Category Archives: UK

#Harper’s War(s): #C51 and the 5-Eyes Spy vs Spy Paradigm, Cui bono? #cdnpoli #pnpcbc #ctvpp #cbcnn

For this installment of the #Harper’s War(s) series, we would like to propose a couple of points to ponder about the broader implications of Bill C-51 as it relates to our “Allies” and especially the citizens of the other 5-Eyes intelligence alliance members, Australia, New Zealand, U.K and U.S., not to mention the jurisdictions of the NSA and the broad array of other international alphabet intelligence agencies within the expanded 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes intelligence community. Considering how creeped out the majority of Canadians are by being johnny-spied and infringed upon by the predatory Harper Regime, our “allies” should feel creeped out even more.

Dominion of Harper's All Seeing Eye
Dominion of Harper’s All Seeing Eye

There must be something more sinister, colonist and imperialist “invisible hand” behind this mad rush to declare more opaque enemies and terrorists located on various blurry battlefields concentrated around trade corridors, energy sources while opening new markets and investment opportunities with military force. Since the pre-World War Next, or at least pre-Cold War 2.0, conditions are being sown, fertilized and fermented on multiple fronts, does Harper seek to be the supreme intelligence overlord and ultimately the overseer of ECHELON 2.0?

Since many of Canada’s Allies have various information and intelligence gathering operations, most of them have some level of real time oversight, not after the fact reviews and unchallenged secret tribunals. The fact that Harper’s Bill C-51 provides no additional oversight to watch over the watchers that share data with other watchers abroad. We can only presume that other “agencies” with arterial motives will attempt to infiltrate our own intelligence apparatuses through vulnerable Ministry/Department backdoors in order to circumvent their own restrictive domestic data and intelligence sharing regulations on mass surveillance and data collection of citizens.

In many ways it seems as if the Harper Regime has decided to be the grand all-seeing-eye, spymaster and records keeper within the right-wing utopian Global Governance Era. In these glorious propaganda filled globalization days where “governments” have embraced tax-cutting and war-mongering at the same time, while downplaying the decline of the domestic economy and outsourcing in order to nickle and dime away solutions in order to create more costly problems, we’ll pose a few questions worth pondering, if anything else…

  1. Who will be watching the Government?
  2. What prevention measures are in place to assure that our intelligence apparatuses are not infiltrated and hijacked by another, group, cabal, cartel, agency or government?
  3. What measures are in place to assure undue search and unwarranted seizure of Canadians data by foreign agencies?
  4. What happens when there is a conflict of interest or competing interests?
  5. What happens when one partner agencies “terrorist” is another partner agencies “freedom fighter”?
  6. What happens “if” another partner agency is found to be committing illegal activities within Canada that go against Canadian interests or violates the civil liberties and freedoms of Canadians?
  7. What prevents multiple agencies from getting bogged down and wasting valuable resources and time engaged in overlapping operations, dis-information campaigns, psyops, spooks, stooges, honeypots, grooming, etc.?
  8. What are the surveillance and preventative counter-measures that address blackmail and/or corruption, rouge advisors, agent provocateurs and/or compromised public officials?
  9. When will robust cyber-security measures be implemented within Canada’s own National IT infrastructure to assure no exploits, vulnerabilities, data leakage or unauthorized access are available between the various Ministry’s portals?How will our personal and private data be protected from potential misuse and/or abuse by external intelligence agencies abroad?
  10. How much will all of this secured infrastructure initially cost and how much will the annual maintenance costs be?
  11. How will the national infrastructure that Canadians need to transact their daily affairs be fortified and secured from the blowback from this unprecedented expansion of secretive intelligence powers?
  12. How will other intelligence agencies data be protected?
  13. Will 5-9-14-Eyes and NATO members or our Allies be contributing to the costs of this shared infrastructure or will they just reap the rewards?
  14. Who assures that all international laws are enforced?
  15. Is the ultimate intent to create a “clearinghouse” for illegal covert supra-national co-intel operations?

