as a regeneration of a familiar containment posture designed to hem Russia in and keep her weak. No great power can be expected to rejoice when a potent military coalition draws closer to its historically exposed frontiers. Not surprisingly, the strategic implications of enlargement were regarded by Russian elites with dismay, and opposition to the initiative became a rare point of consensus across a badly fragmented political spectrum. It is not clear that any amount of Russian agitation could have reversed the momentum of enlargement once the process had been set in motion. In the event, Moscow’s immediate reactions reflected the general confusion and lack of direction that have characterized nearly all aspects of her tortured post-communist transition. In August 1993, during his first visit to Warsaw as Russian President, El’tsin stated publicly that Polish membership in NATO would not run counter to Russian interests (an assertion that was subsequently reiterated by Foreign Minister Kozyrev).63 The rest of the foreign policy establishment, however, was quick to correct the presidential “misstatement.” Thereafter Russian officials were consistent in condemning enlargement as a threat, a betrayal of the trust that made possible a peaceful winding down of the Cold War, and an attempt “to consolidate victory in the Cold War” at Russia’s expense.64

What to do about the accession process once it had begun was quite another matter. The various counter measures that were suggested–to break off arms control negotiations, to adopt a more demanding stance in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, to increase support for Cuba and other anti-American regional powers, to cultivate strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China, to use economic instruments and other sorts of pressure to block a second round of accession possibly including Ukraine and the Baltic States–were by and large rejected as unfeasible, or as steps toward self-imposed isolation.65 As a result of Russia’s critical weakness the battle of enlargement had in effect been lost in advance, and “to wave one’s fist in anger after the fight is over is nothing more than an empty gesture.”66 The only viable course of action, summarized by Kozyrev’s successor Evgenii Primakov as “keeping damage to a minimum,” was to go on record as opposed to enlargement while simultaneously accepting a limited engagement with NATO in the hopes of maintaining some kind of leverage and influence.67 On this less than promising foundation, Russia moved to discuss the entangling commitment of what would become the NATO-Russia Founding Act.68

Serious negotiations on the Founding Act began in January 1997, and concluded with the signing ceremony of 27 May 1997. Despite Russian efforts to make the agreement as formal as possible, the Act was not a legally binding document, but rather “the fruit of compromise resulting from reciprocal concession” containing “numerous ambiguities.”69 The document itself consists of a preamble and four thematic sections devoted to principles, mechanisms for consultation, areas for cooperation, and political-military issues.70 The preamble states the longrangegoal of building a new NATO reaching out to a democratic Russia, and underlines that henceforward neither party will view the other as a political enemy. In the section devoted to principles, explicit mention is made of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and additional OSCE documents, thus placing NATO-Russian cooperation in the larger framework of ideas and institutions associated with a nascent cooperative security regime.

The key mechanism for cooperation defined by the agreement is the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which is tasked to convene monthly on the ambassadorial level and bi-monthly on the level of foreign and defense ministers. The weight that the PJC is expected to carry is however left unclear, and it is expressly stated that neither side will have the right to exercise any kind of veto-power. The document names a wide range of areas where cooperation is deemed to be possible, including conflict prevention, joint peacekeeping operations, exchanges of information, nuclear security issues, arms control, conversion of military industries, disaster assistance, and the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The precise responsibilities of the Council in regard to these themes is not specified.

The final section addresses the military-security issues occasioned by NATO’s eastward expansion, including its impact on the conventional balance of forces in Europe, prospects for the permanent basing of NATO forces on the territory of new members and a related build-up of military infrastructure, and the issue of nuclear weapons. A number of implicit trade-offs and compromises paved the way for agreement in these domains. The question of conventional force limits was left to be fixed by the ongoing CFE negotiations. An American “three nos” pledge (no need, no intention, no plan) was offered to placate concern about the stationing of nuclear weapons. This amounted to little more than a pious declaration of good intentions, but both sides were willing to live with it on the basis of a shared conviction that “any such stationing would make very little military sense.”71 NATO managed to insert a statement of approval for the modernization of military infrastructure, deemed necessary to permit the deployment of large contingents. Russia achieved some face-saving concessions, but in the end NATO gave up almost no option in which it was seriously interested, maintained a strict definition of the Act as an informal and non-binding arrangement, and reiterated the assertion that Russia was receiving nothing more than a consultative voice. If damage limitation was Moscow’s first priority, the results must have been disappointing.

The essence of the Founding Act has been described as “the commitment to develop consultation, cooperation and joint decision-making, including an enhanced dialogue between senior military authorities.”72 In the first year of its existence the PJC made some progress toward achieving these goals. The foci of interactions were the regular sessions of the PJC and Joint Military Commission, accompanied by numerous high-level consultations between ambassadors, foreign and defense ministers, and chiefs of staff. The PJC convoked expert groups and working sessions on a wide range of issues such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, retraining of retired military personnel, air traffic safety, and arms control. A NATO Documentation Center on European Security Issues was opened in Moscow in January 1998, and negotiations on reciprocal Military Liaison Missions were concluded successfully. During June 1998 a conference was convened in Moscow to commmorate the first anniversary of the Founding Act and explore areas for further collaboration.

Association under the aegis of the Founding Act did not disguise Russia’s more fundamental opposition to NATO enlargement. Nor were Russian representatives entirely satisfied with the limited prerogatives that the PJC offered them. Even prior to Kosovo, Russian evaluations of the work of the Council were primarily skeptical. Complaints were raised of the purely “titular” function of Russian representatives at the military liaison mission, and of Moscow’s exclusion from Alliance planning and decision-making.73 The disillusionment associated with these frustrations should not be underestimated. Gregory Hall describes Russia’s “consistently and resoundingly negative” reactions to the limitations of the PJC as the basis for a decisive “shift in orientation away from the West.”74 The PJC nonetheless seemed to be demonstrating its relevance as a forum for dialogue and association. Foreign Minister Primakov evaluated the experiment cautiously but fairly in remarking that: “The past year has shown that we are able to cooperate on the basis of constructive engagement and confidence, and we have achieved quite a lot.”75

If the PJC was both promising and in some sense necessary, it was also inevitably fragile. In the course of 1999 the frail sprouts of Russia-NATO collaboration were nearly swept away by the storm provoked by NATO’s military intervention in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.

3. Russia, NATO, and the Kosovo Crisis.

The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army as the armed wing of Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian oppression in 1997-1998 should not have come as a surprise. A decade of egregious violations by the government of Slobodan Milosevic had left Kosovo’s Albanian majority deeply embittered, and the failure of the strategy of passive resistance crafted by shadow president Ibrahim Rugova was patent. Western capitals were nonetheless caught unprepared as violence in the province escalated through the summer and autumn of 1998. Original U.S. condemnations of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization were quickly set aside in favor of a campaign of coercive diplomacy designed to force Milosevic to pull in his horns.76 When this campaign failed to produce the desired result, the U.S. and its NATO allies, acting through the Alliance, sought to impose settlement with a campaign of graduated bombing strikes. Milosevic’s reaction to the air strikes was to up the ante by moving to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo en masse, thereby provoking a major humanitarian disaster and directly challenging NATO’s credibility. The Alliance, perhaps unintentionally, found itself locked into a large-scale air campaign with disruptive strategic implications.

Russian objections to NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict were concerned more with the precedent established than the outcome on the ground. Although Moscow has often positioned itself as a supporter of Serbian positions in the protracted Balkan conflict, it has not been willing to make meaningful sacrifices, or to court substantial risks, in support of its erstwhile ally.77 In Kosovo, however, the example of unilateral intervention by NATO, on behalf of one side in a civil conflict within a sovereign state, without UN or OSCE approval, in the name of an extremely broad and easily manipulated “doctrine” of humanitarian intervention, and in defiance of Russia’s expressed preferences, posed special challenges.

In the first phase of the conflict Russia distanced itself from the NATO initiative, pillorying the U.S. as a “new goliath” for whom “force is again the only criterion of truth,” and suspending all relations with the Alliance under the terms of the Founding Act in protest.78 With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Russian special mediator on 14 April 1999, however, hostile rhetoric was moderated. Together with the European Union’s senior Kosovo envoy, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin played a critical role in the negotiations that brought an end to the conflict on the basis of UN Resolution 1244 on 10 June. But Russian concerns about the implications of the NATO action remained intact. Moscow’s engagement in the mediation process, and willingness to participate in the KFOR were born, like acquiescence in NATO enlargement, less of enthusiasm than of a desire to limit damage.

Despite its diplomatic efforts, Moscow’s request for a separate occupation zone inside Kosovo was turned down. In reaction, an expanded Russian airborne company was brought in from Bosnia-Herzegovina on short notice on 11-12 June to occupy Priština’s Slatina airport in advance of the arrival of the KFOR contingent. The tense standoff that followed was resolved diplomatically, but the incident could easily have given rise to an armed confrontation between Russian and NATO forces–a measure of the risks involved in the strategic cat and mouse game being played out in the Balkan conflict zone. Russia emerged from the Kosovo conflict highly concerned for its strategic implications, frustrated by what it perceived as marginalization in the peacekeeping operation, and with relations with NATO in tatters.

Russia’s retrospective objections to Western policy in Kosovo have been consistent and intense.79 The decision to intervene militarily is first of all excoriated as an example of the low regard in which Moscow is held in Western capitals. The issues in Kosovo were not unambiguous. If Serbian repression was extreme, it came in response to real provocations, and in no way could the U.S. or its major allies be said to have had vital interests at stake. Unilateral intervention, in defiance of Russia, was the result nonetheless.

The Kosovo conflict is also portrayed as an integral part of a policy continuum where Russia’s own national interests are at stake. The core issue is “what Europe itself will become in the new century, with whom and in what direction it will evolve.”80 Moscow’s greatest fear is the emergence of a consolidating western Europe subordinated to the U.S. and expanding against Russia–an enlarged Euro-Atlantic community from which the Russian Federation would be effectively excluded. In order to avoid such an outcome, maintaining leverage within the central European corridor is vital. Russia is a traditional Balkan power, and it has close cultural and political ties to the region. Moreover, deeply rooted instabilities guarantee that local actors will continue to search for external sponsorship. Southeastern Europe is one of the only European regions where Moscow can still aspire to play the role of a major power, and engagement in the region has become a critical foundation for its entire European policy. NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, inspired by what Viktor Kremeniuk has called the effort “to create a Europe where Russia has no place,” is therefore interpreted as a major challenge.81

The precedent of unilateral action outside of the UN framework was particularly disturbing. The Security Council veto remains one of the few levers of power that a weakened Russia is able to call on to shape the international environment to its advantage. Well prior to the Kosovo crisis the U.S. had consistently maintained that as a regional security forum NATO should not be constrained by an absolute requirement for a UN mandate, and that under special circumstances independent action might be unavoidable. The U.S. position was not consistently supported even by its closest allies, however, and it was usually assumed that such action would only be forthcoming in the most extreme cases. In the case of Kosovo, much of the pressure for independent action was selfimposed by the extraordinary ultimatum presented to Serbia at the Rambouillet negotiating sessions.

Moscow has also portrayed the Kosovo conflict as a “trial run” for a strategic worst case scenario–the use of NATO forces, operating from forward bases in central Europe obtained as a result of the enlargement process, as an instrument for military intervention in a conflict on the Russian periphery, or even within the federation itself. In the wake of Kosovo, NATO was widely depicted in Russian strategic discourse as “the primary and by far the most serious threat not only to Russian national interests but also to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent and sovereign state.”82

The efficiency of NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia only served to reinforce Moscow’s heightened sense of threat perception. Though Yugoslavia’s conventional forces do not seem to have been degraded by the air campaign to the extent originally announced, and though without Russian mediation the war could have been much more protracted and difficult, NATO had demonstrated its capacity to function effectively as a war-fighting alliance.83 The conduct of the air war was operationally impressive, and the Alliance’s overwhelming technical edge left Serbia virtually defenseless. If Operation Allied Force was intended to intimidate, it must certainly have achieved its purpose.

Russian reactions to the Kosovo crisis have been conditioned by national weakness and limited options. Moscow did not have the capacity to prevent a decision for the use of force. Once that decision had been made, its goal became to limit damage and avoid isolation. NATO’s own strategic miscalculations were of some service in this regard. The original choice for limited bombing strikes was premised on the assumption that after two or three days of punishment, Milosevic would make discretion the better part of valor and cave in to Alliance demands. When this scenario did not play out, Russian influence in Belgrade became a significant asset in the search for a negotiated solution. Chernomyrdin’s ability to pressure Belgrade was critical to the endgame that brought the war to a close, but even here Russia was able to glean precious little advantage. Its core demand for a zone of occupation was refused, the role to which it was assigned under KFOR was modest, and it was made clear to all that NATO would call the shots on the ground inside the occupied province.

4. The Aftermath of Kosovo.

In August 1998 Russian financial markets collapsed, shattering hopes for a long awaited economic recovery. In March 1999, NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia, and in the following summer Russia launched a new military offensive against the rebellious province of Chechnya. On New Year’s Eve 2000, El’tsin resigned as Russia’s President, and in March 2000 acting President Vladimir Putin was formally elected to a five year mandate. Putin’s popularity had soared on the wings of public support for the crackdown in the northern Caucasus, widely perceived as a long overdue gesture of national reassertion. The conjuncture of these events–the discrediting of El’tsin’s reform cause as a result of fiscal collapse, the aggravation of threat perception provoked by Kosovo, the accession of a younger and more dynamic ruler, and Russia’s harsh self-assertion in Chechnya–has given rise to a new climate of relations between Russia and the West with sobering military and strategic implications.

In the months following the Kosovo imbroglio the Russian Federation issued the texts of a new National Security Concept and National Military Strategy. Although they had been in the making for some time, the texts coincided with the reformulation of priorities associated with post-Kosovo re-evaluations.84 Both documents reflect a competitive, “statist” interpretation of Russian national interests and represent a clear rejection of the liberal policies that inspired Russian security policy at the outset of the El’tsin era.85

The first variant of a national security policy issued by the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry in February 1992 placed the emphasis upon Russia’s aspiration to join the “civilized” West.86 The 1993 version of a Russian military doctrine abandoned the traditional Soviet negation of first-use nuclear options, but it did not single out external threats for special mention.87 El’tsin’s 1997 national security concept was more outspoken in asserting the need for a “multipolar” world order, but the concept presumed Russia’s role as a major power acting in concert with its peers. The 1997 Concept down played external threats, and emphasized the primacy of internal dilemmas born of poor economic performance, social frustration, and the slow pace of reform.88 In sharp contrast, the revised Concept, approved by Acting President Putin on 10 January 2000, highlights external threats, and specifically cites NATO unilateralism as a threat to world peace.89

The most challenging assertion to emerge from the texts is a new emphasis upon the role of Russia’s nuclear forces, both as a foundation for deterrence and as a means for prevailing in theater contingencies where vital interests are perceived to be at stake. In the 1993 Military Doctrine, first use of nuclear weapons was accepted in the case of attack by a nuclear armed adversary, or by a state allied with a nuclear power, and in the event that the “existence” of the Russian Federation was put at risk. The 2000 version sanctions the first use of nuclear weapons to “repulse armed aggression” by a conventionally armed adversary, even if that adversary is not bound to a nuclear armed ally. These assertions are unfortunately not merely rhetorical flourishes. Russia maintains a large tactical nuclear arsenal, and in June 1999 Russian military exercises simulating a response to conventional attack against the Kaliningrad enclave culminated with a Russian counter-attack spearheaded by tactical nuclear strikes.

President Putin was propelled into power by the “short, victorious war” in Chechnya, he has publicly committed to a doubling of the military budget, and he has stressed the importance of rebuilding Russian military power. The road back to military credibility will be a long one, but in the wake of Kosovo, the commitment seems to have been made.

Putin’s military initiatives have been accompanied by renewed commitment to pragmatic cooperation with the West, by a reassuring rhetoric of accommodation, and by an effort to reestablish a Russia-NATO connection. Russia remains significantly engaged with NATO in both SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with a commitment of 3,250 troops) and KFOR in Kosovo (where it commits some 1,200 troops), and it has cautiously revived its dialogue with the Alliance under the aegis of the Founding Act.90 A visit to Moscow by Secretary General Robertson in February 2000, including a meeting with President Putin, concluded with a joint statement pledging to “pursue a vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues.”91 Progress promised to be slow, and lack of clarity about long-term goals remained intact. On 5 March 2000, Putin provocatively remarked to the BBC’s David Frost that he “would not rule out” the possibility of Russia’s eventually joining NATO, moving Robertson to respond that “at present Russian membership is not on the agenda.”92

Expectations must be modest, but there is a viable agenda for renewed NATO-Russia collaboration. At present, much of Russia’s military hierarchy perceives the Alliance as a threat. Expanded military-to-military contacts can help dilute such perceptions and groom a new generation of Russian officers more accustomed to collaboration. Official representation for NATO in Moscow would represent an important step forward. With its own substantial military traditions and priorities firmly in place, Russia is not likely to embrace PfP in the way that its Ukrainian counterpart has done. It would however benefit from a renewal of dialogue in areas such as nuclear safety, civil emergency procedures, peace operations, and officer retraining. There is a great amount of work to be done in fixing common understandings concerning doctrinal issues, regional threats, and world order concerns.93

Cooperation is proceeding in other areas as well. Negotiations leading toward a revision of the CFE treaty were sustained despite the distractions of Kosovo and Chechnya, and on Putin’s watch they have been brought to a successful conclusion (though the war in Chechnya has prevented Russia from coming into compliance with new flank limits, and blocked U.S. ratification).94 The Russian Duma has also been brought around to ratify the START II strategic arms control treaty, though with the significant condition that the U.S. give up the effort to revise the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Putin has repeatedly asserted his desire to improve relations with Europe, and there is no need to doubt his sincerity. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner, with over 45 percent of total trade, and commercial transactions are on the rise. It is also the single most important source of direct foreign investment in Russia. Russia ranks sixth among EU trading partners, and in key sectors such as energy its role is critical.95 Over half the grants made under the EU’s TACIS program are earmarked for the Russian Federation, and many (in the areas of military training, nuclear safeguards, chemical weapons conversion, and crime prevention) are security related. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia on Corfu in 1994, and in 1998 a Russia-EU Partnership Council was created. As a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EAPC, and the PJC, Russia is already integrated into Europe’s overlapping institutional structure and does not risk isolation. Moscow cannot afford a decisive break with the West, and it is not in her interest to pursue or provoke one.

The halcyon days of “strategic partnership” are nonetheless a thing of the past. Kosovo has substantiated a focused threat that Russia will seek to neutralize with a long term commitment to rebuilding the foundations of national power, including military power. Chechnya has weakened the Western commitment to assist Russia, and outstanding issues such as the American commitment to national missile defense and the NATO enlargement agenda remain divisive. U.S. engagement on behalf of the new independent states is a source of continuing aggravation and concern. Transatlantic friction could also come into play, should Russia turn back to the old Soviet effort to leverage divisions within the Alliance to its own advantage.96

NATO’s war in Kosovo and Russia’s second round of fighting in Chechnya have probably put paid to any hopes of making the Russian Federation a functioning part of a recast Euro-Atlantic security system in the near future. The line of division that separates the Russian Federation and the West, including the “grey zone” in central Europe, but also the faultline between the U.S. European and Central Commands stretching through the Caucasus and Caspian Sea into distant Central Asia, will remain a volatile and conflict prone shatterbelt where a traditional politics of force and intimidation may have a future as well as a past.

Numerous countervailing tendencies make it unlikely that inevitable friction will sweep out of control. Russia is nowhere near to being in a position to contemplate the use of force outside the immediate vicinity of its frontiers. The interests of its dominant oligarchy do not include suicidal confrontation with great power rivals that it cannot hope to overcome. Military exposure may be rhetorically decried as intolerable, but military effectiveness is a function of many attributes, including social cohesion and morale, leadership, economic viability, technological sophistication, and national purpose, that post-Soviet Russia has not been able to sustain. The currently preferred option of increased reliance on the nuclear option is an essentially defensive expedient. In cases where Russian and Western interests have clashed, Moscow has been careful to avoid confrontation. Weakness and a concomitant lack of alternatives have pushed it, almost inexorably, toward policies of accommodation.

The most salient short-term threats to Russian national interests lie along the Federation’s southern flank. The most pressing long-term security dilemma may well concern relations with China in the Far East. On the European front, although flash points are not lacking, security challenges are likely to be much less pressing. Indeed, one might argue that despite its current weakness, Moscow confronts fewer direct challenges on its western marches at the present moment than ever before in its long history.

The West should take account of the relatively benign regional security environment in crafting its own policies. The harsher edges of Russia’s current strategic discourse give no cause for alarm–exaggerated selfassertion and distancing rhetoric are typical defensive mechanisms for weak states confronted by the real and imagined pretenses of the strong. The Putin leadership has made clear its desire to pursue a pragmatic relationship with the U.S. and its European allies. The case of Chechnya, though tragic, does not threaten the West. Russia will continue to angle for influence in the post-Soviet space, but is not in a position to use force to achieve its goal. The nuclear card in her current security doctrine bespeaks weakness, not strength. Even the NATO enlargement agenda, if pursued gradually and in the context of a positive and expanding NATO-Russian relationship presided over by a dynamic PJC, need not become confrontational. The vision of a Europe whole and at peace, embedded in a stable Euro-Atlantic community and open to cooperation with its neighbors, is a positive vision for Moscow as well.

NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine: Promise and Limits

Three years have passed since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Agreement on Distinctive Partnership, enough time for the respective special relationships to demonstrate both strengths and limitations. The agreements have clearly contributed to the overarching goals that inspired them: “to engage with Russia and Ukraine … to help them through their post-communist transition rather than abandon them to it, and to demonstrate to former adversaries that membership in European institutions was neither a dream nor a false promise.”97 The agreements are not sufficient unto themselves, however, as mechanisms for helping Kyiv and Moscow turn the corner of transition, or to integrate with the West. The NATO-Ukrainian partnership has been dynamic and successful, but on a limited scale. NATO-Russia ties have been troubled, though in the end, even under the severe strains of the Kosovo crisis, they have not snapped. The framework provided by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Charter is vitally important to the effort to forge a new Euro-Atlantic security order, but much more will be required if the process is to be seen through to a successful conclusion. The NATO-Ukraine relationship functions well within the parameters defined by Ukrainian neutrality. Kyiv needs Western assistance to promote the modernization of its armed forces, and leverage to sustain sovereignty against subtle Russian pressure. It needs reassurance in the face of the severe dislocations provoked by a difficult post-communist transition, and access to European institutions to sustain popular morale in a time of hardship. NATO has been able to offer technical assistance, positive engagement in Euro-Atlantic security structures, and long-term prospects for closer association. Its engagement with Ukraine helps reinforce geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, wards off the perception of an emerging security vacuum, and makes the Alliance a relevant actor in a vital geostrategic area.

The limits to NATO-Ukrainian cooperation derive both from Ukraine’s domestic weakness, and concern for possible Russian reactions. The threat of domestic instability will remain on Ukraine’s agenda for some time to come, and in the best of circumstances Kyiv will require a decade and more to prepare for accession to Western institutions. The Russian factor is more troublesome in the short term. In the wake of the first round of NATO enlargement, Foreign Minister Primakov spoke dramatically of a “red line” equivalent to the former Soviet border, beyond which NATO could not be allowed to penetrate. Pragmatic cooperation has already breached that line, but there is no sign that Russia has any intention of abandoning its strong opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO. For the time being, and in view of NATO’s desire to avoid confrontation with the Russian Federation, the NATO-Ukraine relationship must remain limited to nation assistance and security coordination, useful but not decisive in defining a new European security architecture.

The NATO-Russian relationship got off to a promising start, with strong backing from Russian President El’tsin. In the wake of Kosovo, and under the new direction of Putin, relations have become clouded. Putin has nonetheless initiated an attempt to rebuild the foundation of cooperation suspended during the Kosovo operations, and it is vital for the effort to succeed. NATO-Russian relations are hampered by a legacy of hostility and mistrust, Russia has little to offer the Alliance that is not of essentially symbolic value, and the search for accommodation severely constrains NATO’s range of available options. The work of the PJC has been uneven and its real achievements are modest. Nevertheless, some kind of formal relationship with the Russian Federation is absolutely necessary if a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security structure is ever to take form. Russia is a once and future great power, it is led by an astute and purposeful leader, and it has the capacity to disrupt Western security planning if its interests are not taken into account. Cultivating positive ties with Moscow will be difficult, but the effort must be made.

Whether Russia itself will be amenable to such a relationship remains to be seen. Policy council in Moscow is divided, between optimistic evaluations of the potential for collaboration with the West, and pessimistic assessments, particularly well represented within the military hierarchy, that stress the limits of such aspirations and the need for more autonomous national policies. NATO has excluded bringing the Russian Federation inside the Alliance’s decision-making cycle, and it has not hesitated to act in defiance of Moscow if circumstances are perceived to require it. These choices reduce the amount of leverage that the Alliance can hope to assert upon a hesitant Russian partner. Under Putin Moscow seems to be returning to the familiar Soviet strategy of weakening NATO by playing off inevitable transatlantic disagreements. Frustration over the course of events in Kosovo, opposition to Washington’s national missile defense program, and recent debate over the European commitment to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity provide grist to the mill of these efforts. If the Founding Act can be made to function in accordance with its original charter, it will provide space for a more self-confident Russia “to play upon allied rivalry or discord,” and for the NATO allies “to enlist the Russians by one means or another in stratagems to influence the outcome of debates.”98 Resulting friction will be a part of the price that the Alliance must pay to keep Russia engaged.

Rebuilding NATO-Russian relations on the basis of the Founding Act represents the immediate task at hand. Russia cannot simply be brought whole into Western institutions, nor is it clear that it would desire to move in that direction even if it could. Constructive engagement with the West is the only reasonable option. But NATORussian cooperation is fated to remain tentative and fragile. There is a danger, which the Kosovo crisis exposed, in trying prematurely to institutionalize a relationship that lacks underlying substance. That substance needs to be created, by emphasizing a wide variety of interactions and building on small, positive initiatives.

The materials for constructing a more hopeful relationship are at hand. The momentum of NATO-Russian collaboration is hardy, and will be furthered. The goal, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, should be “as much cooperation between NATO and Russia as possible.”99 The successful conclusion of a revised CFE treaty despite the Kosovo episode is a sign of the prospects for pragmatic cooperation in areas where both sides share mutual interests. Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR works well on the tactical level and provides a positive example of collaborative effort. To fully realize the promise of Russian cooperation with the West, however, major impediments, such as the issue of further rounds of NATO expansion, will need to be resolved. Progress in working toward negotiated solutions for unresolved flash points in the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans, and the Black Sea and Transcaucasus region will likewise be critical. NATO’s relations with Russia and Ukraine are too frail to bear the weight of these overlapping agendas left to their own devises. They are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of the kind of Euro-Atlantic collective security system that the Alliance favors. As such, however, they are absolutely vital. NATO’s cooperation with Russia and Ukraine should be pursued without unrealistic expectations, but diligently, consistently, and for the long haul.

1 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Foes as Friends?,” Foreign Policy, No. 90, Spring 1993, p. 156.
2 Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 8.
3 “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe: Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991,” NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Pres, 1992, pp. 22.
4 Cited in P. E. Tyler, “Pentagon New World Order: US to Reign Supreme,” The International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1992, pp. 1-2. After premature release, this document was repudiated by the administration of George Bush.
5 “Rome Declaration on Peace Cooperation,” in NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992, pp. 26-27.
6 Ibid.
7 The idea for the NACC had its origins in a joint declaration by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 10 May 1991. See “Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” in NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, June 1991, pp. 28-29.
8 “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Transition,” AUSA Background Brief, No. 81, April 1999, p.7.
9 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP) After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999.
10 Current Membership Action Plan participants are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
11 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Review, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. D7-D13.
12 Cited in Geir Lundestad, “ ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1996,” in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes, eds., The United States and the European Alliance since 1945, Oxford: Berg, 1999, p. 34.
13 Remarks by the President in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Washington, D.C.: Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1 August 1991.
14 Nadia Schadlow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security,” in Lubomyr A. Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 271-283.
15 See F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine: Europe’s Next Crisis?,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 6, July-August 1994, pp. 14-16.
16 Paul Kubicek, “Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 103-126, and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Presidentialism in Ukraine: A Mid-Term Review of the Second Presidency,” Democratization, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 152-171.
17 “Ukraine at Five: A Progress Report on U.S. Policy,” speech by Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State, to The Washington Group 1996 Leadership Conference, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1996, p. 2, cited from http:www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/10-11tal.htlm.
18 “Introduction,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 4. The authors limit their attention to the “traditional” Third World, but the concept is relevant to states such as Ukraine.
19 John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May-June 1996, p. 62.
20 Derek Mueller, Jeronim Perovic, and Andreas Wenger, “The New Approach to Russian Security in the Context of the Programme for Change,” Aussenpolitik , No. 1, 1998, pp. 28-31, and Leonid Maiorov and Dimitri Afinogenov, “Vazhneishie napravleniia integratsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 February 1998.
21 On geopolitical pluralism see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January-February 1995, p. 31.
22 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Relationship,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 2-3.
23 Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” p. 31, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, March-April 1994, p. 80.
24 The Polish-Ukrainian relationship has been in this regard somewhat neglected. See Ian J. Brzezinski, “Polish- Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 26-37.
25 Adrian Kartnycky, “The Ukrainian Factor,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 107.
26 James Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Trouble,” in Charles Dick and Anne Aldis, eds., Central and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects, Camberly: Conflict Studies Research Center Occasional Paper No. 37, December 1998, p. 115.
27 See the summary of U.S. intelligence assessments predicting severe social and political instability in Ukraine in Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Dire U.S. Forecast for Ukrainian Conflict,” The International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1994.
28 For the text see Uriadovyi Kur’ier, 4 February 1997, pp. 5-6.
29 Gwendolyn Sasse, “Fueling Nation-State Building: Ukraine’s Energy Dependence on Russia,” Central Asian and Caucasia Prospects Briefing No. 17, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1998.
30 John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, McNair Paper 42, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies and National Defense University, August 1995.
31 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 develops the argument expertly.
32 William Zimmerman, “Is Ukraine a Political Community?,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-55.
33 Nadia Diuk, “Ukraine: A Land In Between,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1998, pp. 97-111.
34 “Kutschma klare Wahlsieger in der Ukraine: Internationale Beobachter registrieren zahlreiche Verstösse,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 November 1999.
35 John Morrison makes the apt observation that the Russian-Ukrainian relationship represents for eastern Europe what the German-French relationship represents for western Europe. John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Friendship,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, October 1993, p. 677.
36 James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 33-50.
37 E. Cherkasova, “Sevastopol: Eshche raz o territorial’noi probleme,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, pp. 108-114.
38 Aleksei Bogaturov, “Rossiia i ‘geopoliticheskii pliuralizm’ zapada,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 12, 1994, pp. 83-84.
39 The most cogent statements of the position are by Aleksandr Dugin, Misterii Evrazii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1996, and especially Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997.
40 For the “keystone” metaphor see Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1997.
41 See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” Current History, Vol. 97, No. 621, October 1998, pp. 342-346.
42 Alexander J. Motyl, “Making Sense of Ukraine,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 1-7.
43 See the account in Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Troubles,” pp. 128-131.
44 For the text see “Charter On a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” NATO Review, No. 4, July-August 1997, pp. 5-6.
45 Margarita M. Balmaceda, “Ukraine, Russia, and European Security: Thinking Beyond NATO Expansion,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45, No. 1, January-February 1998, p. 23.
46 Olga Alexandrova, “The NATO-Ukrainian Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration,” Aussenpolitik , No. 4, 1997, pp. 325-336.
47 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999, pp. 1-9.
48 Lidiia Leont’eva, “Aspekti psikhologichnoi borot’bi: U konteksti konteptsii natsional’noi bezpeki Ukraini,” Viis’ko Ukraini, 7 August 1997, p. 17.
49 Taras Kuzio, “Nato Enlargement: The View From the East,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 48-62.
50 Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Papers No. 55, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, October 1996.
51 John Jaworsky, “Ukraine’s Armed Forces and Military Policy,” in Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World, pp. 223-247.
52 Stephen A. Cambone, “NATO Enlargement: Implications for the Military Dimension of Ukraine’s Security,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 8-18.
53 Vladimir Belous, “Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 159-171.
54 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 116.
55 Dmitri Zaks, “Russians Bristle at NATO Sea Breeze,” The Moscow Times, 26 August 1997.
56 Anatol Lieven, “Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997, p. 70. The argument, supportive of engagement with Ukraine but tempered by restraint, is developed at greater length in Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999.
57 Bruce Russett and Alan C. Stam, “Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 3, 1998, pp. 361-382.
58 Col. Stephen D. Olynyk, USAR (Ret.), “The State of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” The Officer, November 1997, pp. 25-28.
59 Andrei V. Kozyrev, “Russia and Human Rights,” Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 282-296.
60 G. Vorontsov, “Ot Khelsinki k ‘obshcheevropeiskomu domu’,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1988, pp. 40-45.
61 Charles Krupnick, “Europe’s Intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe’s Emerging Security Structure,” European Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 30-51.
62 Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1997, pp. 706-710, and James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.
63 Kozyrev asserted that “Russia will have no objection if NATO does not take an aggressive stance in respect of Russia. This [Polish membership in the Alliance] is a matter of Poland and NATO.” Cited from Vasilii Safronchuk, “NATO Summit Seen As Shame for Russia,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 9 July 1997, p. 3.
64 See S. Rogov, “Rasshirenie NATO i Rossiia,” Morskoi sbornik , No. 7, 1997, pp. 15-19.
65 Igor Maslov, “Russia and NATO: A Critical Period,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 1-15, and Aleksei Podberezkin, “Geostrategicheskoe polozhenie i bezopasnosti Rossii,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 7, 1996, pp. 90-97.
66 Iu. P. Davidov, “Rossiia i NATO: Posle bala,” SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, No. 1, 1998, p. 3.
67 Primakov’s remark is cited rom S. Kondrashev, “U nas svoe litso, i my nigde ne skatyvalis’ k konfrontatsii,” Izvestiia, 23 December 1997, p. 3. See also Alexander A. Sergounin, “Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 55-71, and for a summary of the preferred Russian strategic response N. N. Afanasievskii, “Rossiia-NATO: Kurs na sotrudnichestvo,” Orientir, No. 7, 1997, pp. 9-11.
68 For a lucid and thorough evaluation of Russian reactions to NATO enlargement see J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000.
69 Youri Roubinskii, “La Russie et l’OTAN: Une nouvelle étape?,” Politique etrangérè, Vol. 62, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 553.
70 For the text in English and Russian see “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 158-168, and “Osnovopolagaiushchii Akt o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh. Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora,” Krasnaia zvezda, 29 May 1997, p. 3.
71 Hans-Henning Schroeder, ” ‘… it’s good for America, it’s good for Europe, and it’s good for Russia …’: Russland und die NATO nach der Unterzeichnung der ‘Grundakte’,” Osteuropa, Vol. 48, No. 5, May 1998, p. 447.
72 Fergus Carr and Paul Flenly, “NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1999, p. 99.
73 Articulated in A. Kvashnin, “Rossiia i NATO zainteresovany v rasshirenii voennogo sotrudnichestva,” Krasnaia zvezda, 4 September 1998. See also the critique in P. Ivanova and B. Khalosha, “Rossiia-NATO: Shto dal’she?,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 6, 1999, pp. 5-15.
74 Gregory B. Hall, “NATO and Russia, Russians and NATO: A Turning Point in Post-Cold War East-West Relations?,” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 25.
75 Cited in Kav’er Solana, “NATO-Rossiia: Pervyi god stabil’nogo provizheniia vpered,” Novosti NATO, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-May 1998, p. 1.
76 R. Craig Nation, “US Policy and the Kosovo Crisis,” The International Spectator, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 23-39.
77 See V. K. Volkov, “Tragediia Iugoslavii,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, No. 5, 1994, pp. 22-31, and R. Craig Nation, “La Russia, la Serbia, e il conflitto jugoslavo,” Europa, Europe, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996, pp. 171-192.
78 A. Matveyev, “Washington’s Claims to World Leadership,” International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 5, 1999, p. 53.
79 See the evaluations in Dmitri Trenin, ed., Kosovo: Mezhdunarodnye aspekty krizisa, Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 1999.
80 V. Kuvaldin, “Iugoslovenskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, p. 22.
81 See Kremeniuk’s intervention in “Balkanskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura , No. 10, October 1999, p. 42. This round table discussion provides a interesting survey of Russian perspectives on the Kosovo conflict.
82 Viktor Gobarev, “Russia-NATO Relations After the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1999, p. 11.
83 For the controversy over the effectiveness of NATO’s air war inside Kosovo see “The Kosovo Cover-Up,” Newsweek, 15 May 2000, pp. 22-26.
84 For the texts see “Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt,” Krasnaia zvezda, 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4.
85 Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 7-12.
86 See the text in International Affairs, No. 3, April-May 1992.
87 See the text in Izvestiia, 18 November 1993, pp. 1-4.
88 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5.
89 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimaia Voennoe Obozrenie, 14 January 2000, and “Russia’s National Security Concept,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 15-20.
90 Susan LaFraniere, “Russia Mends Broken Ties With NATO,” The Washington Post, 17 February 2000, pp. A1 and A23, and Michael Wines, “Russia and NATO, Split Over Kosovo, Agree to Renew Relations,” The New York Times, 17 February 2000, p. A11.
91 “Join Statement On the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, in Moscow on16 February 2000,” NATO Review, Vol.48, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 20.
92 Cited from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0003080103.htm.
93 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces,” NATO Review, Vol. 48, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 19-22.
94 Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 6, September/October 1999, pp. 15-19.
95 Heinz Timmermann, “Russland: Strategischer Partner der Europeischen Union? Interessen, Impulse, Widersprüche,” Osteuropa, No. 10, 1999, pp. 991-1009.
96 See Iu. P. Davydov, “Rossiia-NATO: O poiskakh perspektivy,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura, No. 1, 1999, p. 21.
97 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Rebalancing NATO for a Strong Future,” ROA National Security Report; The Officer, March 2000, p. 1.
98 Michael Brenner, Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 88.
99 “U.S. Ambassador to NATO On NATO-Russian Relations,” Security Issues Digest, No. 91, 10 May 2000, p. 4.

http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/nation.pdf [pdf]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a broadcaster funded by the U.S. Congress that provides news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East “where the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed”.[3] RFE/RL is supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a bi-partisan federal agency overseeing all U.S. international broadcasting services.[4]

Founded as a propaganda news source in 1949 by the National Committee for a Free Europe, RFE/RL received funds from the Central Intelligence Agency until 1972.[5][6] During the earliest years of Radio Free Europe’s existence, the CIA and the U.S. Department of State issued broad policy directives, and a system evolved where broadcast policy was determined through negotiation between the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and RFE staff.[7]

RFE/RL was headquartered at Englischer Garten in Munich, Germany, from 1949 to 1995. In 1995, the headquarters were moved to Prague in the Czech Republic. European operations have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War. In addition to the headquarters, the service maintains 20 local bureaus in countries throughout their broadcast region, as well as a corporate office in Washington, D.C. RFE/RL broadcasts in 28 languages[8] to 21 countries[9] including Armenia, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.[10]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFE Logo.png

RFE/RL official logo
RFE Broadcast Regions crop.jpg

RFE/RL Broadcast Region 2009
Abbreviation RFE/RL
Motto Free Media in Unfree Societies
Formation 1949 (Radio Free Europe), 1953 (Radio Liberty), 1976 (merger)
Type private, non-profit Sec 501(c)3 corporation
Purpose/focus Broadcast Media
Headquarters Prague Broadcast Center
Location Prague
Official languages English; programs are also available in Albanian, Armenian, Arabic, Avar, Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Bosnian, Belarusian, Chechen, Circassian, Crimean Tatar, Dari, Georgian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Pashto, Persian, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Ukrainian, Uzbek
President Kevin Klose (since January 26, 2013);[1] Dennis Mulhaupt is Chair of RFE’s corporate board (since October 2010).[2]
Parent organization Broadcasting Board of Governors
Budget $83,161,000 (FY 08)
Staff 497
Website http://www.rferl.org

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Europe/Radio_Liberty

Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

ShareAlike Statement: https://dumpharper.wordpress.com/sharealike/

#cdnpoli: Meet #Ukraine’s Svoboda Party #GPC #NDP #LPC #CPC

Meet the Svoboda Party

Since we have previously put together a fairly comprehensive summary regarding the Right Sector, we really wanted to grasp an understanding of the popularity that surrounds the Svoboda Party since they seem poised to not only win the May 25th elections, if there are indeed any, but may well gain a majority. The text of this doc below, aside from this brief hastily composed introduction, will be taken directly from the official Svoboda Party website itself along with the link. Upon reviewing their “program” one can see, if you have read the text of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement, how the two cannot be reconciled for the most part as integration is not within their mandate, it is indeed the opposite. Not only that, but it may surprise you how different the Svoboda Party is compared to any of the political party’s that currently hold any power, could, “legitimacy” or presence in Canada or the US or the UK or the EU for that matter. They are indeed the anti-party that is anti-establishment and anti-status-quo which explains it’s popularity.

This will certainly cause many unforeseen (?) issues for many of the key players involved in the coup d’etat as the contagion will spread and cannot be isolated within the boundaries of Ukraine. That is why this look into the mandate of the Svoboda Party seems very important for many reasons since they already hold so many high level positions. In addition, it seems rather odd that that we are not being informed, due to the escalating anti-Russia and anti-Putin rhetoric and propaganda spins, about the situations occurring in many other regions of Ukraine, including what has been occurring in the so called pro-EU side, considering the new puppet regime was booed by the protesters as they were announced at Maidan.

It is worth noting that Ukraine is a far more diverse nation than is being reported and there are many minority groups and many in Ukraine speak Russian and other languages. They are Ukrainian citizens that are not necessarily pro-Russia or pro-Putin or anti-EU or anti_Ukraine and their voices are being ignored and silenced and are defiantly afraid for their safety and it is all because of the language they speak. They have been essentially used as scapegoats and media fodder by the Western powers and are faced with unimpeded violence at the hands of the Right Sector and other ultra-nationalist white supremacist groups. This in itself should be an indication that the newly installed government is illegitimate considering the State is not protecting them in any way shape or form, period. Quite the contrary, the State is allowing an unimpeded ethnic cleansing campaign to go unchallenged, which is a violation of not only the EU Integration agreement but international laws

We should also take into consideration the sudden and dramatic narrative shift away from Kiev and towards Crimea, that no matter how they spin it, seems to be very peaceful and orderly as it does not seem like any kind of invasion, but a response that was called for by the regional authorities in the semi-autonomous region of Crimea that have rejected the unconstitutional matter in which the previously and democratically elected government structure was dissolved and has scheduled a referendum.

All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” program – “Program for the Protection of Ukrainians”

The main purpose of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is to build a powerful Ukrainian State based on the principles of social and national justice. A state, which takes its rightful place among the leading countries and provides a continuous development of the Ukrainian nation.

