Tag Archives: Canada

Harper Party Spies

To hear the Harper Party loyalists talk, you’d think that the Liberal Party of Canada has a problem. Yet another Liberal has spoken words that don’t echo the words of their leader.

And this is a problem?

Let’s set the scene. A woman asked retired General Andrew Leslie about his thoughts regarding the Israeli Palestine situation. The General gave a long answer including the need for Israel to be able to defend herself from terrorists, such as Hamas, but he also blamed the Israeli military for the deaths of civilians in Palestine.

I guess the General didn’t realize that he was talking with a Harper Party spy. Looking to get whatever dirt she could dig up on a noted Liberal contender for the 2015 Election and she hit the mother lode! This guy thinks the Israeli military shouldn’t have killed Palestinian civilians!

What a horrid thought. No mere MP much less a noted advisor to Stephen Harper would say such a thing. No, Stephen’s troops would blindly parrot the talking points issued from the unelected, appointed, not ready for big boy pants crew in the PMO.

Nope, they’d swallow their gumption and say whatever their Leader says they should say. Here are your pompoms and here’s your script: “Israel is good, Palestinians are bad and they all deserve to die.”

Rah Team!

The problem with the Harper Party antics is that General Leslie is right. As a professional soldier, trained in the military, he knows the rules and one of the biggies is that every effort must be undertaken to prevent civilian casualties or “collateral damage” as they like to say today.

What is even more horrid is the tactics that the Harper Team are stooping to in an attempt to try and demonize the Liberal Party.

While the Harper Party complains about the liberal media and “gotcha journalism” they are stepping down several rungs with these Secret Agent X19 tactics. Sneak a recording device in and try and get the enemy to say something that can be used against them. And then try to get the so called incriminating evidence into the public eye.

The Harperistas didn’t send their ill gotten booty to the media, not at first; they tried to hand it over to a prominent Jewish organization who put the kibosh on that plan. They were smart enough to not get involved in petty politics, maybe they can read the writing on the wall or maybe they just don’t like the idea of being used as a dupe for the Harper Party?

So they went with Plan B. Hand the audio over to the Sun News Network, the finest investigative journalists this side of 1972 Pravda. And the Sun News Crew was more than happy to jump all over this.

The Harper People crow about this, they see nothing wrong, they just want people to know what goes on in the opposing camp. What they don’t say is that this is putting a chilling effect on Democracy in Canada.

It is hard enough to get a politician to say anything in public now, they don’t want to annoy the Boss, but in the future, every politician of every stripe is going to be guarded in what they say lest there be a secret agent nearby. And when they’re done with the named politicians, they can start on those who are merely considering running for office.

Seriously, it is hard to get a politician to comment on the weather anymore. What with having to consider if this stretch of warm weather is bad for the farmers and so on it takes them tem minutes to come up with “Yep, nice weather.” It is getting to the point that some politicians cannot scratch their butt without a note from the PMO.

Real boats rock, Steve. Having people within a party who hold differing opinions is not a bad thing, it is part of Democracy. Any Leader, be it in politics or business that surrounds themselves with kowtowing lackies soon finds themselves on the outside looking in.

But your echo boxes are half right. How can Canadians decide on which candidate is best for their riding if we don’t know how they think and what they feel about the issues that we care about? Simply put they can’t.

I am comfortable in voting for someone who has the wits and courage to speak their mind in public. It means that they have the ability to speak up for me in the House and in the Caucus. These are not your people, Steve.

They are mine.

And for what it’s worth, there are an awful lot of people like me who think that the killing and wounding of civilians is wrong. It doesn’t matter which side does it.

I like General Leslie a hell of a lot more that any echo box you have to offer.

Ta ta for now,


Happy By-Election Canada Day!

Today (June 30th) like many people I’m celebrating my Canada Holiday by sitting at home and enjoying a day off.

Where I work, it was a mutual decision between the employer and the workers to have a 3 day weekend rather than have everyone show up for Monday and then take Tuesday off. It’s a win-win case. The workers have a long weekend, and it makes it far easier for the employer to schedule production for the week.

A lot of other people will be celebrating tomorrow, which IS Canada Day, and some lucky buggers will get a 4 day weekend out of it.

I wish.

Depending on the type of business you’re in, starting up for one day of work is a huge pain in the keister. Shutting things down and restarting them on Wednesday eats up a chunk of productive time and the boss would rather not do that… and a three day weekend is nice.

So what kind of idiot would schedule anything important on June 30th?

Well Steve Harper for one. 4 by-elections are slated for today.

You have to wonder how many people will bother to show up to vote today, what with Canada Day being a semi fixed holiday so some people get the 30th, some get the 1st, and not to mention that this weekend marks the more or less official start to the summer so many people will have this week (and possibly more) booked off for vacation time. I know I did when I had the luxury of being able to book my time off.

So why schedule the by-elections for today and not last Monday for example?

I’m figuring there are two main reasons. Number One, it guarantees low turnout at the polls and low turnout is usually a good thing for the incumbent party when it comes to elections in general and especially by-elections. And Number Two he figures the Harper Party “get out the vote” machine will outperform the other parties’ efforts and prevent any surprises.

Now I’ve seen a fair amount of complaints that this will affect Fort McMurray more than the other ridings, but I think the people saying this don’t work in heavy industry. Fort Mac is 24/7 and they don’t shut off for a one day holiday in the oil fields, it’s just way too expensive.

I could be wrong, but I doubt it.

But that doesn’t mean the people working in other jobs around Fort Mac may not be affected, but probably not that much more than anywhere else that has a by-election today.

I guess the bottom line is the Party that likes to claim they’re for this, that, and the other thing aren’t really all that in favour of Democracy. At least not in Canada anyway.

Too often I keep coming back to this point. Our Democracy is far too important to trust to a bunch of ninnies in Ottawa and yet by and large we are more than willing to let those same ninnies run roughshod over our Democracy.

If you want change, you need to do something and voting is about the simplest thing you can do to cause it to happen. I’m willing to bet that too many people are going to be more interested in getting to the camp grounds or the cottage than to make sure their voice is heard.

A shame isn’t it?

Well, that’s about it for me today. I don’t get to vote today, so I’ll watch a little World Cup and get some errands done. I’ll enjoy today as best I can since I’m back to work tomorrow.

Enjoy your Canada Day whenever it happens! I’ll have a beer for you.

Oh, and if today is By-Election Day in your neck of the woods, get your butt out there and vote!




Long Live the Wage Slave

A friend of mine, someone who I worked beside, used to refer to “us” the employees at that company as “wage slaves”. What he meant by that, as he explained to me, is that companies generally pay only enough to keep employees.

Not to keep them happy, just to keep them.

There is a point, he explained, at which people will stop looking for work because they are earning “enough”. Now we were not getting rich by any means, but we were content. Most of us were able to pay our bills, buy some luxuries, and set some aside for savings. Depending on your priorities you could do pretty good working there.

Actually it’s an old idea. Henry Ford was one of the first, if not the first to use it.

Henry had a problem. He was selling Model T cars faster than he could make them. Or rather he could have sold more if he had been able to make them, but there was a problem with production.

Ford Motors at that time was paying the same wages as most other manufacturers at that time. So it really didn’t matter if you worked for Ford or someone else, you were going to make similar wages.

Now working in an auto plant at that time was dirty and dangerous, people would just quit because they didn’t like it, people would take sick days or whatever because there was no incentive to stay. Ford realized that he was spending more money training new people than these new people were producing for him (trainees are slow and require a trainer) and absenteeism was slowing production even more.

Ford needed a new idea. He decided to pay his people an outrageous wage and to shorten the work week and shorten the work day as well. His competitors thought he’d lost it. He’ll be out of business in no time they claimed.

What actually happened was the opposite. Productivity soared, people were willing to work and to work hard to keep their Ford Wage, absenteeism dropped dramatically for the same reason. Will all the workers showing up and not needing to train new people every day, Ford had hit the mother lode. His laughing competitors stopped snickering and started to copy him because they were losing their workers as everyone wanted to work for Ford and worse, they were losing sales.

Contrast that with the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFW) that we have in place here in Canada. If Henry Ford could have done this, the world would be a vastly different place.

Businesses apply to the government to allow them to bring in foreign workers because of a supposed lack of available people to work those jobs with the appropriate skill set.

Arguably there is a need to bring in some out of country workers for jobs that require a special set of skills. Let’s say the company purchased a new piece of equipment from a foreign supplier and needs someone to come with that piece of equipment to train the staff on how to use and maintain that equipment. That makes sense.

TFWs in the service industry? That’s another thing all together.

It’s not just the service industry, there are others that are using the TFW to displace or to avoid hiring people who have or are willing to learn the necessary skills to perform the duties required by these employers.

Why would they do that? Employee retention is a big issue here. These companies spend time and money to train people to be valuable to their company and these people may leave if they see a better offer or a job closer to home that needs the same skills as they learned with the original company.

This is where Henry Ford shook up the world. He was willing to make life better for the workers to retain them. With TFWs, employers don’t have to.

What happens when you become a TFW?

In some recent news stories these workers are used and housed by the employer. They make close to the same wage if not the same wage as Canadian workers, but the Canadian worker has the ability to quit.

The TFW is under contract to work for the employer, the TFW cannot simply quit for another job. If the TFW doesn’t keep the employer happy though, the TFW can be fired back to wherever he or she came from.

How would you like to live under those terms?

If your employer was abusive, let’s say scheduling your 8 hour shift to the morning rush for 4 hours and the supper rush for 4 hours, how long would you work there?

We have labour standards about safety and hours of work and overtime but they are only available to people who have the ability to complain to the authorities. If your boss had the power to ship you back to the Philippines or Belize because you were a “bad worker” who went to the Labour Board because you were doing unsafe work, would you report it?

We saw the case with the Royal Bank where current employees were being forced to train their TFW replacements before they were tossed into the street. We’ve seen the reports of Canadians in the fast food industry having their shifts reduced to accommodate TFWs who have to be given a full week of work each week. Employers who allegedly won’t even look at Canadian resumes because they would rather hire TFWs, the list goes on.

The employers argue that the TFWs are better workers, and that may be, but fear is a wonderful motivator. And living in fear is no way to live.

I’m sure that TFWs are good workers even without having to be scared of losing their jobs to perform well. Many of them see this as a means to emigrate to Canada because they see a better life in Canada than they would see back in their native countries.

I’m equally sure there are good employers who treat their TFWs with the same respect that they would show a Canadian employee.

But the question still remains, why are we importing workers to work at burger chains and coffee chains when we have so many people looking for work?

Being a wage slave used to be a voluntary position. If you were treated OK and the pay wasn’t bad, you’d stay with your employer. The TFW model has flipped this on its head. These people are locked in to jobs that they may be overqualified for and they have no real ability to change things. They are virtual slaves to their employers, but they do get a wage for their work.

Displacing the parttimers.

Flipping burgers and pouring coffee used to be the domain of the part time worker, usually students. They were able to buy themselves the things that they wanted or to save for the future, maybe towards a university education. These young part timers were often working their first jobs, they were learning the skills to work in full time positions down the road, and they are being cheated out of this part of their education by greedy employers and a government that just doesn’t seem to have a clue.

The solution is simple. The government could very easily change the policies to prevent abuses of the system, but they seem loathe to do that. Why? I don’t know, maybe it’s because employers tend to have more money to donate to political parties than their employees do?

Around the corner from where I live is a variety store. When I go to that store, the person working the counter is usually one of the owners. When I get pizza, I see the owners working in the shop as well. This used to be normal for smaller businesses. More and more if you look at the ownership signs that often appear at the entrance was you’ll see that the business is owned by XYZ Enterprises or a numbered company.

These are the guys that need the cheap labour that can’t walk away. They fronted the money for the franchise and that’s all they think they should be required to do. If you cannot make a go of it by paying a decent wage or without risking high turnover then you’re in the wrong business. If you’re not willing to stand behind the counter or flip burgers yourself, you’re in the wrong business.

And the government should not be in the business of letting you import slaves, even if you do pay them (the slaves, that is).

Laters, BC

Will #Harper’s #cdnpoli Lies re #Crimea #Ukraine Lead to War with #Russia?

There are several burning questions with no clear answers. We will explore the subject and present some grossly overlooked facts that preceded the current seemingly manufactured crisis situation in Crimea. Before things spiral into the abyss it’s very important that everybody keep cool heads considering time and time again we are told by the Harper Government that the Canadian Government is acting for the benefit of the “Ukrainian people”.

Does a lie become the truth by simply repeating it over and over?

Is Stephen Harper and John Baird’s opaque “Cold War” lies and misrepresentation of the facts regarding Ukraine leading to war with Russia or is this just self-fulfilling grandstanding by the PMO or simply a dangerous campaign stunt aimed at pandering for votes hatched within the Harper Party itself?

Is the Canadian media’s lack of due diligence in omitting facts by repeating press releases from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and reports from RFE/RL’s Ukraine/Russia/Middle East dis-information propaganda arm Radio Svoboda fueling an unnecessary rush to war?

Do these events truly signify that the Harper Government has officially ceded Canada’s sovereignty and turned over control to foreign entities?

Unfortunately there is to this point no recognition of events leading to the formation of the Government Harper’s going to visit – overturning of an agreement made on 21 February 2014.

An action motivating the Russians, but to this point totally ignored in the words of John Baird – though not in those of Christopher Westdal, a former Canadian ambassador to both Ukraine and Russia.

Does re-directing the narrative away from Kiev and towards Crimea change the facts?

This is very troubling since it really brings into question the legitimacy of Stephen Harper and John Baird among others. Another troubling aspect is the complicity with which the Canadian media conglomerates have decided to report on the subsequent events. Not only that, but if there was a voice within Ottawa that knew the truth, the secretly passed lifelong gag order officially titled “Order Amending the Schedule to the Security of Information Act P.C. 2014-165 February 28, 2014” that was quietly announced on 12 March 2013 via the Canada Gazette website would see them imprisoned for up to 14 years.

On Friday, February 21 there was agreement on positive directions for the Ukraine as related in the following live blog coverage article via the Guardian:

Ukraine crisis: deal signed in effort to end Kiev standoff
Shiv Malik and Aisha Gani in London and Tom McCarthy in New York theguardian.com, Friday 21 February 2014 23.01 GMT

The signed agreement has been translated and is now available on the German Foreign ministry’s website.

Here it is in full:

Concerned with the tragic loss of life in Ukraine, seeking an immediate end of bloodshed and determined to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, We, the signing parties, have agreed upon the following:

1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted,signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

3. Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

4. Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

5. The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

6. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation.

Kyiv, 21 February 2014


President of Ukraine: Viktor Yanukovych

For the Opposition: Vitaliy Klichko, UDAR, Oleh Tyahnibok, Svoboda, Arsenij Yatseniuk, Batkivshchyna

Witnessed by:

For the EU – Poland: foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski; Germany: foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier; France: foreign minister Laurent Fabius

For the Russian Federation – Vladimir Lukin, special envoy

Updated at 3.27pm GMT

source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-president-claims-deal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev

download/view: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf

The agreement was officially delivered by the Embassy of Ukraine to Canada on 21 February 2014:

February 21, 2014 an Agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine was signed in Kyiv
21 February, 22:58 Embassy of Ukraine to Canada

In result of negotiations President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders Arseniy Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok and Vitali Klitschko have signed an agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine.

The Agreement provides:

– Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now.

– Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

– Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

– Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014.

– New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

– Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

– The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence.

– The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

– Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

– Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force.

– After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine.

– The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

The negotiations was also attended by representatives of the European Union – German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Head for Continental Europe at the French Foreign Ministry Eric Fournier and also Russian human rights commissioner Vladimir Lukin.

source: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/18110-21-lyutogo-cr-u-kijevi-pidpisano-ugodu-z-vregulyuvannya-krizi-v-ukrajini

The agreement was officially accepted and recognized by John Baird on behalf of Canada on 21 February 2014:

Canada Welcomes Agreement in Ukraine

February 21, 2014 – Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement on the current situation in Ukraine:

“Canada welcomes the agreement reached today between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders, including the Maidan council, to bring an end to months of repression and violence and hold early presidential elections.

“Canada will remain vigilant in monitoring progress under the agreement and stands ready to promote the full implementation of its commitments. We note the steps taken toward releasing former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison and continue to call for this to happen immediately.

“The measures on travel bans and sanctions announced yesterday by Prime Minister Stephen Harper will be calibrated to respond to the degree to which the Ukrainian authorities adhere to both the spirit and the letter of today’s agreement.

“All Canadians mourn the lives lost over the past several days. We remain committed to ensuring Ukraine’s path toward democracy and to ensuring that the lives were not lost in vain.”

For a full list of actions taken to date by Canada in response to the situation in Ukraine, visit Canada’s Response to the Situation in Ukraine.

– 30 –

For further information, media representatives may contact:

Media Relations Office
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada
Follow us on Twitter: @DFATDCanada

Date Modified: 2014-02-21

source: http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2014/02/21c.aspx?lang=eng

The reaction? “EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement” U.S. said “We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise”:

22 February 2014 EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement

The White House welcomed the signing of an accord between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders Friday.

“We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise, and offer the support of the United States in its implementation,” said White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in a statement released to the press.

The agreement calls for early elections and a new government.

Following the signing, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) restored the 2004 constitution.

Russia, a strong supporter of Yanukovych, was not a signatory to the agreement.

The White House again called for those responsible for the violence to be held accountable, saying it was prepared to “impose additional sanctions if necessary.”

Carney added that the U.S. will stand with the Ukrainian people “as they work to restore peace, security, and human dignity across the country and determine the future course of their nation.”

– The European Union has welcomed the agreement reached on Friday between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders.

In a written statement, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said he welcomed the agreement, describing it as a necessary compromise for a democratic, peaceful way out of the crisis.

Rompuy said the EU continues to stand by Ukraine.

“The agreement was facilitated by the important work of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and based on the persistent efforts of the last two months by High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Fule,” he added.

French President Francois Hollande also welcomed the agreement and called for a “full and timely implementation of the deal.”

“After the unacceptable, intolerable and unjustifiable violence that has plunged Ukraine into mourning in recent days, France calls for the full and timely implementation of the deal that has just been signed,” he said.

Three European foreign ministers – France’s Laurent Fabius, Germany’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski – brokered the peace deal and praised Yanukovych and the opposition for their “courage” in agreeing to end the standoff.

The agreement stipulates a return to the 2004 Constitution within 48 hours and calls for early presidential elections.

The crisis-ending agreement is expected to help end EU sanctions against Ukraine, which were agreed on during yesterday’s extraordinary meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels.

Dozens were killed in violent clashes on Thursday, according to a statement from Ukraine’s Health Ministry.

Mass anti-government protests began in November when Yanukovych refused to sign a free trade agreement with the EU amid pressure from Russia.

– Germany FM expresses cautious optimism after Ukraine deal

Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has welcomed an agreement signed today between Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders, but warned that difficulties lay ahead.

“This might have been the last chance to find an exit and end the violence,” Steinmeier said.

“Not all of the problems are solved,” Steinmeier cautioned, but added that the agreement opened the way for a political solution to the crisis.

“There is reason to look forward with confidence,” he said.

Steinmeier, together with France’s Foreign Minister Fabius Laurent and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski carried out marathon talks with the government and the opposition after deadly clashes broke out early Thursday morning.

The three welcomed the agreement and called for an immediate end to the violence.

“The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland welcome the signing of the agreement and commend the parties for their courage and commitment to the deal. We call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation in Ukraine,” said a joint statement released by the German Foreign Ministry.

Germany’s government spokesman Steffen Seibert said Friday, “This might be the last chance for a political process to come out of this deep crisis in Ukraine.”

“We are witnessing a terrible human tragedy. Dozens of deaths within a few hours,” Seibert noted. He also said that it was the duty of all to ensure that the protests remain non-violent, adding, “It is the duty of the Ukrainian government to create the conditions for nonviolence and an opportunity for peaceful free expression.”

Seibert said the German government strongly condemned the week’s violence and Chancellor Angela Merkel was shocked by the events.

He said Merkel had a phone conversation with Viktor Yanukovych yesterday and convinced him to receive the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland as moderators of talks between the government and the opposition.

source: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/163552/eu-u-s-germany-and-france-welcome-ukraine-agreement.html

Yet the next day overthrow of the agreement and installation of a new President was accepted and is being supported as though there had been no agreement:

Putin’s frustration with West begins to show [Video]

The Globe and Mail | Mar. 04 2014

The Globe’s senior international correspondent Mark MacKinnon explains why the West should not expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to ease tensions over Ukraine.

source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/putins-frustration-with-west-begins-to-show/article17278684/

Christopher Westdal on Ukraine talks [Video]
World | Mar 14, 2014 | 9:37

CBC speaks to former Canadian ambassador to Russia and Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441788499/

Ukraine ambassador on de-escalating Crimea tensions [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 9:02

Vadym Prystaiko comments on a controversial referendum in Crimea as Russia amasses troops at the border

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441749317/

John Baird on Ukraine aid [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 8:21

Foreign Affairs minister discusses Canada’s $220M million loan for Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441750880/

PM Harper to visit Ukraine [Video]
Politics | Mar 14, 2014 | 21:10

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird says Prime Minister Stephen Harper will travel to Kyiv next weekend

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2442000351/

Further Research

Manufacturing Discontent Propaganda 101. Just rinse, recycle and repeat the past…

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union: Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, December 9, 1969 Mentions a FY 1970 budget of $13,130,000 for the Radio Liberty Committee

103. Memorandum for the 303 Committee 1
Washington, December 9, 1969.

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

[1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR.
Secret; Eyes Only.]

4. Alternatives

A. The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination. On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which the program is trying to promote.

B. It could also be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities. In this event the efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American “subversion” would lose some of their credibility. This argument, however, is negated by the fact that suspicions of U.S. intentions are so deeply ingrained that any change in U.S. policy toward the emigration would have minimal impact on the conservatives. Moreover, a source of support for those in the Soviet Union who are sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration would be removed and the Soviet authorities would be able more easily to foist their own version of events on the people and be under less pressure to make reforms.


United States Policy Options

A. High Profile Support
The United States could reverse field and follow a more vigorous pro-émigré policy, which might take the form, for example, of (i) more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré activities and objectives, (ii) extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving U.S. Government assistance; (iii) adoption for the first time of a policy of open support for the independence
of national minority areas like the Ukraine.

—Blatant support of anti-Soviet émigré activities would suggest the determination of the Administration to follow a tough policy toward the USSR, exploiting any vulnerability, in the event that the USSR does not become more cooperative on major issues in dispute.
—Any substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might have some feedback in terms of defections, in acquisition of information, and in stimulating dissension inside the USSR;
—United States identification with the independence of national minority areas would strike a responsive chord in an area like the Ukraine and could strengthen nationalist resistance to Russian domination.


Minority Repression

Among many of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union, dissent is vocal and widespread. It is also vigorously repressed. In the Ukraine, the arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965 and 1966, and subsequent repressions, have been vigorously protested by leading Ukrainian scientists, artists, and writers, including Oleg Antonov, one of the Soviet Union’s leading aircraft designers.

The contempt of the Baltic people for Soviet rule remains as strong as ever. It is no longer expressed in hopeless armed resistance, as it was twenty years ago. Instead, these small nations manifest a vigorous determination to preserve their national cultures. Even the local Communist Party apparatus has sought to assert a degree of autonomy. In Estonia many works of Western literature that have never been published in Russian are printed in the native language. Two of the major underground documents recently proposing alternatives to the Communist dictatorship originated in Estonia.

source: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus1969.pdf [pdf]

NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine
R. Craig Nation
Elihu Root Professor of Military Studies
Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
June 2000


1. The New NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was conceived and maintained during the decades of the Cold War as an association for collective defense in the face of a clear and present external threat. With the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, NATO appeared to many to be an alliance without a mission. In an era of revolutionary transformations, where the familiar certainties of bipolarity no longer held sway, the future of the Alliance was inevitably placed in discussion. Immanuel Wallerstein, speaking from the far left wing of the American political spectrum, pressed the conclusion to its logical extreme: “A Cold War instrument, it is not clear why NATO is now needed … The United States should stop obstructing the creation of a European army, allowing NATO to wither away.”1

The American commitment to European defense lies at the heart of the transatlantic bargain that defines NATO. It is an expensive commitment, which absorbs nearly half of total U.S. military spending.2 Washington reacted to the end of the Cold War by significantly reducing its troop presence in the European theater, lowering the number of effectives from over 300,000 in 1991 to approximately 100,000. Simultaneously, however, it made clear that at the institutional level no other organization could substitute for the Atlantic Alliance as the anchor of a new European security order. From a European perspective, though the imminent d0anger of the Cold War period was no longer in place, as a forum for defense cooperation and a means for keeping the U.S. engaged in the Old Continent the Alliance remained essential.

Survival demanded adaptation, and at its Copenhagen session in 1991 the North Atlantic Council took a first step toward revitalization with a declaration on “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe” that reiterated collective defense and transatlantic cooperation as essential responsibilities.3 As if in answer to Wallerstein, the need to keep other European security forums subordinated to NATO leadership was clearly stated, a priority that coincided with the U.S.’s March 1992 Defense Planning Guidance concept, which specified that “we [the U.S.] must attempt to prevent the emergence of any kind of exclusively European defense forces, that could finish by threatening NATO.” 4

The Atlantic Council summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 culminated a first phase of adaptation. The Council sought to redefine NATO’s military responsibilities with the publication of a New Strategic Concept that encouraged the creation of multilateral formations, coined the phrase “interlocking institutions” to emphasize the complementary role of other leading European institutions (such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Western European Union, and the Council of Europe) in the security sector, and placed a new emphasis upon mobile forces and peace operations.5 NATO’s “intact validity” as the keystone in Europe’s security arch was clearly stated.6 Finally, the Council sought to confront the potential for a security vacuum to develop in post-communist central Europe by announcing the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for formal association between NATO and the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe.7

At Rome the Alliance staked a course toward expanded out of area commitments and engagement to the east. Much of its subsequent development has been consistent with that course. In Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997 the NACC was reestablished as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), with “increased ability to give focus and weight to discussions concerning multilateral political and security-related issues.”8 With 46 members (19 NATO full members plus 27 partners) the EAPC has become a vital pillar of NATO’s aspiration to play an inclusive, pan-European role.

The NACC’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was launched at NATO’s Brussels summit in January 1994. Today, under EAPC auspices, it too has expanded to include partnership programs with 27 partners. PfP seeks to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, democratic control of armed forces, and readiness to operate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under UN or OSCE auspices as well as with NATO. It includes ambitious NATO/PfP national and “In the Spirit of PfP” exercise programs and NATO School SHAPE programs open to partner participation. Over the years it has become ever more ambitious, establishing the norm that partners should be contributors as well as recipients, moving from broad-based multilateral dialogue to bilateral relations between individual partners and the Alliance in the form of Individual Partnership Programs, and establishing a Planning and Review Process to draw partners closer to the Alliance by helping them to meet interoperability standards.9

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords assigned NATO forces, designated as an Implementation Force (IFOR) and after renewal of the mandate as a Stabilization Force (SFOR), significant peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1999, after diplomatic pressure failed to convince Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to call off his campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO waged a full-scale air war to impose a peace settlement. Since June 1999, Kosovo has been occupied by a NATO-led Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), with extensive responsibilities for maintaining public order. In 1997 the Alliance also launched a first round of enlargement by agreeing to bring Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the fold as full members, and adopted a Membership Action Plan to assist new candidates in their efforts to prepare for eventual affiliation.10

These varied initiatives had a purposeful logic. The new NATO would not be limited to collective defense responsibilities, but rather actively engaged in peace keeping and peace enforcement operations on Europe’s unstable periphery. It was moreover pledged to future rounds of enlargement on the basis of an “open-door” approach defined by rigorous accession criteria. Not least, the Alliance was committed to a process of internal reform and adaptation that sought to strengthen its European pillar and accentuate its character as an inclusive, collective security forum. NATO’s fiftieth anniversary observances in Washington during April 1999 marked an important culmination for these trends, formally welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new members and promulgating an ambitious new Strategic Concept.11

2. NATO, Russia, and Ukraine.

The Russian Federation articulated strong objections to NATO’s enlargement decision. In part to placate these discontents, and in part to sustain the momentum of enlargement by making the process more inclusive, NATO paralleled its accession talks with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with an attempt to craft special relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv. NATO’s ties with Russia and Ukraine may be depicted as a triangle, with each leg representing a significant set of bilateral interactions. But the relationship as a whole has a larger importance, and is integral to the effort to recast NATO’s post-Cold War responsibilities.

The Russian Federation has been in a state of perpetual crisis since the breakup of the USSR in 1991, and its international stature has declined radically. Russia nonetheless retains all the objective attributes of a great world power. With 80 percent of former Soviet territories it remains the world’s largest state, and largest single national repository of strategic raw materials. It is the world’s second ranking nuclear power, and despite the much publicized decline of its conventional forces, is still a major conventional military power. Russia has inherited the Soviet Union’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and possesses a critical geostrategic situation, at the core of the Eurasian heartland.

Ukraine has a population of 52 million, renowned agricultural potential, important coal, mineral, and timber resources, a substantial industrial infrastructure, and an important geographical position between the Russian Federation, the Black Sea, and central Europe. Though its experience of independence has been difficult and to some extent disappointing, it is widely viewed as a pivotal state in a region undergoing fundamental transformations.