Further Research:


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

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#Harper’s War(s): Ten + Reasons to Vote Against the Use of Military Force #cdnpoli #GPC #NDP #LPC #CPC

With the hyper-accelerations and unprecedented fear-mongering campaign being waged upon “We the People” of Canada and our “Allies” with regards to the “terrorist” threat posed by IS/ISIL/ISIS. With the recent tragic friendly-fire death of a Canadian soldier, the reports that an Agent employed by a Canadian intelligence organization was involved in the delivery of the 3 U.K. schoolgirls into Syria and the media blackout by the Canadian media conglomerates regarding the very important Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing titled “The President’s Request for Authorization to Use Force Against ISIS: Military and Diplomatic Efforts” (AUMF), we feel it is necessary to republish an open letter by former U.S. Congressman Dennis Kucinich Members of Congress detailing 10 reasons to vote against the use of military force.

The reason this is of utmost importance is that the Harper Regime is hell-bent on furthering our military intervention and has thus far been less than transparent, actually rather deceptive and opaque, regarding our role in Iraq/Syria and beyond while the U.S. is proposing an initial 3 year open ended commitment. According to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, President Barack Obama’s proposed resolution authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State contains no geographic limitations. The proposal allows attacks on “associated persons or forces” or any “closely related successor entity” to IS/ISIL/ISIS that is at war with the United States or its partners.

Yes, this is the very same Dennis Kucinich that announced the raising of the Al Qaeda flag over the courthouse in Benghazi in Libya back in November 2011 after the “successful liberation” of Libya by NATO air power. Oddly enough, the Canadian military predicted Libya would descend into civil war and Top Pentagon officials distrusted Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2011 march to war in Libya as well.

We may also presume why John Baird has decided to “quit” the game of geo-poltics, maybe there was too much blood on his hands and realized that the fix is in within the Harper Regime. Now this is extremely problematic considering the rush by the war-mongering Harper Regime to ram Bill C-51 through and the implications of these combined issues. Within a few days we have several “Allies” that are publicly stating views that counter the narrative of not only the Harper Regime, but our so called “free and independent” media conglomerates. Unlike the coordinated one-sided Ukraine/Russia propaganda campaign, this poses such an interesting and convoluted conundrum that even the AP and Reuters can’t seem to deliver a straight storyline. This is presumably, much like the dueling Israel/Iran narrative, due to the fact that their dueling narratives reach a much broader audience on both sides of the false left/right paradigm with the single solid connection that there are a small group of fear-mongering war-profiteering NeoCons within both “official” political Parties, whether they may be Liberal/Democrats or Conservative/Republicans. Below this open letter, we will embed the above mentioned video uploaded by former U.S. Congressman Dennis Kucinich along with another article titled “How Governments Twist Terrorism” since there seems to be no clear “definition” being presented by the Harper Regime with regards to Bill C-51 and the Harper Regime members of the Committee seem to have a serious problem asking questions of the witnesses and instead are presenting monologs to the witnesses.


Ten Reasons to Vote Against the Use of Military Force

Dear Colleague,

I was honored to serve in Congress for 16 years. During that time I provided information and helped to create debates over U.S. policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and other nations, defending the Article I, Section 8 responsibilities of Congress on matters of war and peace. Those of you who know me are aware that I avoid partisanship. I have challenged Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

Congress rightfully lacks confidence in this administration, given its bungling of a war against Libya and its general mishandling of international policy.

Why would Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, be so ready to give up its constitutional power to this president with an Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), which represents a wholesale appropriation of war power?

This could be one of the most important votes you will ever cast, so I want to share with you, collegially, information that I hope will be of use in your deliberations.

I present some thoughts for your consideration as you enter into a momentous, new debate over the authorization of military force, this time against the Islamic State.

This could be one of the most important votes you will ever cast, so I want to share with you, collegially, information that I hope will be of use in your deliberations.

Here are 10 reasons why Congress should not grant the president authority to use military force against the Islamic State, based on fact, consequences and the U.S. Constitution:

  1.  ISIS is not a threat to the U.S. homeland.

Writing in The American Conservative, Senior Editor Daniel Larison points out that the U.S. is taking on an unnecessary risk:

“… the U.S. mistakenly volunteers to address a regional security problem that poses no real threat to America, [while] its regional partners do as little as they can get away with, and in some cases stop doing even that in order to get the U.S. to take additional risks on their behalf.”

If the U.S. enters the fray, of course, regional partners will let us do the fighting.