In order to achieve this objective, The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” proposes a clear plan of immediate priority steps.

І. Power and Society: Radical Clean-up and Fair System

1. Conduct lustration of the authorities. Depose from power the agents of KGB and government officials who held executive positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

2. Promulgate lists of the agents of the USSR KGB, who were or are in the state service of Ukraine and in other socially important positions.

3. Appoint released after the lustration vacancies to young professionals, graduates of Ukrainian universities, who are selected on the base of principles of patriotism and professionalism and special government administrative courses.

4. Establish mandatory policy for polygraph testing of government employees and candidates for elective office regarding their involvement in corruption, cooperation with foreign intelligence services and having dual citizenship.

5. Adopt a special anti-corruption law to control not only income, but also expenditures of public officials and their family members.

6. Implement as a principle in criminal law that “the greater the position, the higher the responsibility for the crime committed”.

7. Set the graph “nationality” in the passport and birth certificate. Determine the nationality by birth certificate or birth certificate of the parents, considering the requests of the citizen.

8. Implement a criminal penalty for any displays of Ukrainophobia.

9. Submit to public discussion the draft law on proportional representation in the executive branch of Ukrainians and representatives of national minorities.

10. Submit to public discussion the draft of the Constitution, according to which the Ukrainian state is a presidential republic, the President of Ukraine is the head of the state, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the direct head of the Government of Ukraine.

11. Reduce the term in office of the President of Ukraine to four years. (One and the same person can hold the office of President for no more than twice). To be elected as the President, one must be a citizen of Ukraine by birth, has lived in Ukraine for the last 20 years, has reached 35 years of age, who speaks and is fluent in the official language, has no criminal record and has not been brought to responsibility for anti-Ukrainian offenses.

12. Implement a proportional system of elections to the parliament with open lists. To be elected as a deputy, one must have been living in Ukraine for the last 10 years, reached 18 years of age, who speaks and is fluent in the official language, who is competent and has no criminal record.

13. Provide equal access for all electoral stakeholders to the media for their coverage of program provisions, debates and so on. Prohibit paid political advertising in the mass media three months before and throughout the campaign.

14. Oblige candidates for all elective offices to specify in their official biographies the nationality, all previous (from the Soviet era) party and government positions and convictions – repaid and unrepaid. Withdraw the registration of the candidates who concealed biographical facts or deprive deputies of their mandate, if the concealment was found after the election

15. Provide equal participation of representatives of all political parties participating in elections in the electoral committees.

16. Cancel parliamentary immunity from criminal and economic crimes. Prohibit bringing to responsibility deputies of all levels for their political positions, statements and voting nature (except for anti-Ukrainian, anti-state, and Ukrainophobian activity).

17. Limit the duration of the parliament and local councils from five to three years. Reduce the number of national deputies of Ukraine in the parliament to 300.

18. Implement fingerprint voting in order to ensure exclusively personal involvement of the deputies in the Parliament.

19. Restrict the increase of wages and other material rewards for deputies within the period of validity of their mandate.

20. Implement the election of local judges by the community for 5 years, appellate judges by the Congress of local judges for a period of 7 years, the Supreme Court by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine for 10 years.

21. Raise the age limit of judges to 30 years. A judge may be elected if he is a citizen of Ukraine who has experience in the field of law for at least 5 years, who is competent, has no criminal record, has been living in Ukraine for the last 10 years and who speaks and is fluent in the official language.

22. Provide transparent and publicly accessible functioning of the unified register of court decisions in order to ensure uniform application of the law by all courts of the state.

23. Provide compensation for moral and material damage incurred by a person through unlawful decisions and actions of state authorities and local government officials, at the expense of the perpetrators. The losses for a wrongful judgment must be compensated at the expense of the judge who approved it.

24. Submit to public discussion the draft law on a new three-tiered system of administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine, which consists of 300 counties and also cities, towns and villages.

25. Implement a majoritarian system of elections for deputies of village, town and city councils, a mixed proportional and majoritarian system for deputies of county councils.. To be elected as a deputy of the local council, one must be a citizen of Ukraine, who reached 18 years of a age on the election day, who is competent, has no criminal record and has been living in the community for at least 5 years.

26. Provide local communities with the right to elect every 3 years the village, town, city and district chairmen who heads the Executive Committee through secret, equal and direct voting. Elect village, town and district headmen in two rounds.

27. Provide the local communities with the right to withdraw deputies of local councils and local judges, to impeach the head of the executive committee, surveyor and the head of of Internal Affairs by referendum.

28. Ensure the increase of the role of local government by reallocating powers and financial resources between the central government and local governments on the basis of budgeting “from the bottom up”.

29. Introduce the practice of the widest direct democracy in local communities – referendums, plebiscites, general meetings and so on. Introduce the practice of the widest direct democracy in local communities – referendums, plebiscites, general meetings and so on. Conduct local referendums on vital issues. Introduce a mechanism for community veto on decisions of local governments.

30. Deepen the impact on the livelihood of the local government communities by creating house, street and block committees. Allow the division of land and new construction in populated areas only with the consent of the authorities, except in cases of national needs. Resolve disputed land and construction issues through local referenda.

31. Allow all mentally healthy citizens of Ukraine that have never been convicted of a crime to freely acquire and possess firearms and cold weaponry.

ІІ. Economy: Economic Independence and Social Justice

1. Conduct “energy audits” – carry out a complete inventory of mining sites and energy production of all types in Ukraine.

2. Adopt a national program of energy independence of Ukraine on the principle of “consumption reduction, production increase, source diversification.”

3. Diversify the import sources of energy resources: no more than 30% per provider (country). Implement and develop special trade programs (for example, the project “carbamide in exchange for liquefied gas”). Eliminate the monopoly of foreign energy companies on the Ukrainian market.

4. Establish strict proportional dependence of prices for Russian gas transit through Ukraine and the rent of underground gas storage facilities in accordance with the selling price of gas for Ukraine.

5. Achieve sales of Russian gas to European consumers in the east and not the west border of Ukraine.

6. Destroy corruption schemes in the energy sector. Establish transparent tenders for equipment for state-owned energy companies. Implement strict state control over the pricing in the oil and gas sector.

7. Adopt a national program to develop energy fields. Increase own gas and oil production, in particular by developing the sea shelf, including deposits abroad. Develop the coal industry as a priority area.

8. Create own closed nuclear cycle based on domestic raw materials. Construct public infrastructure necessary for the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

9. Adopt a national program of development and implementation of alternative energy: diesel fuel from coal, biofuel, wind, solar, hydropower (including recovery of small HPP networks) etc.

10. Develop and implement a national program to encourage energy-saving technologies. Switch to control heat measuring equipment of end users. Invest in heat supply technology. As a result, reduce the energy needs of the state and lower prices for utilities.

11. Adopt a law on strategic companies and strategic industries. Disallow the privatization of strategic enterprises and return to state ownership ones that were privatized earlier. Ensure state control over natural monopolies.

12. Check the legality of the privatization of all large enterprises (in which the average number of employees exceeds one thousand persons annually or the gross revenue from sales of the product in a year exceeds fifty million hryvnias). Return illegally privatized facilities to state and workers ownership.

13. Provide an opportunity to employees to acquire right of ownership of state and communal companies, participate in their management and fair distribution of profits. Allow employees to sell their share in the company exclusively to the appropriate company. Require employees who have stopped the employment relationship with the enterprise to sell their share to the enterprise.

14. Ensure the benefits of domestic investors over foreign ones in the privatization of state enterprises.

15. Return to state ownership privatized enterprises whose owners do not fulfill their social, investment and other commitments.

16. Allow transfer of long-term use of historical and cultural heritage objects for the purpose of restoring, preserving and efficient functionality, subject to the investor protection requirements of restoration and investment commitments. Suspend the use in case of non-compliance or liabilities.

17. Increase criminal penalties for crimes related to the seizure of enterprises, land and so on. Create a legal framework for combating illegal construction.

18. Adopt a new land code and approve it in national referendum. Conduct a complete inventory of land, buildings, and premises in Ukraine. Create a “Unified State Register of rights to immovable property and land” and to ensure its openness and transparency.

19. Prohibit agriculture land trade in Ukraine. Give it to long-term possession of Ukrainian citizens with the right of family inheritance. Determine legal grounds for termination of such possession in case of using the agricultural land for inappropriate purposes or in case of deterioration of the soil (fertility).

20. Establish criminal liability for soil erosion as a result of human actions. Strengthen criminal liability for illegitimate acquisition of soils.

21. Allow persons who acquired ownership of agricultural land by lawful means (when shared, or obtained by an inheritance by law) to sell these plots of land exclusively to the state. Disallow any other means of transfer of such sites. Disclaim the ownership of agricultural land acquired by debt receipts.

22. Obligate the citizens who wish to acquire land for agricultural purposes in an amount greater than 30 acres, to take a qualifying exam in the subject of the land’s activity.

23. Allow land ownership only of homestead land parcels and those under apartment buildings and other real estate. Do not allow ownership of land by foreigners and persons without citizenship.

24. Ensure the rent for the use of agricultural land to be in accordance with the regulatory assessment of the land.

25. Disallow change of use of agricultural land designation, except for state and public needs. Turn to the state ownership land that is not used for the purposes intended or used contrary to the comprehensive plans for sustainable rural development.

26. Adopt a law on increased land value to regulate its use and ensure public control over it.

27. Adopt a new tax code with socially fair simplified system of taxation. Simplify and improve tax administration and accounting.

28. Reduce the fiscal pressure on all sectors of the state, which produce national product, particularly small and medium enterprises. Establish progressive tax rate on the principle of “small business – low taxes, big business – big taxes.”

29. Cancel criminalized value added tax. Establish a single social tax on personal income taxation on a progressive scale and base rate of 20%. Do not tax the income of minimum wage. Set progressive luxury tax (real estate, luxury goods, etc.). Forward a minimum 30% of revenues from taxes on luxury to lower consumer prices of essential commodities.

30. Establish comprehensive tax incentive investments in science, education and innovation. Reduce income tax to 5% on the portion of profits that redirect to technological renovation of production means in accordance with advanced technology.

31. Provide maximal punishment for economic crimes, corruption and state job damages in especially large amounts. Fight for capital export in the offshore, including through the revision agreements on avoidance of double taxation of income and property.

32. Ensure state control over the banking sector (state-owned banks must have at least 30% of the banking capital of the country). Legally restrict usurious extortionate interest on bank loans for households and enterprises in Ukraine. Do not allow foreign persons to own controlling stakes of any private banks in Ukraine.

33. Ensure complete transparency and accessibility of the National Bank for law enforcement agencies. Restrict the independence of the National Bank during economical emergency situations, such as the economic crises, wars. Introduce criminal liability for antisocial monetary and other policies of the National Bank, which lead to the impoverishment of the general population. Adopt a law on state gold and currency reserves.

34. Prohibit the issuance of foreign currency loans (exception – business entities that carry out foreign trade activities). Transfer debt on loans issued to individuals in foreign currency into national currency at the exchange rate that was at the time the loan. Compensate for the difference at the expense of gross expenses of banks and foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine.

35. Eliminate the social gap between rich and poor by encouraging development of the middle class (small and middle businessmen, high-paying professionals, including public sector workers – doctors, teachers, etc.), which will amount to not less than 60% of the working population. Provide targeted public interest-free loans to start a business (SME) and to simplify the permitting system. Implement state program of economic education of citizens.

36. Adopt a new Law of Ukraine “On government procurements and state orders”, considering the benefits for the national manufacturers. Trade with state funds. Create a unified state Internet resource for the effective conduct of online-trading in the area of procurement.

37. Ensure revenues from the transit potential of Ukraine to the state budget and send them to construction of transport infrastructure.

38. Require to conduct construction of state and municipal facilities solely by national experts, thus creating working places for the citizens of Ukraine.

39. Implement targeted preferential government loans to small and medium agriculture, particularly to provide for agricultural manufacturers with means of production. Implement large-scale sectoral programs of direct grants. Provide government support for innovation in agriculture.

40. Adopt a national program for the development of agricultural equipment. Impose prohibitive import duties on agricultural machinery 5 years after its announcement, the equivalent of which is produced in Ukraine.

41. Develop the cooperative movement in rural areas in accordance with a separate comprehensive state program.

42. Create networks for sales of Ukrainian agricultural products.

43. Establish the parity of purchasing and selling prices for agricultural products. Provide food needs of the state exclusively through domestic agricultural products (except products that are not cultivated in the Ukraine).

44. Carry out an effective and transparent activity of the State Reserve and its activity on all agricultural markets. Provide agricultural manufacturers with government contracts for agricultural products. Rebuild the state system of storing agricultural products.

45. Adopt national development programs of breeding, seed production, plant protection, livestock breeding, horticulture, fish culture and so on. Conduct a complete inventory of appropriate production facilities.

46. Develop the social sector in rural areas. Ensure easily accessible preferential loans for the purchase and construction of housing in rural areas if the borrower participates in agricultural production and for budget employees.

47. Develop competitive sectors for Ukrainian industrial and innovation activities: food-processing (including recycling of foreign material), aircraft, shipbuilding, machine tools and machinery (energy, agriculture, etc.), military-industrial complexes and space industry. Direct government support for high-tech, knowledge-intensive, innovative, import substitution and vertically integrated industry.

48. Encourage gradual replacement of imported products with domestic ones (especially big and small agricultural machinery, light industry, food products).

49. Eliminate private monopolies and oligopolies in the Ukrainian economy.

50. Allow export of non-recoverable raw materials and derivative products only by corresponding licenses.

51. Adopt a law on privatization of housing in apartment blocks including land plots for houses, adjacent areas and joint ownership of citizens.

52. Reform housing and communal services. Stimulate the creation of condominiums. Ensure maintenance and exploitation of apartment buildings on competitive basis. Disallow foreign companies to serve condominiums. Introduce institute of certified managers of apartment buildings.

53. Return companies-monopolists of electricity, gas, heat, water supply and sanitation to communal ownership of territorial communities.

54. Implement a comprehensive state program for full utilization of solid domestic and biological waste.

55. Require building companies to build social housing at affordable prices in accordance with the government program. Create a state special fund for development of social housing. Implement a comprehensive program of reconstruction and gradual replacement of buildings built in the 1960-ies (“khrushchevskas”).

56. Adopt a new, socially just, Labor Code – Labor Code of Ukraine. Develop a tariffication scale of hourly wages in line with European standards. Set five-fold ratio between the maximum and minimum hourly wage in the public sector employees.

57. Support the development of effective independent trade unions. Ensure the right to strike.

58. Abolish the unjust pension reform, legitimize retirement age from life expectancy. Establish direct dependence of the amount of pension from work experience and the permissible five-fold ratio between the maximum and minimum pension for solidarity pension system.

59. Bring the living wage in line with the actual needs. Regularly review the living wage standards to maintain their relevance.

60. Provide disabled citizens and orphans government with targeted assistance in an amount not less than the subsistence minimum.

ІІІ. National Health: Overcoming the Demographic Crisis and Raising the Quality of Life

1. Implement long-term state program to promote healthy social life, including the promotion of mental and physical health, fighting drug addiction, alcoholism and smoking.

2. Implement obligatory state social health insurance that will provide a guaranteed basic package of urgent primary medical aid, provided free of charge at the expense of public health fund.

3. Implement a “Reproductive Health of the Nation” program. Disallow abortion except due to medical issues, and/or rape, which were proved in court. Align the implementation of illegal abortion to attempted murder in the criminal law.

4. Implement a policy of economic protectionism against domestic pharmaceutical industry and medical engineering. Ensure strict state control over the quality and price of medical products, especially imported.

5. Recover and return to state ownership Sanatorium and resort facilities. Prohibit realigning of sanatoriums. Prevent the privatization of the resort and sanatorium lands throughout Ukraine.

6. Adopt national housing program under which a family with three children receives state free loan, a family of four children – state free loan, 50% of which is refundable, a family with five children or more – free housing from state. Establish accessible government soft loans for housing for young families.

7. Increase the amount of payments to Ukrainian families for the birth of each additional child in accordance with inflation rates in the country and the growth of prices for baby products.

8. Ban advertising of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages in any form throughout Ukraine. Criminalize promotion of drug use (including so-called ‘soft drugs’) and sexual perversions.

9. Provide local communities the right to limit the sale of alcoholic beverages.

10. Set a special tax on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, genetically modified food. Direct the funds received to programs addressing social diseases (tuberculosis, oncological and cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, HIV / AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, drug addiction).

11. Create a network of modern laboratories for the analysis of food products for the presence of genetically modified organisms.

12. Allow sale of genetically modified food products only with special labeling that is clearly visible and only in specialized departments of retail establishments. Strengthen criminal penalties for non-compliance during labeling and trade of genetically modified foods.

13. Organize adequate state control over healthcare workers, sanitary working conditions and public safety in manufacturing.

14. Provide residents of regions of Ukraine, who were affected by anthropogenic pollution, with a status equal to that of Chernobyl residents.

15. Keep the existing reserve areas and parks intact and create new recreational areas.

16. Require raw material-intensive branches of large companies to conduct ecological modernization of production facilities.

17. Encourage the transfer beyond the settlements to a safe distance of all enterprises engaged in pollutant emissions into the environment.

18. Oblige physical and legal persons to compensate double the amount of damage caused to the environment.

IV. Citizenship and Migration: Right to a Homeland and Protection of the Living Space

1. Adopt a new Citizenship Act, under which citizenship will be given only to those persons who were born in Ukraine or are ethnically Ukrainian, who returned from abroad for permanent living and working in Ukraine. Allow people born in Ukraine from foreigners or stateless persons to acquire Ukrainian citizenship upon reaching age of majority only under the conditions of Ukrainian language fluency, knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine.

2. Allow to acquire citizenship of Ukraine in exceptional cases, to persons who are legally residing in Ukraine for at least 15 years and are fluent in Ukrainian, have knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine., took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and abandoned all other nationalities. Disallow these persons’ right to acquire the citizenship of Ukraine, if they have criminal records.

3. Provide strict criminal liability for unlawful provision and obtaining of citizenship.

4. Eliminate the illegal practice of dual citizenship. Deprive of Ukrainian citizenship persons who hide that they are citizens of another state.

5. Confiscate property and capital goods acquired in Ukraine from offenders of the Citizenship Act to the state.

6. Facilitate the mass returning to Ukraine of ethnic Ukrainians. Ensure preferential terms for returning home of Ukrainians and their descendants born abroad.

7. Conclude bilateral agreements on the legalization of Ukrainian workers. Provide state protection of Ukrainians abroad by all possible means.

8. Create conditions for Ukrainian migrant workers to return home. Consider their earned money and property, provided that they invest in Ukrainian business, to be investments that are not taxed.

9. Eliminate the root cause of migration and demographic crisis – ensure the constitutional right to housing for every Ukrainian family.

10. Ban the adoption of Ukrainian children by foreigners.

11. Introduce symmetrical visa regime with other countries. Let visa-free entry to Ukraine to citizens of only those countries which have abolished visa requirements for citizens of Ukraine.

12. Establish stricter anti-immigration measures and improve the system of detention and deportation of illegal immigrants.

13. Strengthen state border protection and cut off channels of illegal migration.

14. Establish mandatory registration of foreign citizens who arrive on the territory of Ukraine, in the local bodies of Ministry of Internal Affairs. Establish, due to the threat of international terrorism and crime, a uniform biometric control system for everyone who enters Ukraine (database of fingerprints, eye retina, etc.).

15. Terminate agreement with the EU on readmission. Conclude with other states, from territories where illegal immigrants come to Ukraine, readmission agreements (return of illegal immigrants) on favorable conditions for Ukraine.

16. Provide place in higher educational institutions’ dormitories primarily for Ukrainian, not foreign students.

17. Carry out regular inspections of Foreigners Registration materials coming from schools with lists of students who actually enrolled in them. Ensure timely exit from the territory of Ukraine of foreign students who are expelled from schools.

V. Information Space and Education: Preserving National Identity and Cultural Development

1. Adopt the Law “On Protection of the Ukrainian language” instead of the current “On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. New State Language Policy Committee, responsible for the protection and distribution of Ukrainian language. Create a State Language Policy Committee, responsible for the protection and propagation of the Ukrainian language.

2. Regulate the use of the Ukrainian language in the media according to the number of Ukrainians – no less than 78% of their space and airtime.

3. Provide simultaneous official language audio translation of foreign performances, broadcasts and films on television and radio. Provide translation at the expense of the media owners.

4. Abolish tax on the Ukrainian book publishing, audio, video production and software.

5. Implement a mandatory Ukrainian language exam for civil servants and candidates for elected office. Require all state employees to use Ukrainian language at work and during public appearances.

6. Include in the programs of all universities in Ukraine a compulsory “Culture of Ukrainian language” course of not less than 72 hours.

7. Verify the language of instruction in all without exception training and educational institutions to be in accordance with the official status of the learning facilities. Revoke licenses of educational institutions if they have carried out teaching in foreign languages without proper registration status of the establishment of foreign language teaching. Cease the supply of textbooks and teaching materials in foreign languages at the expense of the State Budget of Ukraine in institutions that do not have official status of institutions with foreign language teaching.

8. Cultivate the best traditions of Ukrainian pedagogy. Discontinue the practice of mechanical copying of foreign models, including the Bologna Process.

9. Expand the network of preschool educational institutions. Provide each child access to Ukrainian preschool.

10. Restore and maintain the system of after-school facilities and children’s sports schools.

11. Implement a state program of soft loans for education. Provide graduates of secondary and higher education with first working place.