NATO’s ties with the Russian Federation, burdened by a legacy of rivalry and distrust, are of particular salience. The Alliance’s agenda for a transformed Euro-Atlantic security order cannot be fulfilled without Russian engagement. Ukraine defines a “European Choice” as the central pillar of its foreign policy, but it is constrained by a legacy of backwardness, and by a complex relationship with its Russian neighbor. Though it is a troubled polity, as a major regional power Ukraine is too important for the Alliance to ignore.

At the very origin of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay is reported to have quipped that it was founded “to keep the Russian out, the Germans down, and Americans in.”12 None of these observations are relevant to the Alliance’s role today. Europe is no longer dependent upon the United States for core security in the way that it once was. Russia is not capable of projecting a geostrategic threat comparable to that once posed by the Soviet Union. A stronger and more purposeful Germany, willing and able to play its natural role as a bridge between East and West, would serve everyone’s best interests. As analysts like Wallerstein correctly point out, under the altered circumstances of the post-Cold War, the traditional premises of collective defense and containment are no longer sufficient to support the imposing edifice of Atlanticism.

Revolutionary changes in the security environment have not made the Alliance irrelevant, but they have posed new priorities. The fundamental challenge of the current era is not deterrence, but rather engagement on behalf of a greater Europe and Euro-Atlantic community “whole and at peace.” NATO has come toward that challenge by launching a process of internal reform, redefining core missions, and committing to enlargement. The cultivation of special relations with Russia and Ukraine, former enemies situated well outside of the Alliance’s traditional area of competence, is an integral part of the effort. If these relationships develop and prosper, the Alliance’s potential as a collective security forum can be realized to the full, and its vocation as a “zone of peace” will be greatly expanded. With Russian support, the enlargement process can go forward gradually and consistently, without becoming a source of geostrategic friction. Not least, a NATO-Russia partnership could become a critical pillar of a new world order actually worthy of the name. Positive association will provide incentives for Russia’s ongoing domestic transformation, and eventually allow the doors of the Alliance to be opened to Russia itself.

NATO’s effort to create and sustain special relationships with Russia and Ukraine faces significant challenges, but much is at stake. Should the effort fail, Europe risks to see the emergence of a new line of division between East and West that will inevitably become a source of strategic tension. Success will mean a major step toward the promise of a more peaceful world order for which victory in the Cold War once seemed a harbinger.

Ukraine Between East and West

1. A Pivotal State?

Western policy toward Ukraine has moved through several phases. Speaking in Kyiv during August 1991, on the very eve of the Soviet breakup, U.S. President George Bush cautioned Ukrainians that “freedom is not the same as independence,” and that Americans “will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”13 After 1991, relations were dominated by the problem of the arsenal that Ukraine had inherited from the USSR, which briefly made it the world’s third-ranking nuclear power. Kyiv’s reluctance to cooperate with the nuclear non-proliferation regime (to sign the non-proliferation treaty and the START I agreement, to associate with the Lisbon Protocols, and to commit to a process of denuclearization) created considerable tension.14 In the wake of Ukraine’s bout with hyperinflation in 1993-1994, pessimistic evaluations and predictions of imminent breakdown were widespread.15

With the U.S. shift toward a more assertive Russian policy after the “Zhirinovskii Shock” of December 1993 (when the Liberal Democratic party led by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii won the largest tally in voting by party list for the lower house of a new Russian parliament), and especially following the election of new Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in June 1994, Ukraine’s stature improved considerably. Kuchma committed Ukraine to denuclearization, sought to revitalize a domestic reform agenda, and strove for balanced relations between Russia and the West.16

From 1994 onward Ukraine has enjoyed the status of privileged partner, and the commitment “to see an independent, secure, democratic Ukraine survive, succeed and prosper” has been inscribed as a vital interest.17 Ukraine has come to be perceived as a “pivotal” state–one of a handful “whose futures [are] poised at critical turning points, and whose fates would significantly affect regional, and even international, stability.”18 As “the linchpin of stability in post-communist Eurasia,” it has become a centerpiece of Western policy.19

The case for casting Ukraine as a pivotal rests upon four premises. The first is that the consolidation of Ukrainian sovereignty is essential to prevent the recreation of something like the former Soviet superpower around its Russian core. Russian national security policy clearly articulates the goal of voluntary re-association of former Soviet states.20 As long as Kyiv maintains a commitment to full sovereignty, however, the premise of “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia is likely to prevail.21 “The West,” notes Taras Kuzio, “has increasingly come to understand and appreciate the strategic significance of Ukraine as the main post-Soviet country capable of preventing the re-emergence of a new Russian-dominated union.”22

Second, the point at which Russia comes to understand that Ukraine cannot be either won over, subverted, or subordinated to some kind of renewed association is also the point at which Moscow will be forced to abandon imperial fantasies and commit to the arduous but essential tasks of democratization and domestic reform. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the fundamental political struggle underway within post-communist Russia “is over whether Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a distinctly Eurasian and once again an imperial state,” and “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes and empire.” 23 Ukraine’s progress in consolidating sovereignty is thereby defined as the key determinant of the geostrategic orientation of its menacing Russian neighbor.

Third, a stable Ukraine is perceived to be important in its own right, as a large and potentially powerful state that cannot be allowed to become detached from a process of modernization and development in the region as a whole. Ukraine borders on no less than seven central and eastern European states, all of which confront comparable challenges of democratization, adaptation to the world economy, and institutional reform. Its transformation is an integral part of post-communist transition in the central European corridor stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Ukraine has been associated with the Central European Initiative since June 1996, it is an associate of the Forum of Black Sea Cooperation, and it pursues close bilateral relations with its regional neighbors. Ukraine’s historical and cultural ties with Poland and Russia make it a potential bridge between East and West.24 “In time,” writes Adrian Karatnycky, “a stable and democratic Ukraine, linked to democratic Europe, could act as a conduit for democratic ideas to the east; a Western-oriented Ukraine, with its large Russian population, could engage Russia to the West.”25

Finally, Ukraine is increasingly perceived to be critically situated in the emerging battle to dominate energy transport corridors linking the oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian basin to European markets. The economic viability of Caspian resources has yet to be conclusively demonstrated, but considerable competition has already emerged over the construction of pipelines. Whether Ukraine will provide alternative routes helping to diversify access, as the West would prefer, or “find itself forced to play the role of a Russian subsidiary,” remains to be seen.26 Its relevance in the effort to exploit the Caspian energy knot is not in doubt.

A heightened perception of Ukraine’s strategic importance has been manifested in intensified military-tomilitary contacts with both the U.S. and its key allies. Since 1996 Ukraine has been the third leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid, after Israel and Egypt, in addition to receiving considerable World Bank and International Monetary Fund support, and the largesse has borne fruit. In 1993-1994, with its economy in tatters, separatist movements on the rise, and relations with the Russian Federation in a downward spiral, the potential for a Ukrainian civil war, or external conflict with Russia, was widely assessed as acute.27 Today, the threat of overt hostilities seems to be minimal. Ukraine has moved peacefully through two democratic electoral cycles. >From June 1996 it has been governed on the basis of a democratic constitution. In September 1996 Kyiv began to issue its own national currency (the hyrvnya), and in January 1997 it published a National Security Concept that emphasized the goal of integration with the Western post-Cold War security system. 28 Ukraine retains considerable support from a potent diaspora, and it has established a strong international profile.

2. Ukraine’s Dilemmas of Sovereignty.

Despite these accomplishments, Ukraine remains a troubled polity, whose prospects for long-term stabilization are cloudy. Although the country possesses great potential wealth, its legacy from seventy years of Soviet power has been heavy.

Ukraine’s economy was closely integrated with the Soviet command system, and it has inherited almost all of the flaws associated with that system in full measure. The agricultural sector continues to suffer from a bitter experience under Soviet power, including a cumbersome collective farm structure that has proven difficult to dismantle. Much of Ukraine’s industrial infrastructure is outmoded and non-competitive, energy-intensive, and highly polluting. A significant portion of Soviet military-related industries were located in Ukraine, and this sector, which was formerly highly protected, has been hit hard by the loss of Soviet markets. The years of independence have seen chronic disaffection and demoralization among the industrial work force. There is also a near total energy dependence upon former Soviet suppliers, particularly the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.29

Under post-independence Prime Minister Vitold Fokin Ukraine adopted a go-slow approach to reform, on the premise that its first priorities must be the consolidation of independence and nation-building. The result was a virtual economic meltdown in 1993-1994, including hyperinflation and collapsing living standards. In September 1994 Kuchma worked out a Systematic Transformation Facility with the IMF, and in the early years of his tenure applied it with some success. The recent past has seen considerable slippage, however, and overall Ukraine’s economic transition has been abysmal, including a 60 percent decline in GDP since 1991. Privatization has not been decisively advanced, large state budget deficits have become chronic, state subsidization of non-profitable enterprises remains the norm, and living standards continue to decline. Dislocations occasioned by economic hardship will remain a possibility, and some analysts foresee little economic future for Ukraine beyond the status of an “agricultural periphery to a more advanced Russia.”30

Lacking any real experience of independent statehood prior to 1991, Ukraine has also confronted the difficult challenge of building and sustaining a national identity. Underdeveloped national consciousness has been manifested by an aggravated and sometimes antagonistic regionalism. 31 The most serious tensions have derived from a divide between Ukraine’s westernmost districts, committed to an agenda for a strongly delineated Ukrainian national idea, and the heavily Russified eastern and southern regions whose population has tended to favor closer association with the Russian Federation. According to the census of 1989, 22 percent of Ukraine’s population is of Russian descent. A significantly higher percentage may be classified as Russified Ukrainians, for whom the Russian language (or a Russian-Ukrainian melange) continues to serve as a primary vehicle of communication (nearly 50 percent of the Ukrainian population cites Russian as its first language). Fully aware of the potential problem represented by their country’s large Russian minority, the governments of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma have striven, with some success, to propagate an agenda for an inclusive Ukrainian civic nationalism. 32 Strongly contrasting regional identities persist, however, and in the event of a severe national crisis could become fonts of instability.

The Russian factor in Ukrainian domestic politics is focused in several distinct areas. First in order of extent is the Donbas, the densely populated heart of eastern Ukraine and its mining, metallurgical, and chemical complexes. The five districts of eastern Ukraine contain 34 percent of the country’s population, but they are responsible for over 45 percent of total industrial production. Only 32 percent of residents list Ukrainian as their mother tongue, compared to 66 percent who name Russian. In the core districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, native speakers of Ukrainian number 3 percent and 7 percent respectively. Since 1992, a local political agenda has been cultivated calling for the elevation of Russian to the status of an official language, dual citizenship arrangements, open borders, and closer association with the Russian Federation.

Southern Ukraine also contains districts with a significant Russian profile. The Black Sea littoral around the cities of Odesa and Kherson was originally settled by Russians in the era of Catherine the Great, and given the designation “New Russia,” a term of reference that has found resonance with contemporary Russian nationalists.

The Crimean Peninsula, historically a part of Russia and only annexed to Ukraine at the behest of Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 (to honor the three-hundredth anniversary of Russian-Ukrainian association) is probably the most significant focus for Russian nationalism inside Ukraine. Approximately 70 percent of Crimea’s population of 2.7 million is Great Russian, 22 percent Ukrainian, and 8 percent indigenous Crimean Tatars. Russian nationalism has been powerfully manifest in Crimea, and has found an echo within the Russian Federation, particularly around the status of the port city of Sevastopol. The Russian national movement in Crimea has not, however, been overtly supported by the Russian state. Elections in the spring of 1994 brought the pro-Russian Republican Movement of the Crimea to power behind president Iurii Meshkov, but Moscow refused to rally behind the movement’s separatist agenda and looked away as Kuchma pushed Meshkov aside and abolished the Crimean presidency in March 1995.

Western Ukraine presents a strong contrast to the Russified east and south. Focused on the city of L’viv, whose baroque central square is regaled by a statue of the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz, dominantly Uniate Christian, attached historically to the central European cultural zone, and only brought within the confines of the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, western Ukraine functions as the motor of an assertively anti- Russian Ukrainian national consciousness. Under Gorbachev, the Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika (Rukh) based in western Ukraine became the driving force of an Ukrainian independence movement. Since Kuchma’s election in 1994 over Rukh candidate Viacheslav Chornovil the movement has split, with one wing evolving into an almost purely western Ukrainian regional party, calling for an aggressive Ukrainianization of national institutions and greater distancing from the Russian Federation.

Ukraine contains other, smaller pockets of local and regional identity. The Zaporizhzhia district north of the Sea of Azov has a large, politically mobilized Cossack population. The Trancarpathian region (the Zakarpatska district) contains a complex ethnic mix, including a large Ruthenian minority that has resisted Ukrainianization. Chernivtsi district, formerly part of the Habsburg domains and only detached from modern Romania during the Second World War, also defends an autonomous regional identity and central European vocation. None of these smaller sub-regions is likely to threaten national unity on its own. The multiple fault lines that fracture Ukraine, however, could become considerably more unstable against the background of a generalized national or regional crisis.

A yearning for order and lost security are powerful forces pushing a portion of Ukraine’s electorate toward extremist alternatives. By 1996, one-third of the Ukrainian population was asserting support for a “Pinochet style” regime and some cities even saw the birth of Pinochet fan clubs. In the parliamentary elections of 29 March 1998, the Communist party of Ukraine became the country’s largest party with 28 percent of the vote, in a parliament (Verkhovna Rada) dominated by parties of the left, and in the 1999 presidential vote communist candidate Simonenko carried 40 percent of the national tally.33 Kravchuk and Kuchma have responded to these trends in approximately the same manner as their Russian counterparts, by crafting a presidential regime in which the executive branch possesses extraordinary power that it uses to override a hostile but effectively impotent parliamentary assembly. Like Russia, Ukraine is structured as a corporatist regime, where powerful collective entities and interest groups, working hand in glove with the presidential entourage and “party of power,” combine to constitute a power elite. Kuchma has been successful in neutralizing opposition through a combination of cooptation and divide and conquer tactics. His personal entourage has come to consist almost entirely of old friends and associates from Dnipropetrovsk, and his regime has become renowned for pervasive corruption. Kuchma’s reelection was marred by abusive use of the national media on behalf of the incumbent and coerced bloc voting, and procedures were criticized by OSCE and Council of Europe observers.34 If democratization remains a watchword of Western strategy, the case of Ukraine might give security planners pause.

3. Relations with Russia.
Of all the challenges that independent Ukraine confronts, its relationship with the Russian Federation is the most significant, both for its own future and for the future of central and eastern Europe.35 Ukraine, like Europe as a whole, cannot be secure if confronted by a hostile Russia. But Moscow will not easily be persuaded to abandon all pretenses to a “privileged” relationship with its former eastern Slavic dependency.

Economic relations between Russia and Ukraine are significant for both sides. Levels of interdependence at the moment of independence were high. Ukraine, for example, furnished over 65 percent of Soviet metallurgical capacity and 40 percent of agricultural resources, while nearly 80 percent of Ukrainian energy resources derived from Soviet sources. Dependence on Russian energy sources was to some extent balanced by the fact that the main pipeline connecting Russian natural gas fields to the European market transits Ukraine, but Kyiv is also heavily reliant upon transit revenues. Since independence, Russia has not shied away from using Ukraine’s energy dependency, the substantial debt that it has brought in its train, and general commercial dependence, as a source of strategic leverage. Kyiv has sought to reduce that leverage by negotiating higher transit fees for natural gas transfers, converting Odesa into a Black Sea oil terminal to allow diversification of supply, and rationalizing a highly inefficient oil refining capacity. The result of Russian pressing and Ukrainian resistance has been a considerable amount of strategic friction.

The issues of sovereignty over Crimea and control of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol have been particularly troublesome. On 28 May 1997 the Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental Black Sea Accords granted Moscow outright possession of 50 percent of the fleet, allowed it to purchase an additional 32 percent of the Ukrainian share in exchange for Ukrainian debt relief, and granted Moscow a twenty year lease (with the option to renew for an additional five years) over naval facilities in Sevastopol, with Ukraine retaining possession of one bay.36 On 31 May 1997 a Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership extended mutual guarantees of territorial integrity. These agreements were in principle a breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian relations, providing a blueprint for resolving the thorny issue of the fleet in the context of de jure Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. Despite the best of intentions, however, some things have been left unclear. The question of Sevastopol has great emotional resonance with Russian national opinion and has become a cause célèbre for the nationalist rightwing and its allies in the State Duma. It would be surprising if at some point in the future it was not raised again. There are also important strategic issues at stake, which technical agreements over access cannot resolve. Some kind of permanent naval basing in Crimea is vital to a continued Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. There is significant in-place military shipbuilding capacity in Sevastopol that Moscow will be loath to give up. And Crimea remains an important source of leverage in bilateral relations.37

Less concretely, but perhaps most fundamentally, a potent strain of Russian national sentiment continues to regard Ukraine as an inseparable part of a larger family of eastern Slavic nations, artificially separated from the Motherland by hostile Western powers seeking “the weakening of Russia’s strategic and economic situation in Eurasia.” 38 The most consistent expression of an alternative agenda in contemporary Russia is the geopolitical school, which portrays the entire Eurasian land mass as an organic whole within which Russian hegemony and the elusive “Russian Idea” have been historically sanctioned sources of unity and order. According to the argument, the disbanding of the Soviet imperium, inspired by the vain idea of “joining” the West, has led to a national catastrophe that only a renewed Eurasian orientation can reverse.39 Ukraine is regarded as an integral part of the eastern Slavic cultural space and of the Eurasian heartland. It is indeed a “linchpin” of regional order, but one that Russia is urged to reclaim as part of a long-term strategy to reassert itself as a protagonist in world affairs. So long as Ukraine remains economically fragile and socially unstable, such aspirations will have an objective foundation. It has been easy to make the case for Ukraine’s pivotal status as the “keystone” in the central European arch of post-communist states in transition, but difficult to define a convincing agenda for progressive change.40 Until considerably more progress toward democratic consolidation and economic reform has been made, the possibility of civil unrest, regional conflict, and backsliding on the issue of sovereignty cannot altogether be ruled out. Though the dire forecasts of 1994 have not come to pass, Ukraine’s global balance of eight years of postcommunist transition is negative, and dramatic improvement is not in sight.41

Ukraine’s fragility creates a certain imbalance in Western strategy, which rests upon a rhetorical commitment to democratic consolidation, but which must deal with a weak state not always amenable to external direction. Alexander Motyl suggests that, although Ukraine’s transition has not been notably more troubled than those of other post-communist polities in the central European corridor, it must nonetheless be described as “a mess.”42 A central question for Western policy is whether it is prudent to place so much strategic weight upon an arch in such a state of disrepair.

4. Ukraine and the West: The Role of NATO.

Despite its many problems, Ukraine clearly aspires to draw closer to the West. Russia is and will remain too weak to use coercive means to force any kind of “regathering” of purportedly Russian lands. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has revealed severe limitations as a forum for regional cooperation, and with Western encouragement Ukraine has become an active member of the so-called GUAAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) inside the CIS seeking to balance Russian influence. Bilateral relations between sovereign state actors are likely to continue to dominate the international relations of post-Soviet Eurasia. On this level, the Russian Federation can hope to exercise considerable leverage in defense of its national interests. It cannot realistically aspire to block an ongoing process of engagement with Western institutions.

Ukraine’s relationship with these institutions, and particularly the European Union (EU) and NATO, is mixed. Kyiv has repeatedly stated that its long-term strategic goal is integration with Europe. But Ukraine is a weak state, ill-prepared to contemplate full membership in European forums in the foreseeable future. The EU, with its agenda for enlargement already overloaded, has purposefully kept Ukraine at a distance.43 NATO has stepped into the breach, and in the process become Ukraine’s key institutional link to a larger European reality.

NATO has sought to address the dilemma of engaging a strategically vital but structurally fragile Ukraine by crafting a special relationship, parallel with but not identical to that defined for Russia by the May 1997 NATORussia Founding Act.44 The idea seems originally to have been put forward by the Ukrainians themselves, inspired by the fear “that Ukraine would be the compensation Russia received for acquiescing in NATO’s inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.”45 It was enthusiastically greeted by the Alliance, and has been pursued in a pragmatic, purposeful, and generally successful manner.

The Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, concluded on 9 July 1997, differed from the Russian prototype in important ways. Unlike the Founding Act, it involved no formal or informal concessions from either side, and in its original form created no standing body equivalent to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. It was in essence a political declaration that pledged the signatories to consultation and cooperation, without specifying what forms these initiatives would take.46

NATO’s special relationship with Ukraine has been enthusiastically pursued by both sides. In May 1997 a NATO Information and Documentation Center was established in Kyiv, where it has become a focal point for explaining the benefits of association with NATO to the general public. In December 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding on civil emergency planning was concluded, defining terms of cooperation in disaster preparedness and relief. Enthusiastic participation in PfP exercises has been a cornerstone of the relationship. Over 5000 Ukrainian officers have taken part in PfP activities to date, a number of interoperability directives have been fulfilled with PfP financial assistance, and a PfP Training Center is under construction at Yavoriv.47 A NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv facilitates PfP activities, and in March 2000 the Ukrainian parliament approved the PfP Status of Forces Agreement and its additional protocol, as well as the Open Skies Treaty promoting transparency in arms control. The dynamic of NATO-Russian relations has mandated the creation of an institutional focus for cooperation, designated the NATO-Ukraine Commission and broadly paralleling the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Achievements have been acknowledged by the January 2000 visit to Kyiv by NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, and by a March 2000 session of the North Atlantic Council conducted in the Ukrainian capital.

The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been free from most of the political tensions that have marred NATO-Russian relations. Ukraine has expressed a commitment to political neutrality that for the moment precludes aspirations to full membership, and Russia has not articulated strong objections to cooperation at lower levels.48 Moscow and Kyiv have in fact shared certain understandings concerning the role of NATO in the region, including opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of new member states, support for the evolution of the Alliance from a military organization devoted to collective defense toward a political forum devoted to collective security, and an agenda for the gradual construction of a pan-European security system into which NATO can be incorporated as a significant, but not necessarily dominant part.49

Neither dialogue with the EU nor the Ukraine-NATO Charter can serve as panaceas for Ukraine’s unresolved problems, or be considered as ends in themselves. The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been successful because it has unfolded within clearly defined limits. By cultivating a special relationship with Ukraine with excessive zeal, the Alliance would risk to reinforce Russia’s sense of alienation and exposure, thereby conjuring up the very kinds of assertive behavior it seeks to prevent. By pressuring Kyiv to function as the keystone of a NATO-led containment posture (or giving the impression that something like this is occurring) it could exacerbate instability within Ukraine itself, and East-West division internationally. In the absence of egregious Russian misconduct, NATO’s strategic challenge is not to “win” Ukraine, but to provide reliable security assistance to a weak polity struggling to reinforce its sovereignty and a focus for the aspirations of a “European Choice.”

Ukraine is and will remain militarily exposed. It has surrendered its nuclear arsenal at Western insistence and is under pressure to foreswear the manufacture of medium range (300-500 kilometer) ballistic missile systems.50 Much of the country is a broad plain that lacks natural defensive barriers and is open to invasion from three sides. Though Kyiv was successful in establishing viable national armed forces in the wake of the Soviet breakup, subsequent military reforms have been half-hearted. Today’s Ukrainian armed forces are chronically underfunded, severely demoralized, plagued by a disproportionate number of officers in the ranks, and still not effectively subordinated to civilian control. Downsizing continues (750,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Ukraine in 1991, by 1998 force levels were at 360,000, and current plans call for a draw down to 320,000). Given the weak national economic base, the Ukrainian armed forces nonetheless remain large and unwieldy, “characterized by inertia and a general adherence to the status quo.”51 Ukraine has for the time being been denied the option that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have pursued–to reduce and restructure its national forces to complement rather than replicate NATO’s capacity in the context of a realistic prospect for eventual full membership.52

Meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine can only be provided by NATO, but there will be serious political and operational constraints to any large-scale use of Alliance forces in the Eurasian steppe. Moscow has committed itself to a national military strategy that emphasizes reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons in a phase of conventional weakness.53 Assertive military commitments in areas immediately contiguous to the Russian border will therefore pose considerable risk. Moscow is willing and able to assert meaningful pressure in close proximity to its frontiers, and in the central European corridor it can be counted upon to do so if vital interests are perceived to be at stake. Zero-sum competition for Ukraine’s heart and mind is therefore a dangerous game. “Washington’s inclusion of the region near Russia’s borders as vital US security interests or targets for expanding US influence,” writes Sergo Mikoyan, “will make managing regional conflicts in these areas more difficult, if not impossible.”54

A good example of such difficulties was provided by the August 1997 joint military exercise scheduled to be conducted under Partnership for Peace auspices and designated “Operation Sea Breeze.” The operation was originally scripted, at Ukrainian request, to depict a landing by alliance forces on the Crimean coast near Sevastopol in response to a secessionist threat. After vehement Russian protests, objections from the Crimean regional parliament, and demonstrations in the streets, the exercise was called off and rescripted.55 Deploying and sustaining ground forces in a hostile environment in southern Ukraine would be difficult under the best of circumstances. In the real world, impetus to undertake such a deployment would break down quickly in the face of strong political objections.

Bolstered by U.S. forward deployments, NATO forces have the capacity to respond to a Ukrainian request for assistance in the direst emergencies. This capacity is important and needs to be maintained and cultivated–the centrality of NATO in planning for military contingencies in Eurasia remains intact. In the absence of a real and present Russian threat, however, efforts to recast Ukraine as a geopolitical barrier are neither prudent nor necessary.

Russia has not manifested any desire to retake Ukraine by assault, and the ramifications of any such attempt would be devastating. Although they are complex and sometimes contentious, social and cultural relations between Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine and across the Russian-Ukrainian state boundary, with the partial exception of western Ukraine, are also essentially benign. Worst case scenarios involving communal or interstate violence are always possible, but highly unlikely.

Post-communist Ukraine is too fragile domestically to function as “an embattled outpost of the West.”56 Attempts to mobilize Ukraine against Russia would contribute to domestic division and make the task of nationbuilding more difficult. They are also likely to provoke unpalatable international consequences. Russian responses to Ukrainian attachment to NATO need not be limited to central Europe. The Russian periphery is vast, and an important strain of geopolitical analysis emphasizes the need for an eastern orientation and the cultivation of strategic alliances with India, China, and the Islamic Middle East. “Winning” Ukraine at the price of reinforced strategic partnership between Russia and China would not be a good bargain for the West.57

NATO’s best option is to reiterate support for the consolidation of sovereignty within Ukraine and the other new independent states and to engage on behalf of military modernization and security cooperation, but to avoid creating illusions about the prospects for full association until such time as national standards can be realistically achieved, and the regional security environment, including relations with Russia, has stabilized. This is best stated straightforwardly, rather than disguised behind false premises. Association with NATO is a positive option for Ukraine and the West, but full membership is for the moment neither practicable (Ukraine is nowhere near being ready to meet NATO membership criteria) nor politically desirable.

The most serious threats to stability today are located within Ukraine itself, in the potential for social and political unrest provoked by economic stress and political frustration. Cooperation in the security sector should not blind Western strategists to the long-term importance of encouraging democratization, development, and the growth of civil society as prerequisites for national consolidation. NATO’s policies toward Ukraine should be designed first of all to support these goals.

The economic instrument of power will be crucial. Efforts to encourage appropriate international aid and assistance, promote investment, and sponsor Ukraine’s integration with the world economy have often been frustrating, but they cannot be abandoned. In comparison with the extent of IMF, World Bank, governmental and private assistance set aside for the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s needs are modest and they can be met. Incentive packages tied to continuing reform effort will be an important impetus for positive change. Military support, including miliary-to-military contacts, nation assistance, and security assistance programs, can also make a contribution. The U.S. has taken the lead in this regard, concluding military support agreements with a number of new independent states including Ukraine in July 1993, Azerbaijan in July 1997, Kazakhstan in November 1997, and Georgia in March 1998. The U.S. and Ukraine have conducted senior leadership visits and exchanges as well as port calls; organized student visits between U.S. and Ukrainian military schools and colleges (under the IMET program); and pursued a partnership program between the Ukrainian National Guard and the National Guard of California. Ukrainian officers attend officers training programs at the George Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and over the past five years Ukraine has been an important contributor to U.N. and CIS peacekeeping operations. Together with Azerbaijan and Georgia it is preparing a specialized peacekeeping battalion. These varied initiatives reflect a serious commitment to help with a painful process of military downsizing and modernization. If sustained, they will also help to keep Ukraine anchored to the West as a security partner.58

The Russian Federation

1. The New Russia.

The Russian Federation that emerged in 1992 from the ruin of Soviet power was stripped of nearly all the elaborately constructed defenses that its Soviet predecessor assumed as a natural right. The USSR was a force unto itself in international affairs, and it left behind few if any real allies. Soviet military power was the product of an extraordinary mobilization that could not be maintained indefinitely. Under the successor regime of Boris El’tsin the Russian armed forces were drawn into domestic political struggles as an ally of the “party of power,” partially discredited as a result, starved for funds, and in effect allowed to languish by a mistrustful leadership for whom international stature was not a high priority. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the central European buffer bought so dearly during the Second World War was swept away. Simultaneously, declarations of independence in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia led to the surrender of nearly all the territorial acquisitions of Russia’s imperial and communist leaders from the seventeenth century onward. Viewed in conventional terms and from Moscow’s perspective, the break up of the USSR was a strategic disaster that left Russia ill-prepared to engage with a victorious and assertive Euro-Atlantic community.