There is no credible information available that indicates ISIS is a direct threat to the U.S. According to a Wall Street Journal article, “Lawmakers Told Islamic State Isn’t Terror Threat on U.S. Soil,” Congress has already been advised by U.S. counterterrorism officials that ISIS is not a threat to the U.S. homeland. Additionally, no new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) has been produced alleging ISIS is a direct threat to America. However, an all-out U.S. war against ISIS could expose America to unnecessary threats, without any national security benefits.

  1. The AUMF disingenuously calls for a “limited” war, while it is written to guarantee a permanent war, thus nullifying the power of the people’s representatives in Congress.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution were vitally concerned with the separation of powers, especially when it came to war. The power to declare war is vested in the Congress, in Article I, Section 8. The AUMF is written to enable the administration to conduct war, unilaterally, against any group, anywhere, at any time, over a period of three years, which opposing combatants will ignore.

If the administration succeeds in gaining approval for this particular AUMF, it will not have to return to Congress for approval as it takes its war from nation to nation. This is clearly contrary to the intent of the founders. It weakens Congress’ constitutional power (checks and balances) and undermines the Constitution.

  1. The AUMF is a blank check and a fiscal black hole.

Since the AUMF sets the stage for a worldwide conflict, the cost of action will run into the hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars, particularly if ground troops are involved in a war with religious overtones that go back 14 centuries. This war will inevitably require an emergency wartime supplemental appropriation and massive borrowing, adding to the $16 trillion U.S. deficit and weakening the U.S. economy internally while providing great wealth to war profiteers who are already draining America’s wealth.

  1. Regional armies appear to be rising to their own defense; U.S. presence will escalate war.

At this very moment ISIS is finally under pressure from Iraqi forces and pro-government militias, without U.S. boots on the ground. Additionally, ISIS is said to be experiencing internal pressures and conflicts. The Washington Post points out: “The Islamic State is battling major offensives waged on at least three fronts — by Kurds in northern Syria, Kurds in northern Iraq and the combined force of Iraqi army and Shiite militia fighters advancing on the central Iraqi city of Tikrit.”

“…the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. The provocative videos, in which a black-hooded executioner addresses President Obama by name, are clearly made to draw America into the fight. An [U.S.] invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide … they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day Crusade and kill Muslims.” — Graeme Wood in the Atlantic Magazine, March 2015.

ISIS desperately needs to draw the U.S. in, to provide a rallying cry “against the foreign invader.” Why should America put our troops in harm’s way to provide this terrorist organization with new life, especially since armies in the region are stepping up to take the fight to ISIS?

In the AUMF, the president wants language that provides for U.S. ground forces to have “flexibility.” Read: “Boots on the ground!” If Congress passes the AUMF, it will have no say in the conduct of this war, except for appropriations.

  1. The U.S. could get drawn into a worldwide religious war.

President Obama says, “We are not at war against Islam.” Congressional approval of the president’s request for the AUMF against the Islamic State will change that quickly. The AUMF will become a powerful recruiting tool for ISIS. How else will it be interpreted abroad, other than America at war with Islam? The U.S. could blunder into a complex, multidimensional conflict with explicit religious overtones, no matter what the president says.

ISIS wants to draw the U.S. into a religious war, to secure its role as the self-proclaimed defender of Islam against crusading foreign invaders.

Jihadis, anticipating a great war for Islam, have streamed into the region from all over the world to join ISIS ranks. An estimated 20,000 fighters from 90 nations have converged to fight alongside ISIS.

“This is a fight the Islamic State should be denied. And yet we should have learned that it is a bad idea to get into a ground war with people whose idea of victory is martyrdom.” — Richard Cohen in the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 2015.

  1. ISIS and Al Qaeda are divided. US re-entry into war could unite them.

ISIS and Al Qaeda are in a deep rift. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri differ on strategy, tactics, methods, religious interpretations and on Baghdadi’s establishment of a caliphate.

An all-out U.S. military attack against ISIS will force Al Qaeda into an alliance it does not want, to join ISIS in a “fight against Western invaders,” creating a united front much stronger and more deadly to America and her allies.

  1. A Solution: Follow ISIS’ money, and shut it down.

Where is ISIS getting its money? Up to 100,000 ISIS fighters are funded by Gulf State donors, identified in the past as being from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Fully equipping and providing for one modern combat-ready soldier can cost $850,000 to $1,000,000 a year. ISIS’ army could be gaining $85 billion to $100 billion a year from various sources. We can either commit the U.S. military to another war, and the U.S. to further risk of impending attacks through the genesis of a new crusade, or we can fight this threat with intelligent power and high technology.