12. Adopt a state program of patriotic education and hardening the nature of the young generation. Provide active leisure and recreation for children and youth. Promote youth networks and patriotic organizations, sports groups, clubs, summer camps for children and youth.

13. Change the principles for candidate of science titles and PhDs and for structure of the Supreme Attestation Commission of Ukraine for ensuring real, not formal control over the quality of dissertations.

14. Encourage the return of Ukrainian scientists who moved abroad.

15. Establish incentive programs of cooperation between Ukrainian and leading foreign academic institutions.

16. Bring patent law of Ukraine in line with the leading international practice of patent law. Ensure that the researchers and developers receive no less than 25% of the amount from the sale of rights to a patent for their invention.

17. Remove soviet propagandistic literature from youth and public library funds. Purchase at the expense of the national budget works of literature, art, music, film to replenish libraries, museums, record libraries, video libraries, repertoire of theaters, music collectives and more.

18. Provide state scholarships and grants on competitive basis to carry out art projects, creations of national works of literature, art, music, movies, plays, concerts, TV programs and more.

19. Develop networks of concert halls, cinemas, bookshops, galleries and exhibition halls, providing favorable conditions for them to rent.

20. Introduce the protection issue of national information space within the competence of NSDC to deal with informational occupation of Ukraine. Create public radio and television, competitive Ukrainian film industry.

21. Deprive of licenses the media that violates language legislation, humiliates national dignity of Ukrainians, spreads misinformation or carries out anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

22. Require all media to inform the public about all of their owners (the press – in every issue, TV and radio – daily, during broadcast).

23. Increase import duty on foreign polygraphic, audio and video products. Implement a tax on foreign rebroadcasting of radio and television program products, copying and rental of music and film. Redirect the funds for the development to the national information space.

24. Direct every sixth hryvnia from profits from rental of foreign films to the development of the domestic film industry. Set tax on advertising, during the broadcast of foreign films, in favor of national cinema.

25. Increase mandatory quotas of airtime on radio and TV and screen time in cinemas for Ukrainian language audio-visual products produced in Ukraine and ensure its uniform presence on the air throughout the day. Implement strict criminal liability for failure to comply with the quota.

26. Establish tax relief on the development of advanced information technology and modern electronic networks. Eliminate oligopoly market of information technologies on the territory of Ukraine.

27. Create competitive Ukrainian operating system for computers based on current available systems with high-quality translation, reasonable ammount of Ukrainian fonts, implement customer support and security services. Establish a Ukrainian operating system in all government bodies and institutions.

28. Establish domestic production of Ukrainian-language software (especially specialized: for accounting, storing, school, office, etc.) for government agencies, educational institutions and for free sale. Require public institutions to use exclusively Ukrainian software.

29. Promote the establishment of a unified Ukrainian Local Church centered in Kiev.

VI. Historical Justice: State Building and Overcoming the Consequences of Occupation

1. Specify in the Constitution of Ukraine that the succession of modern Ukrainian state was established in Kievan Rus’, continued by Galicia-Volhynia, Cossack Hetman Republic period, Ukrainian People’s Republic, West Ukrainian People’s Republic, Carpathian Ukraine and the Ukrainian state, which was restored by the Act of June 30 1941, and that independent Ukraine emerged as a result of over three centuries of national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.

2. Recognize the fact of occupation of Ukraine by Bolshevik Russia during 1918-91, which resulted in an unprecedented genocide of Ukrainians.

3. Achieve Ukrainian genocide recognition during the twentieth century from the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the European Parliament, the parliaments of the world, in which 20.5 million Ukrainians were killed, to be considered a crime against humanity (terror and looting of civilians during the war of UPR against Bolshevik Russia in 1918-1921; dekulakization and forced collectivization; artificial famine of 1921, 1932-33, 1947; several waves of Ukrainian elite killings in 1920-30-40’s and 1970’s; killing of civilians during the war, forced labor export of Ukrainians to foreign lands; “Operation Vistula”; torture in prisons and humiliation using punitive psychiatry on Ukrainian patriots until the collapse of the Soviet empire; robbing the national economy, historical and cultural values; robbery and destruction of Ukrainian churches; persecution on ethnic and religious grounds; the systematic destruction of Ukrainian culture and language; total Russification).

4. Open all the archives of Cheka-SPD-NKVD-MGB-KGB that are stored in the central archive and regional archives of the Security Service of Ukraine.

5. Renew criminal investigation into the Holodomor of 1932-33, which was recognized by the state as genocide of the Ukrainian people, a crime, to which the statute of limitations is not applicable. Carry out a public trial of communism. Obtain a court order to ban the communist ideology as misanthropic and one that has caused irreparable damage to the Ukrainian people.

6. Establish strict criminal liability for public denial of the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian nation.

7. Abolish and prevent the use of imperial-Bolshevik symbols, commemorations of dates, monuments and names in honor of butchers of Ukraine. Prohibit the establishment of any imperial monuments and symbols in Ukraine that glorify the history of the occupants..

8. Set up a special investigative structure for tracing criminals who were destroying the Ukrainian nation, and after finding them bring them to justice.

9. Demand from Moscow official recognition, apology and compensation for the genocide of the Ukrainian people. Achieve from Russia the return of savings of the citizens of Ukraine (83 billion karbovanetses as of 1991). Insist on the transfer to Ukraine the rightful share of the Diamond fund, gold and foreign exchange reserves, foreign assets of the former USSR.

10. Pay compensation to repressed Ukrainians and their descendants in amounts corresponding to their suffering.

11. Provide Ukrainians from Kuban, Chełm Land, Nadsyannya, Podlasie, Lemko regions, which were forcibly evicted from their land, with status of deported peoples with all social guarantees.

12. Develop and implement a public education program “The Truth about the Ukrainian genocide.” Provide separate educational discipline “History of Ukrainian genocide in the twentieth century” in all schools.

13. Acknowledge that the struggle, which was taking place until the end of the 1950-ies by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Acknowledge UPA soldiers and OUN underground fighters to be members of the national liberation struggle for independence of Ukraine.

14. Provide the veterans of UPA with proper privileges and compensate for the not added ones since the independence.

15. Abolish special pensions for servants of the Soviet regime, the executives of the Communist party, Komsomol and punitive authorities of the USSR.

16. Disseminate the truth about the Ukrainian liberation struggle in the twentieth century by means of social advertising, public parliamentary hearings, documentary and feature films, book publishing and more. Implement a course of studying the history of the Ukrainian liberation struggle in the twentieth century in all schools.

17. Establish a National Memorial Museum dedicated to the Ukrainian valour (the armed struggle for independence of the Ukrainian Nation).

18. Revive traditional Ukrainian holidays. Introduce state-level celebration on the second Sunday in May of traditional for the Ukrainians Mother’s Day.

19. Announce October 14 (St. Pokrova – patron saint of Ukrainian Cossacks, the day of the creation of UPA) to be a national holiday – the Day of Ukrainian Weaponry. Cancel celebration of 23th February – the so-called “Fatherland Defender Day” (of the Soviet army).

20. Facilitate the return of national, cultural, historical and other values to Ukraine exported abroad during periods of occupation.

VII. Foreign Policy and Defence: the European-Ukrainian Centrism and a Strong State

1. Determine the European Ukrainocentrism state strategic course according to which Ukraine aims to become not only the geographical, but also the geopolitical center of Europe.

2. Cease all participation of Ukraine in supranational formations launched by Moscow: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Common Economic Space (CES), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and others.

3. Pay special attention to the only true geopolitical project, in which the main role is played by Ukraine – GUAM. Involve other countries in the Commonwealth from the Black Sea and Caspian Basin.

4. Direct foreign efforts to build closer political and economic cooperation with natural allies – the countries of Baltic-Black Sea geopolitical axis (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, in the long term – Belarus et al.). Initiate mutually beneficial agreements between these countries and Ukraine in all strategic areas: trade and customs policy, energy security and transit, defense, etc.

5. Develop and implement an effective state program’s for positive image of Ukraine in the world. Involve through special government programs the numerous Ukrainian diasporas to lobby Ukrainian interests in other countries.

6. Complete delimitation (establish agreement) and demarcation (marking of border signs) of Ukraine national borders, including the sea. Set borders unilaterally in case of further delays by neighbors countries, including Russia. Ensure proper border security. Introduce a visa regime with Russia.

7. Demand from countries which declared the safety and security of the borders of Ukraine in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons (Budapest Memorandum, 1994), effective rather than paper guarantees. Conclude bilateral agreements with the U. S. and the UK for immediate full-scale military assistance to Ukraine in case of armed aggression against Ukraine.

8. Appeal to the General Assembly and the UN Security Council demanding statements to evaluate the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes without declaring war.

9. Restore the nuclear status of Ukraine due to violations of the Budapest Memorandum by Russia (one of the guarantors of security of Ukraine): conflicts around Tuzla island and the Kerch Strait, direct threats, brutal political and economic pressure, regular attempts of officials to question the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Restore tactical missile and nuclear arsenal state. Appeal to the U. S. and the UK to promote and support the nuclear program in Ukraine.

10. Start real, not declarative actions that enable the integration of Ukraine into the European security structures: clean authority and power structures from the agents of Moscow; neutralize subversive organizations funded by Russia; delimit and demarcate the borders; destroy the pockets of separatism; neutralize all territorial claims to Ukraine; ensure the withdrawal of Russian military bases on Ukrainian territory; immediately reform and rebuild the Armed Forces and Naval Forces of Ukraine.

11. Demand from NATO member countries favorable conditions for Ukraine, clear guarantees and specific terms of possible entry of Ukraine into NATO. Develop and implement a parallel plan for Security and Defense of Ukraine.

12. Develop own system of missile attack warning and means of action in response to the independent or joint basis with other countries. Recover in its entirety the air defense system to protect the country’s entire airspace. Strengthen Air Defence to protect strategic facilities and populous cities. Appeal to Western countries to provide Ukraine for rent with mobile air defense system to deploy missile and air shields in exchange for intelligence of Ukrainian radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. This way, verify the real willingness of NATO to cooperate with Ukraine in the field of defense and security.

13. Set funding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at 5% of GDP (to overcome technological backwardness of the Armed Forces from neighboring countries), given the urgent need for reforming and upgrading the troops. Reform the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including the navy and the aircraft, equip them with ships, aircraft, missile strike systems and air defense systems of the 4th and 5th generations, re-equip existing equipment (aircraft, ships) with modern weapons.

14. Restore the prestige of service in the Armed Forces and other military formations. Increase salaries of military personnel. Solve the problem of providing them with housing by providing soft loans for the state of its acquisition.

15. Rebuild own military-industrial complex for providing the Armed Forces of Ukraine with national modern weapons and effective participation of Ukraine in the global arms market. Integrate research institutions of the Armed Forces into the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. Provide priority studies on the establishment of the modern samples of high precision weapons and weapons that act on new physical principles. Establish favorable military-technical cooperation with other countries.

16. Ensure strict control over pricing and receiving the proceeds from arms sales to the state budget of Ukraine. Direct all proceeds from arms sales solely for defense. End the practice of mindless destruction of modern effective samples of armament at the request of other countries or their sale at the expense of Ukraine.

17. Develop and systematically implement by 2017 a new program of reform and construction of Ukrainian army that will provide real national defense. Create high-tech and professional contract army – the regular troops. Establish a national reserve of the Armed Forces.

18. Create a unified system of training and mobilization of reservists (on the Swiss model). Restore in its entirety the system of initial military training and civil defense in the secondary school and a network of military faculties in universities.

19. Create an effective counter-intelligence service to ensure the safety of the Ukrainian rear against saboteurs of the likely opponent.

20. Reorganize and strengthen the coast guard of the Black Sea. Set in the strategically important areas on the Black Sea-Azov coast of Ukraine anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles to protect the body of water, place modern air defense missile systems to cover military coast guard and Marine Corps’s naval forces. Increase the number of troops in the Crimea, re-equip them with modern rocket artillery and armored vehicles for rapid deployment and countering possible aggression.

VIII. Crimea and Sevastopol: Establishing a Constitutional Order and Ensuring Stable Development

1. Submit to nationwide referendum the change of status of the Crimea from autonomous to regional and abolish the special status of Sevastopol.

2. Provide Sevastopol with the right of free port. Implement preferential tax treatment for resort and recreational economic activity in the Southern and Western coast of Crimea.

3. Terminate “Kharkiv agreements” between Yanukovych and Medvedev of April 21, 2010.

4. Develop a program at the level of National Security Council on unilateral actions of Ukraine in case of failure of obligations on the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine until 2017. Demand the immediate withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, if the Russian Federation further violates the laws of Ukraine and the signed international agreements.

5. Create Ukrainian checkpoints at all sites, leased by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Disallow foreign military personnel in military uniform to move outside of leased military bases of foreign countries on the territory of Ukraine(except for official delegations).

6. Raise the flag of Ukraine over all the objects rented by the Black Sea Fleet and set the procedures for the use of foreign state symbols on the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine and international standards.

7. Ensure immediate enforcement of all decisions of the Ukrainian courts regarding the removal of Ukrainian property from illegal use by the Black Sea Fleet. Appeal to judicial instances with claims for compensation related to these losses. Conduct a thorough inventory of the property, buildings and territories used by the Black Sea Fleet.

8. Implement unilaterally and in accordance with international standards the recalculation of rental rates for the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.

9. Strengthen the protection of the state border in the Azov and Black Seas. Ensure strict customs controls for all cargoes that enter the territory of Ukraine through Black Sea Fleet.

10. Implement continuous unimpeded professional inspections of military facilities the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine for compliance with the laws of their operation and Ukraine signed international agreements. Demand from the Russian Federation detailed quarterly reports on their residence in Ukraine (including the territorial waters and the continental shelf) weapons and ammunition.

11. Make a complete revision of property rights and land use rights and property of objects in the Crimea.

12. Restore the right for unrestricted use of land areas in accordance with applicable law – beaches and coastal zones in the hundred-meter zone from the flow line.

13. Adopt a state program of integration into Ukrainian society of the Crimean part that would foresee economic, transport, cultural, informational and educational integration.

14. Implement state programs representing Ukrainian culture and art in the Crimea. Provide on competitive basis centers of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian media in Crimea, supported by the state.

15. Ensure that the Ukrainians of the Crimea have free access to Ukrainian media and bookstores through targeted subsidies from the state budget.

16. Ensure that the Ukrainians of the Crimea have the opportunity to freely receive education in their mother tongue in secondary, vocational and higher education establishments.

Approved by the Constituent Congress of SNPU on September 9th, 1995, with amendments and additions made by

The ninth Congress of SNPU on February 14th, 2004,

The twentieth Congress of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” on May 24th, 2009,

The twenty-third Congress of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” on December 24th, 2011

Registered by order number 1470/5 of Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on August 12th, 2009.

source: http://en.svoboda.org.ua/about/program/

After reviewing the above Svoboda Party “program” it would be a good idea to review the overview of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement titled “Guide to the Association Agreement” for a deeper understanding of the point we are attempting to articulate.

EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
“Guide to the Association Agreement”

++++ Background:

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are currently based on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in 1998. At the Paris Summit in 2008 the leaders of the EU and Ukraine agreed that an Association Agreement should be the successor agreement to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) is the first of a new generation of Association Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries. Negotiations on this comprehensive, ambitious and innovative Agreement between the EU and Ukraine were launched in March 2007. In February 2008, following confirmation of Ukraine’s WTO membership, the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as a core element of the Association Agreement.

At the 15th Ukraine-EU Summit of 19 December 2011, the EU leaders and President Yanukovych noted that a common understanding on the text of the Association Agreement was reached.

On 30 March 2012 the chief negotiators of the European Union and Ukraine initialled the text of the Association Agreement, which included provisions on the establishment of a DCFTA as an integral part. In this context, chief trade negotiators from both sides initialled the DCFTA part of the Agreement on 19 July 2012. Both EU and Ukraine expressed their common commitment to undertake further technical steps, required to prepare conclusion of the Association Agreement.

++++ Political association and economic integration:

The Association Agreement will constitute a new stage in the development of EU-Ukraine contractual relations, aiming at political association and economic integration and leaving open the way for further progressive developments. The AA provides for a shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship, based on common values, in particular full respect for democratic principles, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

> Wide range of sector cooperation: This ambitious and pioneering Agreement is a concrete way to exploit the dynamics in EU-Ukraine relations, focusing on support to core reforms, on economic recovery and growth, governance and sector co-operation in more than 30 areas, such as energy, transport, environment protection, industrial and small and medium enterprise (SME) cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer protection, education, training and youth as well as cultural cooperation.

> Trade and Trade related matters (DCFTA): Closer economic integration through the DCFTA will be a powerful stimulant to the country’s economic growth. Approximation of Ukraine to EU legislation, norms and standards, will be the method. As a core element of the Association Agreement, the DCFTA will create business opportunities in both the EU and Ukraine and will promote real economic modernization and integration with the EU. Higher standards of products, better services to citizens, and above all Ukraine’s readiness to compete effectively in international markets should be the result of this process.

> Mobility: The importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course,

1 /5

provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place is recognised in the Agreement.

++++ Content of the Association Agreement

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement counts in total over 1200 pages and comprises of

> A Preamble as an introductory statement of the Agreement, setting out the Agreement’s purpose and underlying philosophy;

> Seven Titles which concern General Principles; Political Cooperation and Foreign and Security Policy; Justice Freedom and Security; Trade and Trade related matters (DCFTA); Economic and Sector Cooperation; Financial Cooperation with Anti-Fraud Provisions, as well as Institutional, General and Final Provisions;

> 43 Annexes setting out EU legislation to be taken over by a specific date and

> Three Protocols.

The Association Agreement in a nut-shell:

> The AA aims to accelerate the deepening of political and economic relations between Ukraine and the EU, as well as Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal Market including by setting up a DCFTA.

> The AA is a concrete way to exploit the dynamics in EU-Ukraine relations, focusing on support to core reforms, on economic recovery and growth, governance and sector co-operation.

> The AA constitutes also a reform agenda for Ukraine, based around a comprehensive programme of Ukraine’s approximation of its legislation to EU norms, around which all partners of Ukraine can align themselves and focus their assistance.

> The AA negotiations were not a stand-alone exercise: EU assistance to Ukraine is linked with the reform agenda as it emerges from the result of negotiations. The Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme (CIB) is particularly important in this regard.

++++ Preamble

The PREAMBLE is a selection of the most important areas/facts pertinent to EU-Ukraine relations. It sets out the ambition for a close and lasting relationship. Although it has a non-binding introductory character, it presents important references to common values and could be perceived as a “scene-setter” for the Agreement.

The elements which are set out in the Preamble include among others:

> A reference to common values on which the EU is built – namely democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law – and which are shared by Ukraine.

> A reference that Ukraine is recognised as a European country which shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the EU.

> A reference to the European aspirations of Ukraine. The EU welcomes Ukraine’s European choice, including its commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy and a market economy.

> An acknowledgement that the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU will depend on progress in the implementation of the Association Agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.

++++ Title I: General Principles

Title I defines the general principles which will form the basis for the domestic and external policies of the Association between the EU and Ukraine namely:

> Respect for democratic principles, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

> The promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are set out. Moreover, the principles of a free market economy, good governance, the fight against corruption, the fight against different forms of trans-national organised crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable development as well as effective multilateralism are central to enhancing the relationship between the EU and Ukraine and will underpin their relationship.

2 /5

++++ Title II: Political dialogue and reform, political association, cooperation and convergence in the field of foreign and security policy

In Title II, the Association Agreement foresees the intensification of the EU-Ukraine political dialogue and cooperation in view of gradual convergence in the area of Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) as well as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

> Title II covers issues such as the aims of political dialogue, dialogue and cooperation on domestic reform as well as foreign and security policy.

> The Agreement foresees several fora for the conduct of political dialogue: the EU-Ukraine Summit will present the highest level of political dialogue. At ministerial level the dialogue will be conducted within the Association Council. The political dialogue will aim inter alia:

>> to deepen political association and increase political and security policy convergence and effectiveness;

>> to promote international stability and security based on effective multilateralism;

>> to strengthen cooperation and dialogue on international security and crisis management, notably in order to address global and regional challenges and key threats;

>> to foster result-oriented and practical cooperation for achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent;

>> to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belon ing to minorities and respect for diversity, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political reforms.

> Title II dedicates a specific article on the International Criminal Court and calls on the cooperation of the EU and Ukraine in promoting peace and international justice by ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and its related instruments.

++++ Title III: Justice, Freedom and Security

Title III covers issues concerning the rule of law and respect for human rights; protection of personal data;

cooperation on migration, asylum and border management; treatment of workers; mobility of workers; movement of persons; money laundering and terrorism financing; cooperation on the fight against illicit drugs; the fight against crime and corruption; cooperation in fighting terrorism and legal cooperation.

> The EU and Ukraine commit through the Association Agreement to increase their dialogue and cooperation on migration, asylum and border management. The importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place is recognised in the Agreement

> The commitment to combating organised crime and money laundering, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to stepping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism is also reflected in the Agreement.

> The wish to enhance people-to-people contacts is explicitly set out.

++++ Title IV: Trade and Trade-Related Matters
The EU is Ukraine’s main commercial partner and accounts for 31% of its external trade, ahead of Russia (2010).

Closer economic integration through the DCFTA will be a powerful stimulant to the country’s economic growth. As a core element of the Association Agreement, the DCFTA will create business opportunities in Ukraine and will promote real economic modernization and integration with the EU. Higher standards of products, better services to citizens, and above all Ukraine’s readiness to compete effectively in international markets should be the result of this process.

> Hence the DCFTA Title IV of the Association Agreement is dedicated to Trade and Trade Related Matters. Through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area economic integration is envisaged.