El’tsin’s reform-oriented supporters originally sought to address the growing imbalance of power through bandwagoning association with a triumphant West. According to new Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s transition would make it an integral part of an enlarged community of Western states stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” committed to a strategic partnership with the U.S., but without sacrificing the prerogatives that geostrategic weight, cultural tradition, and economic potential made its just due.59 These were extravagant hopes, and they would soon be proven vain. Suspicion of Russia’s intentions and concern for its long-term potential were too deeply rooted in the West to dissipate overnight. Russia was too big and too troubled to integrate into existing Western institutions without fundamentally changing their nature. At the same time, Russia’s reduced stature made it difficult for her to attract substantial concessions in exchange for strategic allegiance. For its own part, Moscow yearned for a symbolic parity with the leading Western powers that her underlying power indices did not justify nor in fact permit.

Russia’s unprecedented rapid retreat from great power status has reduced her importance in the context of Western grand strategy, but with over 20,000 nuclear warheads, the great northern kingdom remains too potent to ignore.

2. Russia and NATO.

The strategic evolution of the Atlantic Alliance has been at the core of Russian concern over current Western security policy. Between 1948 and 1989, central Europe was transformed into something like a prepared battlefield for the third world war. In spite of intense militarization, however, the Soviet Union’s western marches were relatively stable. NATO’s intentions, declared and in fact, were strictly defensive. Moscow’s greatest concern was not a conventional military threat, but rather the potential spill over effect of instability within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet glacis in central Europe, built around the 20-plus divisions of the Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany, was formidable, and an adequate guarantee against external aggression. On these terms, and despite chronic wrangling, Moscow could coexist comfortably with a hostile but essentially passive NATO.

The original aspirations of Soviet reformers in the Gorbachev era were summed up by the popular phrase “the Common European Home.” 60 So certain was Gorbachev of the declining relevance of force in an interdependent world, of the need for cooperative forums for the pursuit of mutual security, and of his country’s European vocation, that he was willing to accept widely disproportionate arms reduction agreements and unilateral concessions in order to bridge the East-West divide.

Moscow’s inability to realize these aspirations during the first decade of post-Soviet reform may be ascribed to two causes. First, and most essential, is the travail of transition within Russia itself. The corrupt, demoralized, quasi-authoritarian, and war-torn regime that El’tsin has bequeathed to his successors has little that is positive to offer. Until such time as its internal demons are put to rest it will be condemned to watch from the sidelines as the European project unfolds.

Western policy also shares some of the responsibility for Russia’s failure. Though the West has maintained a rhetorical commitment to “partnership” with the new Russia, it has not sustained pro-active policies sufficient to overcome Russia’s suspicions about the real intentions of its former Cold War rivals. The Russians’ institution of choice as the foundation for a new European security order was the OSCE, where the Russian Federation is fully represented and U.S. influence is to some extent diluted, and whose idealistic charter (the 1990 Charter of Paris) is grounded in the premises of mutual security.61 NATO’s activist agenda from 1990 onward effectively precluded the possibility for the OSCE to evolve in this direction. In place of an inclusive but weak and unthreatening OSCE, whose main function would be to provide a forum for dialogue and consensus building, the Western community elevated an ambitious, U.S.-led, only partially representative, and militarily potent Atlantic Alliance bearing the legacy of adversarial relations inherited from the Cold War.

Moscow could not have been expected to rejoice in the perpetuation of what it has consistently viewed as an unrepentant Cold War rival. It nonetheless took up a seat at the NACC in December 1991, and, with some reluctance, joined the PfP in June 1994. The precipitating event in the transformation of Russian threat perceptions was the emergence of the agenda for NATO enlargement.

So far as the decision to enlarge can be reconstructed, it seems to have derived from a meeting of U.S. President William Clinton with Lech Walesa of Poland and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. during April 1993; to have been embraced by a small group of presidential advisors and pushed through the interagency process behind the scenes; and to have been promulgated as policy without any kind of public debate or consensus in place at the January 1994 NATO ministerial in Brussels. The decision was affected by a U.S. desire to address the concerns of key European allies, but driven forward by U.S. domestic political concerns.62

The decision to expand the Alliance also contained important symbolic and strategic implications. Territorial adjustments and shifts in spheres of influence normally follow decision in warfare. The absorption by NATO of what had once been a Soviet-dominated buffer zone seemed to be a clear vindication of the West’s claim to “victory” in the Cold War. Russia’s position has been that its own leaders took the initiative to end the Cold War, and that a tacit agreement not to enlarge NATO into the area of the former Warsaw Pact was an integral part of the negotiations that allowed for the peaceful unification of Germany. Part of the strategic logic of enlargement has always been that of deterrence against the potential revival of a Russian threat, interpreted in Moscow as a regeneration of a familiar containment posture designed to hem Russia in and keep her weak. No great power can be expected to rejoice when a potent military coalition draws closer to its historically exposed frontiers. Not surprisingly, the strategic implications of enlargement were regarded by Russian elites with dismay, and opposition to the initiative became a rare point of consensus across a badly fragmented political spectrum. It is not clear that any amount of Russian agitation could have reversed the momentum of enlargement once the process had been set in motion. In the event, Moscow’s immediate reactions reflected the general confusion and lack of direction that have characterized nearly all aspects of her tortured post-communist transition. In August 1993, during his first visit to Warsaw as Russian President, El’tsin stated publicly that Polish membership in NATO would not run counter to Russian interests (an assertion that was subsequently reiterated by Foreign Minister Kozyrev).63 The rest of the foreign policy establishment, however, was quick to correct the presidential “misstatement.” Thereafter Russian officials were consistent in condemning enlargement as a threat, a betrayal of the trust that made possible a peaceful winding down of the Cold War, and an attempt “to consolidate victory in the Cold War” at Russia’s expense.64

What to do about the accession process once it had begun was quite another matter. The various counter measures that were suggested–to break off arms control negotiations, to adopt a more demanding stance in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, to increase support for Cuba and other anti-American regional powers, to cultivate strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China, to use economic instruments and other sorts of pressure to block a second round of accession possibly including Ukraine and the Baltic States–were by and large rejected as unfeasible, or as steps toward self-imposed isolation.65 As a result of Russia’s critical weakness the battle of enlargement had in effect been lost in advance, and “to wave one’s fist in anger after the fight is over is nothing more than an empty gesture.”66 The only viable course of action, summarized by Kozyrev’s successor Evgenii Primakov as “keeping damage to a minimum,” was to go on record as opposed to enlargement while simultaneously accepting a limited engagement with NATO in the hopes of maintaining some kind of leverage and influence.67 On this less than promising foundation, Russia moved to discuss the entangling commitment of what would become the NATO-Russia Founding Act.68

Serious negotiations on the Founding Act began in January 1997, and concluded with the signing ceremony of 27 May 1997. Despite Russian efforts to make the agreement as formal as possible, the Act was not a legally binding document, but rather “the fruit of compromise resulting from reciprocal concession” containing “numerous ambiguities.”69 The document itself consists of a preamble and four thematic sections devoted to principles, mechanisms for consultation, areas for cooperation, and political-military issues.70 The preamble states the longrangegoal of building a new NATO reaching out to a democratic Russia, and underlines that henceforward neither party will view the other as a political enemy. In the section devoted to principles, explicit mention is made of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and additional OSCE documents, thus placing NATO-Russian cooperation in the larger framework of ideas and institutions associated with a nascent cooperative security regime.

The key mechanism for cooperation defined by the agreement is the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which is tasked to convene monthly on the ambassadorial level and bi-monthly on the level of foreign and defense ministers. The weight that the PJC is expected to carry is however left unclear, and it is expressly stated that neither side will have the right to exercise any kind of veto-power. The document names a wide range of areas where cooperation is deemed to be possible, including conflict prevention, joint peacekeeping operations, exchanges of information, nuclear security issues, arms control, conversion of military industries, disaster assistance, and the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The precise responsibilities of the Council in regard to these themes is not specified.

The final section addresses the military-security issues occasioned by NATO’s eastward expansion, including its impact on the conventional balance of forces in Europe, prospects for the permanent basing of NATO forces on the territory of new members and a related build-up of military infrastructure, and the issue of nuclear weapons. A number of implicit trade-offs and compromises paved the way for agreement in these domains. The question of conventional force limits was left to be fixed by the ongoing CFE negotiations. An American “three nos” pledge (no need, no intention, no plan) was offered to placate concern about the stationing of nuclear weapons. This amounted to little more than a pious declaration of good intentions, but both sides were willing to live with it on the basis of a shared conviction that “any such stationing would make very little military sense.”71 NATO managed to insert a statement of approval for the modernization of military infrastructure, deemed necessary to permit the deployment of large contingents. Russia achieved some face-saving concessions, but in the end NATO gave up almost no option in which it was seriously interested, maintained a strict definition of the Act as an informal and non-binding arrangement, and reiterated the assertion that Russia was receiving nothing more than a consultative voice. If damage limitation was Moscow’s first priority, the results must have been disappointing.

The essence of the Founding Act has been described as “the commitment to develop consultation, cooperation and joint decision-making, including an enhanced dialogue between senior military authorities.”72 In the first year of its existence the PJC made some progress toward achieving these goals. The foci of interactions were the regular sessions of the PJC and Joint Military Commission, accompanied by numerous high-level consultations between ambassadors, foreign and defense ministers, and chiefs of staff. The PJC convoked expert groups and working sessions on a wide range of issues such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, retraining of retired military personnel, air traffic safety, and arms control. A NATO Documentation Center on European Security Issues was opened in Moscow in January 1998, and negotiations on reciprocal Military Liaison Missions were concluded successfully. During June 1998 a conference was convened in Moscow to commmorate the first anniversary of the Founding Act and explore areas for further collaboration.

Association under the aegis of the Founding Act did not disguise Russia’s more fundamental opposition to NATO enlargement. Nor were Russian representatives entirely satisfied with the limited prerogatives that the PJC offered them. Even prior to Kosovo, Russian evaluations of the work of the Council were primarily skeptical. Complaints were raised of the purely “titular” function of Russian representatives at the military liaison mission, and of Moscow’s exclusion from Alliance planning and decision-making.73 The disillusionment associated with these frustrations should not be underestimated. Gregory Hall describes Russia’s “consistently and resoundingly negative” reactions to the limitations of the PJC as the basis for a decisive “shift in orientation away from the West.”74 The PJC nonetheless seemed to be demonstrating its relevance as a forum for dialogue and association. Foreign Minister Primakov evaluated the experiment cautiously but fairly in remarking that: “The past year has shown that we are able to cooperate on the basis of constructive engagement and confidence, and we have achieved quite a lot.”75

If the PJC was both promising and in some sense necessary, it was also inevitably fragile. In the course of 1999 the frail sprouts of Russia-NATO collaboration were nearly swept away by the storm provoked by NATO’s military intervention in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.

3. Russia, NATO, and the Kosovo Crisis.

The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army as the armed wing of Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian oppression in 1997-1998 should not have come as a surprise. A decade of egregious violations by the government of Slobodan Milosevic had left Kosovo’s Albanian majority deeply embittered, and the failure of the strategy of passive resistance crafted by shadow president Ibrahim Rugova was patent. Western capitals were nonetheless caught unprepared as violence in the province escalated through the summer and autumn of 1998. Original U.S. condemnations of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization were quickly set aside in favor of a campaign of coercive diplomacy designed to force Milosevic to pull in his horns.76 When this campaign failed to produce the desired result, the U.S. and its NATO allies, acting through the Alliance, sought to impose settlement with a campaign of graduated bombing strikes. Milosevic’s reaction to the air strikes was to up the ante by moving to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo en masse, thereby provoking a major humanitarian disaster and directly challenging NATO’s credibility. The Alliance, perhaps unintentionally, found itself locked into a large-scale air campaign with disruptive strategic implications.

Russian objections to NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict were concerned more with the precedent established than the outcome on the ground. Although Moscow has often positioned itself as a supporter of Serbian positions in the protracted Balkan conflict, it has not been willing to make meaningful sacrifices, or to court substantial risks, in support of its erstwhile ally.77 In Kosovo, however, the example of unilateral intervention by NATO, on behalf of one side in a civil conflict within a sovereign state, without UN or OSCE approval, in the name of an extremely broad and easily manipulated “doctrine” of humanitarian intervention, and in defiance of Russia’s expressed preferences, posed special challenges.

In the first phase of the conflict Russia distanced itself from the NATO initiative, pillorying the U.S. as a “new goliath” for whom “force is again the only criterion of truth,” and suspending all relations with the Alliance under the terms of the Founding Act in protest.78 With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Russian special mediator on 14 April 1999, however, hostile rhetoric was moderated. Together with the European Union’s senior Kosovo envoy, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin played a critical role in the negotiations that brought an end to the conflict on the basis of UN Resolution 1244 on 10 June. But Russian concerns about the implications of the NATO action remained intact. Moscow’s engagement in the mediation process, and willingness to participate in the KFOR were born, like acquiescence in NATO enlargement, less of enthusiasm than of a desire to limit damage.

Despite its diplomatic efforts, Moscow’s request for a separate occupation zone inside Kosovo was turned down. In reaction, an expanded Russian airborne company was brought in from Bosnia-Herzegovina on short notice on 11-12 June to occupy Priština’s Slatina airport in advance of the arrival of the KFOR contingent. The tense standoff that followed was resolved diplomatically, but the incident could easily have given rise to an armed confrontation between Russian and NATO forces–a measure of the risks involved in the strategic cat and mouse game being played out in the Balkan conflict zone. Russia emerged from the Kosovo conflict highly concerned for its strategic implications, frustrated by what it perceived as marginalization in the peacekeeping operation, and with relations with NATO in tatters.

Russia’s retrospective objections to Western policy in Kosovo have been consistent and intense.79 The decision to intervene militarily is first of all excoriated as an example of the low regard in which Moscow is held in Western capitals. The issues in Kosovo were not unambiguous. If Serbian repression was extreme, it came in response to real provocations, and in no way could the U.S. or its major allies be said to have had vital interests at stake. Unilateral intervention, in defiance of Russia, was the result nonetheless.

The Kosovo conflict is also portrayed as an integral part of a policy continuum where Russia’s own national interests are at stake. The core issue is “what Europe itself will become in the new century, with whom and in what direction it will evolve.”80 Moscow’s greatest fear is the emergence of a consolidating western Europe subordinated to the U.S. and expanding against Russia–an enlarged Euro-Atlantic community from which the Russian Federation would be effectively excluded. In order to avoid such an outcome, maintaining leverage within the central European corridor is vital. Russia is a traditional Balkan power, and it has close cultural and political ties to the region. Moreover, deeply rooted instabilities guarantee that local actors will continue to search for external sponsorship. Southeastern Europe is one of the only European regions where Moscow can still aspire to play the role of a major power, and engagement in the region has become a critical foundation for its entire European policy. NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, inspired by what Viktor Kremeniuk has called the effort “to create a Europe where Russia has no place,” is therefore interpreted as a major challenge.81

The precedent of unilateral action outside of the UN framework was particularly disturbing. The Security Council veto remains one of the few levers of power that a weakened Russia is able to call on to shape the international environment to its advantage. Well prior to the Kosovo crisis the U.S. had consistently maintained that as a regional security forum NATO should not be constrained by an absolute requirement for a UN mandate, and that under special circumstances independent action might be unavoidable. The U.S. position was not consistently supported even by its closest allies, however, and it was usually assumed that such action would only be forthcoming in the most extreme cases. In the case of Kosovo, much of the pressure for independent action was selfimposed by the extraordinary ultimatum presented to Serbia at the Rambouillet negotiating sessions.

Moscow has also portrayed the Kosovo conflict as a “trial run” for a strategic worst case scenario–the use of NATO forces, operating from forward bases in central Europe obtained as a result of the enlargement process, as an instrument for military intervention in a conflict on the Russian periphery, or even within the federation itself. In the wake of Kosovo, NATO was widely depicted in Russian strategic discourse as “the primary and by far the most serious threat not only to Russian national interests but also to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent and sovereign state.”82

The efficiency of NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia only served to reinforce Moscow’s heightened sense of threat perception. Though Yugoslavia’s conventional forces do not seem to have been degraded by the air campaign to the extent originally announced, and though without Russian mediation the war could have been much more protracted and difficult, NATO had demonstrated its capacity to function effectively as a war-fighting alliance.83 The conduct of the air war was operationally impressive, and the Alliance’s overwhelming technical edge left Serbia virtually defenseless. If Operation Allied Force was intended to intimidate, it must certainly have achieved its purpose.

Russian reactions to the Kosovo crisis have been conditioned by national weakness and limited options. Moscow did not have the capacity to prevent a decision for the use of force. Once that decision had been made, its goal became to limit damage and avoid isolation. NATO’s own strategic miscalculations were of some service in this regard. The original choice for limited bombing strikes was premised on the assumption that after two or three days of punishment, Milosevic would make discretion the better part of valor and cave in to Alliance demands. When this scenario did not play out, Russian influence in Belgrade became a significant asset in the search for a negotiated solution. Chernomyrdin’s ability to pressure Belgrade was critical to the endgame that brought the war to a close, but even here Russia was able to glean precious little advantage. Its core demand for a zone of occupation was refused, the role to which it was assigned under KFOR was modest, and it was made clear to all that NATO would call the shots on the ground inside the occupied province.

4. The Aftermath of Kosovo.

In August 1998 Russian financial markets collapsed, shattering hopes for a long awaited economic recovery. In March 1999, NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia, and in the following summer Russia launched a new military offensive against the rebellious province of Chechnya. On New Year’s Eve 2000, El’tsin resigned as Russia’s President, and in March 2000 acting President Vladimir Putin was formally elected to a five year mandate. Putin’s popularity had soared on the wings of public support for the crackdown in the northern Caucasus, widely perceived as a long overdue gesture of national reassertion. The conjuncture of these events–the discrediting of El’tsin’s reform cause as a result of fiscal collapse, the aggravation of threat perception provoked by Kosovo, the accession of a younger and more dynamic ruler, and Russia’s harsh self-assertion in Chechnya–has given rise to a new climate of relations between Russia and the West with sobering military and strategic implications.

In the months following the Kosovo imbroglio the Russian Federation issued the texts of a new National Security Concept and National Military Strategy. Although they had been in the making for some time, the texts coincided with the reformulation of priorities associated with post-Kosovo re-evaluations.84 Both documents reflect a competitive, “statist” interpretation of Russian national interests and represent a clear rejection of the liberal policies that inspired Russian security policy at the outset of the El’tsin era.85

The first variant of a national security policy issued by the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry in February 1992 placed the emphasis upon Russia’s aspiration to join the “civilized” West.86 The 1993 version of a Russian military doctrine abandoned the traditional Soviet negation of first-use nuclear options, but it did not single out external threats for special mention.87 El’tsin’s 1997 national security concept was more outspoken in asserting the need for a “multipolar” world order, but the concept presumed Russia’s role as a major power acting in concert with its peers. The 1997 Concept down played external threats, and emphasized the primacy of internal dilemmas born of poor economic performance, social frustration, and the slow pace of reform.88 In sharp contrast, the revised Concept, approved by Acting President Putin on 10 January 2000, highlights external threats, and specifically cites NATO unilateralism as a threat to world peace.89

The most challenging assertion to emerge from the texts is a new emphasis upon the role of Russia’s nuclear forces, both as a foundation for deterrence and as a means for prevailing in theater contingencies where vital interests are perceived to be at stake. In the 1993 Military Doctrine, first use of nuclear weapons was accepted in the case of attack by a nuclear armed adversary, or by a state allied with a nuclear power, and in the event that the “existence” of the Russian Federation was put at risk. The 2000 version sanctions the first use of nuclear weapons to “repulse armed aggression” by a conventionally armed adversary, even if that adversary is not bound to a nuclear armed ally. These assertions are unfortunately not merely rhetorical flourishes. Russia maintains a large tactical nuclear arsenal, and in June 1999 Russian military exercises simulating a response to conventional attack against the Kaliningrad enclave culminated with a Russian counter-attack spearheaded by tactical nuclear strikes.

President Putin was propelled into power by the “short, victorious war” in Chechnya, he has publicly committed to a doubling of the military budget, and he has stressed the importance of rebuilding Russian military power. The road back to military credibility will be a long one, but in the wake of Kosovo, the commitment seems to have been made.

Putin’s military initiatives have been accompanied by renewed commitment to pragmatic cooperation with the West, by a reassuring rhetoric of accommodation, and by an effort to reestablish a Russia-NATO connection. Russia remains significantly engaged with NATO in both SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with a commitment of 3,250 troops) and KFOR in Kosovo (where it commits some 1,200 troops), and it has cautiously revived its dialogue with the Alliance under the aegis of the Founding Act.90 A visit to Moscow by Secretary General Robertson in February 2000, including a meeting with President Putin, concluded with a joint statement pledging to “pursue a vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues.”91 Progress promised to be slow, and lack of clarity about long-term goals remained intact. On 5 March 2000, Putin provocatively remarked to the BBC’s David Frost that he “would not rule out” the possibility of Russia’s eventually joining NATO, moving Robertson to respond that “at present Russian membership is not on the agenda.”92

Expectations must be modest, but there is a viable agenda for renewed NATO-Russia collaboration. At present, much of Russia’s military hierarchy perceives the Alliance as a threat. Expanded military-to-military contacts can help dilute such perceptions and groom a new generation of Russian officers more accustomed to collaboration. Official representation for NATO in Moscow would represent an important step forward. With its own substantial military traditions and priorities firmly in place, Russia is not likely to embrace PfP in the way that its Ukrainian counterpart has done. It would however benefit from a renewal of dialogue in areas such as nuclear safety, civil emergency procedures, peace operations, and officer retraining. There is a great amount of work to be done in fixing common understandings concerning doctrinal issues, regional threats, and world order concerns.93

Cooperation is proceeding in other areas as well. Negotiations leading toward a revision of the CFE treaty were sustained despite the distractions of Kosovo and Chechnya, and on Putin’s watch they have been brought to a successful conclusion (though the war in Chechnya has prevented Russia from coming into compliance with new flank limits, and blocked U.S. ratification).94 The Russian Duma has also been brought around to ratify the START II strategic arms control treaty, though with the significant condition that the U.S. give up the effort to revise the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Putin has repeatedly asserted his desire to improve relations with Europe, and there is no need to doubt his sincerity. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner, with over 45 percent of total trade, and commercial transactions are on the rise. It is also the single most important source of direct foreign investment in Russia. Russia ranks sixth among EU trading partners, and in key sectors such as energy its role is critical.95 Over half the grants made under the EU’s TACIS program are earmarked for the Russian Federation, and many (in the areas of military training, nuclear safeguards, chemical weapons conversion, and crime prevention) are security related. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia on Corfu in 1994, and in 1998 a Russia-EU Partnership Council was created. As a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EAPC, and the PJC, Russia is already integrated into Europe’s overlapping institutional structure and does not risk isolation. Moscow cannot afford a decisive break with the West, and it is not in her interest to pursue or provoke one.

The halcyon days of “strategic partnership” are nonetheless a thing of the past. Kosovo has substantiated a focused threat that Russia will seek to neutralize with a long term commitment to rebuilding the foundations of national power, including military power. Chechnya has weakened the Western commitment to assist Russia, and outstanding issues such as the American commitment to national missile defense and the NATO enlargement agenda remain divisive. U.S. engagement on behalf of the new independent states is a source of continuing aggravation and concern. Transatlantic friction could also come into play, should Russia turn back to the old Soviet effort to leverage divisions within the Alliance to its own advantage.96

NATO’s war in Kosovo and Russia’s second round of fighting in Chechnya have probably put paid to any hopes of making the Russian Federation a functioning part of a recast Euro-Atlantic security system in the near future. The line of division that separates the Russian Federation and the West, including the “grey zone” in central Europe, but also the faultline between the U.S. European and Central Commands stretching through the Caucasus and Caspian Sea into distant Central Asia, will remain a volatile and conflict prone shatterbelt where a traditional politics of force and intimidation may have a future as well as a past.

Numerous countervailing tendencies make it unlikely that inevitable friction will sweep out of control. Russia is nowhere near to being in a position to contemplate the use of force outside the immediate vicinity of its frontiers. The interests of its dominant oligarchy do not include suicidal confrontation with great power rivals that it cannot hope to overcome. Military exposure may be rhetorically decried as intolerable, but military effectiveness is a function of many attributes, including social cohesion and morale, leadership, economic viability, technological sophistication, and national purpose, that post-Soviet Russia has not been able to sustain. The currently preferred option of increased reliance on the nuclear option is an essentially defensive expedient. In cases where Russian and Western interests have clashed, Moscow has been careful to avoid confrontation. Weakness and a concomitant lack of alternatives have pushed it, almost inexorably, toward policies of accommodation.

The most salient short-term threats to Russian national interests lie along the Federation’s southern flank. The most pressing long-term security dilemma may well concern relations with China in the Far East. On the European front, although flash points are not lacking, security challenges are likely to be much less pressing. Indeed, one might argue that despite its current weakness, Moscow confronts fewer direct challenges on its western marches at the present moment than ever before in its long history.

The West should take account of the relatively benign regional security environment in crafting its own policies. The harsher edges of Russia’s current strategic discourse give no cause for alarm–exaggerated selfassertion and distancing rhetoric are typical defensive mechanisms for weak states confronted by the real and imagined pretenses of the strong. The Putin leadership has made clear its desire to pursue a pragmatic relationship with the U.S. and its European allies. The case of Chechnya, though tragic, does not threaten the West. Russia will continue to angle for influence in the post-Soviet space, but is not in a position to use force to achieve its goal. The nuclear card in her current security doctrine bespeaks weakness, not strength. Even the NATO enlargement agenda, if pursued gradually and in the context of a positive and expanding NATO-Russian relationship presided over by a dynamic PJC, need not become confrontational. The vision of a Europe whole and at peace, embedded in a stable Euro-Atlantic community and open to cooperation with its neighbors, is a positive vision for Moscow as well.

NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine: Promise and Limits

Three years have passed since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Agreement on Distinctive Partnership, enough time for the respective special relationships to demonstrate both strengths and limitations. The agreements have clearly contributed to the overarching goals that inspired them: “to engage with Russia and Ukraine … to help them through their post-communist transition rather than abandon them to it, and to demonstrate to former adversaries that membership in European institutions was neither a dream nor a false promise.”97 The agreements are not sufficient unto themselves, however, as mechanisms for helping Kyiv and Moscow turn the corner of transition, or to integrate with the West. The NATO-Ukrainian partnership has been dynamic and successful, but on a limited scale. NATO-Russia ties have been troubled, though in the end, even under the severe strains of the Kosovo crisis, they have not snapped. The framework provided by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Charter is vitally important to the effort to forge a new Euro-Atlantic security order, but much more will be required if the process is to be seen through to a successful conclusion. The NATO-Ukraine relationship functions well within the parameters defined by Ukrainian neutrality. Kyiv needs Western assistance to promote the modernization of its armed forces, and leverage to sustain sovereignty against subtle Russian pressure. It needs reassurance in the face of the severe dislocations provoked by a difficult post-communist transition, and access to European institutions to sustain popular morale in a time of hardship. NATO has been able to offer technical assistance, positive engagement in Euro-Atlantic security structures, and long-term prospects for closer association. Its engagement with Ukraine helps reinforce geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, wards off the perception of an emerging security vacuum, and makes the Alliance a relevant actor in a vital geostrategic area.

The limits to NATO-Ukrainian cooperation derive both from Ukraine’s domestic weakness, and concern for possible Russian reactions. The threat of domestic instability will remain on Ukraine’s agenda for some time to come, and in the best of circumstances Kyiv will require a decade and more to prepare for accession to Western institutions. The Russian factor is more troublesome in the short term. In the wake of the first round of NATO enlargement, Foreign Minister Primakov spoke dramatically of a “red line” equivalent to the former Soviet border, beyond which NATO could not be allowed to penetrate. Pragmatic cooperation has already breached that line, but there is no sign that Russia has any intention of abandoning its strong opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO. For the time being, and in view of NATO’s desire to avoid confrontation with the Russian Federation, the NATO-Ukraine relationship must remain limited to nation assistance and security coordination, useful but not decisive in defining a new European security architecture.

The NATO-Russian relationship got off to a promising start, with strong backing from Russian President El’tsin. In the wake of Kosovo, and under the new direction of Putin, relations have become clouded. Putin has nonetheless initiated an attempt to rebuild the foundation of cooperation suspended during the Kosovo operations, and it is vital for the effort to succeed. NATO-Russian relations are hampered by a legacy of hostility and mistrust, Russia has little to offer the Alliance that is not of essentially symbolic value, and the search for accommodation severely constrains NATO’s range of available options. The work of the PJC has been uneven and its real achievements are modest. Nevertheless, some kind of formal relationship with the Russian Federation is absolutely necessary if a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security structure is ever to take form. Russia is a once and future great power, it is led by an astute and purposeful leader, and it has the capacity to disrupt Western security planning if its interests are not taken into account. Cultivating positive ties with Moscow will be difficult, but the effort must be made.