The administration must identify the specific sources of ISIS’ money, the individuals, the nations and the means of transfer, and shut them all down. It must sanction countries and individuals, tie up their bank accounts and commercial activities, freeze their assets and cancel their credit cards. Send platoons of accountants from the Treasury Department and the IRS into the fray, not platoons of U.S. soldiers. The U.S. must track oil sales, sales of antiquities and other valuables. Anyone involved in any transactions of any kind with ISIS must be identified and sanctioned.

  1. Solution: Cyber response.

The U.S. has the ability to identify and disrupt terror networks using digital technology. The CIA, in a major reorganization, has just created a fifth directorate, the Directorate of Digital Innovation, in recognition that intelligent power means using the most technologically advanced tools available. For its part, the NSA, which has admitted gaps, is also strengthening its information collecting. If, as Clausewitz said, “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” in the 21st century we  have other means to avoid a “boots on the ground” shooting war.

  1. Endless wars enable Washington to ignore a domestic agenda.

It has been said that others attack us in order to destroy the way we live. Since 9/11, our own government has been responsible for shredding the Constitution through wars of choice and the imposition of a national security state with a permanent state of emergency.

The U.S. now spends about $1 trillion a year to “defend” America using lethal means. Yet the more money we spend, the greater the peril. Why? Meanwhile, at home, America’s middle class is falling apart, wages and benefits have dropped, retirement savings have vanished and Wall Street and war profiteers clean up. Americans, punished through unwarranted, massive surveillance, have forfeited constitutional rights and civil liberties. The right to privacy, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, has been destroyed in the name of security.

  1. The time has come for the U.S. to review the effects of interventionism.

ISIS grew out of U.S. interventions. Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria have disintegrated into chaos and violence. The price tag has been extraordinary in loss of human life and the cost of trillions of dollars. Bad judgments, misinformation and even lies have caused our nation to intervene, inspiring radical elements, stoking the fires of nationalism and engendering religious conflict. A great price has been paid and continues to be paid by our troops and their families.

This is the time for Congress and the administration to rethink the failed national security strategy, the failed doctrine of intervention, the failed “right to protect” doctrine and the abominable intrusion into the private lives of Americans.

Congress must refuse to give up its constitutional power under Article I, Section 8 and hold the executive branch in check on matters of war. It should defeat the AUMF and stop the administration from spreading war around the world.

Congress has a new opportunity to get control of runaway spending and keep America strong without wasting resources. In my early years in Congress, I was shocked to learn, from the inspector general to the Department of Defense, that DOD had over $1 trillion in accounts that could not be reconciled. According to the GAO, the Army “lost track of 56 airplanes, 32 tanks, and 36 Javelin missile command launch units.” The Constitution, Article I, Section 9, requires an accounting. With the national security budget at $1 trillion annually, and trillions spent for wars of choice, and a trillion unaccounted for, and countless billions in cost overruns, the question is who is defending the taxpayers?

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides a new opportunity for a much-needed debate over the direction of America, our priorities and the best way to protect our nation from harm. Thank you for considering my views.

Respectfully,

Dennis Kucinich
Member of Congress 1997 – 2013

source: http://www.kucinich.com/?_escaped_fragment_=10-Reasons-to-Vote-Against-the-Use-of-Military-Force/c1z12/5500a8330cf27b8ab26b528e
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/03/11/open-letter-to-members-congress-about-authorization-to-use-military-force/


Uploaded on Nov 2, 2011

Hi, Congressman Dennis Kucinich here. I just got off the phone with a very well-known talk show host from Cleveland, Mike Trivisonno, who told me about calls that he is getting from people who are concerned that there is an Al Qaeda flag flying over the courthouse in Benghazi in Libya. It was put there by the same group that we helped to oust the Gaddafi regime.

What is going on in America? On the one hand, we have soldiers dying in Afghanistan fighting Al Qaeda. On the other hand, we just helped a group of people take over Libya and the Al Qaeda flag is flying over their capital city headquarters.

What are we doing? It is time for America to get its story and its priorities straight about what we stand for as a nation. Its time to get out of all these wars and all of these conflicts where we think we can play both sides against the middle and it usually ends up with U.S. soldiers getting killed.