> The DCFTA, linked to the broader process of legislative approximation will contribute to further economic integration with the European Union’s Internal Market. This includes the elimination of almost all tariffs and barriers in the area of trade in goods, the provision of services, and the flow of investments (especially in the energy sector). Once Ukraine has taken over the relevant EU acquis, the EU will grant market access for example in areas such as public procurement or industrial goods.

> The DCFTA will provide for a conducive new climate for economic relations between the EU and Ukraine. New

3 /5

trade and investment opportunities will be created and competition will be stimulated. All these elements are factors crucial to economic restructuring and modernisation. As regards the impact of a removal of customs duties entailed by the DCFTA, experience has shown that this short-term loss of import charges will be more than compensated for by the increased revenue received by the state from indirect taxes paid by companies seizing new market opportunities and by the general boost to the economy. The budget spending on legal and institutional reforms in trade-related areas is or will be supported by the EU along with funds from International Financial Institutions. The DCFTA once in force will provide tariff cuts which will allow the economic operators of both sides to save around 750 millions euros per year in average (most of the customs duties being lifted)

++++ Title V: Economic and sector cooperation

Title V comprises 28 chapters in the fields of energy cooperation; macro-economic cooperation; management of public finances; taxation; statistics; environment; transport; space; cooperation in science and technology; industrial and enterprise policy; mining and metals; financial services; company law, corporate governance, accounting and auditing; information society; audio-visual policy; tourism; agriculture and rural development; fisheries and maritime policy; Danube river; consumer protection; cooperation on employment, social policy and equal opportunities; public health; education, training and youth; culture, sport and physical activity; civil society, cross-border and regional cooperation; participation in European Agencies and Programmes, based on gradual approximation with the EU acquis and also – where relevant – with international norms and standards.

++++ Title VI: Financial cooperation, with anti-fraud provisions

The European Union and its Member States continue to be the largest donor to Ukraine: since 1991, assistance provided by the European Union alone has amounted to over €2.5 billion. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) allocates € 470 million to Ukraine for the years 2011-2013. This goes to support action in three priority areas: good governance and the rule of law; facilitating the entry into force of the Association Agreement, and sustainable development, including energy and environment. This amount includes funding under the Eastern Partnership for the Comprehensive Institution Building programme (€ 43.37 million). The latter is designed to improve the administrative capacity of partner countries and their compatibility with EU institutions, for instance through twinning programmes, professional training and secondment of personnel.

> Ukraine will benefit from EU Financial Assistance through existing funding mechanisms and instruments in order to achieve the objectives of the Association Agreement.

> The future priority areas of the EU Financial Assistance to Ukraine will be laid down in relevant indicative programmes reflecting agreed policy priorities between the EU and Ukraine. The indicative amounts of assistance will take into account Ukraine’s needs, sector capacities and progress with reforms.

> EU assistance will be implemented in close cooperation and coordination with other donor countries, donor organisations and International Financial Institutions (IFI), and in line with international principles of aid effectiveness. Through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), to which Ukraine is eligible IFI investments could be leveraged. The NIF aims at mobilising additional funding to cover the investment needs of Ukraine for infrastructures in sectors such as transport, energy, the environment and social issues (e.g. construction of schools or hospitals).

> The Agreement lays down that the EU and Ukraine will take effective measures to prevent and fight fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities.

++++ Title VII: Institutional, general and final provisions

The Association Agreement foresees a tailor-made institutional set up for EU-Ukraine relations.

> At the top level, the EU-Ukraine Summit will be established: The Summit will present the highest level of political dialogue and will be a platform for meetings between Presidents.

> At ministerial level, the dialogue will be conducted within the Association Council which could meet in any configuration. The Association Council will have the power to take binding decisions.

> The Association Council will be assisted in the performance of its duties by an Association Committee. The Association Committee will create Subcommittees to implement sector cooperation. Meeting in a special format, the Association Committee will address the specific DCFTA issues.

> The Association Agreement also foresees a parliamentary dimension, notably by establishing a Parliamentary Association Committee. It will be a forum for Members of the European Parliament and the

4 /5

Parliament of Ukraine to meet and exchange views.

> Another important element of the Association Agreement is the promotion of regular civil society meetings. Hence, a dedicated Civil Society Platform will be established. The Platform will be able to make recommendations to the Association Council.

In order to ensure the correct implementation of the Association Agreement, the Agreement texts sets out some general and final provisions. A selection of these provisions is set out below:

> One key provision underpinning the Association Agreement sets out the concept of gradual approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to EU norms and standards. Specific timelines are set within which Ukraine should approximate its legislations to the relevant EU legislation. These timelines vary between 2 and 10 years after the entry into force of the Agreement.

> Another guiding provision sets out the concept of dynamic approximation. There was a need to set out this concept as the EU law and legislation is not static but under constant evolution. Thus the approximation process will be dynamic and should keep pace with the principal EU reforms, but in a proportionate way, taking account of Ukraine’s capacity to carry out the approximation.

> In order to examine whether the commitments as set out in the Association Agreement are met, dedicated provisions related to monitoring were included in the Agreement. Monitoring means here to supervise the application and implementation of the Association Agreement, its objectives and commitments. It is a continuous appraisal of progress in implementing and enforcing measures and commitments covered by the Association Agreement. This monitoring process will be of a particular importance for the DCFTA as its positive result will be the prerequisite of any further market opening for the Ukrainian economic operators

> Monitoring will include the assessments of approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to the EU acts (and where applicable international instruments) as defined in the Association Agreement.

> The Association Agreement also sets out a Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This mechanism would come into effect if obligations under the Association Agreement are not fulfilled by one of the Agreement Parties. For the DCFTA part, another binding trade specific Dispute Settlement Mechanism is set out in form of a dedicated protocol. This trade specific mechanism is inspired by traditional WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

> The duration of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is unlimited. At the same time the Parties will undertake a comprehensive review of the achievement of objectives under the Agreement within five years. It should be noted that the text of the AA will be drawn up in 22 EU Member States languages as well as in Ukrainian.

5 /5


If after reviewing the above Svoboda Party “program” and the “Guide to the Association Agreement” does not adequately answer enough questions, the full text may give a broader understanding of how they cannot be reconciled and what really lies ahead for Ukraine.



Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Member States’,
THE EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Union’ or ‘the EU’ and
THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, hereinafter referred to as ‘the
on the one part, and


on the other part,
Hereafter jointly referred to as ‘the Parties’,

– TAKING ACCOUNT of the close historical relationship and progressively closer links between the Parties as well as their desire to strengthen and widen relations in an ambitious and innovative way;
– COMMITTED to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values, that is respect for democratic principles, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect for diversity, human dignity and commitment to the principles of a free market economy, which would facilitate the participation of Ukraine in European policies;
– RECOGNIZING that Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the European Union (EU) and is committed to promoting those values;
– NOTING the importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity;
– TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the strong public support in Ukraine for the country’s European choice;
– CONFIRMING that the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice, including its commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy and a market economy;
– RECOGNIZING that the common values on which the European Union is built – namely democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law – are also essential elements of this Agreement;
– ACKNOWLEDGING that the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the European Union will depend on progress in the implementation of the current Agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas;
– COMMITTED to implementing all the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular of the Helsinki Final Act [of 1975], the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna Conferences of 1991 and 1992 respectively, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe [of 1990], the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights [of 1948] and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [of 1950];
– DESIROUS of strengthening international peace and security as well as engaging in effective multilateralism and the peaceful settlement of disputes, notably by closely cooperating to that end within the framework of the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE);
– COMMITTED to promoting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders;
– DESIROUS of achieving an ever closer convergence of positions on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest, taking into account the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);
– COMMITTED to reaffirming the international obligations of the Parties, to fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and to cooperating on disarmament and arms control;
– DESIROUS of moving forward the reform and approximation process in Ukraine forward, thus contributing to gradual economic integration and deepening of political association;
– CONVINCED of the need for Ukraine to implement the political, socio-economic, legal and institutional reforms necessary to effectively implement this Agreement and committed to decisively supporting those reforms in Ukraine;
– DESIROUS of achieving economic integration, inter alia through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as an integral part of this Agreement, in compliance with rights and obligations arising out of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership of the Parties, including through extensive regulatory approximation;
– RECOGNIZING that such a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, linked to the broader process of legislative approximation, shall contribute to further economic integration with the European Union Internal Market as envisaged in this Agreement;
– COMMITTED to developing a conducive new climate for economic relations between the Parties, and above all for the development of trade and investment and stimulating competition, factors which are crucial to economic restructuring and modernisation;
– COMMITTED to enhancing energy cooperation, building on the commitment of the Parties to implement the Energy Charter Treaty [of 1994];
– COMMITTED to enhancing energy security, facilitating the development of appropriate infrastructure and increasing market integration and regulatory approximation towards key elements of the EU acquis, promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources as well as achieving a high level of nuclear safety;
– COMMITTED to increasing dialogue – based on the fundamental principles of solidarity, mutual trust, joint responsibility and partnership – and cooperation on migration, asylum and border management, with a comprehensive approach paying attention to legal migration and to cooperating in tackling illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and the efficient implementation of the readmission agreement;
– RECOGNISING the importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place;
– COMMITTED to combating organised crime and money laundering, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to stepping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism;
– COMMITTED to enhancing cooperation in the field of environmental protection and to the principles of sustainable development;
– DESIROUS of enhancing people-to-people contacts;
– COMMITTED to promoting cross-border and inter-regional cooperation;
– COMMITTED to gradually approximating Ukraine’s legislation with that of the Union along the lines set out in this Agreement and to effectively implementing it;
– TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that this Agreement shall not prejudice and leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations;
– CONFIRMING that the provisions of this Agreement that fall within the scope of Part III, Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting Parties, and not as part of the European Union, unless the European Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland jointly notify Ukraine that the United Kingdom or Ireland is bound as part of the European Union in accordance with Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the United Kingdom and/or Ireland ceases to be bound as part of the European Union in accordance with Article 4a of the Protocol No. 21, the European Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland shall immediately inform Ukraine of any change in their position in which case they shall remain bound by the provisions of the Agreement in their own right. The same applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol No. 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to those Treaties.



Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

ShareAlike Statement: https://dumpharper.wordpress.com/sharealike/

What is the #Harper Delegation to #Ukraine hiding from #cdnpoli? #CPC #GPC #NDP #LPC

We would like to probe and issue that will most surely have dire consequences regarding the escalating situation in Ukraine. For this summary article we will purposely exclude the propaganda that is being repeated by virtually all of the msm outlets and conglomerates as they are readily available elsewhere and more than likely already embedded into your subconscious via the unrelenting narrative. Instead we will take this opportunity to explore the darker information that has been hidden in plain sight all along.

We believe that this seemingly purposeful commission is the most troubling aspect of the Regime’s delegation that is completely outta touch with reality as the history and run up to WW1 and WW2 has shown us, it only takes one useful idiot and some carefully crafted propaganda to spark a war of epic proportions and collapse the entire global economy as well as millions of lives that are lost, displaced and impoverished for generations. Typically politicians are usually self-serving dupes serving the interests of globalist investors that hide behind the scenes as advisers.

It is also worth noting that, as far as we are concerned, the entire Harper Party along with the Opposition Party’s and all of the msm conglomerates are either intentionally and/or conveniently following the narratives from “both” sides, ignoring and/or simply ignorant of the facts on the ground as well as history and/or willingly complicit and/or being truly opportunistic capitalists by purposely suggesting that this is a battle between the “democratic” EU and the “repressive” Kremlin in this violent uprising. More simply the msm keeps reporting this as a battle being waged by Putin’s Russia to prevent Ukraine’s “integration” into the EU. If so, the Right Sector that is controlling the ground in Ukraine is having none of that as they are against any integration into either side of the equation.

Below are 5 points to ponder and as you review the information below and keep in mind that the leader of the Right Sector was also fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan at the same time that Osama bin Laden’s Muhajahadeen, predecessors to the modern day al Qaeda, were fighting the Soviets. This would seem rather important considering the seemingly never-ending and long lasting implications that the multi-trillion dollar “War on Terror” has brought forth, not to mention the countless lives and casualties of innocent civilians caught in the chaos and destruction as well as the thousands upon thousands of affected Military personnel that thought they were fighting for our collective freedom.

  • Why is the Harper Regime playing partisan games with the Ukraine issues and what are they hiding besides the neo-nazi fascist Svoboda Party and the paramilitary Right Sector’s involvement?
  • Is this simply another attempt at pandering for votes like the 9 figure pilgrimage to Israel or is something more sinister at play?
  • Why is the focus of the msm being shifted to Crimea exclusively, with daytime images, propaganda and video being repeated, and away from the radically right-wing controlled Maidan in Kiev, with nighttime images and video being repeated?
  • Why is there such an absence of any reporting from any of the other regions in a rather large and diverse country?
  • Will these unseen events eventually lead to perpetual civil wars that will spill across all borders in all nations or simply be isolated with Ukraine?

Below are several interviews that should be read, re-read and shared to really understand some of the underlying powers structures now that the Ukraine vacuum has been created. Keep in mind that this is essentially the “militia” that now controls the security services for all intents and purposes…

Interview with Dmytro Yarosh, Leader of Right Sector

7 Feb 2014

YaroshUkrains’ka Pravda, 4 February 2014, 15:59

Dmytro Yarosh, Leader of Right Sector: When 80% of the Country Does Not Support the Regime, There Can’t be a Civil War

An Interview by Mustafa Nayyem and Oksana Kovalenko (Translated from Ukrainian by William Risch)

Dmytro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, has been the least well-known figure over the past two months. Just two weeks ago, only a narrow circle of people involved with organizing the Euromaidan even knew about the very existence of the Sector and Yarosh. Today, it’s impossible not to describe events in Kyiv without mentioning Right Sector.

On January 19, after events on Hrushevskyi Street started, world media exploded with fiery scenes of young guys with Molotov cocktails and masks over their faces. Right Sector’s actions tore the term “peaceful protest” to pieces, but at the same time, Right Sector forced the regime to listen to the Maidan and repeal the January 16 laws.

The headquarters of this still informal group is on the fifth floor of the Trade Unions’ Building. Photography is forbidden in the hallway, numerous matresses are spread on the floor, next to which, besides wood and metal sticks, lay textbooks – most of Right Sector’s members are young guys of university age.

We met Dmytro Yarosh in one of the floor’s offices – two by three meters – where Right Sector press conferences usually take place. Here, too, is the fully-equipped office for the sector’s leader. Three guys with walkie-talkies, dressed in camouflage, with masks over their heads, man the office’s “reception room.”


What is your personal story, and what have you done with your life?

I am leader of the all-Ukrainian organization, Stepan Bandera Trident. I have been involved in public life for the past 25 years. I’m from Dniprodzerzhyns’k, in the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’ (Region). I raised the first blue-and-yellow flag in April 1989 in Dniprodzerzhyns’k.

I was one of the founders of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh). I was a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union; in 1989 I received recommendations (to join it) from Levko Luk’ianenko and Stepan Khmara in Moscow, on the Arbat, where we picketed then for the renewal of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’s activities. Since 1994, as a founder of the Stepan Bandera Trident, I have had various positions in it: first as leader of Trident’s city structure, then as leader of its oblast’ structure, then its regional one, and so on.

I was commander of the organization from 1996 to 1999, then I was chief inspector of Trident, then I became commander of the organization again, then I passed on my duties as chief commander to my successor, Andriy Stempits’kyi. I’ve actually spent a lifetime in this. I have been trained as an instructor of Ukrainian language and literature, and in 2001, I finished the Drohobych Pedagogical University in the Philological Faculty.

How did Right Sector emerge?

There was a big protest in Kyiv on November 24-25 because of the decision to cancel the Eurointegration program. In general, Trident is not an active supporter of any integration processes, but we announced that we would create Right Sector as a platform for coordinating the actions of various revolutionary-oriented groups, because to a considerable degree, from the very beginning, we were perfectly aware that we couldn’t live in the system of state structures that has existed up to now.

Right Sector fully emerged after the events of November 30, when we went out to protest on Mykhailivs’kyi Square.

It was there that we started training and getting our defenses ready. Then we were at the Maidan all the time, and we entered the Maidan’s self-defense force. Other organizations that entered Right Sector were Trident, UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self Defense), and Carpathian Sich from the Subcarpathians.

Have you conducted training before?

Yes, for 20 years. We already have a lot of generations who have been changed by it. My kids were small at one time, and now my daughter is 20 years old, and she’s spent her whole life in Trident.

Trident is an organization with narrow operations, like an order of knights. We have three specific tasks: propagandizing the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as interpreted by Stepan Bandera; raising up Ukrainian youth in a spirit of patriotism; and national defense activity, that is, defending the honor and dignity of the Ukrainian nation in all forms by all methods and means available.

In general, Ukrainian nationalism and Banderites are not narrow-minded plebs with sadistic tendencies; these are intellectuals, people who write, who publish, who are involved not just in using force. Trident is an organization that produces certain ideas.

We are not a political party. In Trident, we’re even forbidden from taking state jobs.

Serhiy Kvit, President of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, is among Trident’s well-known members. He’s my good friend and comrade. At one time, he was a sotnyk in our organization. There’s also Petro Ivanyshyn, a doctor of philology, head of an academic department at the Drohobych Pedagogical University, who was also a sotnyk.

Where exactly do these training sessions take place?

At camps throughout Ukraine: Dnipropetrovs’k, Dniprodzerzhyns’k, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad, Nikopol’ and so on. Guys get together, and they have their plan of activities for a month, for half a year, for a year. They go through training and lessons. They conduct various events aimed at the de-communization and decolonization of Ukraine.

I think you’ve heard about events from 2011, when our mobile group blew up the head of Stalin’s bust in Zaporizhzhia; that was a rather notorious thing.

We never made PR out of it. We simply do what is for our nation’s good, for our state’s good. Those of us who can do it close down drug dealerships and help law-enforcement organs (if you can call them that, because it seems to me that the police are the most active drug dealers).

Was what happened on January 19 on Hrushevs’kyi Street something planned in advance?

No, of course not. We were always on the front lines those two months. The dictatorship laws that were passed January 16 were the stimulous for these events. We couldn’t live under state rules like those. On January 19, Automaidan activists drove up, and they wanted to go to the Supreme Rada and picket it. Right Sector came up there in organized fashion when hundreds of people were already there.

We tried to talk with the police and get them to agree to let us through. They responded rather aggressively. And what happened next, you know – we committed active deeds, and our guys defended the people. And I think that what happened was very good, because if it hadn’t been for those events on the nineteenth, I don’t think the regime would have made concessions and negotiate with the opposition.

How many of your people are at the Maidan?

Around 1,500 people, along with a mobilization reserve from Kyiv. But right now, affiliates are emerging all over Ukraine. They are organizing on their own, they call themselves Right Sector, and we are working to coordinate their activities as much as possible.

How many people in general can you mobilize across the country?

I think that for now, we can already mobilize 4,000 – 5,000 people.

How do you finance your organization?

I am not involved in that issue, but it’s all financed by people. We even opened up bank cards, but they were blocked right away. And after January 19 – there’s just been a flood of help. We need everything, because we’ve been here for two months already. People bring packs of money. We keep a complete account, everything is transparent, and guys buy equipment with the money.

Tell us about your organization’s structure.

The structure will be completely finalized after these events. Right now, Right Sector is a completely orderly organization; it’s not at all an extremist one, or a radical one; in general, I don’t like the word “radical.” Right now there is a unit on the Maidan, there are units in the oblasts, and there are spontaneous groups that have emerged. We invite leaders, we talk with them, we look to see if these are decent people, and then we make decisions about them. Right now we have started coordinating our actions with those of Afghan War veterans, too. They haven’t officially entered Right Sector, but we now coordinate our activities with them completely, because I don’t bring guys together just like that.

How do you make decisions?

There are strategic decisions, there are emergency ones, and there are tactical ones. People themselves make them at all levels. Regarding strategic matters, we discuss this or that problem with a leadership group of up to 12 people, including me, and we make a decision. And all the commanders decide all the other things. For example, we have Iranian – he makes a decision in his group whether or not to send people to the barricades.

Iranian? Is he from Iran?

No, that’s just his pseudonym. All the guys have pseudonyms for obvious reasons, because we live in such a state system. For example, since 1994, I have had the code name Hawk (Iastrub) in Trident. And we have one Pylypach and one Letun. Everyone chooses his own name, just like in the Cossack Sich.


Do you coordinate your activities with opposition forces?

First of all, we have relations with Andriy Parubiy as Maidan commander and de-facto leader of Self Defense (Samooborona), which we formally belong to as the 23rd hundredth (sotnia), though we have over 1,500 people.

But if you talk about the entire opposition, for the most part, we have no relations with them at all. They don’t recognize our existence. It seems to me that this is a big mistake of the opposition, that they don’t consider the forces of the Afghan veterans, Right Sector, or even Self Defense.

It seems to me that even Andriy Parubiy doesn’t have such an easy time coordinating actions with the trio of opposition leaders. Because I see some of the remarks that they make there. Andriy says one thing, while the leaders say something slightly different.

For example, I’m surprised that after January 19, opposition leaders didn’t come upstairs and thank the guys. Approach people, talk with them. These are live people, and they’re good, too.

Yesterday, a television crew came by, and the cameraman said, “I was surprised. One guy was reading a textbook on materials’ resistance, while the other was fluent in English and was speaking with some foreigner. You have such great guys!”

Well, it’s true. They’re the flower of the nation. These are people who right now are sacrificing their lives and their freedom for the sake of the Fatherland. This is something else, but politicians close their eyes to it.