Whether Russia itself will be amenable to such a relationship remains to be seen. Policy council in Moscow is divided, between optimistic evaluations of the potential for collaboration with the West, and pessimistic assessments, particularly well represented within the military hierarchy, that stress the limits of such aspirations and the need for more autonomous national policies. NATO has excluded bringing the Russian Federation inside the Alliance’s decision-making cycle, and it has not hesitated to act in defiance of Moscow if circumstances are perceived to require it. These choices reduce the amount of leverage that the Alliance can hope to assert upon a hesitant Russian partner. Under Putin Moscow seems to be returning to the familiar Soviet strategy of weakening NATO by playing off inevitable transatlantic disagreements. Frustration over the course of events in Kosovo, opposition to Washington’s national missile defense program, and recent debate over the European commitment to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity provide grist to the mill of these efforts. If the Founding Act can be made to function in accordance with its original charter, it will provide space for a more self-confident Russia “to play upon allied rivalry or discord,” and for the NATO allies “to enlist the Russians by one means or another in stratagems to influence the outcome of debates.”98 Resulting friction will be a part of the price that the Alliance must pay to keep Russia engaged.

Rebuilding NATO-Russian relations on the basis of the Founding Act represents the immediate task at hand. Russia cannot simply be brought whole into Western institutions, nor is it clear that it would desire to move in that direction even if it could. Constructive engagement with the West is the only reasonable option. But NATORussian cooperation is fated to remain tentative and fragile. There is a danger, which the Kosovo crisis exposed, in trying prematurely to institutionalize a relationship that lacks underlying substance. That substance needs to be created, by emphasizing a wide variety of interactions and building on small, positive initiatives.

The materials for constructing a more hopeful relationship are at hand. The momentum of NATO-Russian collaboration is hardy, and will be furthered. The goal, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, should be “as much cooperation between NATO and Russia as possible.”99 The successful conclusion of a revised CFE treaty despite the Kosovo episode is a sign of the prospects for pragmatic cooperation in areas where both sides share mutual interests. Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR works well on the tactical level and provides a positive example of collaborative effort. To fully realize the promise of Russian cooperation with the West, however, major impediments, such as the issue of further rounds of NATO expansion, will need to be resolved. Progress in working toward negotiated solutions for unresolved flash points in the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans, and the Black Sea and Transcaucasus region will likewise be critical. NATO’s relations with Russia and Ukraine are too frail to bear the weight of these overlapping agendas left to their own devises. They are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of the kind of Euro-Atlantic collective security system that the Alliance favors. As such, however, they are absolutely vital. NATO’s cooperation with Russia and Ukraine should be pursued without unrealistic expectations, but diligently, consistently, and for the long haul.

1 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Foes as Friends?,” Foreign Policy, No. 90, Spring 1993, p. 156.
2 Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 8.
3 “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe: Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991,” NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Pres, 1992, pp. 22.
4 Cited in P. E. Tyler, “Pentagon New World Order: US to Reign Supreme,” The International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1992, pp. 1-2. After premature release, this document was repudiated by the administration of George Bush.
5 “Rome Declaration on Peace Cooperation,” in NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992, pp. 26-27.
6 Ibid.
7 The idea for the NACC had its origins in a joint declaration by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 10 May 1991. See “Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” in NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, June 1991, pp. 28-29.
8 “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Transition,” AUSA Background Brief, No. 81, April 1999, p.7.
9 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP) After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999.
10 Current Membership Action Plan participants are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
11 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Review, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. D7-D13.
12 Cited in Geir Lundestad, “ ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1996,” in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes, eds., The United States and the European Alliance since 1945, Oxford: Berg, 1999, p. 34.
13 Remarks by the President in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Washington, D.C.: Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1 August 1991.
14 Nadia Schadlow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security,” in Lubomyr A. Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 271-283.
15 See F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine: Europe’s Next Crisis?,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 6, July-August 1994, pp. 14-16.
16 Paul Kubicek, “Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 103-126, and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Presidentialism in Ukraine: A Mid-Term Review of the Second Presidency,” Democratization, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 152-171.
17 “Ukraine at Five: A Progress Report on U.S. Policy,” speech by Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State, to The Washington Group 1996 Leadership Conference, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1996, p. 2, cited from http:www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/10-11tal.htlm.
18 “Introduction,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 4. The authors limit their attention to the “traditional” Third World, but the concept is relevant to states such as Ukraine.
19 John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May-June 1996, p. 62.
20 Derek Mueller, Jeronim Perovic, and Andreas Wenger, “The New Approach to Russian Security in the Context of the Programme for Change,” Aussenpolitik , No. 1, 1998, pp. 28-31, and Leonid Maiorov and Dimitri Afinogenov, “Vazhneishie napravleniia integratsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 February 1998.
21 On geopolitical pluralism see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January-February 1995, p. 31.
22 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Relationship,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 2-3.
23 Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” p. 31, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, March-April 1994, p. 80.
24 The Polish-Ukrainian relationship has been in this regard somewhat neglected. See Ian J. Brzezinski, “Polish- Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 26-37.
25 Adrian Kartnycky, “The Ukrainian Factor,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 107.
26 James Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Trouble,” in Charles Dick and Anne Aldis, eds., Central and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects, Camberly: Conflict Studies Research Center Occasional Paper No. 37, December 1998, p. 115.
27 See the summary of U.S. intelligence assessments predicting severe social and political instability in Ukraine in Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Dire U.S. Forecast for Ukrainian Conflict,” The International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1994.
28 For the text see Uriadovyi Kur’ier, 4 February 1997, pp. 5-6.
29 Gwendolyn Sasse, “Fueling Nation-State Building: Ukraine’s Energy Dependence on Russia,” Central Asian and Caucasia Prospects Briefing No. 17, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1998.
30 John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, McNair Paper 42, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies and National Defense University, August 1995.
31 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 develops the argument expertly.
32 William Zimmerman, “Is Ukraine a Political Community?,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-55.
33 Nadia Diuk, “Ukraine: A Land In Between,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1998, pp. 97-111.
34 “Kutschma klare Wahlsieger in der Ukraine: Internationale Beobachter registrieren zahlreiche Verstösse,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 November 1999.
35 John Morrison makes the apt observation that the Russian-Ukrainian relationship represents for eastern Europe what the German-French relationship represents for western Europe. John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Friendship,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, October 1993, p. 677.
36 James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 33-50.
37 E. Cherkasova, “Sevastopol: Eshche raz o territorial’noi probleme,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, pp. 108-114.
38 Aleksei Bogaturov, “Rossiia i ‘geopoliticheskii pliuralizm’ zapada,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 12, 1994, pp. 83-84.
39 The most cogent statements of the position are by Aleksandr Dugin, Misterii Evrazii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1996, and especially Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997.
40 For the “keystone” metaphor see Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1997.
41 See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” Current History, Vol. 97, No. 621, October 1998, pp. 342-346.
42 Alexander J. Motyl, “Making Sense of Ukraine,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 1-7.
43 See the account in Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Troubles,” pp. 128-131.
44 For the text see “Charter On a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” NATO Review, No. 4, July-August 1997, pp. 5-6.
45 Margarita M. Balmaceda, “Ukraine, Russia, and European Security: Thinking Beyond NATO Expansion,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45, No. 1, January-February 1998, p. 23.
46 Olga Alexandrova, “The NATO-Ukrainian Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration,” Aussenpolitik , No. 4, 1997, pp. 325-336.
47 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999, pp. 1-9.
48 Lidiia Leont’eva, “Aspekti psikhologichnoi borot’bi: U konteksti konteptsii natsional’noi bezpeki Ukraini,” Viis’ko Ukraini, 7 August 1997, p. 17.
49 Taras Kuzio, “Nato Enlargement: The View From the East,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 48-62.
50 Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Papers No. 55, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, October 1996.
51 John Jaworsky, “Ukraine’s Armed Forces and Military Policy,” in Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World, pp. 223-247.
52 Stephen A. Cambone, “NATO Enlargement: Implications for the Military Dimension of Ukraine’s Security,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 8-18.
53 Vladimir Belous, “Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 159-171.
54 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 116.
55 Dmitri Zaks, “Russians Bristle at NATO Sea Breeze,” The Moscow Times, 26 August 1997.
56 Anatol Lieven, “Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997, p. 70. The argument, supportive of engagement with Ukraine but tempered by restraint, is developed at greater length in Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999.
57 Bruce Russett and Alan C. Stam, “Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 3, 1998, pp. 361-382.
58 Col. Stephen D. Olynyk, USAR (Ret.), “The State of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” The Officer, November 1997, pp. 25-28.
59 Andrei V. Kozyrev, “Russia and Human Rights,” Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 282-296.
60 G. Vorontsov, “Ot Khelsinki k ‘obshcheevropeiskomu domu’,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1988, pp. 40-45.
61 Charles Krupnick, “Europe’s Intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe’s Emerging Security Structure,” European Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 30-51.
62 Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1997, pp. 706-710, and James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.
63 Kozyrev asserted that “Russia will have no objection if NATO does not take an aggressive stance in respect of Russia. This [Polish membership in the Alliance] is a matter of Poland and NATO.” Cited from Vasilii Safronchuk, “NATO Summit Seen As Shame for Russia,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 9 July 1997, p. 3.
64 See S. Rogov, “Rasshirenie NATO i Rossiia,” Morskoi sbornik , No. 7, 1997, pp. 15-19.
65 Igor Maslov, “Russia and NATO: A Critical Period,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 1-15, and Aleksei Podberezkin, “Geostrategicheskoe polozhenie i bezopasnosti Rossii,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 7, 1996, pp. 90-97.
66 Iu. P. Davidov, “Rossiia i NATO: Posle bala,” SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, No. 1, 1998, p. 3.
67 Primakov’s remark is cited rom S. Kondrashev, “U nas svoe litso, i my nigde ne skatyvalis’ k konfrontatsii,” Izvestiia, 23 December 1997, p. 3. See also Alexander A. Sergounin, “Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 55-71, and for a summary of the preferred Russian strategic response N. N. Afanasievskii, “Rossiia-NATO: Kurs na sotrudnichestvo,” Orientir, No. 7, 1997, pp. 9-11.
68 For a lucid and thorough evaluation of Russian reactions to NATO enlargement see J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000.
69 Youri Roubinskii, “La Russie et l’OTAN: Une nouvelle étape?,” Politique etrangérè, Vol. 62, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 553.
70 For the text in English and Russian see “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 158-168, and “Osnovopolagaiushchii Akt o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh. Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora,” Krasnaia zvezda, 29 May 1997, p. 3.
71 Hans-Henning Schroeder, ” ‘… it’s good for America, it’s good for Europe, and it’s good for Russia …’: Russland und die NATO nach der Unterzeichnung der ‘Grundakte’,” Osteuropa, Vol. 48, No. 5, May 1998, p. 447.
72 Fergus Carr and Paul Flenly, “NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1999, p. 99.
73 Articulated in A. Kvashnin, “Rossiia i NATO zainteresovany v rasshirenii voennogo sotrudnichestva,” Krasnaia zvezda, 4 September 1998. See also the critique in P. Ivanova and B. Khalosha, “Rossiia-NATO: Shto dal’she?,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 6, 1999, pp. 5-15.
74 Gregory B. Hall, “NATO and Russia, Russians and NATO: A Turning Point in Post-Cold War East-West Relations?,” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 25.
75 Cited in Kav’er Solana, “NATO-Rossiia: Pervyi god stabil’nogo provizheniia vpered,” Novosti NATO, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-May 1998, p. 1.
76 R. Craig Nation, “US Policy and the Kosovo Crisis,” The International Spectator, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 23-39.
77 See V. K. Volkov, “Tragediia Iugoslavii,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, No. 5, 1994, pp. 22-31, and R. Craig Nation, “La Russia, la Serbia, e il conflitto jugoslavo,” Europa, Europe, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996, pp. 171-192.
78 A. Matveyev, “Washington’s Claims to World Leadership,” International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 5, 1999, p. 53.
79 See the evaluations in Dmitri Trenin, ed., Kosovo: Mezhdunarodnye aspekty krizisa, Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 1999.
80 V. Kuvaldin, “Iugoslovenskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, p. 22.
81 See Kremeniuk’s intervention in “Balkanskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura , No. 10, October 1999, p. 42. This round table discussion provides a interesting survey of Russian perspectives on the Kosovo conflict.
82 Viktor Gobarev, “Russia-NATO Relations After the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1999, p. 11.
83 For the controversy over the effectiveness of NATO’s air war inside Kosovo see “The Kosovo Cover-Up,” Newsweek, 15 May 2000, pp. 22-26.
84 For the texts see “Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt,” Krasnaia zvezda, 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4.
85 Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 7-12.
86 See the text in International Affairs, No. 3, April-May 1992.
87 See the text in Izvestiia, 18 November 1993, pp. 1-4.
88 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5.
89 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimaia Voennoe Obozrenie, 14 January 2000, and “Russia’s National Security Concept,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 15-20.
90 Susan LaFraniere, “Russia Mends Broken Ties With NATO,” The Washington Post, 17 February 2000, pp. A1 and A23, and Michael Wines, “Russia and NATO, Split Over Kosovo, Agree to Renew Relations,” The New York Times, 17 February 2000, p. A11.
91 “Join Statement On the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, in Moscow on16 February 2000,” NATO Review, Vol.48, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 20.
92 Cited from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0003080103.htm.
93 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces,” NATO Review, Vol. 48, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 19-22.
94 Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 6, September/October 1999, pp. 15-19.
95 Heinz Timmermann, “Russland: Strategischer Partner der Europeischen Union? Interessen, Impulse, Widersprüche,” Osteuropa, No. 10, 1999, pp. 991-1009.
96 See Iu. P. Davydov, “Rossiia-NATO: O poiskakh perspektivy,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura, No. 1, 1999, p. 21.
97 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Rebalancing NATO for a Strong Future,” ROA National Security Report; The Officer, March 2000, p. 1.
98 Michael Brenner, Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 88.
99 “U.S. Ambassador to NATO On NATO-Russian Relations,” Security Issues Digest, No. 91, 10 May 2000, p. 4.

http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/nation.pdf [pdf]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a broadcaster funded by the U.S. Congress that provides news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East “where the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed”.[3] RFE/RL is supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a bi-partisan federal agency overseeing all U.S. international broadcasting services.[4]

Founded as a propaganda news source in 1949 by the National Committee for a Free Europe, RFE/RL received funds from the Central Intelligence Agency until 1972.[5][6] During the earliest years of Radio Free Europe’s existence, the CIA and the U.S. Department of State issued broad policy directives, and a system evolved where broadcast policy was determined through negotiation between the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and RFE staff.[7]

RFE/RL was headquartered at Englischer Garten in Munich, Germany, from 1949 to 1995. In 1995, the headquarters were moved to Prague in the Czech Republic. European operations have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War. In addition to the headquarters, the service maintains 20 local bureaus in countries throughout their broadcast region, as well as a corporate office in Washington, D.C. RFE/RL broadcasts in 28 languages[8] to 21 countries[9] including Armenia, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.[10]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFE Logo.png

RFE/RL official logo
RFE Broadcast Regions crop.jpg

RFE/RL Broadcast Region 2009
Abbreviation RFE/RL
Motto Free Media in Unfree Societies
Formation 1949 (Radio Free Europe), 1953 (Radio Liberty), 1976 (merger)
Type private, non-profit Sec 501(c)3 corporation
Purpose/focus Broadcast Media
Headquarters Prague Broadcast Center
Location Prague
Official languages English; programs are also available in Albanian, Armenian, Arabic, Avar, Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Bosnian, Belarusian, Chechen, Circassian, Crimean Tatar, Dari, Georgian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Pashto, Persian, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Ukrainian, Uzbek
President Kevin Klose (since January 26, 2013);[1] Dennis Mulhaupt is Chair of RFE’s corporate board (since October 2010).[2]
Parent organization Broadcasting Board of Governors
Budget $83,161,000 (FY 08)
Staff 497
Website http://www.rferl.org

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Europe/Radio_Liberty

Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

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Is #Harper’s #PMO using taxpayers $$$ to Solicit #cdnpoli Election Donations via Social Media? II

Update re: “Is ‪#‎Harper‬’s ‪#‎PMO‬ using taxpayers $$$ to Solicit ‪#‎cdnpoli Election Donations via Social Media?” via @FMPsportsguy status update here: https://pic.twitter.com/6StqbFpzhO. We also published a follow up summary between this update related to Harper’s Ministers titled “Are #Harper’s Ministers using taxpayers $$$ to Solicit #cdnpoli Election Donations via Social Media?” here: https://dumpharper.wordpress.com/2014/03/09/are-harpers-ministers-using-taxpayers-to-solicit-cdnpoli-election-donations-via-social-media/


@opHarper @jasonfekete good work, here is answer from ethics commisioner to regards to complaint #cdnpoli - (@FMPsportsguy) March 08, 2014

If you notice the inquiry by FMPsportsguy was specifically delivered to the “Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner” who then replied that the Treasury Board website would be the first point of inquiry. So it seems like it will be up to us to sift through the information that is contained on the Treasury Board website that was referenced above to see what applies. We also have to consider how this campaigning fits within the current Elections Act as well as Pierre Poilievre’s Fair Election Act. For now, here are the links to the page and the sections that seem to apply in this case. It is worth noting that in section n “Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks” was rescinded and replaced by “Policy on Acceptable Network and Device Use” updated 2014-03-06, these links will be posted below

Communications Policy of the Government of Canada

18. Internet and Electronic Communication

The Internet, social media tools and other means of electronic communication are powerful enablers for building and sustaining effective communication within institutions and with their clients across Canada and around the world.

An important tool for providing information and services to the public, the Internet facilitates interactive, two-way communication and feedback. It provides opportunities to reach and connect with Canadians wherever they reside, and to deliver personalized services.

Institutions must maintain an active presence on the Internet to enable 24-hour electronic access to public programs, services and information. E-mail and Web sites must be used to enable direct communications between Canadians and government institutions, and among public service managers and employees.

Institutions must advance Government of Canada on-line initiatives aimed at expanding the reach and quality of internal and external communications, improving service delivery, connecting and interacting with citizens, enhancing public access and fostering public dialogue.

Institutions must ensure that Internet communications conform to government policies and standards. Government of Canada themes and messages must be accurately reflected in electronic communications with the public and among employees.

To ensure congruence with other communication activities, an institution’s Web sites, sub-sites and portals must be reviewed regularly by the head of communications, or his or her designate, who oversees and advises on Web content and design.

Web site managers, at headquarters and in regional offices, must consult with communications staff on the editorial and visual content of Web pages, including design and presentation, to ensure publishing standards and other communication requirements are met.

Collaboration is also required between communications and information technology specialists to ensure effective planning and management of electronic information services. Managers and employees responsible for the operational and technical aspects of an institution’s Web-based systems work in consultation with communications staff who provide strategic advice on Web content and the use of technology for communication purposes. (Also see Web site references in Requirement 23, Advertising, Requirement 24, Partnering and Collaborative Arrangements, Requirement 26, Marketing and Requirement 27, Publishing.)

Institutions must:

  1. manage their Web sites and portals in accordance with the Treasury Board’s Standard on Web Accessibility and Standard on Web Usability;
  2. identify on-line information and services, including e-mail messages, in accordance with the Federal Identity Program Policy;
  3. ensure electronic communications conform to the requirements of the Official Languages Act and to the Treasury Board’s Policy on Official Languages, Directive on Official Languages for Communications and Services and Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks;
  4. be connected to the Government of Canada’s Internet and intranet portal sites, the Canada Site and Publiservice, managed by Service Canada;
  5. ensure that Internet-published information on policies, programs, services and initiatives is regularly updated, accurate, easy to understand, and accessible in multiple formats for persons with disabilities;
  6. ensure that printed material for public dissemination is published concurrently on the Internet;
  7. ensure that social media icons displayed on Government of Canada Web sites link to official social media accounts;
  8. when social media icons are displayed to allow the sharing of Government of Canada content through users’ personal accounts, ensure that a disclaimer is displayed in proximity to the icons, that states that no endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied;
  9. ensure that the address of the official departmental social media account appears on other communications products, such as television or print;
  10. incorporate mechanisms into on-line services for receiving and acknowledging public feedback;
  11. ensure that information about their external public consultations and citizen engagement activities is posted on their Web sites and information, including Web links, is submitted to the Consulting With Canadians Web site maintained by Service Canada (For further policy direction, see Requirement 9, Consultation and Citizen Engagement.);
  12. respect privacy rights and copyright ownership in all on-line publishing and communication – in compliance with the Privacy Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Copyright Act;
  13. ensure that information published on Web sites, prior to posting any changes or updates, is recorded and archived to assure long-term retention and the preservation of institutional memory – with timely and consistent processes for doing so established in consultation with the managers of an institution’s information holdings; and
  14. abide by the Treasury Board’s Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks, Policy on Management of Information Technology, Policy on Information Management, Policy on Government Security and Policy on Privacy Protection.

source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12316

Note the Date Modified: 1998-02-24 and the next comment will have the “Replaced By” link…

Rescinded – Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks

This page has been archived.

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the “Contact Us” page.

Policy Framework

Related Links:

Legislation and Regulations

Replaced By

source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12419

Once again note the Date Modified: 1998-02-24 which does not accurately reflect the actual date modified…

Rescinded – Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks

This policy is replaced by this or these policies

source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12419&section=replacedby

Once again the Date Modified: 2014-03-06 does not reflect the correct date of the modification. The “Effective Date” section is as follows and the table of contents are below…

1. Effective Date
1.1 This policy takes effect on October 1, 2013.
1.2 It replaces the Policy on the Use of Electronic Networks of February 12, 1998.
1.3 All policy requirements will be effective October 1, 2013, with the exception of 6.1.3. which will come into effect April 1, 2014.


Policy on Acceptable Network and Device Use
Table of Contents

Table of Contents

1. Effective Date


The Policy on Acceptable Network and Device Use will ensure that employees use Government of Canada electronic networks and devices in an acceptable manner and provide employees with open access to the Internet including Web 2.0 tools and services.

source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=27122


The above policy changes noted are something that should be explored and examined immediately as they relate to use of government resources with regards to campaign solicitations and partisan activities.

Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

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#cdnpoli: Meet #Ukraine’s Svoboda Party #GPC #NDP #LPC #CPC

Meet the Svoboda Party

Since we have previously put together a fairly comprehensive summary regarding the Right Sector, we really wanted to grasp an understanding of the popularity that surrounds the Svoboda Party since they seem poised to not only win the May 25th elections, if there are indeed any, but may well gain a majority. The text of this doc below, aside from this brief hastily composed introduction, will be taken directly from the official Svoboda Party website itself along with the link. Upon reviewing their “program” one can see, if you have read the text of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement, how the two cannot be reconciled for the most part as integration is not within their mandate, it is indeed the opposite. Not only that, but it may surprise you how different the Svoboda Party is compared to any of the political party’s that currently hold any power, could, “legitimacy” or presence in Canada or the US or the UK or the EU for that matter. They are indeed the anti-party that is anti-establishment and anti-status-quo which explains it’s popularity.

This will certainly cause many unforeseen (?) issues for many of the key players involved in the coup d’etat as the contagion will spread and cannot be isolated within the boundaries of Ukraine. That is why this look into the mandate of the Svoboda Party seems very important for many reasons since they already hold so many high level positions. In addition, it seems rather odd that that we are not being informed, due to the escalating anti-Russia and anti-Putin rhetoric and propaganda spins, about the situations occurring in many other regions of Ukraine, including what has been occurring in the so called pro-EU side, considering the new puppet regime was booed by the protesters as they were announced at Maidan.

It is worth noting that Ukraine is a far more diverse nation than is being reported and there are many minority groups and many in Ukraine speak Russian and other languages. They are Ukrainian citizens that are not necessarily pro-Russia or pro-Putin or anti-EU or anti_Ukraine and their voices are being ignored and silenced and are defiantly afraid for their safety and it is all because of the language they speak. They have been essentially used as scapegoats and media fodder by the Western powers and are faced with unimpeded violence at the hands of the Right Sector and other ultra-nationalist white supremacist groups. This in itself should be an indication that the newly installed government is illegitimate considering the State is not protecting them in any way shape or form, period. Quite the contrary, the State is allowing an unimpeded ethnic cleansing campaign to go unchallenged, which is a violation of not only the EU Integration agreement but international laws

We should also take into consideration the sudden and dramatic narrative shift away from Kiev and towards Crimea, that no matter how they spin it, seems to be very peaceful and orderly as it does not seem like any kind of invasion, but a response that was called for by the regional authorities in the semi-autonomous region of Crimea that have rejected the unconstitutional matter in which the previously and democratically elected government structure was dissolved and has scheduled a referendum.

All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” program – “Program for the Protection of Ukrainians”

The main purpose of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is to build a powerful Ukrainian State based on the principles of social and national justice. A state, which takes its rightful place among the leading countries and provides a continuous development of the Ukrainian nation.

In order to achieve this objective, The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” proposes a clear plan of immediate priority steps.

І. Power and Society: Radical Clean-up and Fair System

1. Conduct lustration of the authorities. Depose from power the agents of KGB and government officials who held executive positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

2. Promulgate lists of the agents of the USSR KGB, who were or are in the state service of Ukraine and in other socially important positions.

3. Appoint released after the lustration vacancies to young professionals, graduates of Ukrainian universities, who are selected on the base of principles of patriotism and professionalism and special government administrative courses.

4. Establish mandatory policy for polygraph testing of government employees and candidates for elective office regarding their involvement in corruption, cooperation with foreign intelligence services and having dual citizenship.

5. Adopt a special anti-corruption law to control not only income, but also expenditures of public officials and their family members.

6. Implement as a principle in criminal law that “the greater the position, the higher the responsibility for the crime committed”.

7. Set the graph “nationality” in the passport and birth certificate. Determine the nationality by birth certificate or birth certificate of the parents, considering the requests of the citizen.

8. Implement a criminal penalty for any displays of Ukrainophobia.

9. Submit to public discussion the draft law on proportional representation in the executive branch of Ukrainians and representatives of national minorities.

10. Submit to public discussion the draft of the Constitution, according to which the Ukrainian state is a presidential republic, the President of Ukraine is the head of the state, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the direct head of the Government of Ukraine.

11. Reduce the term in office of the President of Ukraine to four years. (One and the same person can hold the office of President for no more than twice). To be elected as the President, one must be a citizen of Ukraine by birth, has lived in Ukraine for the last 20 years, has reached 35 years of age, who speaks and is fluent in the official language, has no criminal record and has not been brought to responsibility for anti-Ukrainian offenses.

12. Implement a proportional system of elections to the parliament with open lists. To be elected as a deputy, one must have been living in Ukraine for the last 10 years, reached 18 years of age, who speaks and is fluent in the official language, who is competent and has no criminal record.

13. Provide equal access for all electoral stakeholders to the media for their coverage of program provisions, debates and so on. Prohibit paid political advertising in the mass media three months before and throughout the campaign.

14. Oblige candidates for all elective offices to specify in their official biographies the nationality, all previous (from the Soviet era) party and government positions and convictions – repaid and unrepaid. Withdraw the registration of the candidates who concealed biographical facts or deprive deputies of their mandate, if the concealment was found after the election

15. Provide equal participation of representatives of all political parties participating in elections in the electoral committees.

16. Cancel parliamentary immunity from criminal and economic crimes. Prohibit bringing to responsibility deputies of all levels for their political positions, statements and voting nature (except for anti-Ukrainian, anti-state, and Ukrainophobian activity).

17. Limit the duration of the parliament and local councils from five to three years. Reduce the number of national deputies of Ukraine in the parliament to 300.

18. Implement fingerprint voting in order to ensure exclusively personal involvement of the deputies in the Parliament.

19. Restrict the increase of wages and other material rewards for deputies within the period of validity of their mandate.

20. Implement the election of local judges by the community for 5 years, appellate judges by the Congress of local judges for a period of 7 years, the Supreme Court by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine for 10 years.

21. Raise the age limit of judges to 30 years. A judge may be elected if he is a citizen of Ukraine who has experience in the field of law for at least 5 years, who is competent, has no criminal record, has been living in Ukraine for the last 10 years and who speaks and is fluent in the official language.

22. Provide transparent and publicly accessible functioning of the unified register of court decisions in order to ensure uniform application of the law by all courts of the state.

23. Provide compensation for moral and material damage incurred by a person through unlawful decisions and actions of state authorities and local government officials, at the expense of the perpetrators. The losses for a wrongful judgment must be compensated at the expense of the judge who approved it.

24. Submit to public discussion the draft law on a new three-tiered system of administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine, which consists of 300 counties and also cities, towns and villages.

25. Implement a majoritarian system of elections for deputies of village, town and city councils, a mixed proportional and majoritarian system for deputies of county councils.. To be elected as a deputy of the local council, one must be a citizen of Ukraine, who reached 18 years of a age on the election day, who is competent, has no criminal record and has been living in the community for at least 5 years.

26. Provide local communities with the right to elect every 3 years the village, town, city and district chairmen who heads the Executive Committee through secret, equal and direct voting. Elect village, town and district headmen in two rounds.

27. Provide the local communities with the right to withdraw deputies of local councils and local judges, to impeach the head of the executive committee, surveyor and the head of of Internal Affairs by referendum.