Its time to bring our troops home and take care of things here at home. As we approach Veteran’s Day 2011, we should really honor those who serve by having a foreign policy that is straight. That speaks directly to the concerns of the American people. That is mindful of the fact that we can’t tell the whole world what to do and we have an obligation to get our own house in order here at home and put people back to work.

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0FQzhWy0VI


How Governments Twist Terrorism
By Philip Giraldi | March 12, 2015

States craft terror definitions and designations to absolve themselves and satisfy their constituencies.

The Washington Post reports that “terrorism trend lines are ‘worse than at any other point in history.’” But what is terrorism? It has frequently been pointed out that “terrorism” is a tactic, not an actual physical adversary, but it is less often noted that a simple definition of what constitutes terrorism is hardly universally accepted, while the designation itself is essentially political. The glib assertion that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter fails to capture the distinction’s consequences as the terror label itself increasingly comes with a number of legal and practical liabilities attached. Describing an organization as terroristic in order to discredit it has itself become a tactic, and one that sometimes has only limited connections to what the group in question actually believes or does.

The bone of contention in defining terrorism is where to draw the line in terms of the use of violence in furtherance of a political objective. In practice, it is generally accepted that state players who employ violence do so within a social framework that confers legitimacy, while nonstate players who use political violence are ipso facto terrorists, or at least susceptible to being tagged with that label, which confers upon them both illegitimacy and a particularly abhorrent criminality. But some on the receiving end of such a Manichean distinction object, noting that the laws defining terror are themselves drawn up by the governments and international organizations, which inevitably give themselves a pass in terms of their own potential liability. They would argue that established regimes will inevitably conspire to label their enemies terrorists to marginalize both resistance movements and internal dissent in such a way as to diminish the credibility of the groups that are so targeted. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently been doing precisely that, and one might reasonably argue that government use of violence is often in practice indistinguishable from the actions of nonstate players.

Some common dictionary definitions of terrorism include engaging in “the systematic use of terror,” surely an indication of the inscrutability of an issue when the word must be used to define itself. The United Nations has been unsuccessfully negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism since 2002 that would define terror as causing death or serious injury or destroying or damaging public or private property “to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”   The United States Federal criminal code uses similar language, as does the Patriot Act, with the key elements being the use of violence or physical destruction to “intimidate or coerce” a civilian population or an existing government.

Governments are aware of what can be accomplished by invoking the word “terrorism.” The diplomacy-averse United States frequently hides behind the label, as it is prohibited by law from negotiating with groups so-labeled, and thereby avoids having to confront the possible legitimacy of what they represent. And it also justifies a uniformly violent response, which is invariably described as self-defense.

Fourteen years ago the “global war on terror” was used to justify wholesale American intervention in predominantly Muslim countries. A number of European countries, including France and Britain, have followed the example of the two Patriot Acts by introducing antiterrorism legislation that provides special police and intelligence service authorities that limit normal legal protections in terrorism cases. The broadly written laws have largely rendered the authorities immune from either regulation or prosecution, and governments in the West have generally been reluctant to allow any third-party inquiries into the related behavior of military and police forces. In the United States the state secret privilege, originally intended to prohibit the exposure of classified information in court, has been used to completely derail judicial proceedings relating to offenses allegedly committed by the government in terrorism cases.

And critics of the essentially hypocritical double standard used in defining terrorism certainly have a point. One might reasonably argue that the use of drones, in which “signature” targets are killed because they match a profile, fits comfortably within the definition of terrorism. During 2003-4, American Army and Marine forces in Fallujah sometimes shelled and bombed targets in the city indiscriminately and were certainly responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths. The Israeli Defense Forces killed thousands of civilians in two incursions into Gaza as well as several attacks on Lebanon. There was no declaration of war to justify the use of armed force in either case, and independent observers noted that many of the civilian casualties could have been avoided, normally a defining factor that makes an incident terror. Both Israel and the United States turned the tables on the situation by referring to their opponents and victims as “terrorists.” There has been no accountability for the deaths because it was two governments that carried out the killing.