Though there was Vitaliy Klychko – I met with him twice, and we had absolutely normal conversations. However, the opposition often fulfills part of our demands, because they are perfectly aware of our presence, and they see that Right Sector is a certain factor to be reckoned with on the Maidan.

But didn’t you try to contact them for the sake of coordinating activities?

We had no direct contacts. I had the impression from the very start of the peaceful Maidan that they operated very much on impulse, not on a system of actions thought through. They didn’t even set up a unified headquarters. From the very beginning, we called for unity at the Maidan so that there would be no divisions between politicians, Civic Sector, and Right Sector. In all interviews I’ve had, I’ve stressed that the uprising must be unified, and that I don’t want to provoke responses from the opposition.

But everything has its limits. When the country faced a real threat of war, great distrust of opposition leaders surfaced on the Maidan. They just talked for two months. Even though they had been given a mandate – “Take it, decide things!” – they couldn’t do anything. On January 19, we went on the offensive, and they started doing something. Well, we’ll keep putting pressure on them.

As far as we understand, the Freedom (Svoboda) Party is closest to you in ideological views…

Yes. We have a lot of common positions when it comes to ideological questions, but there are big differences. For instance, I don’t understand certain racist things they share, I absolutely don’t accept them. A Belarusian died for Ukraine, and an Armenian from Dnipropetrovs’k died for Ukraine. They are much greater comrades of mine than any, sorry, Communist cattle like Symonenko, who play for Russia but are ethnic Ukrainians.

Stepan Bandera once advocated three ways of dealing with non-Ukrainians. It’s very simple. You deal with them as comrades – and this is for those who fight with you for Ukraine, regardless of their nationality. You deal with them in a tolerant way – for those who live on the land and do not oppose our struggle; thus, we treat them normally, Ukraine has a place for all. The third way of dealing with them is in a hostile way – and this is for those who oppose the Ukrainian people’s national liberation struggle. And this is in any state; any people takes exactly these positions.

Social nationalism is very complicated for me, because it is my belief that nationalism does not require anything extra; it is enough. Oleh (Tiahnybok – Ukrains’ka Pravda), too, has lately tried to go the way of traditional nationalism. Thank God. Although there isn’t much of a point talking about ideological discussions during a revolution. Finally, our guys stand at the barricades just like guys from Svoboda. This unites us.

People from the regime say that during negotiations, opposition leaders claimed that people were ready to leave administrative buildings if those arrested and prosecuted were released. Is this true?

I think the regime lied. I think that the opposition didn’t say any such thing. Before the amnesty law was voted on, we made clear our position, and it was like the same thing the opposition had said. That is, if the regime made a compromise and passed the law for a so-called amnesty drafted by the opposition, then Right Sector was ready to withdraw its fighters from Hrushevs’kyi Street and unblock the street. This would be a reasonable compromise.

This doesn’t cancel out our political demands. We must change the country at another level. The Maidan is only a Sich (a Cossack military and administrative center – WR), a training ground, but it’s not about constant fighting.

Your opponents would reply that you were the first ones to open fire and go on an all-out offensive…

No, no, no! Excuse me, Berkut special forces beat children on the Maidan on November 30, 2013. For two months, people stood at the Maidan and took no action. Then came the regime’s usual provocation – passing the laws of January 16. They started beating activists, kidnapping people. Look what they’ve done with the Automaidan.

They were the very ones who provoked this situation, and people went on the attack, because people couldn’t take it anymore. How much longer could you stand there and dance on the Maidan? We’re not sheep, Ukrainians must have some pride, and they showed that Ukrainians do have pride.

What do you think, why did Right Sector have to show up for this, why didn’t the opposition do it?

Because Right Sector is the Maidan’s most revolutionary structure. Let me emphasize: revolutionary, and not radical. Revolution is reason, a plan, action. When the people are in an uproar, you can’t avoid using this situation for the people’s own benefit. The opposition, unfortunately, is incapable of doing this, maybe because their seats in parliament are very soft and they can’t take decisive steps. We can take such a step.

Have you spoken with the opposition about this?

I’m telling you, we have no contact with them. I’ll stress it again – I am for unifying the opposition movement, the one involved in protests and in the general uprising. Thus, any explanation I give will wind up being used against me. They’ll start yelling that I’m a provocateur. If you want my honest opinion, I don’t care what they say about me. Our difference is that I’m not interested in political ratings.

Right now, representatives of opposition parties are taking part in negotiations with the regime. What do you think, can these people take responsibility for the Maidan’s actions and give some guarantees on its behalf?

That’s the problem; the Maidan doesn’t control the negotiations process. The levels of trust opposition leaders had at the beginning and now are completely different.

We demand that not only opposition leaders be in the negotiations, but also representatives from the Maidan. At least as observers. Then you can offer some guarantees and at least articulate here, to people on the Maidan, that we have this agreement reached between the regime and the opposition, and it should be carried out.

Because otherwise, there’s the impression that they agree on one thing, and then they change something among themselves, and then the result turns out to be completely different.

Our goal now is to force the opposition to go back to negotiations with specific demands and achieve a certain compromise. But this absolutely must happen with Maidan representatives.

Those Afghan veterans or Andriy Parubiy as self-defense commander can be in the negotiating group. If they invite me, I’ll go. We see nothing awful in this. We can argue our position and compel both the regime and the opposition to make an agreement, so that there will be no bloodshed, and so that the state will take different actions. I’m ready to go negotiate for this.

Let’s make this simpler. Imagine that you are in negotiations, and Viktor Yanukovych is sitting across from you. What arguments would you use to convince him to change his actions?

I would seek a compromise. I would put pressure on him, though I know he wouldn’t like that very much. I’m not sure that Yanukovych is getting reliable information. It seems to me that he has some inadequate understanding of the situation. For example, I think he doesn’t understand that 80% of the people right now do not trust the regime. I think that his advisors are giving him slightly different figures and are showing him different scenarios from the real ones.

First, I’d start out by saying that he can’t fight his own people. No one yet has defeated his own people. I would explain that those things that law enforcement are doing is a real war against Ukrainians. Second, and this is very important – I would try to explain to him that those thousands of self-defense forces that have already been formed will not give Berkut or riot police an easy time clearing the Maidan and pass through it in parade fashion.

They don’t understand that the Maidan is a phenomenon with its own army, with its own medical services, with its own structures, and that it’s already a certain state. And they won’t be able to take it over without shedding a lot of blood.

It’s already impossible to drive it away with clubs. They’ll have to use weapons, real ones, not like the ones they use on Hrushevs’kyi Street. And they’ll really get it from us, that I can guarantee Viktor Yanukovych.

All right, but what do you want? So you tell Viktor Fedorovych (Yanukvoych) that the situation is like this. What next?

A precondition for any negotiations must be the freeing of all those arrested. These people aren’t terrorists and they aren’t extremists. I think you even know some of those people. They are absolutely normal, decent people who got fed up. People should be freed. Any talk about normalizing the situation can only happen after this.

Second, the regime should stop using force. In the regions, above all. Stop kidnapping activists. This is terror against one’s own people.

They must immediately start investigating crimes that have taken place on the streets. Berkut special forces couldn’t have been shooting without the knowledge of the Minister of Internal Affairs. It’s a military structure; there has to be discipline there, a clear sense of subordination. If they were provocations, then we need to find out who was doing the shooting. Give people information, don’t be silent, don’t close your eyes to what has been going on.

Yanukovych indeed has fulfilled several of our demands regarding the government’s resignation and the repeal of the laws of January 16. But changing an existing office to another that has the prefix “v.o.” (“acting” – translator) doesn’t solve any problems.

We need to form a compromise government that could be made up of people who are not leaders of political parties, but professionals. Moreover, all those odious figures – all the Zakharchenkos, the Tabachnyks, and other politicians like them – should be replaced. This is the first step they would need to make, and it would remove the tensions immediately.

Who do you see heading the Cabinet of Ministers?

I can’t say, because I’m not an expert at forming governments. Politicians should talk about that.

But when you don’t have your own proposals, you take away all responsibility from yourself and remove yourself from political developments.

For 25 years, I’ve avoided public politics. That’s not a problem for me. Although now, we are looking into the possibility that, if there will be peace, Right Sector will grow into a political organization. All the guys have said this. For God’s sake! We can always get involved in politics. For me, they’re the flower of the nation, and they can’t be cannon fodder people use and then forget. But it’s still too early to talk about anything specific. Right Sector today can’t be narrowed down to some political matters.

But that’s exactly what it looks like right now – you’re being used: you’re standing at the barricades, while they offer government posts to Arseniy Iatseniuk and Vitaliy Klychko.

The fact is that the life of the state and the life of our people aren’t limited to a sole Cabinet of Ministers. Let them take those positions. If they invite us to help, we will. We’ll take over law enforcement, and we’ll bring order in the state. But I doubt that we’ll get even just one office.


What will you propose to Viktor Yanukovych if the revolution is victorious?

It depends on him. Some time ago, we gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and no one would touch him. Today, if he made a smart decision, we could even grant him safety in his own state. Just so there would be no war, so there would be no bloodshed. Let him stay in Mezhyhir’ia, take care of his ostriches, and no one would bother him there. But that has to be his decision.

Do you see yourself in some office?

Right now, no. I have a really good office right now – I’m leader of Trident. It’s easier for me to speak in front of members in formation, not onstage.

But that’s not an office that can change the country. What would you do in a time of peace?

If you want peace, get ready for war. We started Right Sector, and Right Sector has changed the country a little. During peace, I would continue being involved in Trident. Like I’d been doing for the last twenty years.

You understand, Trident is not a structure that has an unequivocal goal of setting up some armed conflict. No. Any kind of normal state must have state paramilitary structures that prepare youth for service in the army, which gives it a chance to mobilize a certain personnel reserve for defending the people’s interest in times of foreign or domestic peril. It’s a normal thing in most civilized countries of the world. Trident will always be relevant. Even if we have the best president and the best government.

Do you have any information regarding who’s kidnapping people?

Unfortunately, we don’t. We are trying to dig this information up, but we’ve had no luck so far. We ask the regime to activate law enforcement, its Security Service (Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU – WR), so that all investigation teams are employed in this search. Finally, [the SBU] is not as compromised in all these events as the MVS (Ministry of Internal Affairs) is. But there’s been nothing so far.

So you sincerely trust regime structures to investigate this issue?

I’m not certain that the regime is guilty of these crimes. I don’t rule out foreign special services being responsible for this. For example, the FSB (Federal Security Service). Russia always makes use of instability in Ukraine. As soon as there is instability in Ukraine, they come over here and deal with certain issues they have. Putin has said more than once that Ukraine is not a state. And I am more than convinced that up to the present, there have been plans for splitting Ukraine up into two or three, or five, or six zones of influence.

But Right Sector and its activities have been called a destabilizing factor.

It seems to me that it’s the opposite – over the last few months Right Sector has shown that it is a stabilizing factor. If it hadn’t been for Right Sector, there wouldn’t have been any negotiations, radical moods would have increased, and they would have exploded in regions as partisan warfare. Why doesn’t anyone think about that?

As for now, the situation anyway is under control, and it it is now at some negotiating stage. If they don’t reach an agreement, the risk of partisan warfare in Ukraine will sharply increase. We know Ukrainians have a very glorious tradition of waging partisan warfare. They’ve fought for decades. Only will this be useful for the state?

But aren’t you afraid that a partisan war could grow into a civil war?

There can be no civil war. When 80% of the people do not support the regime, it will be a struggle between society, the people, and the regime. And these two things make great differences between a civil war and what we are talking about. This will be a national liberation war. But we’d rather not have one. We have a state, we have a foundation for developing nation building and state building.

But a lot of people in eastern Ukraine sincerely believe that Banderites and nationalists are gathered here, and they are really convinced that they must fight this. What should we do with these people?

According to the information I have, this is a very small percentage of people. I myself am from the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’, and I completely understand the situation. These are mostly people working for hire. You saw the events near the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’ Administration building. There, local (Party of) Regions deputy Stupak for a year and a half got scumbags together and formed fight clubs and guard structures that, together with the police, out of “conviction” defend the Oblast’ Administration.

Did you see at least one normal citizen among those defenders of the administration building who went out there voluntarily? Or in the Crimea itself, they’ve set up units of hatted Cossacks, chauvinists, who form Black Hundreds and defend the regime. But where are the masses of people? Besides that, Crimean Tatars are completely on the side of the Euromaidan. So none of this is simple.

If you’d speak with people in the East, they’d say the same thing about the Maidan: that there is a very small percentage of sincere supporters, and that the majority are hired nationalists. Both you and they have very similar rhetoric, which in the end is very unlikely to produce a compromise.

Let’s consider some examples. The Party of Regions tried to set up an Anti-Maidan by bringing in people from all over Ukraine. Who actually has been standing there? It’s either really asocial elements or state employees and recipients of state aid who simply were forced to come. I spoke with a whole bunch of such people, and when I yelled out, “Get out, crook!” (Zeka het’!), they waved and laughed. It’s a myth that there’s some social support for Yanukovych and his regime.

The soccer ultras all over Ukraine, the ones who supported the Maidan, are clear examples of this. These are people with real ideas, from Luhans’k Zoria, Simferopil’ Tavriia, Zaporizhzhia Metalurh, Dnipropetrovs’k Dnipro, Kharkiv Metalist, and so on. How many times did Dopa and Hepa (Mykhailo Dobkin, governor of the Kharkiv Oblast’, and Hennadiy Kernes, mayor of Kharkiv – WR) try to gather those hired thugs and send them here to Kyiv, and they haven’t been able to do it. What support can you talk about? This idea about a split in the country is a big lie. There is no split. Yanukovych, bless his heart, united the country.

All the time there’s been this call made at the Maidan to the three opposition leaders to make a decision on a single candidate. Do you support this call?

It doesn’t seem that relevant because you more often hear calls to make decisions with Maidan leaders. The leaders of the resistance which is going on. The importance of presidential elections for people has gone down to second or third place.

During presidential elections – early or regularly scheduled ones – what will be your strategy: will you support someone, or will you run on your own?

We don’t rule out Right Sector nominating its own candidate for elections. But it’s still too early to talk about this.

So you sincerely believe that a candidate from Right Sector has a chance at winning across the country?

If you took at reality, there is always a chance for it. Right Sector became an all-Ukrainian phenomenon in a few weeks. It’s Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Donets’k, the Crimea. On the other hand, presidential elections can bring quite a bit of attention to our ideas of revolutionary changes for the state.

Aren’t you afraid that your electoral campaign could divide up the opposition’s electorate and lead to you being blamed for causing a split?

Listen, let this process finish, and then we’ll see what’s going on and how things are going. Fairy tales about fragmenting one’s forces, which they tell each other, is some kind of child’s play. They all know that they’re running as three separate candidates, thus breaking up forces from the very beginning.

Either you sit down and make a real agreement and fulfill what you’d agreed to do, or each should play his own game. For us, at this stage, it’s not that important to take part in presidential elections. We need peace.

The fact is that there are people who talk a lot and do little, while there are people who act and demonstrate with their sweat and blood that they can change things, that they can act, that they can achieve a result.

Right Sector is a platform for guys who have demonstrated their ability to change something, to sacrifice the gifts they have received to achieve something higher. Politicians in recent years have not demonstrated this. I don’t see them having demonstrated this kind of sacrifice, the desire and the ability to sacrifice.

So who for you is the leader of the resistance?

There is no one for now. I made an announcement that I was ready to bear responsibility for all those things that happened. This doesn’t mean that I have some presidential ambitions. I simply see that there needs to be complete coordination and control over the situation. Let politicians settle those issues for themselves. If one of them is ready to do it, then let him do it, and we will sincerely support him. But I don’t see anyone doing this.


Are you aware of the fact that if you are defeated, or even if there is a compromise between the regime and the opposition, a jail cell might be waiting for you?

Yes, of course. I’ve been ready for it for the past 25 years. What can you do? That’s life. I go there but for the grace of God. What will be, will be. If there will be a criminal case, then there will be a criminal case. I am ready to fight for Ukraine. Let them try to put me in jail. Finally, we’ve yet to see who will imprison whom.

Have you been given a police summons?

No. I live here, what do I need a summons for? They don’t deliver them to the Maidan, and guys don’t let cops enter the fifth floor.

But something could happen before you’re even arrested. You could face the fate of Ihor Lutsenko or Dmytro Bulatov…

I know in whose name I’m waging this struggle. Of course, I don’t want that, I’m a living human being, and I have the instinct of self-preservation. But guys are protecting me, they go around with me, and they wear armored flak jackets.

Do you go outside the Maidan in general?

I’m rarely outside it. I won’t tell you where I go.

What is happening with your family right now?

I last saw my family for Christmas. They’re in Ukraine, but I’ve temporarily changed their residence. The fact is that all information about our addresses has been posted on the Internet, and about our families, so there is a certain danger.

But there’s also the very same information on the Internet about Berkut forces, for instance. Can you give guarantees to all law enforcement and regime officials that nothing threatens their families?

I can guarantee that Right Sector in no way will touch any child, or any family, of any law enforcement personnel, from any structure. Right Sector doesn’t fight women and children. We are not beasts from Berkut who beat up journalists and medical personnel. So you don’t have to worry – no one will be taking any actions like those. I can vouch for Right Sector.

But you still set an ultimatum… you have this demand for the Fourth (of February): either you release everyone, or there will be… Can you say what this is about? Why exactly the Fourth?

The Fourth of February is the next session of parliament. We demand that the Supreme Rada produce a document announcing the unconditional and complete freeing and rehabilitation of people arrested. And this is no amnesty, because there were no crimes committed.

We also demand the regime end any use of force – this would be kidnappings, burning cars, and so on. I think that they will listen to us. I am 90 percent certain that they will listen to us.

Otherwise, we are on the edge of a bloody conflict. I don’t rule out that people who are standing on the Maidan will conduct a very serious mobilization and go to the government offices district. And they will take it – and I am more than convinced of this – though it will be with blood, with great losses. Because we’ve been left with a pathological situation. Then all of them will be taken out: both the regime guards and Yanukovych. That’s why it’s better for them to reach an agreement with us.

Do you understand that even what you just said now can be used against you?

Yes, of course. It’s a revolution. There are two sides of the barricades – it’s a basic fact. Right now everything is being used either against us or against them.

Do you select in some way people who come to you? Do they go through some selection process?

Without a doubt. We are signing up volunteers all the time, especially during some active campaigns. Regarding criteria, you need to talk directly to the commanders. They work with people. I know exactly that they don’t take in people who are under age. Because they run in packs at age 15-16.

Do you issue people weapons (that is, ones that are not firearms)?

They show up on their own with either some baseball bats or with some sticks. We don’t equip them with them. As for the money that we get from people, we use that to buy all kinds of little shields, helmets, shields, a very big arsenal of all that stuff. They get all the necessary equipment, and then they have lessons with them.

If a person is in poor physical health, then he or she gets other work – in the kitchen, in the medical station, and so on. Our girls are great, simply great; they’ve done so much good already. They even took away the wounded during fighting, and they help us here all the time.

Regarding firearms, you called on people to bring them to the Maidan. Why have you done that?

When the MVS issued an order allowing use of firearms against people, I called on people who had legally registered firearms to join us, to create a group for supporting us with firearms in case they came to the Maidan and started shooting. I think that you can only return fire, because there are no other alternatives. But that’s only if they open fire first.

Has this unit been created?

That’s a secret, sorry.

Who has all the information that is now at Right Sector? There is a person who knows everything.

No one knows everything. The political leadership has the information.

How do you coordinate your actions? It’s not a secret that all telephone conversations are listened in on, how do you do it?

Regarding messengers and go-betweens, all the guys have walkie-talkies, but they also monitor them, and we know that. I get the impression that they have listening devices installed in all the buildings around us. Operational vehicles are in place and so on. By the way, I don’t regard guys sitting in them as enemies or something like that. They’re doing their job, and they have to do it.

Moreover, I am more than convinced that in law enforcement structures, attitudes toward the regime, the opposition, and the Maidan are very, very ambiguous. Some of them hate us, but that’s a small percentage. Others are sympathetic toward us, because we also have been conducting certain negotiations with law enforcement personnel. Guys come to us and talk. The regime is falling apart. You just need to put enough pressure on it so that they take those political steps.

There are two barricades on Hrushevs’kyi Street. Do you talk at all with Berkut forces? Do you bring them warm tea or coffee? I know that there used to be such initiatives.

I don’t know if we bring them right now. Earlier, when they blocked us in at the Maidan itself, we gave them food. I was against this, not because these cops, these guys, are not friends. They’re also Ukrainians, they simply are on the other side of the barricades. They serve the enemy. But it’s not worth doing. The more they are driven crazy by not getting enough food and so on, the less chances there are that they will go on the offensive and on the attack, and begin beating people like they’ve done several times. Thus, out of purely pragmatic reasons, I don’t think that we should bring them sandwiches or coffee.

source: http://seansrussiablog.org/2014/02/07/interview-dmytro-yarosh-leader-right-sector/

Exclusive: Leader of Far-Right Ukrainian Militant Group Talks Revolution With TIME

Simon Shuster / Kiev @shustry
Feb. 4, 2014

Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor, a coalition of ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, stands with some of his fighters at the scene of the worst clashes last month between the group's fighters and police in Kiev.
Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor, a coalition of ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, stands with some of his fighters at the scene of the worst clashes last month between the group’s fighters and police in Kiev. Maxim Dondyuk

In his first interview with foreign media, Dmitro Yarosh, leader of the far-right militant group Pravy Sektor, says he and his antigovernment cohorts in Kiev are ready for armed struggle

Take the smell of an army barracks, add a bit of char and gasoline, and you’d have a rough idea of the air on the fifth floor of the House of Trade Unions, the headquarters of the revolution in Ukraine. When protesters first occupied the building in December, their leaders divvied up its floors among the political parties and activists involved in the revolt. Since then, the only floor off-limits to journalists has been the fifth, which houses the militant arm of the revolution, Pravy Sektor (Right Sector), the coalition of right-wing radicals that grew out of the uprising. They had good reason to avoid publicity. After their violent clashes with police last month, their members could face years in prison if the ruling government survives the revolt.