28. Ensure the increase of the role of local government by reallocating powers and financial resources between the central government and local governments on the basis of budgeting “from the bottom up”.

29. Introduce the practice of the widest direct democracy in local communities – referendums, plebiscites, general meetings and so on. Introduce the practice of the widest direct democracy in local communities – referendums, plebiscites, general meetings and so on. Conduct local referendums on vital issues. Introduce a mechanism for community veto on decisions of local governments.

30. Deepen the impact on the livelihood of the local government communities by creating house, street and block committees. Allow the division of land and new construction in populated areas only with the consent of the authorities, except in cases of national needs. Resolve disputed land and construction issues through local referenda.

31. Allow all mentally healthy citizens of Ukraine that have never been convicted of a crime to freely acquire and possess firearms and cold weaponry.

ІІ. Economy: Economic Independence and Social Justice

1. Conduct “energy audits” – carry out a complete inventory of mining sites and energy production of all types in Ukraine.

2. Adopt a national program of energy independence of Ukraine on the principle of “consumption reduction, production increase, source diversification.”

3. Diversify the import sources of energy resources: no more than 30% per provider (country). Implement and develop special trade programs (for example, the project “carbamide in exchange for liquefied gas”). Eliminate the monopoly of foreign energy companies on the Ukrainian market.

4. Establish strict proportional dependence of prices for Russian gas transit through Ukraine and the rent of underground gas storage facilities in accordance with the selling price of gas for Ukraine.

5. Achieve sales of Russian gas to European consumers in the east and not the west border of Ukraine.

6. Destroy corruption schemes in the energy sector. Establish transparent tenders for equipment for state-owned energy companies. Implement strict state control over the pricing in the oil and gas sector.

7. Adopt a national program to develop energy fields. Increase own gas and oil production, in particular by developing the sea shelf, including deposits abroad. Develop the coal industry as a priority area.

8. Create own closed nuclear cycle based on domestic raw materials. Construct public infrastructure necessary for the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

9. Adopt a national program of development and implementation of alternative energy: diesel fuel from coal, biofuel, wind, solar, hydropower (including recovery of small HPP networks) etc.

10. Develop and implement a national program to encourage energy-saving technologies. Switch to control heat measuring equipment of end users. Invest in heat supply technology. As a result, reduce the energy needs of the state and lower prices for utilities.

11. Adopt a law on strategic companies and strategic industries. Disallow the privatization of strategic enterprises and return to state ownership ones that were privatized earlier. Ensure state control over natural monopolies.

12. Check the legality of the privatization of all large enterprises (in which the average number of employees exceeds one thousand persons annually or the gross revenue from sales of the product in a year exceeds fifty million hryvnias). Return illegally privatized facilities to state and workers ownership.

13. Provide an opportunity to employees to acquire right of ownership of state and communal companies, participate in their management and fair distribution of profits. Allow employees to sell their share in the company exclusively to the appropriate company. Require employees who have stopped the employment relationship with the enterprise to sell their share to the enterprise.

14. Ensure the benefits of domestic investors over foreign ones in the privatization of state enterprises.

15. Return to state ownership privatized enterprises whose owners do not fulfill their social, investment and other commitments.

16. Allow transfer of long-term use of historical and cultural heritage objects for the purpose of restoring, preserving and efficient functionality, subject to the investor protection requirements of restoration and investment commitments. Suspend the use in case of non-compliance or liabilities.

17. Increase criminal penalties for crimes related to the seizure of enterprises, land and so on. Create a legal framework for combating illegal construction.

18. Adopt a new land code and approve it in national referendum. Conduct a complete inventory of land, buildings, and premises in Ukraine. Create a “Unified State Register of rights to immovable property and land” and to ensure its openness and transparency.

19. Prohibit agriculture land trade in Ukraine. Give it to long-term possession of Ukrainian citizens with the right of family inheritance. Determine legal grounds for termination of such possession in case of using the agricultural land for inappropriate purposes or in case of deterioration of the soil (fertility).

20. Establish criminal liability for soil erosion as a result of human actions. Strengthen criminal liability for illegitimate acquisition of soils.

21. Allow persons who acquired ownership of agricultural land by lawful means (when shared, or obtained by an inheritance by law) to sell these plots of land exclusively to the state. Disallow any other means of transfer of such sites. Disclaim the ownership of agricultural land acquired by debt receipts.

22. Obligate the citizens who wish to acquire land for agricultural purposes in an amount greater than 30 acres, to take a qualifying exam in the subject of the land’s activity.

23. Allow land ownership only of homestead land parcels and those under apartment buildings and other real estate. Do not allow ownership of land by foreigners and persons without citizenship.

24. Ensure the rent for the use of agricultural land to be in accordance with the regulatory assessment of the land.

25. Disallow change of use of agricultural land designation, except for state and public needs. Turn to the state ownership land that is not used for the purposes intended or used contrary to the comprehensive plans for sustainable rural development.

26. Adopt a law on increased land value to regulate its use and ensure public control over it.

27. Adopt a new tax code with socially fair simplified system of taxation. Simplify and improve tax administration and accounting.

28. Reduce the fiscal pressure on all sectors of the state, which produce national product, particularly small and medium enterprises. Establish progressive tax rate on the principle of “small business – low taxes, big business – big taxes.”

29. Cancel criminalized value added tax. Establish a single social tax on personal income taxation on a progressive scale and base rate of 20%. Do not tax the income of minimum wage. Set progressive luxury tax (real estate, luxury goods, etc.). Forward a minimum 30% of revenues from taxes on luxury to lower consumer prices of essential commodities.

30. Establish comprehensive tax incentive investments in science, education and innovation. Reduce income tax to 5% on the portion of profits that redirect to technological renovation of production means in accordance with advanced technology.

31. Provide maximal punishment for economic crimes, corruption and state job damages in especially large amounts. Fight for capital export in the offshore, including through the revision agreements on avoidance of double taxation of income and property.

32. Ensure state control over the banking sector (state-owned banks must have at least 30% of the banking capital of the country). Legally restrict usurious extortionate interest on bank loans for households and enterprises in Ukraine. Do not allow foreign persons to own controlling stakes of any private banks in Ukraine.

33. Ensure complete transparency and accessibility of the National Bank for law enforcement agencies. Restrict the independence of the National Bank during economical emergency situations, such as the economic crises, wars. Introduce criminal liability for antisocial monetary and other policies of the National Bank, which lead to the impoverishment of the general population. Adopt a law on state gold and currency reserves.

34. Prohibit the issuance of foreign currency loans (exception – business entities that carry out foreign trade activities). Transfer debt on loans issued to individuals in foreign currency into national currency at the exchange rate that was at the time the loan. Compensate for the difference at the expense of gross expenses of banks and foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine.

35. Eliminate the social gap between rich and poor by encouraging development of the middle class (small and middle businessmen, high-paying professionals, including public sector workers – doctors, teachers, etc.), which will amount to not less than 60% of the working population. Provide targeted public interest-free loans to start a business (SME) and to simplify the permitting system. Implement state program of economic education of citizens.

36. Adopt a new Law of Ukraine “On government procurements and state orders”, considering the benefits for the national manufacturers. Trade with state funds. Create a unified state Internet resource for the effective conduct of online-trading in the area of procurement.

37. Ensure revenues from the transit potential of Ukraine to the state budget and send them to construction of transport infrastructure.

38. Require to conduct construction of state and municipal facilities solely by national experts, thus creating working places for the citizens of Ukraine.

39. Implement targeted preferential government loans to small and medium agriculture, particularly to provide for agricultural manufacturers with means of production. Implement large-scale sectoral programs of direct grants. Provide government support for innovation in agriculture.

40. Adopt a national program for the development of agricultural equipment. Impose prohibitive import duties on agricultural machinery 5 years after its announcement, the equivalent of which is produced in Ukraine.

41. Develop the cooperative movement in rural areas in accordance with a separate comprehensive state program.

42. Create networks for sales of Ukrainian agricultural products.

43. Establish the parity of purchasing and selling prices for agricultural products. Provide food needs of the state exclusively through domestic agricultural products (except products that are not cultivated in the Ukraine).

44. Carry out an effective and transparent activity of the State Reserve and its activity on all agricultural markets. Provide agricultural manufacturers with government contracts for agricultural products. Rebuild the state system of storing agricultural products.

45. Adopt national development programs of breeding, seed production, plant protection, livestock breeding, horticulture, fish culture and so on. Conduct a complete inventory of appropriate production facilities.

46. Develop the social sector in rural areas. Ensure easily accessible preferential loans for the purchase and construction of housing in rural areas if the borrower participates in agricultural production and for budget employees.

47. Develop competitive sectors for Ukrainian industrial and innovation activities: food-processing (including recycling of foreign material), aircraft, shipbuilding, machine tools and machinery (energy, agriculture, etc.), military-industrial complexes and space industry. Direct government support for high-tech, knowledge-intensive, innovative, import substitution and vertically integrated industry.

48. Encourage gradual replacement of imported products with domestic ones (especially big and small agricultural machinery, light industry, food products).

49. Eliminate private monopolies and oligopolies in the Ukrainian economy.

50. Allow export of non-recoverable raw materials and derivative products only by corresponding licenses.

51. Adopt a law on privatization of housing in apartment blocks including land plots for houses, adjacent areas and joint ownership of citizens.

52. Reform housing and communal services. Stimulate the creation of condominiums. Ensure maintenance and exploitation of apartment buildings on competitive basis. Disallow foreign companies to serve condominiums. Introduce institute of certified managers of apartment buildings.

53. Return companies-monopolists of electricity, gas, heat, water supply and sanitation to communal ownership of territorial communities.

54. Implement a comprehensive state program for full utilization of solid domestic and biological waste.

55. Require building companies to build social housing at affordable prices in accordance with the government program. Create a state special fund for development of social housing. Implement a comprehensive program of reconstruction and gradual replacement of buildings built in the 1960-ies (“khrushchevskas”).

56. Adopt a new, socially just, Labor Code – Labor Code of Ukraine. Develop a tariffication scale of hourly wages in line with European standards. Set five-fold ratio between the maximum and minimum hourly wage in the public sector employees.

57. Support the development of effective independent trade unions. Ensure the right to strike.

58. Abolish the unjust pension reform, legitimize retirement age from life expectancy. Establish direct dependence of the amount of pension from work experience and the permissible five-fold ratio between the maximum and minimum pension for solidarity pension system.

59. Bring the living wage in line with the actual needs. Regularly review the living wage standards to maintain their relevance.

60. Provide disabled citizens and orphans government with targeted assistance in an amount not less than the subsistence minimum.

ІІІ. National Health: Overcoming the Demographic Crisis and Raising the Quality of Life

1. Implement long-term state program to promote healthy social life, including the promotion of mental and physical health, fighting drug addiction, alcoholism and smoking.

2. Implement obligatory state social health insurance that will provide a guaranteed basic package of urgent primary medical aid, provided free of charge at the expense of public health fund.

3. Implement a “Reproductive Health of the Nation” program. Disallow abortion except due to medical issues, and/or rape, which were proved in court. Align the implementation of illegal abortion to attempted murder in the criminal law.

4. Implement a policy of economic protectionism against domestic pharmaceutical industry and medical engineering. Ensure strict state control over the quality and price of medical products, especially imported.

5. Recover and return to state ownership Sanatorium and resort facilities. Prohibit realigning of sanatoriums. Prevent the privatization of the resort and sanatorium lands throughout Ukraine.

6. Adopt national housing program under which a family with three children receives state free loan, a family of four children – state free loan, 50% of which is refundable, a family with five children or more – free housing from state. Establish accessible government soft loans for housing for young families.

7. Increase the amount of payments to Ukrainian families for the birth of each additional child in accordance with inflation rates in the country and the growth of prices for baby products.

8. Ban advertising of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages in any form throughout Ukraine. Criminalize promotion of drug use (including so-called ‘soft drugs’) and sexual perversions.

9. Provide local communities the right to limit the sale of alcoholic beverages.

10. Set a special tax on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, genetically modified food. Direct the funds received to programs addressing social diseases (tuberculosis, oncological and cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, HIV / AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, drug addiction).

11. Create a network of modern laboratories for the analysis of food products for the presence of genetically modified organisms.

12. Allow sale of genetically modified food products only with special labeling that is clearly visible and only in specialized departments of retail establishments. Strengthen criminal penalties for non-compliance during labeling and trade of genetically modified foods.

13. Organize adequate state control over healthcare workers, sanitary working conditions and public safety in manufacturing.

14. Provide residents of regions of Ukraine, who were affected by anthropogenic pollution, with a status equal to that of Chernobyl residents.

15. Keep the existing reserve areas and parks intact and create new recreational areas.

16. Require raw material-intensive branches of large companies to conduct ecological modernization of production facilities.

17. Encourage the transfer beyond the settlements to a safe distance of all enterprises engaged in pollutant emissions into the environment.

18. Oblige physical and legal persons to compensate double the amount of damage caused to the environment.

IV. Citizenship and Migration: Right to a Homeland and Protection of the Living Space

1. Adopt a new Citizenship Act, under which citizenship will be given only to those persons who were born in Ukraine or are ethnically Ukrainian, who returned from abroad for permanent living and working in Ukraine. Allow people born in Ukraine from foreigners or stateless persons to acquire Ukrainian citizenship upon reaching age of majority only under the conditions of Ukrainian language fluency, knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine.

2. Allow to acquire citizenship of Ukraine in exceptional cases, to persons who are legally residing in Ukraine for at least 15 years and are fluent in Ukrainian, have knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine., took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and abandoned all other nationalities. Disallow these persons’ right to acquire the citizenship of Ukraine, if they have criminal records.

3. Provide strict criminal liability for unlawful provision and obtaining of citizenship.

4. Eliminate the illegal practice of dual citizenship. Deprive of Ukrainian citizenship persons who hide that they are citizens of another state.

5. Confiscate property and capital goods acquired in Ukraine from offenders of the Citizenship Act to the state.

6. Facilitate the mass returning to Ukraine of ethnic Ukrainians. Ensure preferential terms for returning home of Ukrainians and their descendants born abroad.

7. Conclude bilateral agreements on the legalization of Ukrainian workers. Provide state protection of Ukrainians abroad by all possible means.

8. Create conditions for Ukrainian migrant workers to return home. Consider their earned money and property, provided that they invest in Ukrainian business, to be investments that are not taxed.

9. Eliminate the root cause of migration and demographic crisis – ensure the constitutional right to housing for every Ukrainian family.

10. Ban the adoption of Ukrainian children by foreigners.

11. Introduce symmetrical visa regime with other countries. Let visa-free entry to Ukraine to citizens of only those countries which have abolished visa requirements for citizens of Ukraine.

12. Establish stricter anti-immigration measures and improve the system of detention and deportation of illegal immigrants.

13. Strengthen state border protection and cut off channels of illegal migration.

14. Establish mandatory registration of foreign citizens who arrive on the territory of Ukraine, in the local bodies of Ministry of Internal Affairs. Establish, due to the threat of international terrorism and crime, a uniform biometric control system for everyone who enters Ukraine (database of fingerprints, eye retina, etc.).

15. Terminate agreement with the EU on readmission. Conclude with other states, from territories where illegal immigrants come to Ukraine, readmission agreements (return of illegal immigrants) on favorable conditions for Ukraine.

16. Provide place in higher educational institutions’ dormitories primarily for Ukrainian, not foreign students.

17. Carry out regular inspections of Foreigners Registration materials coming from schools with lists of students who actually enrolled in them. Ensure timely exit from the territory of Ukraine of foreign students who are expelled from schools.

V. Information Space and Education: Preserving National Identity and Cultural Development

1. Adopt the Law “On Protection of the Ukrainian language” instead of the current “On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. New State Language Policy Committee, responsible for the protection and distribution of Ukrainian language. Create a State Language Policy Committee, responsible for the protection and propagation of the Ukrainian language.

2. Regulate the use of the Ukrainian language in the media according to the number of Ukrainians – no less than 78% of their space and airtime.

3. Provide simultaneous official language audio translation of foreign performances, broadcasts and films on television and radio. Provide translation at the expense of the media owners.

4. Abolish tax on the Ukrainian book publishing, audio, video production and software.

5. Implement a mandatory Ukrainian language exam for civil servants and candidates for elected office. Require all state employees to use Ukrainian language at work and during public appearances.

6. Include in the programs of all universities in Ukraine a compulsory “Culture of Ukrainian language” course of not less than 72 hours.

7. Verify the language of instruction in all without exception training and educational institutions to be in accordance with the official status of the learning facilities. Revoke licenses of educational institutions if they have carried out teaching in foreign languages without proper registration status of the establishment of foreign language teaching. Cease the supply of textbooks and teaching materials in foreign languages at the expense of the State Budget of Ukraine in institutions that do not have official status of institutions with foreign language teaching.

8. Cultivate the best traditions of Ukrainian pedagogy. Discontinue the practice of mechanical copying of foreign models, including the Bologna Process.

9. Expand the network of preschool educational institutions. Provide each child access to Ukrainian preschool.

10. Restore and maintain the system of after-school facilities and children’s sports schools.

11. Implement a state program of soft loans for education. Provide graduates of secondary and higher education with first working place.

12. Adopt a state program of patriotic education and hardening the nature of the young generation. Provide active leisure and recreation for children and youth. Promote youth networks and patriotic organizations, sports groups, clubs, summer camps for children and youth.

13. Change the principles for candidate of science titles and PhDs and for structure of the Supreme Attestation Commission of Ukraine for ensuring real, not formal control over the quality of dissertations.

14. Encourage the return of Ukrainian scientists who moved abroad.

15. Establish incentive programs of cooperation between Ukrainian and leading foreign academic institutions.

16. Bring patent law of Ukraine in line with the leading international practice of patent law. Ensure that the researchers and developers receive no less than 25% of the amount from the sale of rights to a patent for their invention.

17. Remove soviet propagandistic literature from youth and public library funds. Purchase at the expense of the national budget works of literature, art, music, film to replenish libraries, museums, record libraries, video libraries, repertoire of theaters, music collectives and more.

18. Provide state scholarships and grants on competitive basis to carry out art projects, creations of national works of literature, art, music, movies, plays, concerts, TV programs and more.

19. Develop networks of concert halls, cinemas, bookshops, galleries and exhibition halls, providing favorable conditions for them to rent.

20. Introduce the protection issue of national information space within the competence of NSDC to deal with informational occupation of Ukraine. Create public radio and television, competitive Ukrainian film industry.

21. Deprive of licenses the media that violates language legislation, humiliates national dignity of Ukrainians, spreads misinformation or carries out anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

22. Require all media to inform the public about all of their owners (the press – in every issue, TV and radio – daily, during broadcast).

23. Increase import duty on foreign polygraphic, audio and video products. Implement a tax on foreign rebroadcasting of radio and television program products, copying and rental of music and film. Redirect the funds for the development to the national information space.

24. Direct every sixth hryvnia from profits from rental of foreign films to the development of the domestic film industry. Set tax on advertising, during the broadcast of foreign films, in favor of national cinema.

25. Increase mandatory quotas of airtime on radio and TV and screen time in cinemas for Ukrainian language audio-visual products produced in Ukraine and ensure its uniform presence on the air throughout the day. Implement strict criminal liability for failure to comply with the quota.

26. Establish tax relief on the development of advanced information technology and modern electronic networks. Eliminate oligopoly market of information technologies on the territory of Ukraine.

27. Create competitive Ukrainian operating system for computers based on current available systems with high-quality translation, reasonable ammount of Ukrainian fonts, implement customer support and security services. Establish a Ukrainian operating system in all government bodies and institutions.

28. Establish domestic production of Ukrainian-language software (especially specialized: for accounting, storing, school, office, etc.) for government agencies, educational institutions and for free sale. Require public institutions to use exclusively Ukrainian software.

29. Promote the establishment of a unified Ukrainian Local Church centered in Kiev.

VI. Historical Justice: State Building and Overcoming the Consequences of Occupation

1. Specify in the Constitution of Ukraine that the succession of modern Ukrainian state was established in Kievan Rus’, continued by Galicia-Volhynia, Cossack Hetman Republic period, Ukrainian People’s Republic, West Ukrainian People’s Republic, Carpathian Ukraine and the Ukrainian state, which was restored by the Act of June 30 1941, and that independent Ukraine emerged as a result of over three centuries of national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.

2. Recognize the fact of occupation of Ukraine by Bolshevik Russia during 1918-91, which resulted in an unprecedented genocide of Ukrainians.

3. Achieve Ukrainian genocide recognition during the twentieth century from the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the European Parliament, the parliaments of the world, in which 20.5 million Ukrainians were killed, to be considered a crime against humanity (terror and looting of civilians during the war of UPR against Bolshevik Russia in 1918-1921; dekulakization and forced collectivization; artificial famine of 1921, 1932-33, 1947; several waves of Ukrainian elite killings in 1920-30-40’s and 1970’s; killing of civilians during the war, forced labor export of Ukrainians to foreign lands; “Operation Vistula”; torture in prisons and humiliation using punitive psychiatry on Ukrainian patriots until the collapse of the Soviet empire; robbing the national economy, historical and cultural values; robbery and destruction of Ukrainian churches; persecution on ethnic and religious grounds; the systematic destruction of Ukrainian culture and language; total Russification).

4. Open all the archives of Cheka-SPD-NKVD-MGB-KGB that are stored in the central archive and regional archives of the Security Service of Ukraine.

5. Renew criminal investigation into the Holodomor of 1932-33, which was recognized by the state as genocide of the Ukrainian people, a crime, to which the statute of limitations is not applicable. Carry out a public trial of communism. Obtain a court order to ban the communist ideology as misanthropic and one that has caused irreparable damage to the Ukrainian people.

6. Establish strict criminal liability for public denial of the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian nation.

7. Abolish and prevent the use of imperial-Bolshevik symbols, commemorations of dates, monuments and names in honor of butchers of Ukraine. Prohibit the establishment of any imperial monuments and symbols in Ukraine that glorify the history of the occupants..

8. Set up a special investigative structure for tracing criminals who were destroying the Ukrainian nation, and after finding them bring them to justice.

9. Demand from Moscow official recognition, apology and compensation for the genocide of the Ukrainian people. Achieve from Russia the return of savings of the citizens of Ukraine (83 billion karbovanetses as of 1991). Insist on the transfer to Ukraine the rightful share of the Diamond fund, gold and foreign exchange reserves, foreign assets of the former USSR.

10. Pay compensation to repressed Ukrainians and their descendants in amounts corresponding to their suffering.

11. Provide Ukrainians from Kuban, Chełm Land, Nadsyannya, Podlasie, Lemko regions, which were forcibly evicted from their land, with status of deported peoples with all social guarantees.

12. Develop and implement a public education program “The Truth about the Ukrainian genocide.” Provide separate educational discipline “History of Ukrainian genocide in the twentieth century” in all schools.

13. Acknowledge that the struggle, which was taking place until the end of the 1950-ies by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Acknowledge UPA soldiers and OUN underground fighters to be members of the national liberation struggle for independence of Ukraine.

14. Provide the veterans of UPA with proper privileges and compensate for the not added ones since the independence.

15. Abolish special pensions for servants of the Soviet regime, the executives of the Communist party, Komsomol and punitive authorities of the USSR.

16. Disseminate the truth about the Ukrainian liberation struggle in the twentieth century by means of social advertising, public parliamentary hearings, documentary and feature films, book publishing and more. Implement a course of studying the history of the Ukrainian liberation struggle in the twentieth century in all schools.

17. Establish a National Memorial Museum dedicated to the Ukrainian valour (the armed struggle for independence of the Ukrainian Nation).

18. Revive traditional Ukrainian holidays. Introduce state-level celebration on the second Sunday in May of traditional for the Ukrainians Mother’s Day.

19. Announce October 14 (St. Pokrova – patron saint of Ukrainian Cossacks, the day of the creation of UPA) to be a national holiday – the Day of Ukrainian Weaponry. Cancel celebration of 23th February – the so-called “Fatherland Defender Day” (of the Soviet army).

20. Facilitate the return of national, cultural, historical and other values to Ukraine exported abroad during periods of occupation.

VII. Foreign Policy and Defence: the European-Ukrainian Centrism and a Strong State

1. Determine the European Ukrainocentrism state strategic course according to which Ukraine aims to become not only the geographical, but also the geopolitical center of Europe.

2. Cease all participation of Ukraine in supranational formations launched by Moscow: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Common Economic Space (CES), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and others.

3. Pay special attention to the only true geopolitical project, in which the main role is played by Ukraine – GUAM. Involve other countries in the Commonwealth from the Black Sea and Caspian Basin.

4. Direct foreign efforts to build closer political and economic cooperation with natural allies – the countries of Baltic-Black Sea geopolitical axis (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, in the long term – Belarus et al.). Initiate mutually beneficial agreements between these countries and Ukraine in all strategic areas: trade and customs policy, energy security and transit, defense, etc.

5. Develop and implement an effective state program’s for positive image of Ukraine in the world. Involve through special government programs the numerous Ukrainian diasporas to lobby Ukrainian interests in other countries.

6. Complete delimitation (establish agreement) and demarcation (marking of border signs) of Ukraine national borders, including the sea. Set borders unilaterally in case of further delays by neighbors countries, including Russia. Ensure proper border security. Introduce a visa regime with Russia.

7. Demand from countries which declared the safety and security of the borders of Ukraine in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons (Budapest Memorandum, 1994), effective rather than paper guarantees. Conclude bilateral agreements with the U. S. and the UK for immediate full-scale military assistance to Ukraine in case of armed aggression against Ukraine.

8. Appeal to the General Assembly and the UN Security Council demanding statements to evaluate the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes without declaring war.

9. Restore the nuclear status of Ukraine due to violations of the Budapest Memorandum by Russia (one of the guarantors of security of Ukraine): conflicts around Tuzla island and the Kerch Strait, direct threats, brutal political and economic pressure, regular attempts of officials to question the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Restore tactical missile and nuclear arsenal state. Appeal to the U. S. and the UK to promote and support the nuclear program in Ukraine.

10. Start real, not declarative actions that enable the integration of Ukraine into the European security structures: clean authority and power structures from the agents of Moscow; neutralize subversive organizations funded by Russia; delimit and demarcate the borders; destroy the pockets of separatism; neutralize all territorial claims to Ukraine; ensure the withdrawal of Russian military bases on Ukrainian territory; immediately reform and rebuild the Armed Forces and Naval Forces of Ukraine.

11. Demand from NATO member countries favorable conditions for Ukraine, clear guarantees and specific terms of possible entry of Ukraine into NATO. Develop and implement a parallel plan for Security and Defense of Ukraine.

12. Develop own system of missile attack warning and means of action in response to the independent or joint basis with other countries. Recover in its entirety the air defense system to protect the country’s entire airspace. Strengthen Air Defence to protect strategic facilities and populous cities. Appeal to Western countries to provide Ukraine for rent with mobile air defense system to deploy missile and air shields in exchange for intelligence of Ukrainian radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. This way, verify the real willingness of NATO to cooperate with Ukraine in the field of defense and security.

13. Set funding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at 5% of GDP (to overcome technological backwardness of the Armed Forces from neighboring countries), given the urgent need for reforming and upgrading the troops. Reform the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including the navy and the aircraft, equip them with ships, aircraft, missile strike systems and air defense systems of the 4th and 5th generations, re-equip existing equipment (aircraft, ships) with modern weapons.

14. Restore the prestige of service in the Armed Forces and other military formations. Increase salaries of military personnel. Solve the problem of providing them with housing by providing soft loans for the state of its acquisition.

15. Rebuild own military-industrial complex for providing the Armed Forces of Ukraine with national modern weapons and effective participation of Ukraine in the global arms market. Integrate research institutions of the Armed Forces into the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. Provide priority studies on the establishment of the modern samples of high precision weapons and weapons that act on new physical principles. Establish favorable military-technical cooperation with other countries.

16. Ensure strict control over pricing and receiving the proceeds from arms sales to the state budget of Ukraine. Direct all proceeds from arms sales solely for defense. End the practice of mindless destruction of modern effective samples of armament at the request of other countries or their sale at the expense of Ukraine.

17. Develop and systematically implement by 2017 a new program of reform and construction of Ukrainian army that will provide real national defense. Create high-tech and professional contract army – the regular troops. Establish a national reserve of the Armed Forces.

18. Create a unified system of training and mobilization of reservists (on the Swiss model). Restore in its entirety the system of initial military training and civil defense in the secondary school and a network of military faculties in universities.

19. Create an effective counter-intelligence service to ensure the safety of the Ukrainian rear against saboteurs of the likely opponent.

20. Reorganize and strengthen the coast guard of the Black Sea. Set in the strategically important areas on the Black Sea-Azov coast of Ukraine anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles to protect the body of water, place modern air defense missile systems to cover military coast guard and Marine Corps’s naval forces. Increase the number of troops in the Crimea, re-equip them with modern rocket artillery and armored vehicles for rapid deployment and countering possible aggression.

VIII. Crimea and Sevastopol: Establishing a Constitutional Order and Ensuring Stable Development

1. Submit to nationwide referendum the change of status of the Crimea from autonomous to regional and abolish the special status of Sevastopol.

2. Provide Sevastopol with the right of free port. Implement preferential tax treatment for resort and recreational economic activity in the Southern and Western coast of Crimea.