But on Sunday night, their leader Dmitro Yarosh agreed to give his first interview to a foreign media outlet. It was not so much an act of vanity as a political coming-out. He has clearly grown tired of being the movement’s anonymous enforcer. In recent days, as a negotiated end to the crisis has started coming into view, the need for a military wing of the revolution has diminished. And so has the trust in its upper ranks. The mainstream opposition leaders, like the former world boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, have faced growing pressure to distance themselves from Pravy Sektor, which the U.S. State Department has condemned for “inflaming conditions on the streets.” Increasingly marginalized, the group has grown much more assertive and, in some ways, has started going rogue.

In his interview with TIME, Yarosh, whose militant brand of nationalism rejects all foreign influence over Ukrainian affairs, revealed for the first time that Pravy Sektor has amassed a lethal arsenal of weapons. He declined to say exactly how many guns they have. “It is enough,” he says, “to defend all of Ukraine from the internal occupiers” — by which he means the ruling government — and to carry on the revolution if negotiations with that government break down.

But so far, those negotiations have been making significant strides toward resolving the crisis. On Tuesday, the parliament began debating a sweeping reform of the constitution, while allies of President Viktor Yanukovych suggested for the first time that he is ready to consider early elections. Both moves would mark a major breakthrough. But Yarosh, watching from the sidelines, has begun to doubt whether the negotiators have the interests of his men at heart. “This whole peaceful song and dance, the standing around, the negotiations, none of it has brought real change.” Dozens of his men, he says, remain behind bars after their street battles against police two weeks ago.

With that in mind, Yarosh and another militant faction began a parallel set of negotiations over the weekend. On Monday, they claimed to be in direct talks with Ukraine’s police forces to secure the release of jailed protesters, including members of Pravy Sektor. Mainstream opposition leaders said they had not authorized any such talks. At the same time, Yarosh has demanded a seat at the negotiating table with the President. Once again, he was flatly denied. His ideology, it seems, is just too toxic to let him in the room.

But neither can Klitschko and his fellow politicians easily sever their ties with Pravy Sektor. The group serves some of the uprising’s most essential functions. Its fighters control the barricades around the protest camp in the center of Ukraine’s capital, and when riot police have tried to tear it down, they have been on the front lines beating them back with clubs, rocks, Molotov cocktails and even a few catapults, in the mold of siege engines of the Middle Ages. Around the country, its fighters have helped seize government headquarters in more than a dozen cities. “Pravy Sektor has proved its loyalty to the ideals of freedom,” Yarosh says. “Now we needed to present this movement as a source of leadership.”

In any kind of fair election, that would be nearly impossible. Pravy Sektor’s ideology borders on fascism, and it enjoys support only from Ukraine’s most hard-line nationalists, a group too small to secure them a place in parliament. But taking part in the democratic process is not part of Yarosh’s strategy. “We are not politicians,” he says in his office, a pack of Lucky Strikes and a walkie-talkie on the table in front of him, while a sentry in a black ski mask and bulletproof vest stands by the door. “We are soldiers of the national revolution.” His entire adult life has been spent waiting for such a revolution to “steer the country in a new direction, one that would make it truly strong, not dependent on either the West or the East.”

Through all his years in the nationalist movement, Yarosh, a 42-year-old father of three, says he has never had any form of occupation apart from his activism. The son of two factory workers, he was born and raised in a provincial town in eastern Ukraine, and became involved in the nationalist underground in the late 1980s, just as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Nearly all of the satellite states of the USSR, from the Baltics to Central Asia, were then pushing to break away from Moscow’s control, and in 1988, Yarosh joined one of the more radical groups fighting for an independent Ukraine.

The following autumn, months after the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan, Yarosh was drafted into the Red Army, a common form of punishment for political activists at the time. He was stationed briefly in Belarus before being transferred to Siberia, where he served as a guard at strategic missile sites. The Soviet doctrines of unity between Russia and Ukraine did little to soften his views. “If anything, the army made me more convinced that my path is correct,” he says. When Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Yarosh went on hunger strike to demand a transfer to the newly established Ukrainian army. His commanding officers ignored him.

In 1994, a few years after he was discharged and returned to Ukraine, he joined a right-wing organization called Trizub (Trident), and slowly climbed its ranks before assuming leadership in 2005. Along with several other far-right groups, Trizub formed the core of Pravy Sektor when the current uprising broke out in Ukraine two months ago. Its main adversary has always been Russia, although it also has little patience for Western influence on Ukraine. “For all the years of Ukraine’s independence, Russia has pursued a systematic, targeted policy of subjugation toward Ukraine,” Yarosh says. “So of course we will prepare for a conflict with them,” he adds, especially after Russia’s recent invasion of another one of its former satellites, Georgia. “If they stick their faces here like they did in Georgia in 2008, they’ll get it in the teeth.”

So far, his jabs at the leaders of the opposition in Ukraine have not been quite as pointed. He has accused them of vanity and ineffectiveness, but he has also observed the truce they called a week and a half ago to allow their negotiations to proceed. “Not a single Molotov cocktail has gone flying since then,” he says proudly. “A truce is a truce. They want to negotiate, let them negotiate.” But as Yarosh realizes, he and his men have staked a great deal on the outcome of these talks.

If the ruling government holds on to power, Pravy Sektor could be forced to take the blame for the violence that left dozens of police officers in the hospital two weeks ago. “All those criminal charges are already waiting in the prosecutor’s office,” he says. On the other hand, if the opposition forms a new government, they are not likely to carve out a place for Yarosh and his men in the halls of power. So it is no surprise that he has begun to show some political initiative.

For the past two decades, he has been waiting and preparing for the start of the “national revolution,” and now that he finds himself at the head of its armed division, he does not seem ready to let it pass peacefully away, at least not on anyone else’s terms. “People have gotten in touch with us from around the country, saying, ‘Guys, don’t let us down. Take us to victory, to independence, if the other leaders are incapable of that,’” Yarosh says. “So if the time has come for an active struggle, I am ready to carry it to the end. I am not afraid of that responsibility. I see no reason to hide my face.”

source: http://time.com/4493/ukraine-dmitri-yarosh-kiev/

Dmitry Yarosh, the Man Who Claims Victory in the Ukrainian Revolution, Speaks

By / March 12, 2014 4:33 PM EDT

A leader of a once obscure right wing group is now at the center of a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters

Newsweek spoke with Dmirtry Yarosh, 42, a leader of the once obscure right wing group that is now at the  center of a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States

Q: Is it true that you have been training Right Sector forces for over 20 years?

A: I was training paramilitary troops for almost 25 years. Although we just came out of the revolution, my guys are continuing military training all across Ukraine, ready to cleanse the country of the occupiers.

Q: How many are you?

A: I cannot give you the exact number, as our structure and divisions are constantly growing all over Ukraine, but over 10,000 people for sure. We have certain preconditions for our recruits: patriotism and other criteria for proper behavior.

Q: Are you aware that a Moscow court is trying you for calling for terrorist actions against Russia?

A: That is Putin’s idea. He is a political corpse.

Q: Do you have many war veterans in your ranks? Are your forces a part of Ukraine’s army?

A: As soon as Russia declared the war we recruited retired officers, generals of the interior ministry and security agencies. We are coordinating our actions with the council of the National Security and Defense, as well as with the army’s General Headquarters. We are currently negotiating to put our forces on a proper legal footing.

Q: If the Crimea population decides to become a part of Russia at the referendum on Saturday, what will be Right Sector’s reaction?

A: Right Sector, together with all other Ukrainian citizens, are ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity by all possible means. In case the Kremlin decides to attack us, they will have a major partisan war on  Ukraine territory.

Q: Do you think Ukraine has enough forces to defend itself?

A: I am realistic about the pitiful conditions of our military forces, including Right Sector. Our army is many hundreds of times weaker than Russia’s army so it’s important for Ukraine to do everything to resolve the crisis through negotiations.

Q: Why do you call your organization paramilitary? are you armed just with Kalashnikov’s or do you also have more serious weapons?

A: As in any army, we have specialists trained to shoot S-300 missiles. In case of a partisan war, there  will be shooting from every house.

Q: Do you realize that the majority of Russians including cultural and intellectual leaders support Putin’s actions in Crimea because they see you as a leader of a fascist, radical movement? Are you ready to become the reason for the end of years of Russian-Ukrainian friendship?

A: Unfortunately, Russia is largely brainwashed. Ukrainian nationalists have nothing to do with fascism. The powerful Russian propaganda machine knows what it’s doing. The beliefs of Right Sector are against chauvinism. We base our views on nationalist ideas. The proof is that 40 per cent of our members speak Russian; Jews and other nationals feel comfortable in our forces.

Q: What then makes your movement “Right”?

A: We believe Ukraine deserves to have its own national state. That is what makes our movement “Right.”

Q: Was your book “Nation and Revolution” — where you defined your movement’s enemies as the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church — a prediction of “the liberating war” of the Ukrainian nation?

A: The book is a collection of my articles that was criticized when it first came out. But now we see that it predicted many events that have now happened. I would advise Russian citizens to start their struggle against Putin’s fascist regime. That would be the best guarantee of friendship between Russian and the Ukrainian people. So long as Putin is in power, Russian imperialism will always be putting improper pressure upon Ukraine.

Q: Why do you refer to the Russian president, who enjoys high popularity ratings, as a “fascist”?

A: Putin built up his power by fascistic methods. He ignored the constitutional rights of Russian citizens. In Russia, police beat up those taking part in mass protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg. That smells of fascist methods to me. They arrest protesters carrying anti-war signs. That is fascism.

Q: It is broadly believed in Ukraine that the revolution would not have happened without Right Sector. What kind of revolution was it?

A: We had a nationalist revolution to create a state where Ukrainian people would be the master of their own destiny in their own land. Until now, we have had an occupying regime. We’ll do everything to give our people full freedom, justice and a share of the nation’s wealth.

Q: Your men are all over the center of Kiev. Why do you and your men wear black uniforms?

A: This is not an official uniform. We bought uniforms sold to security guards. I have taken professional advice about strengthening our security. We have been given information that some Russian forces are interested in kidnapping, arresting or liquidating me.

Q: Who  is it that is shooting on the Maidan every night?

A: That is not my people. My men never use their weapons unless there is a specific need.

Q: You are running for president. What special attributes do you have that qualify you to be a politician? Do you think you have a chance to win the presidential election?

A: I graduated from university, specializing in Ukrainian language and literature. I never intended to be a politician. But since January 19 this year, I have been responsible for all the events. We have seen two miracles happen already: politicians have not betrayed the revolutionary spirit of the Maidan; and we won the revolution. I expect one more miracle  to take place at the presidential election.

Q: Did your movement support Chechen insurgencies in Russia?

A: We supported the first Chechen war against Russian empire. We sent a delegation to Chechnya. We helped treat the Chechen wounded here. And we publish Chechen books.

Q: Did you really call for Islamic insurgencies to support Ukraine in the war against Russia? Did any of your men meet with the Chechen insurgency leader Doku Umarov?

A: I didn’t say that. I am not sure. When we were helping Chechnia, Doku Umarov was just an ordinary field commander. We are not supporters of the Islamist war against defenseless women and children.

Q: Yesterday, Ukraine’s former president Victor Yanukovych said the new leadership is going to raise Bandera flag that is considered fascist in Russia.  Is that true?

A:  We stood under red and black flags throughout the revolution. Red Ukrainian blood spilled on the black Ukrainian earth –  that flag is the symbol of the national revolution. I am convinced that this flag will bring us freedom.

Q: Who finances you? Do you think the West is going to support Ukraine?

A: As a matter of principle l do not take money from oligarchs as we do not want to be dependent. We received some US dollars from the Ukrainian Diaspora. Otherwise the entire country supports the Right Sector.

I am sure that if Russians bombed Kiev — and we believe there is 50/50 chance that will happen — NATO will not come to fight for Ukraine. Europe has betrayed Ukraine many times. We are not counting on them. We can only count on our own forces and our ingenuity.

source: http://mag.newsweek.com/2014/03/28/exclusive-dmitry-yarosh-man-who-launched-ukrainian.html

In Ukraine, New Government Must Reassure Jewish Community

Abraham H. Foxman
National Director, Anti-Defamation League
Posted: 02/28/2014 2:35 pm EST Updated: 02/28/2014 2:59 pm EST

The Ukrainian Jewish community is nervous. The ultra-nationalist Svoboda party, with its history of anti-Semitism and platform of ethnic nationalism, won more than 10 percent of the vote in October 2012, shared the political leadership of the Maidan revolution over the past months, and just this week received three ministries in the new Ukrainian government.

While Svoboda’s leaders have refrained recently from making anti-Semitic statements, it is troubling that Oleksandr Sych, Svoboda’s chief ideologue, was named vice prime minister. Sych’s speeches over the years have focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism, which he says is exemplified by Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s. Bandera was at times aligned with the Nazis during World War II and was complicit in mass killings of Jews and Poles by Ukrainian partisans.

Sych has also said that Ukrainian nationalism is threatened both by “the Communist Russian regime and liberal Europe.” How ironic that he was brought to power by a revolution sparked by former President Viktor Yanukovych’s sudden refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union.

Interestingly, the armed nationalist groups that fought on the Maidan against government troops and police have made important gestures toward the Jewish community this week.

Dmitro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, met with Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and told him that their movement rejects anti-Semitism and xenophobia and will not tolerate it. He said their goals were a democratic Ukraine, transparent government, ending corruption, and equal opportunity for all ethnic groups.

The day before, Ukrainian Jewish journalist Eleonora Groisman interviewed Sergei Mischenko, the leader of “Spilna Sprava,” and told him that Ukraine’s Jews were worried about the nationalists. Mischenko responded that Jews will not have any problems and shouldn’t worry. He went on to say, “On the Maidan there were Jews with us who served in the Israeli Defense Forces. We got along excellently and fought shoulder to shoulder.”

In November 2013, not long before the anti-Yanukovych protests began, ADL honored Metropolitan Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky, a spiritual leader of Ukrainian Catholics who headed the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church from 1900 until his death in 1944. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was posthumously awarded ADL’s Jan Karski Courage to Care Award for his undaunted heroism in saving Jews from the Holocaust.

After lauding Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s actions, I said:

I want to make one last point, regarding the situation today in Ukraine. There is a strong and growing Ukrainian nationalist movement. It faces a choice of role models: the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera, who declared an independent Ukrainian state on June 30, 1941 in Lviv, when the Nazis drove out the Soviet army, and the next day began murdering Jews. Or it can be inspired by the Ukrainian nationalist Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who wrote on July 1, the day after the state was declared, that the new government should exercise – quote — “wise, just leadership and measures that would take into consideration the needs and welfare of all citizens who inhabit our land, without regard to what faith, nationality, or social stratum they belong.” The Ukrainian nationalism of Andrei Sheptytsky, one of compassion, even love, for his Jewish neighbors, is one that Jews around the world can embrace and support. And we ask all who are inspired by the Metropolitan’s actions and words to help oppose the destructive Banderite strain.

Will Vice Prime Minister Sych renounce Bandera and embrace Europe? Will Svoboda accept Jews as full-fledged Ukrainians and follow the welcome assurances of the armed nationalists? Or will the promises of Right Sector and Spilna Sprava be overtaken by the ethnic nationalism of Svoboda?

Meanwhile, security is being upgraded at Jewish institutions. Over the past several weeks, two Jews in Kiev were violently attacked and Molotov cocktails were thrown at a synagogue in Zaporozhe. Some Jewish leaders have even raised the possibility of a mass exodus from Ukraine.

The future of the Ukrainian Jewish community could depend on the choices made by Svoboda and the actions of Ukraine’s democratic leaders.

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, together with UDAR leader Vitaliy Klichko, brought Svoboda into the opposition coalition in 2012. Now, having brought Svoboda into the government, it is up to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to ensure that anti-Semitism is not tolerated and that democratic norms are adhered to. By sending that message to the people of Ukraine now, the prime minister will reassure the Jewish community and set an admirable example.

Guiding Ukraine’s nationalists to adopt the path of Metropolitan Sheptytsky will be a major test of Ukraine’s democratic development and an important step forward for the country. If achieved, the future of Ukraine’s Jewish community may be bright, not bleak.


It is also worth noting that after exploring the various groups/boards/sites it seems that Svoboda element has been overlooked and not mentioned much in the msm because they, along with the “modern” NeoNazi factions while still being fervently anti-Semetic and anti minority, have seemingly allied and self identified themselves with the “modern” far-right Zionist, NeoCon and Wahhabi/Salafist factions as they admire their ultra Nationalistic ideologies and violent strategies…

Ukraine: “Right Sector” Leader Dmitry Yarosh Meets with Israeli Ambassador, Pledges Allegiance to the Jewish Race

Andrew Anglin
Daily Stormer

February 28, 2014

"We exist only to serve you, oh Chosen Ones, oh Masters of Earth." -Pravy Sektor leader Dmitry Yarosh to the Jews

“We exist only to serve you, oh Chosen Ones, oh Masters of Earth.” -Pravy Sektor leader Dmitry Yarosh to the Jews

From the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution late last year, I have taken a staunchly pro-Russian, anti-coup position.  Throughout the course of events, it has become more and more undeniable that the entire situation was one created and managed by subversive Jews, for the purpose of weakening Russia by tricking the Ukraine into joining the European Union.

However, many nationalist activists remained supportive of the revolution, promoting it on the internet as a positive thing, even after it was discovered that Vitali Klitschko, the most prominent leader of Maidan, is a Jew, that the American Jew Victoria Nuland was playing a role in planning the operation, and that IDF agents were responsible for managing much of the terrorism against the elected government of the Ukraine.

The average age of the revolutionary footsoldiers of Pravy Sektor is about 17. I would never blame these boys for not knowing any better.

The average age of the revolutionary footsoldiers of Pravy Sektor is about 17. I would never blame these boys for not knowing any better, as they likely did not have access to the information we have had access to.

Though it was discouraging to me to see so many who consider themselves supportive of the nationalist cause voicing their support for this Jewish power-grab, I understood that people were excited to see nationalist symbols among the protestors, and thus made the decision to indulge in a fantasy about a “National Socialist Revolution” in the Ukraine.

This week, that fantasy can be seen clearly for what it is, as Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor (Right Sector) has met with the Israeli ambassador to the Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and pledged his allegiance to the Jewish race.

Abe Foxman: Pravy Sektor fanboy
Abe Foxman: Pravy Sektor fanboy

As Abe Foxman writes in the Huffington Post:

Dmitro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, met with Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and told him that their movement rejects anti-Semitism and xenophobia and will not tolerate it. He said their goals were a democratic Ukraine, transparent government, ending corruption, and equal opportunity for all ethnic groups.

Abe closes with this:

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, together with UDAR leader Vitaliy Klichko, brought Svoboda into the opposition coalition in 2012. Now, having brought Svoboda into the government, it is up to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to ensure that anti-Semitism is not tolerated and that democratic norms are adhered to. By sending that message to the people of Ukraine now, the prime minister will reassure the Jewish community and set an admirable example.

Guiding Ukraine’s nationalists to adopt the path of Metropolitan Sheptytsky will be a major test of Ukraine’s democratic development and an important step forward for the country. If achieved, the future of Ukraine’s Jewish community may be bright, not bleak.

The Israeli embassy in the Ukraine released a press statement on the meeting:

February 26, 2014 the Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, met with the leadership of the “Right sector” movement, including its figurehead, Dmitry Yarosh.

The leaders of the movement informed the Ambassador about their position on the future of Ukraine, and stressed that they follow a tolerant policy on national issues.

Dmitry Yarosh also stressed that all hateful rhetoric, especially anti-Semitism, was not only condemned by “the Right Sector,” but that they would continue to fight it through all legitimate legal means. The aim of the movement is to build a democratic Ukraine, establish government transparency, combat corruption and provide equal opportunities for all nations and peoples; they intend to unify the people and build a state ruled by the people.

The parties agreed to establish a hotline to prevent provocations and coordination issues that arise.

The leaders of the movement stressed that any manifestation of chauvinism and xenophobia would be punished.

So there you have it.  It turns out I was in fact more correct than even I had understood, having previously allowed that the leaders of Pravy Sektor could have themselves been confused.  Well, when you meet with Israelis and pledge to defend the Jews and punish anyone who dares question them, you aren’t confused – you are a shill.

Though it is possible that the boys out fighting on the streets will stand up and oppose their leaders pledging their lives to the defense of the Jewish people, I see it as highly unlikely.  No, this is all going to go exactly how the Jews planned it – the Ukraine will enter the EU, take on massive debt, and eventually be totally destroyed.

What We Can Learn

Hopefully, after the debacle of reckless support being irresponsibly thrown behind this Jewish operation by various sectors of the activist community, no doubt ending with a lot of people feeling very foolish, we can learn something for the future.

The most obvious thing to note here is that it is not only possible, but highly probable, that a group wearing nationalist symbols is being managed by Jews.  They understand that the most effective way to neutralize the opposition is to become the opposition.  As such, when a group claiming to be nationalist is engaging in behaviors which are inconsistent with the symbols they wear, their actions should be considered more relevant than what they are wearing.