3. Terminate “Kharkiv agreements” between Yanukovych and Medvedev of April 21, 2010.

4. Develop a program at the level of National Security Council on unilateral actions of Ukraine in case of failure of obligations on the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine until 2017. Demand the immediate withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, if the Russian Federation further violates the laws of Ukraine and the signed international agreements.

5. Create Ukrainian checkpoints at all sites, leased by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Disallow foreign military personnel in military uniform to move outside of leased military bases of foreign countries on the territory of Ukraine(except for official delegations).

6. Raise the flag of Ukraine over all the objects rented by the Black Sea Fleet and set the procedures for the use of foreign state symbols on the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine and international standards.

7. Ensure immediate enforcement of all decisions of the Ukrainian courts regarding the removal of Ukrainian property from illegal use by the Black Sea Fleet. Appeal to judicial instances with claims for compensation related to these losses. Conduct a thorough inventory of the property, buildings and territories used by the Black Sea Fleet.

8. Implement unilaterally and in accordance with international standards the recalculation of rental rates for the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.

9. Strengthen the protection of the state border in the Azov and Black Seas. Ensure strict customs controls for all cargoes that enter the territory of Ukraine through Black Sea Fleet.

10. Implement continuous unimpeded professional inspections of military facilities the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine for compliance with the laws of their operation and Ukraine signed international agreements. Demand from the Russian Federation detailed quarterly reports on their residence in Ukraine (including the territorial waters and the continental shelf) weapons and ammunition.

11. Make a complete revision of property rights and land use rights and property of objects in the Crimea.

12. Restore the right for unrestricted use of land areas in accordance with applicable law – beaches and coastal zones in the hundred-meter zone from the flow line.

13. Adopt a state program of integration into Ukrainian society of the Crimean part that would foresee economic, transport, cultural, informational and educational integration.

14. Implement state programs representing Ukrainian culture and art in the Crimea. Provide on competitive basis centers of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian media in Crimea, supported by the state.

15. Ensure that the Ukrainians of the Crimea have free access to Ukrainian media and bookstores through targeted subsidies from the state budget.

16. Ensure that the Ukrainians of the Crimea have the opportunity to freely receive education in their mother tongue in secondary, vocational and higher education establishments.

Approved by the Constituent Congress of SNPU on September 9th, 1995, with amendments and additions made by

The ninth Congress of SNPU on February 14th, 2004,

The twentieth Congress of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” on May 24th, 2009,

The twenty-third Congress of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” on December 24th, 2011

Registered by order number 1470/5 of Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on August 12th, 2009.

source: http://en.svoboda.org.ua/about/program/

After reviewing the above Svoboda Party “program” it would be a good idea to review the overview of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement titled “Guide to the Association Agreement” for a deeper understanding of the point we are attempting to articulate.

EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
“Guide to the Association Agreement”

++++ Background:

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are currently based on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in 1998. At the Paris Summit in 2008 the leaders of the EU and Ukraine agreed that an Association Agreement should be the successor agreement to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) is the first of a new generation of Association Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries. Negotiations on this comprehensive, ambitious and innovative Agreement between the EU and Ukraine were launched in March 2007. In February 2008, following confirmation of Ukraine’s WTO membership, the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as a core element of the Association Agreement.

At the 15th Ukraine-EU Summit of 19 December 2011, the EU leaders and President Yanukovych noted that a common understanding on the text of the Association Agreement was reached.

On 30 March 2012 the chief negotiators of the European Union and Ukraine initialled the text of the Association Agreement, which included provisions on the establishment of a DCFTA as an integral part. In this context, chief trade negotiators from both sides initialled the DCFTA part of the Agreement on 19 July 2012. Both EU and Ukraine expressed their common commitment to undertake further technical steps, required to prepare conclusion of the Association Agreement.

++++ Political association and economic integration:

The Association Agreement will constitute a new stage in the development of EU-Ukraine contractual relations, aiming at political association and economic integration and leaving open the way for further progressive developments. The AA provides for a shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship, based on common values, in particular full respect for democratic principles, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

> Wide range of sector cooperation: This ambitious and pioneering Agreement is a concrete way to exploit the dynamics in EU-Ukraine relations, focusing on support to core reforms, on economic recovery and growth, governance and sector co-operation in more than 30 areas, such as energy, transport, environment protection, industrial and small and medium enterprise (SME) cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer protection, education, training and youth as well as cultural cooperation.

> Trade and Trade related matters (DCFTA): Closer economic integration through the DCFTA will be a powerful stimulant to the country’s economic growth. Approximation of Ukraine to EU legislation, norms and standards, will be the method. As a core element of the Association Agreement, the DCFTA will create business opportunities in both the EU and Ukraine and will promote real economic modernization and integration with the EU. Higher standards of products, better services to citizens, and above all Ukraine’s readiness to compete effectively in international markets should be the result of this process.

> Mobility: The importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course,

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provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place is recognised in the Agreement.

++++ Content of the Association Agreement

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement counts in total over 1200 pages and comprises of

> A Preamble as an introductory statement of the Agreement, setting out the Agreement’s purpose and underlying philosophy;

> Seven Titles which concern General Principles; Political Cooperation and Foreign and Security Policy; Justice Freedom and Security; Trade and Trade related matters (DCFTA); Economic and Sector Cooperation; Financial Cooperation with Anti-Fraud Provisions, as well as Institutional, General and Final Provisions;

> 43 Annexes setting out EU legislation to be taken over by a specific date and

> Three Protocols.

The Association Agreement in a nut-shell:

> The AA aims to accelerate the deepening of political and economic relations between Ukraine and the EU, as well as Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal Market including by setting up a DCFTA.

> The AA is a concrete way to exploit the dynamics in EU-Ukraine relations, focusing on support to core reforms, on economic recovery and growth, governance and sector co-operation.

> The AA constitutes also a reform agenda for Ukraine, based around a comprehensive programme of Ukraine’s approximation of its legislation to EU norms, around which all partners of Ukraine can align themselves and focus their assistance.

> The AA negotiations were not a stand-alone exercise: EU assistance to Ukraine is linked with the reform agenda as it emerges from the result of negotiations. The Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme (CIB) is particularly important in this regard.

++++ Preamble

The PREAMBLE is a selection of the most important areas/facts pertinent to EU-Ukraine relations. It sets out the ambition for a close and lasting relationship. Although it has a non-binding introductory character, it presents important references to common values and could be perceived as a “scene-setter” for the Agreement.

The elements which are set out in the Preamble include among others:

> A reference to common values on which the EU is built – namely democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law – and which are shared by Ukraine.

> A reference that Ukraine is recognised as a European country which shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the EU.

> A reference to the European aspirations of Ukraine. The EU welcomes Ukraine’s European choice, including its commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy and a market economy.

> An acknowledgement that the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU will depend on progress in the implementation of the Association Agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.

++++ Title I: General Principles

Title I defines the general principles which will form the basis for the domestic and external policies of the Association between the EU and Ukraine namely:

> Respect for democratic principles, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

> The promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are set out. Moreover, the principles of a free market economy, good governance, the fight against corruption, the fight against different forms of trans-national organised crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable development as well as effective multilateralism are central to enhancing the relationship between the EU and Ukraine and will underpin their relationship.

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++++ Title II: Political dialogue and reform, political association, cooperation and convergence in the field of foreign and security policy

In Title II, the Association Agreement foresees the intensification of the EU-Ukraine political dialogue and cooperation in view of gradual convergence in the area of Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) as well as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

> Title II covers issues such as the aims of political dialogue, dialogue and cooperation on domestic reform as well as foreign and security policy.

> The Agreement foresees several fora for the conduct of political dialogue: the EU-Ukraine Summit will present the highest level of political dialogue. At ministerial level the dialogue will be conducted within the Association Council. The political dialogue will aim inter alia:

>> to deepen political association and increase political and security policy convergence and effectiveness;

>> to promote international stability and security based on effective multilateralism;

>> to strengthen cooperation and dialogue on international security and crisis management, notably in order to address global and regional challenges and key threats;

>> to foster result-oriented and practical cooperation for achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent;

>> to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belon ing to minorities and respect for diversity, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political reforms.

> Title II dedicates a specific article on the International Criminal Court and calls on the cooperation of the EU and Ukraine in promoting peace and international justice by ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and its related instruments.

++++ Title III: Justice, Freedom and Security

Title III covers issues concerning the rule of law and respect for human rights; protection of personal data;

cooperation on migration, asylum and border management; treatment of workers; mobility of workers; movement of persons; money laundering and terrorism financing; cooperation on the fight against illicit drugs; the fight against crime and corruption; cooperation in fighting terrorism and legal cooperation.

> The EU and Ukraine commit through the Association Agreement to increase their dialogue and cooperation on migration, asylum and border management. The importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place is recognised in the Agreement

> The commitment to combating organised crime and money laundering, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to stepping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism is also reflected in the Agreement.

> The wish to enhance people-to-people contacts is explicitly set out.

++++ Title IV: Trade and Trade-Related Matters
The EU is Ukraine’s main commercial partner and accounts for 31% of its external trade, ahead of Russia (2010).

Closer economic integration through the DCFTA will be a powerful stimulant to the country’s economic growth. As a core element of the Association Agreement, the DCFTA will create business opportunities in Ukraine and will promote real economic modernization and integration with the EU. Higher standards of products, better services to citizens, and above all Ukraine’s readiness to compete effectively in international markets should be the result of this process.

> Hence the DCFTA Title IV of the Association Agreement is dedicated to Trade and Trade Related Matters. Through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area economic integration is envisaged.

> The DCFTA, linked to the broader process of legislative approximation will contribute to further economic integration with the European Union’s Internal Market. This includes the elimination of almost all tariffs and barriers in the area of trade in goods, the provision of services, and the flow of investments (especially in the energy sector). Once Ukraine has taken over the relevant EU acquis, the EU will grant market access for example in areas such as public procurement or industrial goods.

> The DCFTA will provide for a conducive new climate for economic relations between the EU and Ukraine. New

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trade and investment opportunities will be created and competition will be stimulated. All these elements are factors crucial to economic restructuring and modernisation. As regards the impact of a removal of customs duties entailed by the DCFTA, experience has shown that this short-term loss of import charges will be more than compensated for by the increased revenue received by the state from indirect taxes paid by companies seizing new market opportunities and by the general boost to the economy. The budget spending on legal and institutional reforms in trade-related areas is or will be supported by the EU along with funds from International Financial Institutions. The DCFTA once in force will provide tariff cuts which will allow the economic operators of both sides to save around 750 millions euros per year in average (most of the customs duties being lifted)

++++ Title V: Economic and sector cooperation

Title V comprises 28 chapters in the fields of energy cooperation; macro-economic cooperation; management of public finances; taxation; statistics; environment; transport; space; cooperation in science and technology; industrial and enterprise policy; mining and metals; financial services; company law, corporate governance, accounting and auditing; information society; audio-visual policy; tourism; agriculture and rural development; fisheries and maritime policy; Danube river; consumer protection; cooperation on employment, social policy and equal opportunities; public health; education, training and youth; culture, sport and physical activity; civil society, cross-border and regional cooperation; participation in European Agencies and Programmes, based on gradual approximation with the EU acquis and also – where relevant – with international norms and standards.

++++ Title VI: Financial cooperation, with anti-fraud provisions

The European Union and its Member States continue to be the largest donor to Ukraine: since 1991, assistance provided by the European Union alone has amounted to over €2.5 billion. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) allocates € 470 million to Ukraine for the years 2011-2013. This goes to support action in three priority areas: good governance and the rule of law; facilitating the entry into force of the Association Agreement, and sustainable development, including energy and environment. This amount includes funding under the Eastern Partnership for the Comprehensive Institution Building programme (€ 43.37 million). The latter is designed to improve the administrative capacity of partner countries and their compatibility with EU institutions, for instance through twinning programmes, professional training and secondment of personnel.

> Ukraine will benefit from EU Financial Assistance through existing funding mechanisms and instruments in order to achieve the objectives of the Association Agreement.

> The future priority areas of the EU Financial Assistance to Ukraine will be laid down in relevant indicative programmes reflecting agreed policy priorities between the EU and Ukraine. The indicative amounts of assistance will take into account Ukraine’s needs, sector capacities and progress with reforms.

> EU assistance will be implemented in close cooperation and coordination with other donor countries, donor organisations and International Financial Institutions (IFI), and in line with international principles of aid effectiveness. Through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), to which Ukraine is eligible IFI investments could be leveraged. The NIF aims at mobilising additional funding to cover the investment needs of Ukraine for infrastructures in sectors such as transport, energy, the environment and social issues (e.g. construction of schools or hospitals).

> The Agreement lays down that the EU and Ukraine will take effective measures to prevent and fight fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities.

++++ Title VII: Institutional, general and final provisions

The Association Agreement foresees a tailor-made institutional set up for EU-Ukraine relations.

> At the top level, the EU-Ukraine Summit will be established: The Summit will present the highest level of political dialogue and will be a platform for meetings between Presidents.

> At ministerial level, the dialogue will be conducted within the Association Council which could meet in any configuration. The Association Council will have the power to take binding decisions.

> The Association Council will be assisted in the performance of its duties by an Association Committee. The Association Committee will create Subcommittees to implement sector cooperation. Meeting in a special format, the Association Committee will address the specific DCFTA issues.

> The Association Agreement also foresees a parliamentary dimension, notably by establishing a Parliamentary Association Committee. It will be a forum for Members of the European Parliament and the

4 /5

Parliament of Ukraine to meet and exchange views.

> Another important element of the Association Agreement is the promotion of regular civil society meetings. Hence, a dedicated Civil Society Platform will be established. The Platform will be able to make recommendations to the Association Council.

In order to ensure the correct implementation of the Association Agreement, the Agreement texts sets out some general and final provisions. A selection of these provisions is set out below:

> One key provision underpinning the Association Agreement sets out the concept of gradual approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to EU norms and standards. Specific timelines are set within which Ukraine should approximate its legislations to the relevant EU legislation. These timelines vary between 2 and 10 years after the entry into force of the Agreement.

> Another guiding provision sets out the concept of dynamic approximation. There was a need to set out this concept as the EU law and legislation is not static but under constant evolution. Thus the approximation process will be dynamic and should keep pace with the principal EU reforms, but in a proportionate way, taking account of Ukraine’s capacity to carry out the approximation.

> In order to examine whether the commitments as set out in the Association Agreement are met, dedicated provisions related to monitoring were included in the Agreement. Monitoring means here to supervise the application and implementation of the Association Agreement, its objectives and commitments. It is a continuous appraisal of progress in implementing and enforcing measures and commitments covered by the Association Agreement. This monitoring process will be of a particular importance for the DCFTA as its positive result will be the prerequisite of any further market opening for the Ukrainian economic operators

> Monitoring will include the assessments of approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to the EU acts (and where applicable international instruments) as defined in the Association Agreement.

> The Association Agreement also sets out a Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This mechanism would come into effect if obligations under the Association Agreement are not fulfilled by one of the Agreement Parties. For the DCFTA part, another binding trade specific Dispute Settlement Mechanism is set out in form of a dedicated protocol. This trade specific mechanism is inspired by traditional WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

> The duration of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is unlimited. At the same time the Parties will undertake a comprehensive review of the achievement of objectives under the Agreement within five years. It should be noted that the text of the AA will be drawn up in 22 EU Member States languages as well as in Ukrainian.

5 /5


If after reviewing the above Svoboda Party “program” and the “Guide to the Association Agreement” does not adequately answer enough questions, the full text may give a broader understanding of how they cannot be reconciled and what really lies ahead for Ukraine.



Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Member States’,
THE EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Union’ or ‘the EU’ and
THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, hereinafter referred to as ‘the
on the one part, and


on the other part,
Hereafter jointly referred to as ‘the Parties’,

– TAKING ACCOUNT of the close historical relationship and progressively closer links between the Parties as well as their desire to strengthen and widen relations in an ambitious and innovative way;
– COMMITTED to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values, that is respect for democratic principles, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect for diversity, human dignity and commitment to the principles of a free market economy, which would facilitate the participation of Ukraine in European policies;
– RECOGNIZING that Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the European Union (EU) and is committed to promoting those values;
– NOTING the importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity;
– TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the strong public support in Ukraine for the country’s European choice;
– CONFIRMING that the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice, including its commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy and a market economy;
– RECOGNIZING that the common values on which the European Union is built – namely democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law – are also essential elements of this Agreement;
– ACKNOWLEDGING that the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the European Union will depend on progress in the implementation of the current Agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas;
– COMMITTED to implementing all the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular of the Helsinki Final Act [of 1975], the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna Conferences of 1991 and 1992 respectively, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe [of 1990], the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights [of 1948] and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [of 1950];
– DESIROUS of strengthening international peace and security as well as engaging in effective multilateralism and the peaceful settlement of disputes, notably by closely cooperating to that end within the framework of the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE);
– COMMITTED to promoting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders;
– DESIROUS of achieving an ever closer convergence of positions on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest, taking into account the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);
– COMMITTED to reaffirming the international obligations of the Parties, to fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and to cooperating on disarmament and arms control;
– DESIROUS of moving forward the reform and approximation process in Ukraine forward, thus contributing to gradual economic integration and deepening of political association;
– CONVINCED of the need for Ukraine to implement the political, socio-economic, legal and institutional reforms necessary to effectively implement this Agreement and committed to decisively supporting those reforms in Ukraine;
– DESIROUS of achieving economic integration, inter alia through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as an integral part of this Agreement, in compliance with rights and obligations arising out of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership of the Parties, including through extensive regulatory approximation;
– RECOGNIZING that such a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, linked to the broader process of legislative approximation, shall contribute to further economic integration with the European Union Internal Market as envisaged in this Agreement;
– COMMITTED to developing a conducive new climate for economic relations between the Parties, and above all for the development of trade and investment and stimulating competition, factors which are crucial to economic restructuring and modernisation;
– COMMITTED to enhancing energy cooperation, building on the commitment of the Parties to implement the Energy Charter Treaty [of 1994];
– COMMITTED to enhancing energy security, facilitating the development of appropriate infrastructure and increasing market integration and regulatory approximation towards key elements of the EU acquis, promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources as well as achieving a high level of nuclear safety;
– COMMITTED to increasing dialogue – based on the fundamental principles of solidarity, mutual trust, joint responsibility and partnership – and cooperation on migration, asylum and border management, with a comprehensive approach paying attention to legal migration and to cooperating in tackling illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and the efficient implementation of the readmission agreement;
– RECOGNISING the importance of the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place;
– COMMITTED to combating organised crime and money laundering, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to stepping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism;
– COMMITTED to enhancing cooperation in the field of environmental protection and to the principles of sustainable development;
– DESIROUS of enhancing people-to-people contacts;
– COMMITTED to promoting cross-border and inter-regional cooperation;
– COMMITTED to gradually approximating Ukraine’s legislation with that of the Union along the lines set out in this Agreement and to effectively implementing it;
– TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that this Agreement shall not prejudice and leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations;
– CONFIRMING that the provisions of this Agreement that fall within the scope of Part III, Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting Parties, and not as part of the European Union, unless the European Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland jointly notify Ukraine that the United Kingdom or Ireland is bound as part of the European Union in accordance with Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the United Kingdom and/or Ireland ceases to be bound as part of the European Union in accordance with Article 4a of the Protocol No. 21, the European Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland shall immediately inform Ukraine of any change in their position in which case they shall remain bound by the provisions of the Agreement in their own right. The same applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol No. 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to those Treaties.



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Stephen, Why Do You Treat Our Veterans Like Political Pawns?

How do you put out a fire?

Simple question, first of all it depends on how big the fire is.  If it is a small fire, like a candle, it’s pretty simple.  You can blow it out, some like to dampen their fingertips and pinch the flame out, or the more elegant might use a candle snuffer.  Basically you can douse it with water (on your fingertips) or starve it for fuel (with the snuffer).

If it’s a larger fire, like a campfire you can toss a bucket of water on it, starve it for fuel and let it burn out on its own.

What if it’s a big fire?  Like a PMO/Senate Scandal?

Well Steve and Co. have tried just about everything you can think of.  They tried to let it burn itself out, no luck.  They threw water on it and tossed people under the bus to no avail.

They even sent their minions with torches at Justin Trudeau, the only problem is that Canadians like Justin Trudeau.  He may not be everyone’s choice for PM, but lots of us grew up with him.  He’s a nice guy.

And the fire the Harperistas started at JT’s feet just drew more people to him to sit by the fire.  Like going camping or enjoying a bonfire.  It just wasn’t working.

So the Harper folk looked for a new place to set a fire.  I mean intentionally.

So they set their torches toward recently retired Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie.  And they got a fire started.

A lot of people are upset that the General’s move to a new home not far from his existing home ran to $72,000.00 or so. 

CTV reported this, Minister Rob Nicholson is telling the DND to look into this.  But the bottom line is that it appears that the only thing that General Leslie did wrong was to join the wrong political party.

He joined the Liberal Party of Canada.

You see, because the Military requires members of the Forces to relocate, there is a provision that helps to take care of the move.  A benefit of serving for 20 or more years in the Military is that the government pays for one last move.  It could be across town or across the country, but the government has a third party company that takes care of packing, storing, and moving the retirees’ property to the new location.  The Integrated Relocation Plan (IRP) also takes care of some of the expenses in selling the old home and buying the new one.  In General Leslie’s case, this was $72,000.00.

General Leslie did not hire anyone, he didn’t do anything other than what a 20+ year veteran would do.  He submitted his information for the move.  The third party took care of the rest.

The IRP has been on the books for decades.  As a matter of fact, the Auditor General submitted a report on the IRP in November 2006 to the Harper government that pointed out a number of problems with the IRP.  The government did nothing about it.  They even repeated problems that the AG pointed out in 2006.

When General Leslie moved in 2011, no alarms went off, no one at the Treasury Board Secretariat (Tony Clement’s department) waved any flags and no one in Rob Nicholson’s National Defence Department raised any issues either.

Actually, the Harper Party was so enamoured with General Leslie that they offered him a job, even hinting that he should run for them in the next election.  No they didn’t get mad at him until after he had signed on to be an advisor to the Liberal Party on International Affairs.

Go figure.

The Harper Party should take care here.  They have already offended the Veterans and the Military with their treatment of our Warriors.  They are adding fuel to that fire by starting up with General Leslie.

You see the danger is that when you start fires, they can become unpredictable… especially when they are big ones. 

It just depends on which way the wind blows. 

Laters BC

Maybe Stever should be happy we don’t live in an emerging Democracy like Egypt… It’s not good to pee on the military there, is it Steve?


#Harper vs #Canada: a short compilation #cdnpoli via ‏@Anon_GovWatchCA (archives)

The Harper government is starving the beast of departments that don’t fit into his ideological viewpoints on industry, eliminating positions, eliminating funding, closing down departments or buildings. This has a two fold effect. One, this is money the Conservatives need to help balance the budget. Two, it is eliminating voices of dissent, or any other facts that could create cracks in his vision for Canada. Now groups directly opposed to his vision, not politically, but because that is the purpose of the groups themselves, are being labelled terrorists, accused of fraud, and political scheming, only because it challenges the rhetoric of what the government is trying to do.

Here are some links on muzzling of scientists




This paper shows rather well the muzzling that’s happening


Here is the AB government doing it


Funny how they didn’t want to appeal at all


Why silence environmentalists? If they’re as crazy as the governments say, why not let them say their piece and let Canadians be the judge if they’re crazy or not?

Science has shown that reclamation in the oilsands will not work


What about letting industry and the AB government dictate their own emission rules, and delaying it as long as possible, while the rest of the country has a different set of rules?


What about harpers own appointee saying we’re an ‘environmental rogue state’? That’s someone he hired and vetted.


What of the environment canada report that either left out information, or had misleading data, to confirm the governments message that everything is going good?


Why the deception on emission rates?


What about our poor record on reaching our GHG targets?


Why was the government so sneaky to leave out the oilsands GHG emissions to the UN?


Why were they so quiet when they finally did release that information, and the fact that GHG from the oilsands will quadruple while in other areas it’s falling? Which will push us further and further away from the Copenhagen targets?


Why release press releases from both federal and AB governments about oilsands pollution not being a concern, if the GHG is going to quadruple?


How can science be objective when the oilsands make up our largest group of lobbyists far greater than any other industry?


Why are we allowing industry to rewrite our environmental laws?


Why is the NEB and Transcanada delaying access to information, and hiding information about pipeline spills from 5 years ago?


Why are we selling off land and resources to oligarchies in the USA, why are we spending all this money on advertising, on natural resources promotion, when the Koch brothers will make $100 billion off of our land and resources when average Canadians will never see any of this type of profit?


With environmental regulations gutted, and left to the whims of provinces, will we have more spills like this, that are still leaking after 9 months?


Why does the government spend taxpayers money of all of Canada, to promote a provinces resources that the province owns? Especially if other than tax dollars from the oilsands, only Alberta benefits from it?


Why is all of this money being spent, when John Kerry said that lobbying won’t alter his decision? And he says  “The public has a role in this. We’re all accountable to our publics. The democratic process demands that we do that.” If only our government felt the same way.


Why kill wolves to try and slow the decline of the Caribou when scientists have been reporting for a very long time that their loss of habitat is the main reason? Why disregard the reports from scientists, and instead form an industry led body to address the issue?


Why does the NEB keep any environmental concern out of the northern gateway hearings?


Why is the NEB taking over protecting our oceans and fish from industry, an energy regulator, instead of scientists who’ve gone to school for their specific field in the DFO?


Why such a small window to voice concerns over the kinder morgan expansion, oh right those new laws from the government to ‘speed up the review process’?



Why eliminate over 3000 environmental reviews on pipelines and other projects?


Why spy on environmentalists if only because they threaten your talking points and are a lone voice of dissent? Why are tax paying dollars spent spying on Canadians who care about the environment?


I’m sure the lucrative environment industry, the ones who don’t have as much to gain from expansion being approved, are really radicals and ‘ecoterrorists’. Easier to brand your opponents radicals and kooks, than to actually address valid concerns people have.


2010 the advertising budget for natural resources canada, NRCan, was $237,000.

The Harper government has increased its advertising spending to $16.5m in 2012 from $9m in 2011. To $40m in 2013. No other departments have had an increase in spending like that in just advertising, many other departments are facing massive cuts across the board.




We need our government to force oil companies to clean up their act, not buy their ads for them.

While they cut funding and jobs to the DFO in stations that fall along the proposed nothern gateway pipeline that would lead in monitoring, assessments, and remediation if there was a spill.


The government is focusing on telling the world and Canadians that we’re environmentally friendly when they should be showing it by creating and enforcing sound environmental policies not gutting them.

Meanwhile our national debt has exploded since they took power by an additional $169 billion. I wonder if the same thing will happen in 2015 with the promise of a balanced budget as what happened with the promise to drive the debt-ratio down.

[Link to more links to information on our deficit and debt](http://www.reddit.com/r/canada/comments/1vgy9b/hey_reddit_canada_who_are_you_all_voting_for_next/cesn0yq)

The government is targeting environmental groups. Let us not forget that the public relations war is largely being won by those with the most money, and that compared to just the advertising budget of both the federal government and companies who are represented by CAPP (who receive far more foreign investments than NPOs), foreign donations these groups get pales in comparison.

>Calgary-based TransCanada has hired Phil Fontaine – former national chief of the Assembly of First Nations – to help it win the support of native communities from Alberta to New Brunswick.


I would be concerned if I was an environmental group, when the head of the watch dog for our spy agency is lobbying for enbridge.


I would be concerned if I was an environmental group and was being targeted and spied on by our spy agencies and the RCMP.


I would be concerned if I was first nations and instead of listening to their appeals, or trying to find some common ground, then send out ministers to convince band leaders.


I would be worried if I were first nations, and the government when holding meetings essentially didn’t listen to you and talked past you, really only wanting to use you to bolster support and not have to worry about pesky legal battles.


The radicals and ecoterrorists part? Not necessarily about infrastructure bombings and destruction, but just simply voicing their opposition and taking part of the regulatory hearings. The pipelines aren’t even built yet, so it can’t be a concern that they are going to destroy something that hasn’t been built. It’s the possibility that they could derail or put a wrench in their plans

>Oliver says the groups “threaten to hijack our regulatory system to achieve their radical ideological agenda,” stack the hearings with people to delay or kill “good projects,” attract “jet-setting” celebrities and use funding from “foreign special interest groups.”


These aren’t radicals and eco terrorists, these aren’t people threatening to blow up pipelines. These are people protesting, which is their right. These are people who care about the environment, and because it goes against the plans of our government, they are being focused on. Do the groups below have any criminal history? Have they ever committed any violent acts? Is protesting, or voicing opposition a terrorist act in the eyes of the government now?

>Idle No More, ForestEthics, Sierra Club, EcoSociety, LeadNow, Dogwood Initiative, Council of Canadians and the People’s Summit.

They passed legislation so that the CRA could do this…

>The prime minister’s office directed requests for comment to the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA). Noël Carisse, a spokesman for CRA, said **that since 2012** “the CRA has conducted additional review activities focused on political activities. Audits are being conducted in addition to our regular audit activities, and will include charities from across the entire spectrum of charitable activity.”




>With his announcement this week, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews has increased the concern among environmentalists that Ottawa regards them as implacable adversaries to be monitored and battled, rather than well-meaning advocates to be consulted.