When the actions conflict with the t-shirts, you have a duty to judge the actions over the t-shirts.

Remember this: When the actions conflict with the t-shirts, you have a duty to judge the actions over the t-shirts.

The bottom line is that serious opposition will not endorse Jewish revolution, in the way that both Svoboda and Pravy Sektor did when they refused to question the Jews who were managing the revolution.  We should also note that when you see Jews openly endorsing an allegedly nationalist organization, as they did with the alleged nationalists in the Ukraine, you should assume that they know something that you don’t know.

Thankfully, the fact that so many in the internet activist scene supported this Jewish coup did not have any effect on its outcome.  The Jews would have won here whether or not you supported them, or condemned them as I did.  However, it will not be long before your support does matter, and if you decide to support an openly Jewish-driven revolution, the consequences will be dire.

If we truly wish to stand in opposition to the Jewish parasite, we must be wise as serpents, and not fall into the traps they lay.

source: http://www.dailystormer.com/ukraine-right-sector-leader-dmitry-yarosh-meets-with-israeli-ambassador-pledges-allegiance-to-the-jewish-race/

Here is a follow up to the original post/interview above courtesy The Saker…

Meet the (real) new authorities in the Ukraine, example #1
Published on Feb 25, 2014

Forget Klitchko, Iatseniuk, Tiagnibok or Tymoshenko. Though they all have some degree of popular support, what they don’t have is power. The real authorities in the Ukraine is the so-called “Right Sector”, their leader, Dmytro Yarosh, and his brownshirts. This video shows the reaction of one of these gentlemen, a certain Alexander Muzychka aka “Sashko Bilyi”, a veteran of the war against Russia in Chechnia, addressing a meeting the administration of the Roven region in the northeast of the Ukraine. Mr Muzychka, upon being informed that the new (official) authorities in Kiev have decided to collect unregistered weapons, addressed the meeting with the following words:

Who of you wants to take my assault-rifle away?
Who of you wants to take my pistol?
Who wants to take away my pistol, my assault-rifle or my knives?
If somebody wants to take them, let him come near and try!

Needless to say, none of the politicians in the room said a single word.

This is the new regime in the Ukraine. And this is not going to change any time soon. The Ukrainian military is a joke and exists only on paper. The Ukrainian police has almost totally vanished and the only force which now has a monopoly on violence are the neo-Nazis.

The US and EU can really be proud of themselves. This is indeed a stunning success for “democracy”.

The Saker

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7FH2kgjtfU

Here is a follow up to the above video re: Alexander Muzychko

A Nazi leader Alexander Muzychko humiliates a public prosecutor (Rivne, Ukraine)
Published on Feb 27, 2014

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5vSCGSvf3U

Ok, at some point the topic needs a perspective that will never be spoken of nor seen by the vast majority. This is the point of our exploration into this ugly situation that is unfolding and hidden in plain sight. Surely the source, content and details will be offensive to most but please consider reviewing the following few comments courtesy the white supremacists at Stormfront message boards. Be sure to inform your elected politicos on all 3 sides, especially the Regime loyalists, that we know more than they do and sooner or later they will be brought to account considering the Right Sector does not intend to allow EU integration either…

New heroes of Ukraine. Nationalists in Ukraine uprising. Right Sector.

“Right sector – against the regime and integration”

Thread for collecting best interviews, articles, videos and anything else that explains: who are nationalists fighting on the frontlines of Ukraine Uprising, what are their organizations, ideologies, goals and motivations. Who are their leaders, heroes and martyrs. Why do they fight to the death?

Топик для сбора правдивой информации о героях Украинского Правого сопротивления. Кто их герои и лидеры, какова идеология ключевых организаций, какие причины заставляют их бороться насмерть против Хануковича?
Essential read: WhiteNationalism.com TOO White History
White-friendly movies to promote (imdb etc); Black inventions myths

Dog “racism” – not obliged to follow the white-lies of the human world, the world of canines offers obvious parallels. Study rates dog breeds by intelligence. Insurers profile “aggressive breeds”. Note: “[..] less genetic difference between dogs, wolves and coyotes than there is between the ethnic groups of the human species […]”.
Academic anti-racism? Charlatans and wishful thinkers.”I have used Boas’s study to fight what I guess could be considered racist approaches to anthropology,” said Dr. David Thomas, curator of anthropology at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. “I have to say I am shocked at the findings [of it being wrong].”

Diversity is: no cohesion, no trust, no consensus, no freedom, invasive statism, dystopia, entropy. Some of the most tyrannical, repressive and unfree societies were/are some of the most “diverse”.

source: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1025158/

While “our” elected leaders, especially the Regime’s hand selected delegation as well as those from the rest of the “western” world might like to point in only one direction, EU integration as opposed to closer ties to the Kremlin, when placing blame for the violence and seem to be fixated on the events that spawned from WW1 and WW2…

re: New heroes of Ukraine. Nationalists in Ukraine uprising. Right Sector.
Copying from the big Ukrainian thread

Published on Feb 21, 2014

The Great Ukrainian Reconquista: What is the Right Sector fighting for?

We, the warriors and commanders of the Right Sector are actively fighting the regime, remembering the heroism of King Svyatoslav the Courageous of Kyiv, King Danylo of Galicia, of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the warriors of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; implementing the right of a people to rise against injustice; and aware of our responsibilities before the dead and injured heroes of the Maidan.

For the right of every Ukrainian to human dignity…

For a fair criminal trial of Berkut and other dogs of the occupational system…

Against the humiliation and impoverishment of the Ukrainian people…

Against the war of the government with its own people…

For responsible voters and politicians…

For the election of judges…

Against corrupt and marginal democracy…

Against degeneracy and totalitarian liberalism…

For traditional folk morality and family values…

For Ukrainian families having many children…

For a spiritually and physically healthy youth…

Against a culture of consumerism and eroticism…

Against any form of “integration” on terms dictated from outside of Ukraine…

For unity and worldwide greatness of the Ukrainian nation…

For a great Ukrainian and European Reconquista… Everything is only beginning! From our Maidan, the rebirth of Kyivan-Rus/Ukraine commences, the rebirth of Europe commences.

Glory to Ukraine!

Glory to our heroes!

source: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t414368/

Sorry friends, but sometimes we need to look directly into their eyes to see what lies within their minds in order to fully understand their ultimate intentions…

The Ukraine riots should be called the 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine
The 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine

I wrote an article for discussion on the blatantly Jewish origins of these riots in Ukraine. It is self-evident, it cannot be denied, Russia has even stated that it was caused by ‘international’ influences, it is quite literally the 2nd Jewish War on Ukraine!

The majority of protests occurred after the Ukrainian government refused to ratify or participate in the discussion of legislation from November the 21st 2013, that would have moved Ukraine into further trade deals and political union with the collapsing European Union… As outlined in an article the day the trade deal between the EU and Ukraine was de-facto rejected: The Jewish ‘community’ or kabal in Ukraine was staunchly in favour of joining the EU in order to subject the Ukrainian people to another phased Holodomor…Jewish supremacists in Ukraine, including the various unofficial chief Rabbi’s of Ukraine called for Ukraine to enter the EU, this call was not adhered to and subsequently many Jewish-supremacists inside Ukraine and through the United states took it upon themselves to instigate, fund and organise mass-riots and demonstrations against the pro-Ukrainian independent President and government of Ukraine…

Like Syria this conflict has been instigated by foreigners allegedly by 100% percent, primarily as a result of subversion organised by Jewish-activists, Jewish front-groups and Jewish political figures on an international level

Read the full article…

If anyone has anything else that they believe needs to be said on the riots, just state such, I might edit the article with more information as time goes on, or write another one, if there is enough of a demand for more coverage.
Nationalist Ásatrú News
Nationalist News – Ásatrú Inspiration

All encompassing professional news service and more: economics, demographics, criminology, racial realism, exposing the causes, promoting and providing the infrastructure for the courageous solutions, -telling the straight truth-.


Here is the “Read the full article” referenced above…

Article author: Nationalist Ásatrú News / Published: 23rd Æfterra Jéola 2014 / 23rd day After Yule 2264.RE

The 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine

(UPDATED -1800hrs- 23/1/2014)

In-between 10,000-40,000 anti-government protestors, demonstrators and rioters led by Jewish protest leaders and organizer’s have led continual protests in Kiev through Wednesday night and today especially that have caused the confirmed death of in-between 2* and 5 Ukrainian people and has left thousands injured and with hundreds of serious injuries including severe burns and fractured bones many thousands of protestors have been hurt, who following the vile orders of often-times Jewish organizers have led these nieve protestors into violent confrontations with riot police and military drafted riot police.

Dozens of state police have also been critically or seriously burned and injured, with over 80 police officers having been hospitalized and over 200 injured and millions of pounds equivalent has been lost in the loss of national productivity, property damage and the enormous policing costs primarily in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. The majority of the rioting occured and is still occuring (albeit at lower concentrations) around Maidan square and Europe square in Kiev.

*The two confirmed deaths were as a result of bullet wounds, the Kiev police issued a statement that they were not carrying any metal bullet (as opposed to rubber bullet) ammunition. The opposition leaders are now split as to whether violence is the way forward, with some calling for more violent protests, Jewish opposition leaders such as Vitali Klitschko (not even a Ukrainian, but is a Jew from Kyrgyztan) was calling instead for a nation-wide general strike.

Like Syria this conflict has been instigated by foreigners allegedly by 100% percent, primarily as a result of subversion organised by Jewish-activists, Jewish front-groups and Jewish political figures on an international level

Why are there protests in Ukraine?

The majority of protests occurred after the Ukrainian government refused to ratify or participate in the discussion of legislation from November the 21st 2013, that would have moved Ukraine into further trade deals and political union with the collapsing European Union.

As I outlined in an article the day the trade deal between the EU and Ukraine was de-facto rejected: The Jewish ‘community’ or kabal in Ukraine was staunchly in favour of joining the EU in order to subject the Ukrainian people to another phased Holodomor.

Although this might sound like an outlandish statement to make, the EU, through the free movement of people, coupled with the Jewish ambition for the EU to accept Turkey as an EU member state would, undeniably and inevitably result in the comparative demographic genocide of the Ukrainian and all European people if it were to continue unabated.

Jewish supremacists in Ukraine, including the various unofficial chief Rabbi’s of Ukraine called for Ukraine to enter the EU, this call was not adhered to and subsequently many Jewish-supremacists inside Ukraine and through the United states took it upon themselves to instigate, fund and organise mass-riots and demonstrations against the pro-Ukrainian independent President and government of Ukraine.

The protests had also been occurring before the rejection of the EU trade deals, this was primarily once again as a result of Jewish-supremacist instigation as Ukraine was moving towards further alliances and trade deals with Russia. There is a culture of anti-Russian sentiment inside Ukraine from the general population, as many Ukrainians still remember and lived through the end years of the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus some have been fooled into thinking alliances and trade deals with Russia would be a return to the Soviet Union days.

This is the opposite of the truth (and thus it is no surprise that we find Jewish supremacists promoting the opposite of the truth), as “The EU is the new Communism” (in this video Farage also promises Racial nationalist’s unstoppable return to power that even he cannot stop) and it is being increasingly acknowledged as such in Western Europe.

The Ukrainian government has already accused the EU and American efforts of attempting to subvert Ukraine. It is evident that the protests in Ukraine started literally minutes after EU integration talks ceased.

This fact alone proves that there is an epidemic of systematic anti-Ukrainian (and ultimately anti-white, as shown via the above argument) motivation behind the organizers of the recent protests, which have taken advantage of nieve and uninformed protestors and has, as all Jewish-supremacist revolutions or attempted revolutions do, resulted in the death of numerous Europeans already as of the time of publication of this article.

The fact that the Ukrainian public do not widely speak English has made it harder for them to be made aware of the horrific nature of the EU as revealed in our cultural discussions and in France, Scandinavia and Greece.

This has subsequently made it easier for Jewish-supremacists to play both sides of the political debate in Ukraine, stirring up fears of Russia (and Putin) by using anti-Russian and then anti-Soviet arguments at the same time, in front of different audiences, to create widespread anti-government sentiment over numerous sides of the political spectrum and debate within Ukraine. Although the silent majority (the small middle class and educated folk especially) of Ukrainians are still in support of Ukrainian independence from the EU, but as in all Jewish-supremacist revolutions or cultural upheaval attempts, the silent majority are always sidelined, for the interests of Jews themselves.

The Ukrainian anti-government protestors need to realize they are mistakenly on the side of communism, Jewish-supremacists and Globalist forces by demonstrating against their own freedom as a sovereign nation. Ukrainians need to wake up to the sheer idiocy of protesting against their own freedom, in the name of ‘freedom to be in the EU’.

This predicament of small proportions of Ukraine fighting against their own interests whilst thinking they are standing up for them, is akin to all the Jewish-supremacist manipulations, such as arguing for diversity which means less diversity (white genocide and multi-cultural nothingness) or arguing for equality, which actually means less equality (with more money going to Jewish bankers and the gab between the rich Jewish bankers and everyone else increasing until serfdom).

The anti-Ukrainian government protests and the recent ‘ultimatum’ for new elections is akin to the US pressure exerted on Russia, after Putin’s 1st successful re-election last election cycle, where democratic legitimacy means nothing to do with democratic legitimacy but whether that democratic government fully supports the Jewish-supremacist geo-political objectives or not.

The anti-Ukrainian protests are thus an attempt, to try to deny Russia a key geo-political, economic and military ally in Ukraine, in a wider, well-established anti-white effort to surround, isolate and attempt to destroy Russia on behalf of Jewish financial and racial interests who still hate the Russian people (as European people) for their defiance and destruction of communism in the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Some intelligent and well-informed Ukrainians have instead protested and surrounded the US embassy in Kiev, against the US (via Jewish-supremacists based in the US administration through figure-heads such as Kerry, McCain and Schumer*) subversion in Ukraine.

Several Nationalists in Ukraine have also used the protests as sufficient cover in order to engage in protesting at Jews and Jewish Synagogues, having correctly identified the cause of the current anti-Ukrainian disturbances. Some Nationalists have also taken part in demonstrations albeit for entirely different reasons. There are numerous pictures of well-equiped nationalists taking part in the riot in very small numbers.

The symbol on the shield there is quite evidently an Odin rune, the symbol of the Nordic and Germanic God Odin, the religion of our ancestors is popular throughout nationalist circles even in non-Northern European nations such as Ukraine and Russia and such persons as expected are on the frontlines, using the protest as cover for their own operations and to satiate their anger at the Ukrainian regime for its anti-protest laws and rampant corruption from Christian and Jewish political leaders. (Right) Look closely, that is a German Flecktarn jacket, popular with nationalists, and I can bet only nationalists are as well prepared and armoured as that person there.

The semi-nationalist and anti-interventionist policies of Vladimir Putin, is another reason why Ukraine is being pressured, via internal subversion to move away from Russia, because Russia (and China) are the only major powers who pose a colossal threat to Jewish-supremacist globalist ambitions.

These Jewish ‘opposition leaders’ (much like the foreign backed opposition leaders of Syria*) have made the ludicrous assertion that President Viktor Yanukovych has to call early elections within 24 hours from today (23/1/2014) or face massive protests.

*The same divide and rule (through internal subversion and the creation of factions) tactic resulting in the creation of “provisional” or opposition leaders or factions in countries opposed to Jewish-supremacist geo-political and racial objectives is blatantly clear.

Although it seems that many political factions are attempting to seize the moment, created by Jewish-international subversion, ironically even nationalists, as the above picture demonstrates are seeking to make an impact in their own way. It is likely that the Jewish international media may use pictures such as this to attempt to blame the whole protest on Nationalists, when it is a well-established fact that in previous Ukrianian riots it is Jewish thugs (or often-times Christian) and Jewish communists who are always the violent criminals in such events, nationalists are out on patrol to prevent the Jewish thugs from completely controlling the direction and messages of the protests, this is evident from the protestors denounciation of the so-called opposition leader of Yatsenyuk and others.

“You, Mr. President, have the opportunity to resolve this issue. Early elections will change the situation without bloodshed and we will do everything to achieve that,”

One of many opposition leaders, Arseniy Yatsenyuk in front of 40,000 people, whom he turned up to claim to represent.

The allegedly racially Jewish and evidently pro-Jewish opposition leader (one of many) Yatsenyuk has openly sought to escalate the violence and urge nieve Ukrainians to literally kill themselves in the face of Ukrainian police for Jewish interests by stating that:

“tomorrow we will go forward together* And if it’s a bullet in the forehead, then it’s a bullet in the forehead, but in an honest, fair and brave way”

*”Forward together” being an age old Jewish-communist phrase, but it will not be Jewish-subversives taking bullets to the forehead but European Ukrainians who will be killed for the sake of these Jewish-subversives and pro-EU (pro-white genocide) subversives like Yatsenyuk.

The Russian state Duma has also issued a unanimous statement warning western powers from continuing their incitement of the Ukrainian crisis, although in reality these Western powers, are almost entirely Jewish-supremacists, and their Communist and Socialist slave-followers in the EU commission.

‘On aggravation of the situation in Ukraine’

“In essence, there are attempts to forcefully overthrow the legitimate power institutes in the country… It is regrettable that all these events are provoked and used by representatives of the political opposition who cynically call themselves supporters of democracy… The State Duma again warns that the external pressure on Ukraine and artificially imposing the geopolitical choice of EU association are unacceptable,”

-Russian MPs of the Duma, by unanimous declaration.

The Duma, also ‘expressed readiness to boost the cooperation with the Ukrainian parliament – the Vekhovna Rada – in order to further develop the partnership between nations’ -according to RT.

This statement in this context, could be an indication of Russian willingness to intervene in Ukraine if the protests reach any serious military proportions, in what is obviously a Russian declaration of intent to stand by the true interests of Ukraine and its elected democracy.

It is reported that Military-grade Armoured Personnel Carriers are now on several streets of Ukraine with further mobilization inevitable, in what is evidently an increase in the response to the violent Jewish-supremacist-instigated protests.

*When looking someone up on Wikipedia go straight to the ‘Early life and education’ section and that will allow you to see whether someone is publically Jewish or not in a few seconds, subsequently this normally tells you all you need to know about their ideology, racial interests and motivations.

The Ukrainian people should remember the Holodomor and the majority-Jewish perpetrators who designed, created and then staffed the Soviet government responsible for the genocide of over 7 million Ukrainians in the 1930s and realise that allegedly the very same ethnic culprits who were behind the Holodomor are rallying against their nation once again, turning neighbour against neighbour, friend against friend, in a war that only benefits and can only benefit Jewish interests through what would be the destruction of Ukraine under the EU and the further attempts to isolate Russia.

Jewish-Supremacists have declared that Ukraine should be forced along with their agenda, to its own destruction long-term or be reduced to civil-war in the short-term, this is what malign Jewish-subversion looks like in reality in the videos below, behind the facade of media control and PR, this day the smell of burning flesh and ruined lives fills the air of our nations.”

Keep positive, Keep practical, Keep persevering.

source: http://nationalistasatrunews.com/complete-chronological-archive/the-2nd-jewish-war-on-ukraine.html

Here is a couple of short Right Sector propaganda videos…

Right Sector. The Great Ukrainian Reconquista (English subtitles)
Published on Feb 21, 2014
Rostyslav Ivanyk

The Great Ukrainian Reconquista: What is the Right Sector fighting for?


Right sector. Ukrainian Revolution 2014
Published on Feb 12, 2014


Since the association to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was mentioned by Dmytro Yarosh in the interview, this video may offer some more insight that may be rather important…

Greek Catholic (Uniate) Clergyman in Ukraine calls to kick out Blacks, Jews and Russians
Andre Fomine
Published on Feb 24, 2014

A Sunday sermon by Rev. Mikhaylo Arsenych delivered in 2010:

“Today we are really ready for a revolution.
Would the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army tolerate Tabachnik and Yanukovych today?
The only effective methods of combat are assassination and terror!
The right way to communicate with the enemies is to fire at them!
Our message to them is the message of death by hanging. We’ll send all communists to the gallows-tree in our forest!
The message is our cry for vengence — take your weapon and chase all fear!
It is not a good time to be afraid!
We have been waiting for 20 years!
The situation will get better only if each of us makes a contribution to the construction of our national state.
We must first knock down the old house, and then build the new one.
We must rebuild our political regime and create a new sovereign state.
Only then will we live in our own country – in a country that takes care of our needs.
We want to be masters in our own house and decide for ourselves.
We want to be sure that our children will go to Ukrainian school.
We want to be sure that no Chinese, Negro, Jew or Muscovite will try to come and grab our land tomorrow!
Our success depends on each of us. We shouldn’t waver, we must keep covered todays political regime. The ground will be burning under their feet, like our torches are burning today!
Our hand must be firm! Glory to the Ukraine!”

ANALYSIS: http://orientalreview.org/2014/02/24/the-ukraine-neo-nazi-criminal-state-looming-in-the-centre-of-europe/

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5EXdbzIDEk

While we choose to not post additional links, there are literally dozens upon dozens of rather graphic and gruesome videos and hundreds of self-fulfilling articles posted by the militants themselves that have not been shown nor discussed via the msm conglomerates. We suggest that everyone begin to question everything you see and hear from the various politicians, analysts, think tanks and their profiteering propaganda outlets.

Keep in mind that while we hope we are incorrect, just like the “War on Terror” they are all selling the illusion of spreading peace, prosperity and democracy.

Before jumping to conclusions or on any bandwagons and remember that the People of Ukraine may not be aware of what lies ahead and what lies ahead will not be good considering it has all been based on lies and deception by modern day snake-oil salesman.

Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

ShareAlike Statement: https://dumpharper.wordpress.com/sharealike/