>A document from the Department of Foreign Affairs listed allies of the government’s oil-sands development plans and “adversaries” that included environmental and aboriginal groups.

You’re either with us, or you’re with the ~~pedophiles~~ ecoterrorists.


>”Unfortunately, there are environmental and other radical groups that would seek to block this opportunity to diversify our trade,” Oliver said in an open letter.

>”Their goal is to stop any major project no matter what the cost to Canadian families in lost jobs and economic growth. No forestry. No mining. No oil. No gas. No more hydro-electric dams.”

From the submission that we’re commenting on:

>The Canada Revenue Agency conducts audits for a number of reasons, including in response to outside complaints that an organization is violating federal laws for charities.

>Environmentalists believe that is why so many of them are being singled out. Shortly after the pro-tar sands group Ethical Oil launched a public campaign in 2012 to “expose the radical foreign funded environmental groups’ activities attacking Canada’s ethical oil and industry,” Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty announced an $8 million effort to more deeply investigate nonprofits’ political activity.

>Since then, Ethical Oil has filed formal complaints with the CRA about Environmental Defence, the David Suzuki Foundation and Tides Canada, saying the groups should be “stripped of their charitable status” for “engaging in partisan activity,” according to Ethical Oil’s website.

>Ethical Oil has deep ties to both the tar sands industry and the Harper administration. In 2011, one of the group’s co-founders, Alykhan Velshi, left his job as a spokesperson for Harper’s government to help found Ethical Oil. A few months later, he left Ethical Oil and returned to the Harper administration to become director of planning in the prime minister’s office. Today, he is the director of issues management for the prime minister.

Also interesting how Jason Kenney is paying for Ethical Oils websites…


echnical Data that you can verify

ethicaloil.org — whois ?

Tech Email:ezra@ezralevant.com[1] Name




So who is paying for hosting theses pages ?

See top 5 websites with these affiliate IDs below or click on specific affiliate ID above to see full list for that ID

Domain Alexa Rank IP Google IDs Affiliate/Product IDs Nameserver(s)

jasonkenney.net N/A (56) Google Analytics (Urchin) Id: UA-20233645 (6) ns1.strategicimperativesonline.com (5)

ns2.strategicimperativesonline.com (5)

http://www.jasonkenney.net N/A (56) Google Analytics (Urchin) Id: UA-20233645 (6)


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca

This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

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#Harper’s ‘Pigs at the Trough’ II: #Fantino vs #Canada’s #Veterans #Censored? #cdnpoli #pnpcbc

Is this a case of subversive censorship and/or social media manipulation by the Harper Regime targeting our Veterans? Please invest a few minutes to review, share and provide some feedback below. This is follow-up to “#Harper’s ‘Pigs at the Trough’ II: #Fantino vs #Canada’s #Veterans #cdnpoli via #pnpcbc Part 1” of the the must see and share Breaking News press conference that aired during CBC’s Power & Politics with Evan Solomon on Tuesday, January 28, 2014.

A missing comment was brought to our attention yesterday evening by one of our Vet’s that posted the comment so we began our quest for clues and to rectify the situation. We replied to the inquiry then retrieved the missing comment from our archives and posted it along with a short statement. When we followed up this morning something was definitely amiss and this “issue” may be more troubling than originally thought as it now seems as if the comments are being displayed differently depending on “who” is viewing them and whether or not the user is logged in.

This summary contains 6 screenshots of the same video that was previously uploaded to our channel from a few vantage points. Two of the screengrabs were taken when logged into the channel, one is from the channel summary page and the other is from the video page itself. The third screengrab is from the vantage point of a non-logged in user and the other two are from different users vantage points.

#Harper’s ‘Pigs at the Trough’ II: #Fantino vs #Canada’s #Veterans #cdnpoli via #pnpcbc Part 1 Screengrabs

Below is the comment in question that may, or may not, be visible:


Weeks before my retirement my friend from 3 RCR Petawawa, Cpl Mathew Cossette committed suicide related to mental health issues. 3 days after my retirement another friend from the same unit, WO Mike McNeil committed suicide and I find myself at times overwhelmed by this loss.

These were some of Canada’s best and I was privileged to witness them at their best. This overall view toward the troops by our federal gov’t is what I will remember upon my retirement.

Today I was offered an option to cash out on the pension that I earned and I must say that the offer was a slap in the face to add to these recent current events. I was stunned that my pension was held back by three weeks from previously committed finalization and then a very poor used car sales pitch was offered. I would be willing to discuss this in detail with anyone that would like to hear about this.

As I connect the dots, it appears that the federal gov’t is forcing austerity measures on DND to pay for the F-35’s that we have not heard about in a very long time

#Harper’s ‘Pigs at the Trough’ II: #Fantino vs #Canada’s #Veterans #cdnpoli via #pnpcbc Playlist

Below we have provided a web-accessible video playlist regarding the issue regarding the disrespected Veterans who were in Ottawa to fight ongoing service cuts by the Harper Government and lobby against the closing of their regional offices. After waiting all day, Canada’s Veterans left an emotional meeting feeling betrayed Tuesday, after being cut short and virtually ignored by Veterans Affairs Minister Julian Fantino.



It is worth noting that the closeted Minster of Foreign Endeavours John Baird, just returned from a pilgrimage to Silicon Valley to meet with the “experts” at g**gle and tw*tter to seek help and discuss how the Regime can best use social media to manipulate propaganda globally.

Baird seeks help from Google, Twitter on how diplomats can promote agenda on social media
Mike Blanchfield, The Canadian Press
Published Friday, February 7, 2014 12:41PM EST
Last Updated Friday, February 7, 2014 3:21PM EST

OTTAWA — Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird is encouraging Canadian diplomats to experiment with social media to promote democratic freedom and trade across the globe.

The plan could represent a loosening of the communications leash the Harper government has placed on foreign diplomats as part of its centralized communications strategy.

Baird announced the initiative Friday in northern California as he visited the Silicon Valley headquarters of Internet search giant Google and of Twitter, where he is seeking advice on how to better use social media tools to advance Canadian foreign policy.

“Diplomacy may never live up to the Silicon Valley mantra of ‘move fast and break things,’ for various reasons. But in the environment of instant communication and social media, we do have to move faster and not be afraid to try new things or to make mistakes,” Baird said.

Baird encouraged diplomats to take risks on social media to reach “civic actors” who can bring about political change in their countries.

“It basically is a message to all of our diplomats, a word of encouragement to be innovative, even if it means there are risks,” said a senior government official who was not authorized to speak on the record.

After coming to power in 2006, the Conservative government imposed strict communication controls on is diplomats, including ambassadors and high commissioners, requiring them to clear major public events through the Privy Council Office in Ottawa.

The Canadian Press reported this week that bureaucrats at Industry Canada must run each proposed tweet through a 12-step protocol, and seek the approval of the minister’s office.

However, the senior government official said diplomats abroad would have more local control, saying, “each mission is ultimately responsible for their own Twitter/Facebook and other social media tools.”

Canada has lagged far behind its two closest allies, the United States and Britain, in digital diplomacy so Friday’s announcement was a welcome development, said Roland Paris, director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa.

Paris said in a blog post that the Americans and British have accepted that their diplomats need the freedom to communicate, and make mistakes, because that’s “the price of getting their voices heard in new media, which are increasingly shaping and driving events.”

It remains to be seen whether Baird gives Canadian diplomats the leeway they need to be effective digital diplomats, he said.

“Relations between Canada’s foreign service and the minister’s office have been strained for years. Neither side fully trusts, respects, or even understands the other. In this climate, Baird’s avowed willingness to let Canadian diplomats take chances and make mistakes will need to be demonstrated, not just stated,” said Paris.

Paris said it is not clear whether “the youthful apparatchiks in the Prime Minister’s Office who control the government’s communications will look kindly on such experiments, regardless of what Baird might want in his department.”

Baird said the Internet is an incredible tool that is “creating space for open dialogue, giving voice to the voiceless and expanding human rights” and he says Canadian foreign service needs to embrace it.

“The fast and free exchange of information is changing the nature of diplomacy and foreign affairs, just as it is changing industries,” the minister said.

“The closed world of demarches, summits and diplomatic dinners is no longer sufficient to project our values and interests.”

The government has already launched initiatives in missions in Tunisia, Ukraine and Egypt but wants to expand, officials say.

The initiative builds on an earlier democracy-building partnership with the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto that helps ordinary Iranians share information over the Internet that their government deems off limits.

Baird said social media and “big-data analytics” can allow diplomats to engage in directly with key actors, while social-media mapping exercises by the Foreign Affairs Department “have helped us to reach out to civic actors who seek to bring about positive social and political change in the countries they live in.”

A Foreign Affairs document, obtained by The Canadian Press, says the department has launched 60 new Twitter and 50 new Facebook accounts since June 2013. Most are in embassies and some are in being used by the department’s new Office of Religious Freedom to broadcast Canadian positions in places such as Ukraine and Egypt.

Foreign Affairs is also using YouTube, LinkedIn, Flickr and Foursquare, it says.

In particular, LinkedIn has been used more in recent years by Canadian trade commissioners in foreign missions “to improve their ability to connect Canadian businesses with potential partners in foreign markets.”

The new social-media strategy also appears to dovetail with another major foreign policy announcement last November.

Trade Minister Ed Fast announced that “economic diplomacy” would be the central focus for Canada’s foreign service.

The initiative is part of Canada’s broader strategy to improve trade and investment performance in emerging markets.

The government and the Bank of Canada have identified that as essential to the country’s prosperity.

source: http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/baird-seeks-help-from-google-twitter-on-how-diplomats-can-promote-agenda-on-social-media-1.1675460

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#Censorship + #Harper + #Israel vs #Palestine – (#GolanHeights + #Syria) = #cdnpoli #Error404

Chronology of Events leading up to Stephen Harper and the Harper Regime’s hurried trip to Israel

The premise of this investigative chronological summary timeline is based upon the questions and evidence raised after reviewing and following up on an couple of articles recently published, Conservative party launches website to promote Stephen Harper’s first official Middle East trip by Jason Fekete, Published January 14, 2014 and Foreign Affairs website at odds with PMs comments in support of Israel, group says By Lee Berthiaume, Postmedia News January 15, 2014, regarding the current Harper Government’s Foreign Policy vs. the previous Canadian Government’s Foreign Policy as it relates to Israels economy, the Occupied Territories and Golan Heights.

The timing of a couple of hastily, oddly removed and edited, censored information, that were previously accessible and available via the official tax-payer funded Government of Canada’s websites that are currently being redirected to 404 “Page Not Found” error pages. Along with the PMO based Senate Scandal and past Harper Party electoral shenanigans, the timeline of this censorship is suspicious at best. Once combined with couple of new dedicated websites launched by the Harper Party that utilize taxpayer-funded government assets to promote support for Israel while propagandizing it’s foreign policies domestically and abroad, it gets worse considering how the Harper Government treats Canada’s Veterans.

This certainly appears to be a coup d’etat of sorts by Big Oil driven Fracking special interest groups in an apparent effort to capitalize on the chaotic and deadly situation in Syria, that was encouraged and instigated by the Harper Regime, in-order to subversively exploit the occupied Golan Heights while leveraging, manipulating and diverting Asian, Middle Eastern, African political support and financial assets between various taxpayer-funded government missions and groups domestically and abroad.

Questions to Ponder

  • Who is currently dictating and scripting Canada’s Foreign Policy and who is benefiting from this speculative Economic Diplomacy?
  • What are the costs and motivators behind the timeline and sequence of events?
  • When was the recently updated propaganda narrative mandated?
  • Where is the investment funding coming from and where will the profits go?
  • Why is there so much secrecy in the present and censorship of the past?
  • How does this “timing” affect Canada and Canadian interests in the future?

Please review the following trilogy of topics and chronological sequence of articles, archives, caches and snapshots of retrieved pages, paying close attention to the removed text, links and information from the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada websites:

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East: Canada’s Explanation of Vote: The Syrian Golan

August 2011

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Date Modified: 03Jun2011
Date Cached: 11Aug2011
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Note that the text and link to the “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East” is included.

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Cached 11Aug2011

March 2012

Syria’s Assad ‘must go,’ Baird warns

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird condemned the continued violence and aid impasse in Syria as heavy shelling continued in Homs over the weekend, saying that Canada is considering new measures to make clear that Syrian president Bashar Assad “must go.”

By Edmonton Journal March 5, 2012

July 2012

Two Sides of the Same Flag: How Israel’s Natural Gas Will Change the World

By Marin Katusa, 17 Jul 2012

August 2012

The Russian gas giant that haunts Europe – and Israel

Visiting Russian leader Valdimir Putin last month reportedly proposed bilateral energy cooperation, but a Haifa University expert warns that partnerships with the state-owned company are not of equals.

By Avi Bar-Eli | Aug. 1, 2012 | 5:20 AM

September 2012

Israel and Russia join forces over gas

Lawrence Solomon | September 7, 2012 9:00 PM ET

Syria rebels get tactical help from Toronto IT specialist Behind the scenes, armchair military strategists from U.S., Canada crowdsource a war

CBC News Posted: Sep 26, 2012 9:46 PM ET Last Updated: Sep 26, 2012 9:43 PM ET

Crowdsourcing a War

The National | Sep 26, 2012

October 2012

Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East

UN Votes and Statements

Please note that “59th Session: 2004” currently redirects to a 404 “Page Not found” error message.
Date Modified: 01Mar2012
Date Cached: 20Oct2012
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014


Canada’s Explanation of Vote

The Syrian Golan

Date Modified: 17Jun2009
Date Cached: 20Oct2012
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Please note that “UN Votes and Statements General Assembly 59th Session: 2004” currently redirects to a 404 “Page Not found” error message.

Canada's Explanation of Vote The Syrian Golan: Cached 20Oct2012

February 2013

Israel approves drilling in contested Golan Heights ahead of Obama visit Provided by The Canadian Press

By Canadian Press | Feb 21, 2013

Israel grants Golan exploration licence

By John Reed in Jerusalem, February 21, 2013 2:27 pm

Israeli Licence to Cheney-Linked Energy Firm on Golan Heights Raises Eyebrows

By Jim Lobe | WASHINGTON, Feb 23 2013

April 2013

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process

Date Modified: 26Oct2012
Date Cached: 26Apr2013
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Note that the text and link to the “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East” is included.

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process: Cached 26Apr2013

Israel in gas talks with Russia

Russian companies are examining options of participating in the development of Israeli gas, the Prime Minister’s Office says.

29 October 13 14:48, Amiram Barkat

May 2013

Canada and Israel — best friends forever?

Why is Ottawa so extraordinarily supportive of the Jewish state? Has the Harper administration gone too far, and cost itself influence in the Arab world? And would a change of government see an altered stance?

By Raphael Ahren May 19, 2013

September 2013

Shale: A key to Israel’s future

by Neil Goldstein, Guest Columnist Sep 09, 2013

October 2013

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process

Date Modified: 29Apr2013
Date Cached: 05Oct2013
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Note that the text and link to the “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East” has been removed.

Canada and the Middle East Peace Process: Cached 05Oct2013

November 2013

Stephen Harper planning first visit to Israel, will announce details at Jewish National Fund dinner

John Ivison | November 29, 2013 | Last Updated: Nov 29 6:40 PM ET

Stephen Harper to be feted for support of Israel at Negev dinner

Bird sanctuary in Israel to be named after Harper

The Canadian Press Posted: Nov 30, 2013 9:09 PM ET Last Updated: Dec 01, 2013 5:55 PM ET

December 2013

Stephen Harper breaks into song after Israel trip announcement

The PM belted out his own rendition of the Who’s “The Seeker” and a string of other classic songs.

The Canadian Press Published on Sun Dec 01 2013

Israel Wants Harper’s Advice On Natural Gas: Ambassador

CP | By Mike Blanchfield, The Canadian Press Posted: 12/03/2013 5:03 pm EST | Updated: 12/04/2013 11:23 am EST

Israel’s best friend: Stephen Harper

The Prime Minister’s support seems less strategic than a reflection of his deeply held personal beliefs

by Nick Taylor-Vaisey on Wednesday, December 4, 2013 3:05pm

Will Egypt Purchase Gas from Israel via Cyprus?

Karen Ayat, December 05th, 2013 12:15am

Israel seeks to tap Canada’s expertise in natural gas: new ambassador

David Lazarus, Staff Reporter, Monday, December 23, 2013

Putin’s Mediterranean Move

The race is on to exploit off-shore energy around Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Cyprus — and Moscow is crashing the party.

BY Keith Johnson, DECEMBER 27, 2013

Israel: Gas, Oil and Trouble in the Levant


January 2014

24 Seven

Jan 2-8, 2014
Transcript: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/video/34741/transcript

Video: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/videos-ctg/34741

Overhaul of Israel’s Economy Offers Lessons for United States

By STEVEN DAVIDOFF, January 7, 2014, 4:54 pm

Canada names a partisan voice as new ambassador to Israel

By David Akin, Parliamentary Bureau Chief First posted: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 02:43 PM EST | Updated: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 04:20 PM EST

Baird defends appointment of new pro-Israeli ambassador ahead of Harper trip

by Mike Blanchfield, The Canadian Press on Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:13pm

Toronto lawyer Vivian Bercovici is Canada’s next ambassador to Israel as Harper government ‘affirms unfailing support’ for Jewish state

Stewart Bell | January 8, 2014 | Last Updated: Jan 8 5:51 PM ET

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Date Modified: 26Oct2012
Google Cached: 09Jan2014
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Note that the text and link to the “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East” has not been removed.

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Cached 09Jan2014

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Date Modified: 13Jan2014
Date Retrieved: 15Jan2014
Note that the text and link to the “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East” has been removed.

Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Retrieved 15Jan2014

PM Harper embarks on first trip to the Middle East

January 13,2014

Conservative party launches website to promote Stephen Harper’s first official Middle East trip

Jason Kenney will join Harper on trip that includes Israel, West Bank and Jordan

By Jason Fekete, Postmedia News January 14, 2014

Foreign Affairs website at odds with PM’s comments in support of Israel, group says

By Lee Berthiaume, Postmedia News January 15, 2014

Harper’s Israel Trip Comes Amid Changes Back Home

Althia Raj, Posted: 01/15/2014 11:08 am EST | Updated: 01/15/2014 1:55 pm EST

Stephen Harper’s deceased father a key influence in PM’s support for Israel

PM has called his father the ‘greatest influence’ on his life

Mark Kennedy, Published: January 15, 2014, 4:10 pm

Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East

Date Modified: 26Jun2013
Date Cached: 03Jul2013
Date Retrieved 15Jan2014
Note that the page “Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East last modified 26Oct2013” now redirects to a 404 “Page Not Found” error message.

Explanations of vote on United Nations resolutions concerning the Middle East: Retrieved 15Jan2014

Canada’s Explanation of Vote The Syrian Golan

Date Modified: 26Jun2013
Date Retrieved 15Jan2014
Note that the page “Canada’s Explanation of Vote The Syrian Golan last modified 26Oct2013” now redirects to a 404 “Page Not Found” error message.

Canada's Explanation of Vote The Syrian Golan: Retrieved 15Jan2014

Russia Finds Path Into Mediterranean Gas Through Syria

Christopher Coats, Energy Contributor | 1/16/2014 @ 11:47AM

Syrian energy deal puts Russia in gas-rich Med

Jan. 16, 2014 at 3:56 PM

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper Is One of Israel’s Strongest Backers — But Why?

Conservative Leader Visits Jewish State for First Time

By Ron Csillag Published January 16, 2014

Another Canadian jihadi reported dead in Syria

By Michael Woods, OTTAWA CITIZEN January 16, 2014

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#cbclolx interviews Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal re: #cdnpoli #petrodollar #oil #energy #economy #trade

CBC’s Amanda Lang interviews Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, Kingdom Holdings CEO on his investment style and reform in Saudi Arabia.


Kingdom Holding Company Press & Media / Investor News / Press Release:
Saudi Prince Alwaleed Interviewed by Prominent US & Canadian Media

November 19, 2013

HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud, Chairman of Kingdom Holding Company (KHC) was on a trip to the United States of America and Canada. During his visit to New York and Toronto Prince Alwaleed granted interviews to prominent US and Canadian media entities to discuss various topics such as his investments, the current status of the global economy and the Middle East.

Furthermore, the meetings were attended by a delegation from Kingdom Holding Company and Private Office that included Mr. Shadi Sanbar, KHC’s Executive Director and CFO and Member of the Investment Committee, Ms. Heba Fatani, Senior Executive Manager, Corporate Communications Department, Dr. Nahla Nasser Alanbar, Private Executive Assistant to HRH the Chairman, Mr. Naief Hussam Alzuhair, Manager, Website and Social Media and Mr. Fahad Bin Saad Bin Nafel, Executive Assistant to HRH the Chairman.

His Highness had interviews with:

1) CBC with Ms. Amanda Lang

2) Globe and Mail with Ms. Jacquie McNish

3) CNBC with Ms. Maria Bartiromo “Closing Bell”

4) PBS’s Charlie Rose with Mr. Charlie Rose

5) The Wall Street Journal

6) CNN with Piers Morgan

7) MSNBC with Morning Joe

8) CBS This Morning Charlie Rose, Gayle King

In addition, Prince Alwaleed visited various media offices and met with their editorial management. Moreover, Prince Alwaleed held business meetings with financial and economic representatives during his visit.


  1. Saudi prince Alwaleed bin Talal Kingdom Holdings CEO on his investment style and reform in Saudi Arabia BUSINESS Nov 19, 2013
  2. Saudi billionaire sees a world awash in oil JACQUIE McNISH TORONTO — The Globe and Mail (includes correction) Published Friday, Nov. 15 2013, 7:29 PM EST Last updated Monday, Nov. 18 2013, 6:34 AM EST
  3. Prince Alwaleed knocks activist investors Published: Monday, 18 Nov 2013 5:29 PM ET By: Drew Sandholm Producer
  4. Nov. 20: Charlie Rose talks to Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, the largest individual foreign investor in the United States who has been called the Arabian Warren Buffett.
  5. Saudi Prince Alwaleed’s Kingdom Holding Signals Twitter Interest
  6. Prince Alwaleed on investing $300 million in Twitter, and heeding Warren Buffett’s spending advice November 18th, 2013 09:49 PM ET
  7. Saudi billionaire on oil, Iran and women drivers MORNING JOE 11/18/13 In a recent address, President Obama praised U.S. oil production as a “tremendous step towards American energy independence.” Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal joins Morning Joe to discuss Saudi oil production and world oil production and investing in Twitter and Syria.Saudi billionaire on oil, Iran and women drivers

Published on Nov 22, 2013
Operation Harper [https://www.youtube.com/user/opharper]

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#UpInSmoke: #Harper’s #CPC and #Ford’s #FordNation Ideological Subversion of #cdnpoli #senca

It seems as if “We the People” have found ourselves in quite a predicament and the implications are far reaching. Does the cost of “power” consolidation to an “individual” include servitude to foreign investment schemes that can simply “buy” that one individuals influence? Is Canada simply “closed” for “face to face” business domestically so that it may be politically “sold” to the highest faceless international bidders in a globalized fire sale? Why are the seemingly exponential and expanding connections to organized criminal activity and undue influence within the halls of Government being allowed?

PM Harper’s houses of disrepute By Paul E Kennedy — National Newswatch — Nov 19 2013
“The Prime Minister bears responsibility for having brought the two Houses of Parliament to their knees and turned them into houses of disrepute. This situation could only have come to pass because government MPs and Senators have placed narrow partisan interests and blind loyalty to the leader of the day before their responsibility to the people of Canada and the ideals of justice and democracy.”

The real problem now lies with how the various media conglomerates and social media outlets decide to continue spinning lies to divert our collective eyes from the ultimate prize. Surely another riddle or question to ponder is not the option but another perspective and direction is desperately needed. Somehow we need to force the narrative towards and away from the clown prince of the neo-conservative movement since their ultra-far-right agenda is forging ahead behind this 3 ring circus that they have spent billions of our tax dollars to create. They are collectively proving themselves to be the both sides of the “wars” they have waged in our collective names and successfully downloaded the costs to us. As a refresher, below are the fundamental “sales pitches” of the international ultra-right-wing investor to acquire our tax dollars:

  1. War on Crime
  2. War on Drugs
  3. War on Terror

Now is the time for the collective will of “We the People”, the true majority, to set aside our seemingly petty disagreements and understand our adversaries adversary and their tactics. The fact that the Harper Regime has not tossed Rob Ford under the bus is due to the fact that they desperately need the Ford Nation to pursue their mandate. This will prove to be self-defeating as they have lost all control and need the drunken buffoonery to continue and could care less of the well being of Rob Ford but certainly do NOT care about his wife, children, family or friends. They are proving themselves to be the greedy malcontents that they really are by fueling the criminal side by way of the subversion of the Constitution and Charter to their own needs.

“We the People” need to oxidize their narrative, cut off their funds and smoke ’em outta their caves by simply reviewing and investigating further, in no specific order, a few points that are glaringly missing in the media reporting these days which stifles it’s growth via social media:

  • PMO Scandal(s) – Investigations into Frauds upon the Government, Breach of Trust, Conspiracy, Blackmail, etc.
  • Aboriginal, Indigenous and First Nations – Education, health care, missing women, treaty rights, human rights, land rights, resource development rights, international investor involvement in illegal police state measures.
  • Senate Scandal(s) – In addition to attempts to prevent representative and truly transparent reform, once the Supreme Court Justices began pondering and questioning the future implications of the potential for a potentially undemocratically elected majority caucus to create the conditions for a dictatorship, everyone shut the story down.
  • National Security – Missing millions from border security and community resources, PMO compromised, Rob Ford compromised, Foreign Policy, selective investment in Human Rights at home and abroad.
  • Robocalls Scandal(s) – Puzzling, but hey, due process usually catches up with reality after the next election cycle.
  • CETA – Skimpy draft text presentation is unacceptable at best, not to mention it conflicts with NAFTA and other agreements with the US.
  • TPP – Having to wait for “Anonymous” sources and WikiLeaks for leaked drafts of secret long term “trade” agreements that affect everyone is criminal.
  • Electronic Surveillance – As other Nation and States seem to be taking proactive responses to at least pacify the citizenry, having to wait for “Anonymous” sources and Snowden for details is ridiculous.
  • Crime, Punishment, Immigration and Detention – Selective systems rife with corruption and abuse. Unconstitutional omnibus legislation, horrific conditions within the prison systems, overburdened court systems, under representation of the detained, expanded police powers, out-sourcing and privatizing detention services.
  • Currency Wars and Trade Wars – Setting the pretext and domestic conditions to assure that the “budget plan” gets interrupted by global “economic” conditions. Easily done by way of an over valued dollar that encourages quick short term, low to no interest foreign investment in the housing, financial and resource extraction bubbles at the expense of the tourism and export sectors.
  • Tax Evasion Haven – Been a while since we have explore offshore but this ties into the Economic Extraction Action Plan. More appropriately summarized as the Plan of Action to Extract as much liquidity out of the Canadian economy as possible before the inevitable bursting of the bubbles.
  • Veterans Issues – Lest we forget…

Now, getting back to the familiar and failing narrative, the diversion that is Rob Ford, who actually defines the neo-conservative caucus by way of accurate representation. Just take a peek Stateside and look into the crowds that comprise Koch Nation by way of the ultra-right-wing elements of the neo-conservative Tea Party movement. You’ll notice the same divide between “traditional” conservative values and “ideological” values cloaked within the conservative context.

One may wonder what, or why, or how, any of these issues could converge and/or be interconnected and why the thought is never allowed to cross their minds that “Stephen Harper” may not have the best long term interests in “his” mind for Canada. Now how many times “he” get’s caught up in “his” own lies, his caucus seems blinded to what is occurring before their collective eyes. But then again any good conman, crook or criminal knows that for the most part, the most obvious is always the least obvious. This is where the msm narrative needs to be injected with some facts that they are careful to mention in passing but not fully explore. No matter how hard they try, proper chronological documentation elsewhere will assure that facts will not die.

The fact remains that a small minority of ideological internationalist ultra-neo-conservative loyalists have convinced the majority of  persons with “conservative values” that in order to “win” an election they need the ultra-right-wing Reform/Alliance members led by Stephen Harper. To this end to “win” an election and an eventual majority to govern with authority, they became willingly subservient to the whims of a “leader” without having to admit they have enslaved themselves to a “master” that is controlled by international investors that do not have a vested interest in Canada.


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

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This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

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Secret #TPP, #cdnpoli & Intellectual Property: Wake UP all 3 –> #CPC + #NDP + #LPC!

So, what does the intellectual Harper Regime have to hide from “We the People”, aka: individual citizens, aka: taxpayers? Or, are “We the People” simply the property of faceless corporations? Why is the entire Canadian MSM establishment MIA with regards to TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the largest-ever economic treaty, encompassing nations representing more than 40 per cent of the world’s GDP?

Secret TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)
What are the Secrets in the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)?

If it weren’t bad enough that “We the People” are force fed diversionary neo-conservative scandal after scandal after scandal, while they secretly huddle away in their secret globalist enclaves with their secret globalist committees and secretive globalist cabals. Having to wait for “Anonymous” sources and WikiLeaks for leaked drafts of secret long term “trade” agreements that affect everyone is criminal in the opinion of many. That being stated, we thought we would provide a beginning point, a primer if you will, for those that may be concerned and/or interested. Do NOT allow this to “agreement” to pass blindly and unnoticed! If you care about anything at all upon reviewing the information below, feel free to comment, share, build upon and distribute it in the most expeditious manner possible…

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Secret TPP treaty: Advanced Intellectual Property chapter for all 12 nations with negotiating positions WikiLeaks release: November 13, 2013

Today, 13 November 2013, WikiLeaks released the secret negotiated draft text for the entire TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) Intellectual Property Rights Chapter. The TPP is the largest-ever economic treaty, encompassing nations representing more than 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. The WikiLeaks release of the text comes ahead of the decisive TPP Chief Negotiators summit in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 19-24 November 2013. The chapter published by WikiLeaks is perhaps the most controversial chapter of the TPP due to its wide-ranging effects on medicines, publishers, internet services, civil liberties and biological patents. Significantly, the released text includes the negotiation positions and disagreements between all 12 prospective member states.

The TPP is the forerunner to the equally secret US-EU pact TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), for which President Obama initiated US-EU negotiations in January 2013. Together, the TPP and TTIP will cover more than 60 per cent of global GDP.

Read full press release here: https://wikileaks.org/tpp/pressrelease.html

Description: This is the confidential draft treaty chapter from the Intellectual Property group of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks between the United States, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, Chile, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam, New Zealand and Brunei Darussalam. The treaty is being negotiated in secret by delegations from each of the 12 countries, who together account for 40% of global GDP. The chapter covers proposed international obligations and enforcement mechanisms for copyright, trademark and patent law, and includes the combined positions of all of the parties as they were by the end of August 2013. The document was produced and distributed to the Chief Negotiators
on August 30, 2013, after the 19th Round of Negotiations at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei.

Download: https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf

Leak of TPP text on copyright Limitations and Exceptions Knowledge Ecology International 03 August 2012

Below is a leak of the negotiating text from the TPP trade agreement, on copyright limitations and exceptions. For some additional context on this issue, see: “What does the secret TPPA text say about copyright exceptions?”


Malaysia Rejecting TPP as Agreement Causes Political Turmoil in Australia Written By Drew Wilson August 14, 2012 – The Trans-Pacific Partnership, an agreement that would, among other things, institute a global ISP level regime and three strikes law, allow corporations of any kind to operate above a countries local laws so long as their headquarters is located outside the country and further restrict limitations afforded to consumers in various countries (and that’s likely just the tip of the iceberg), has been back in the news once again for a number of reasons. We begin with the more dramatic developments coming out of Malaysia where the country is reportedly getting increasingly sceptical of the agreement altogether. From The Sun Daily:


Civil Society Groups Oppose US and Australias TPP Proposal on Exceptions and Limitations | Electronic Frontier Foundation BY CAROLINA ROSSINI AUGUST 28, 2012

Civil Society groups from around the Pacific Region join forces to oppose the exceptions and limitations framework in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) proposed by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) in a new joint statement [PDF] [TXT]. It reads:

We, the undersigned public interest organizations, oppose the current framework for exceptions and limitations proposed by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) as the language stands in the August 3rd leaked text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP). It uses the most restrictive three-step test language, extends the test to exceptions and limitations not currently under the test and jeopardizes countries’ ability to set what best fit their needs. The US proposal misses opportunities to use the TPP to strengthen limitations and exceptions further.

The language in Paragraph 1 of the US proposal, specifically the excerpt “shall confine”, limits nations’ ability to seek a flexible exceptions and limitations system. This language would cause numerous potential problems for the kind of balance in copyright systems that the new USTR proposal claims to advance. Additionally, while the language in Paragraph 2, focused on copyright exceptions and limitations for the digital environment, may appear to reflect progress, the unintended consequences of the proposed three-step test language are many and will create chilling effects in the ability of users and entrepreneurs to innovate. This is a worse problem for those nations that do not adopt fair-use-like systems.

We firmly believe that countries should be able to tailor copyright exceptions and limitations to their domestic needs, and extend such limitations into the digital environment to create new exceptions as they find appropriate. We consider that the proposal pushed forward by New Zealand, Chile, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei—which also leaves to each country to decide what is appropriate for their digital environment—is a better solution.


Prominent Academics Respond to the TPP BY CAROLINA ROSSINI AUGUST 30, 2012

We asked several academics to let us know their thoughts about the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The TPP is a secretive, multi-national trade agreement that threatens to extend restrictive intellectual property (IP) laws across the globe and rewrite international rules on its enforcement, and it will do so in a way that will have extensive negative ramifications for users’ freedom of speech, privacy, access to information, and ability to innovate. Their responses are below.

Hollywood Gets to Party with TPP Negotiators, Public Interest Groups Get Thrown Out of Hotel from the yeah,-that-doesn’t-look-corrupt-at-all dept – We’ve been talking about the ridiculous levels of secrecy around the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) agreement — a trade agreement that is being designed to push through basically everything that Hollywood wants in international copyright law. Last week, we mentioned that various civil society groups were planning to hold an open meeting about TPP in the same hotel where the negotiations were being held (in Hollywood, of course). However, it appears that once the USTR found out about this, it got the hotel to cancel the group’s reservation at the hotel. According to Sean Flynn, the Associate Director of the Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) at American University:


The TPP is a corporate coup d’état Kristinn Hrafnsson 15 November 2013, 23:51

The transparency site WikiLeaks has recently released part of a secret trade agreement called the Trans Pacific Partnership Treaty (TPP) being fast-tracked through the US Congress by US President Barrack Obama. What is astounding about the treaty, other than the fact that it is being pushed through without allowing US Congressmen access to the full text, is that only 3 people in each of the 12 prospective signatory countries, have access to the full text. Given that the treaty will affect countries which account for about 40% of the world GDP and over 800 million people, the fact that 600 corporate bankers are effectively hi-jacking the governments of the member countries and that only 3 people in each country know the full contents of the treaty, the document is a true step toward corporate fascism. The Voice of Russia spoke to WikiLeaks number 2 Kristinn Hrafnsson on the section of the TPP which they released.

Download audio file: http://cdn.ruvr.ru/download/2013/11/15/20/11152013_ROBLES_HRAFNSSON_PART1.mp3

Outcry Follows Leak Of Secret Trade Negotiations Emma Woollacott, Forbes Contributor I cover internet piracy and copyright. Tech | 11/14/2013 @ 5:02PM

With two previous versions leaked, the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) was already causing rumblings of concern. But Wikileaks’ release this week of the latest draft has brought controversy to a peak.

The deal is currently being negotiated in secret between the US and Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam – and there are proposals to extend it further.

However, the 30,000-page draft agreement published by Wikileaks reveals intellectual property protection being broadened in an astonishing number of areas – from strengthening the rights of pharmaceutical companies to allowing the patenting of plants and animals. It is, unsurprisingly, supported by more than 600 large corporations, from Nike and Walmart to General Electric and Pfeizer.


Wikileaks does the work Congress and the media won’t – How can this tool believe what he’s saying? The “Free Trade” scam has helped the US in the last 50 years? How? Personal income has been in steady decline since the 1970s and whole industries have entirely disappeared. The latest scam is called Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The negotiation of this treaty-level trade agreement has been “fast tracked” so Congress hasn’t been involved. The negotiations have been held in secret. But Wikileaks comes to the rescue. A 95-page draft from the TPP agreement was released by WikiLeaks this week. We may not have a news media and we may not have a government, but we have have Wikileaks and the Internet.


Trade deal could be bitter medicine by Phillip Dorling Technology News Political News November 14, 2013

WikiLeaks has exposed details of secret trade negotiations that could leave Australians paying more for drugs and medicines, movies, computer games and software, and be placed under surveillance as part of a US-led crackdown on internet piracy.

A leaked draft of a controversial chapter of the Trans Pacific Partnership free trade agreement reveals the negotiating positions of 12 countries – including Australia – on copyright, patents and other intellectual property issues, with a heavy focus on enforcement measures against internet piracy.

Intellectual property experts are critical of the draft treaty, which they say would help the multinational movie and music industries, software giants and pharmaceutical manufacturers to maintain and increase prices by reinforcing the rights of copyright and patent owners, clamping down on online piracy and raising obstacles to the introduction of generic drugs and medicines. Prime Minister Tony Abbott has indicated that he is keen to see the trade talks pushed to a conclusion next month, saying “there’s always horse-trading in these negotiations, but in the end … everyone is better off”’.


Patent plan to push up cost of medicines by Julia Medew Health Editor November 13, 2013

Australians are likely to pay more for medicines in coming years if intellectual property proposals contained in the powerful Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement go ahead.

The leaked treaty being negotiated by Australia and the US with 10 other Asia-Pacific countries reveals a range of measures that would enhance the ability of drug companies to extend and widen patents on drugs.

It also proposes compensation for companies that face delays in the granting or extension of patents, along with measures to ensure data exclusivity for companies so they can prevent competitors, specifically manufacturers of generic medicines, from using past clinic data to support new products.

The leaked TPP negotiations suggest drug companies will also be able to extend patent protection beyond the general 20-year limit by patenting different aspects of their products, such as an active ingredient, for a new use later. This process is called “evergreening”.


Australia backs the US at every turn against its own consumers Peter Martin Economics correspondent November 14, 2013

In public the Australian government is on the side of consumers. Yet behind closed doors it is siding with the US government to block them at every turn.

The extraordinarily detailed information on negotiating positions released by WikiLeaks shows Australia repeatedly backing the interests of the US against the objections of countries including Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Vietnam on questions involving intellectual property. Australia is often the only one of the 12 parties to the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations to do so.

In 2005 the High Court ruled that it was legal for Australians to use so-called ”mod chips” to bypass the copy-protection measures in Sony Playstations. In June this year a committee made up of both sides of Parliament unanimously recommended Australia amend its copyright law to put beyond doubt ”consumers’ rights to circumvent technological protection measures that control geographic market segmentation”. In other words, Australians would be completely free to modify their DVD machines to play discs made for use anywhere in the world. And to defeat the technologies that allow US giants such as Amazon and Apple to geographically segment their markets and charge Australians more than almost anyone else.

The committee’s report: ”At what cost? Information technology pricing and the Australian tax”, found Adobe software was 42 per cent more expensive than in the US, Microsoft products 66 per cent and hardware 46 per cent more expensive.
Yet in closed-door negotiations so secret the media was excluded from Australian briefings on their progress, Canberra has backed the US in trying to criminalise such measures. An amendment proposed by Canada and Singapore to the effect that it is legal to sell and import devices whose sole purpose is to defeat region coding, does not list Australia among its backers.

Canada and seven other countries want to make it clear that internet providers such as Australia’s iiNet cannot be held legally responsible for copyright infringement on their networks. In 2012 iiNet went to the High Court to enforce that right. But Australia and the US are listed in the negotiating document as opposing it.

In only one set of clauses does Australia consistently side with other countries against the US and those concern health. The US is pushing for even stronger patent rights for drug companies.


Wikileaks Release: Secret TPP Treaty. Text of Negotiated Draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Intellectual Property Rights Chapter By Global Research News Global Research, November 13, 2013

Today, 13 November 2013, WikiLeaks released the secret negotiated draft text for the entire TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) Intellectual Property Rights Chapter. The TPP is the largest-ever economic treaty, encompassing nations representing more than 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. The WikiLeaks release of the text comes ahead of the decisive TPP Chief Negotiators summit in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 19-24 November 2013. The chapter published by WikiLeaks is perhaps the most controversial chapter of the TPP due to its wide-ranging effects on medicines, publishers, internet services, civil liberties and biological patents. Significantly, the released text includes the negotiation positions and disagreements between all 12 prospective member states.


The Trans Pacific Partnership IP Chapter Leaks: The Battle Over Internet Service Provider Liability Thursday November 14, 2013

The leak of the Trans Pacific Partnership intellectual property chapter generated global coverage as full access to the proposed text provided a wake-up call on U.S. demands and the clear opposition from many TPP countries. My first post highlighted Canada’s opposition to many U.S. proposals, but nowhere is that more evident than in the section on Internet service provider liability. In fact, ISP liability in the TPP is shaping up to be a battle between Canada and the U.S., with countries lining up either in favour of a general notification obligation (Canada) or a notice-and-takedown system with the prospect of terminating subscriber Internet access and content blocking (U.S.).

The Canadian approach, which enjoys support from Chile, Brunei, New Zealand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Mexico, establishes a general obligation to limit liability for ISPs for infringements that occur on their networks (the U.S. and Australia oppose this approach, Japan and Peru are undecided). The Canadian proposal includes more detailed descriptions of the limitations of liability, an exclusion for services primarily for enabling infringement, and a reminder that ISP liability is still subject to copyright limitations and exceptions. Under the Canadian model, ISP limitation of liability is conditioned on creating a notification process and “legal incentives for ISPs to comply with these procedures or remedies against ISPs that fail to comply.”

The U.S. proposal, which enjoys support from Australia (and support for some provisions from Singapore, New Zealand, and Peru) features far more conditions for ISP limitation of liability that could lead to subscriber service termination and content blocking (Canada, Brunei, Vietnam, and Mexico oppose the approach). Under the U.S. model, specific actions are required for specific limitations of liability. For example, a limitation of liability for automated caching is subject to four requirements, including “removing or disabling access, on receipt of an effective notification of claimed infringement, to cached material that has been removed or access to which has been disabled at the originating site.” Limitation of liability for network storage or linking users to online sites are also subject to compliance with notifications.

However, all forms of ISP limitations of liability are subject to several additional conditions (which Malaysia and New Zealand oppose):


Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) The Council of Canadians

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is 12-nation (and counting) free trade and corporate rights deal that is being led by the United States but also includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. Thailand, The Philippines and South Korea have also expressed interest in joining the talks, which would eclipse the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the ways democracy would be constrained in the interests of multinational corporations.

Of the 26 chapters currently being negotiated in the TPP, only two have to do with trade. The other 24 deal with issues as diverse as how a government regulates corporate activity, what Crown corporations can and cannot do, how long pharmaceutical patents or copyright terms should be, how the Internet is governed, the sharing of personal information across borders, banking and taxation rules, and when a company or investor should be compensated when environmental or public health policies interfere with profits.

The TPP is also considered a geopolitical weapon of the U.S. government, which is trying to isolate China in the Asia-Pacific region, and to block alternative, and more successful, forms of development than the “free trade” model has to offer. But the TPP is being resisted by people across all participating countries because of how it will lock-in a myopic type of corporate globalization that is the main cause of runaway climate change and which has done little to create good, sustainable jobs or reduce poverty worldwide. People working across borders fought and defeated the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Our goal is to make sure the TPP suffers the same fate.


What Canadians need to know about the TPP’s Internet Censorship Plan By Noushin Khushrushahi | November 15, 2013

After years of pushing for greater transparency around the ultra-secretive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), global citizens finally caught a break when Wikileaks released the full text of the TPP’s Internet censorship chapter on November 13, 2013.

The TPP is an extreme trade agreement being negotiated behind closed doors by Canada and 11 other countries. Until this latest leak, all we knew about the TPP was from previously leaked documents in February 2011 – and what we knew was not good. The 2011 leaked text showed that the TPP could end the open Internet as we know it by criminalizing our online activity, invading our privacy, and making our ability to access the Internet far more expensive.

We knew it was bad for the open Internet. We didn’t know it was this bad.

According to privacy expert Professor Michael Geist, Canada (with the support of a number of other countries) has taken a strong stand against extreme U.S. proposals around Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability. While Canada suggests instituting a general notification obligation for ISPs, the U.S. demands that ISPs institute notice-and-takedown regimes. What does this mean? If the U.S. has its way, it means:


What startups need to know about TPP, the secret global trade agreement Eva Arevuo, Engine November 16, 2013 8:00 AM

In the name of “individual rights and free expression,” WikiLeaks this week released the draft text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement — an international trade agreement with the stated aim of liberalizing the economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Among other problems, this agreement may have an adverse impact on U.S. startups.

Negotiations over this trade agreement began in secret in December 2012 between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Japan, Vietnam, and the United States. Together, these nations are responsible for 40 percent of global production and one third of worldwide trade. Despite the secrecy, we know (from a previous leak) that discussions have covered intellectual property, competitive and State-owned enterprises, environmental policy, services and investment, and government procurement, among other issues.


New Bill Targets Patent Trolls Stunting Economic Growth Mike McGeary Oct. 23, 2013 – Today, several members of the House Judiciary committee released the Innovation Act of 2013 as an attempt to curb the pernicious growth of the patent troll business model.

Entrepreneurs, young businesses, and emerging, high-growth technologies are powering what resurgence there is in the American economy. But these businesses are subject to an arcane, onerous system of patent regulation that leaves them vulnerable, and that vulnerability is abused by patent assertion entities and their allies to leverage that system against innovators. With this reality, we are faced with two options: a broken system, or the chance of a reformed system that champions innovation and growth.

At Engine, we completed groundbreaking research this year on technology entrepreneurship in America. Our findings highlight that these young companies create more and better jobs with higher wage premiums than any other industry and that they do so in a way that strengthens communities, creating 4.3 local jobs alongside their own. Moreover, it has become clear that these young, high-growth businesses have created all net new job growth since the time of Ronald Reagan.

Meanwhile, the patent troll racket is directly responsible for $29 billion per year in lost capital and investment. It is this lost capital that could otherwise be used to create the next great American companies that would rejuvenate the American economy.


Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) – Threat To National Sovereignty by Dr. Chandra Muzaffar – Editor’s Note: The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement represents the economic arm of the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, and threatens to undermine the sovereignty of participating countries. Washington lacks a fundamental economic vision, and as its influence in the world continues to wane, the TPP is an attempt to harness the growth and dynamism of South East Asia’s tiger cub economies as a counterweight to China’s influence in the region. The trade deal imposes familiar neoliberal policies written by and for the benefit of US multinational conglomerates. As the participating countries prepare to meet for trade negotiations in Malaysia later this month, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar lays out exactly what is at stake for countries who bend to US pressure and sign the TPP.


Op-Ed: Leaked draft of TPP agreement provisions on intellectual property By Ken Hanly Nov 16, 2013

The draft sections of the Trans=Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement dealing with intellectual property rights has been leaked by Wikileaks. They show that the deal protects the rights of corporations while curtailing the rights of the public.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership has been under negotiation since 2010 and would expand the earlier agreement to many new countries:


TPP: Videos

Wikileaks Exposes the TPP as a Capitulation to Corporate Interests https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRX1wDxdlko

Kevin Zeese: Obama administration’s Fast Track authority plan derailed by bipartisan outrage.

Published on Nov 15, 2013
TheRealNews [https://www.youtube.com/user/TheRealNews]

Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRX1wDxdlko

TPP Exposed: WikiLeaks Publishes Secret Trade Text to Rewrite Copyright Laws, Limit Internet Freedom https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6OZyRQbQ2k

WikiLeaks has published the secret text to part of the biggest U.S. trade deal in history, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). For the past several years, the United States and 12 Pacific Rim nations have been negotiating behind closed doors on the sweeping agreement. A 95-page draft of a TPP chapter released by WikiLeaks on Wednesday details agreements relating to patents, copyright, trademarks and industrial design — showing their wide-reaching implications for internet services, civil liberties, publishing rights,and medicine accessibility. Critics say the deal could rewrite U.S. laws on intellectual property rights, product safety and environmental regulations, while backers say it will help create jobs and boost the economy. President Obama and U.S. trade representative Michael Froman reportedly wish to finalize the TPP by the end of the year and are pushing Congress to expedite legislation that grants the president something called “fast-track authority.” However, this week some 151 House Democrats and 23 Republicans wrote letters to the administration saying they are unwilling to give the president free reign to “diplomatically legislate.” We host a debate on the TPP between Bill Watson, a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch.

Published on Nov 14, 2013
democracynow [http://www.youtube.com/user/democracynow]

Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6OZyRQbQ2k

Trans-Pacific Partnership: Corporate Global Domination (Long Version) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pj_Wiq9J0LM

This video is a long version of the event that occurred on May 28, 2013, when a group of panelists and activists assembled at the All Souls Unitarian Universalist Church in New York City to learn about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to organize opposition to it.

Published on Jun 24, 2013
TheEnvironmentTV [https://www.youtube.com/user/TheEnvironmentTV]

Category: Nonprofits & Activism
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pj_Wiq9J0LM

Anonymous : What is The TPP https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEO0faMuZoY

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (or TPP for short) is being negotiated in secret between more than 12 countries around the Pacific region. Find out why it poses a huge threat to your digital freedoms.

Published on Nov 11, 2013
Anonymous [https://www.youtube.com/user/ANONKILLS]

Information & Credit

For more information to find out how you can take action, visit: https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp

Category: Nonprofits & Activism
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEO0faMuZoY

Trans-Pacific Partnership overview via US Congressman Dennis Kucinich https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtBUL_rgG1k

"The negotiations over the multinational Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the TPP Free Trade Agreement, lack transparency. The U.S. Trade Representative denies members of Congress and the public access to the classified text of the agreement.

"This policy of secrecy undermines public trust and denies members of Congress the opportunity Congress has historically been afforded to provide input on trade deals. According to Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, the U.S. Trade Representative has consulted with 'over 600 mostly corporate advisors on the context of the classified TPP text,' while continuing to deny access to policy makers whose constituencies will be greatly affected by the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

"From what has been leaked of the TPP, it is shaping up to be worse than NAFTA. The North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) legacy of deregulation, the outsourcing of American jobs, and the undermining of U.S. environmental and health laws is legendary."

"The devastating track record of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) thus far is clear, and recent reports confirm the fears of those of us who opposed the NAFTA-style FTAs with Korea, Colombia and Panama last year. Colombia continues to be the most dangerous place in the world for trade unionists. Our trade deficit with Korea in the auto sector has grown to nearly $8 billion, a 28% increase over the same period from last year.

"In June of this year, I joined over 100 Members of Congress in asking U.S. Trade Representative for more transparent negotiations and to provide Congress with the vital opportunity to provide input for the agreement. Our voices join thousands of people across the country and a broad range of civil society groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American Medical Student Association and the AFL-CIO that are calling for increased transparency and accountability in the TPP negotiation process.

"When will the U.S. Trade Representative listen? Why is the process so secret? Shouldn't we know the details of the Trans-Pacific Partnership before the election?"

Published on Oct 18, 2012
DJKucinich [https://www.youtube.com/user/DJKucinich]
Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtBUL_rgG1k

Trans-Pacific Partnership Needs to Protect American Jobs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63INIb6YvYA

Published on Oct 25, 2013
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter [https://www.youtube.com/user/louiseslaughter]

On Friday, October 25, 2013 Louise spoke with Ed Shultz about the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the need to end the era of giveaway trade. Louise has been a vigorous opponent of failed trade agreements and opposed her own party in voting against NAFTA when it was proposed in Congress. She is the author of the Reciprocal Market Access Act which would fix our trade negotiation process and protect American manufacturers from flawed trade deals that favor foreign countries.

Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63INIb6YvYA

Japanese Movement Against TPP Growing https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anhP_NzX5DY

Critics of the Trans-Pacific Partnership say it’s an attempt to impose an American system on Japan and would threaten Japanese public healthcare system

Published on May 6, 2013
TheRealNews [https://www.youtube.com/user/TheRealNews]

Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anhP_NzX5DY

A Conversation on the Trans-Pacific Partnershiphttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFEttSxoSC0

Stratfor Analysts Karen Hooper and Matt Gertken discuss the strategy behind the United States’ latest push for a trans-Pacific free trade agreement, and the challenges it faces.
For more analysis, visit: http://www.Stratfor.com

Published on May 24, 2013
STRATFORvideo [https://www.youtube.com/user/STRATFORvideo]
Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFEttSxoSC0

Fighting The Trans-Pacific Partnership – Nile Bowie on GRTV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yk6VOJHGoM

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is a proposed free trade bloc involving twelve Asia-Pacific countries, including the world’s first and third largest economies. As delegates prepare to descend on Kuala Lumpur for the next round of secretive negotiations, Malaysia-based journalist Nile Bowie joins us to discuss the proposed treaty and its ramifications. Find out more in this week’s GRTV Feature Interview.

Published on Jul 15, 2013
GlobalResearchTV [https://www.youtube.com/user/GlobalResearchTV]

Category: News & Politics
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yk6VOJHGoM

The TPPA will destroy NZ Industry Murray Horton CAFCA MR NEWS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYEVC08afDE

This is a must see for every country who is entering into free trade deals!
Murray Horton from the Campaign Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa CAFCA lays out how the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) will destroy New Zealand’s economy and undermine our sovereignty.

Published on Apr 18, 2011
Vincent Eastwood [https://www.youtube.com/user/MRNEWSguerillamedia]

Category: Nonprofits & Activism
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYEVC08afDE

What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GURmyY-Pgg

Learn more about corporate America’s latest power grab — the TPP — and sign the petition at www.citizenstrade.org.

Published on Mar 14, 2012
ORFTC [https://www.youtube.com/user/ORFTC]

Category: Nonprofits & Activism
License: Standard YouTube License

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GURmyY-Pgg

Expose The TPP
ExposeTheTPP [https://www.youtube.com/user/ExposeTheTPP]

What you don’t know WILL hurt you. So learn more about the Trans-Pacific Partnership at www.ExposeTheTPP.org.


further reading: https://dumpharper.wordpress.com/the-issues/cdntrade/tpp/

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Thoughts on Remembrance Day 2013

Come November each year, most of us turn our thoughts to those who gave their lives in the defence of Democracy and the fight against tyranny and oppression.

Many of us will choose to wear a Red poppy, some a White one.  I have no issue with either but I choose to wear a red one.  The white poppy is the choice of pacifists but the message is the same.  We honour the memory of those who served and died and we pray that the last war will be the last war, ever.

For those who feel that the one colour or the other is an affront, maybe we should recall that these people died so that others could have their own beliefs.

While we honour those that died by wearing a poppy, we also show our respect to all those who served.  Some enlisted to fight the Kaiser, others to fight against Hitler and his allies, some chose to enlist during peace.  They may have had no intention of going to war, but when war came, they went too.

We have lost the last of our veterans of the Great War.  Our veterans from WWII are aged and their numbers grow fewer each year.

These people have earned our respect, as have the veterans who served in places such as Korea, those that served as Blue Berets in many countries around the world, and to those who served in more recent conflicts, such as Afghanistan.

You have earned my respect, and I honour the memory of your comrades that went to these places but never returned.

To those that served during peace time, You have my respect as well.  You were willing to stand guard and prepared to go to where ever our government felt you were needed.

This is why I find it unconscionable that our government finds it necessary to show an incredible lack of respect to those who have served.

This morning the radio reported that Windsor Council voted unanimously to request that the government rescind the decision to close the Windsor Veterans Affairs Office.  Among those who use the services of this office are WWII veterans who will no longer be able to visit a local office when they need to.  The nearest office will be in London, a long trip for someone in their 80s which will likely require someone to drive them there.

The news has also been reporting on injured members of our Canadian Military who are being discharged months before qualifying for their pensions.  This number includes a Member of the Services from London Ontario who lost his legs in Afghanistan as well as others who suffer from various bodily injuries or lost limbs or from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome.  You are no longer welcome in the Military.

And the government has decided to appeal a Court ruling that allows our injured veterans to sue the government to obtain a disability pension rather than the lump sum payment that our government has inflicted on them.

Why?  Because the government of Stephen Harper feels it is a better use of tax money to close these offices, to discharge these soldiers, and to give lump sums to injured veterans than to treat them with the respect that they have earned.  They have been reduced to numbers on a piece of ledger paper in Jim Flaherty’s office, these people are just too expensive to deal with otherwise.

Why do I care?  Just like Stephen Harper, I am an accidental Canadian.  I am a Canadian simply because my mother gave birth to me here just like Stephen’s mother did for him.  My parents however are not accidental Canadians like Stephen’s parents are.  My parents are (or in my Mother’s case was) Canadian by choice.  They were both born in a foreign country and chose to immigrate to Canada.

My parents both grew up under Nazi occupation.  WWII was not something seen in the theatre or read about in the papers, it was part of their lives.  While they were spared the horror of war in their streets, they still lived under the vigilance of their Nazi overseers.

My Mother once told me that in the end days of the war, when the Allied Forces were taking control of former Nazi held territory they hoped to see General Montgomery.  They wanted to thank the British for fighting in their war from the beginning.  She would have been just as happy to see Canadians, we flew the Union Jack at that time, our Forces were in the war from the beginning as well.  Our Forces would have easily passed as British in her eyes back then.

This is part of the reason that I respect those that choose to enlist.

This is part of the reason I honour those who give the ultimate sacrifice.

I owe these people a debt of gratitude.

Stephen Harper on the other hand sees these people as an expense, a cost to be controlled or cut.  Just another item on the long list of accounts payable.  Our Armed Forces are a wonderful backdrop for photo ops, but soldiers who are no longer able to fight are too expensive to keep.  Pensions for injured vets and Veterans Offices are just too expensive to maintain.

A strange way to thank the people who chose to defend Canada don’t you think?

Each year I buy a poppy to show my gratitude.  If it costs me a few dollars a year in income tax to keep offices open and allow the Member of Our Armed Forces to have proper pensions then so be it.  But if you ask me, I’d rather my money be spent on our veterans than on TV commercials.

In Remembrance,