In a world seemingly obsessed with terrorism it was inevitable that something like an anti-terrorism industry would grow dramatically. Every television and radio network has its own stable of pundits who pontificate on every violent incident, and there also are well-compensated freelancers, who describe themselves as experts, such as Evan Kohlmann and Steve Emerson. Emerson recently had to apologize after claiming that Birmingham, England had a number of no-go areas controlled by local Muslim extremists.

It should be no surprise that lawyers have now also gotten into the game. In 1996 Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which allows victims of terrorism to file civil suits in federal and state courts against sponsors or supporters of terrorism. Once you have a group or individual labeled as terrorist, or providing assistance to terrorists, there are a number of options you can pursue. The burgeoning antiterrorism industry appears to be in some ways linked to the increasing employment of Lawfare, which uses the legal system to wage war by alternative means, making it possible to obtain a favorable judgment and damages from the assets of a recognized terrorist organization. Such litigation benefits from favorable legislation in the United States that makes terrorism a worldwide crime subject to U.S. judicial review.

Recent court cases have involved both states that allegedly sponsor terrorism or actual organizations that are now parts of governments that either currently or at one time were perceived to be terrorists. Many of the groups targeted are enemies of Israel, and the Israeli Lawfare center Shurat HaDin is most active in pursuing such litigation. In a recent case in New York City, the Palestinian Authority was successfully sued by a group of Israelis and Americans over terrorist attacks that took place in Israel in 2002-4. If the appeal fails, the Palestinian Authority will be required to pay $1 billion in damages and will be bankrupted, with negative consequences for the United States, which has been seeking to create a viable government on the West Bank.

The U.S. Department of State identifies four countries as state sponsors of terrorism, making them prime targets for sanctions and other legal action. They are Cuba, Sudan, Syria and Iran. Cuba is an anomaly as it has not threatened anyone in decades but remains on the list due to the deep passions within America’s politically powerful Cuban Lobby. Sudan likewise should not be so designated, as even the U.S. government admits that it is cooperative on terrorism issues.

This leaves Syria and Iran, both of which are regarded as state sponsors of terrorism even though both are themselves victims of terrorist attacks carried out by groups supported by the United States. They are on the list because they harbor or cooperate with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. All three groups consider themselves to be resistance movements against the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestine, but Israel regards all three as terrorists, a view shared by the United States on the state department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list. That viewpoint is not necessarily shared by many European governments, which regard the organizations as having evolved into legitimate political parties. There are also thousands of individuals and groups considered to be terroristic or criminal, collected by the U.S. Department of Justice on its Special Designated Nationals List. Individuals and organizations on the list have their assets blocked and are subject to other punitive action by the United States government.

Being designated by the Department of the Treasury or state does not necessarily mean that someone or some organization was actually involved in terrorism. The Texas-based Holy Land Foundation, an Islamic charity, was declared a terrorist organization in 2001. Its officers were convicted and imprisoned in a 2008 trial because the Treasury Department determined ex post facto that it had given money to Hamas before that group was itself named as a terrorist organization.

Inclusion on the State or Treasury lists can mean that there is solid evidence of wrongdoing, but it can also represent mere insinuations or a strong desire to see a group singled out for punishment. In any event, once a group or person is designated for a list, it is difficult to get off. Organizations that have not engaged in terrorist activity for many years remain on the list while other groups that are active escape censure. Recently, the Mujaheddin e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that killed six Americans in the 1970s, was removed from the list under political pressure from Congress and the media. Again, Israel was involved. MEK is an enemy of the current government in Tehran and is itself an important component of the Israeli intelligence effort against Iran, having been involved in the fabrication of information suggesting that Iran has an active nuclear weapons program as well as participating in the assassinations of Tehran’s scientists.

So what terrorism actually consists of very much depends on one’s perspective, rendering the word itself largely meaningless. But those who are listed as terrorists experience real consequences even accepting that the designation is both selectively applied and politicized. The United States and Israel in particular use the terrorism label to demonize opponents, drum up fear, and generate popular support for security policies that might otherwise be unpalatable. They also justify their own behavior by asserting that they occupy the moral high ground in the defense of the world against terror, a claim that certainly should be regarded with considerable skepticism.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-governments-twist-terrorism/

 

 


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

Contact us if you would like to contribute to our collaborative efforts or would like to share/submit articles, data or additional content, feel free to add feedback, additional info, alternative contact details, related links, articles, anonymous submission, etc. as a comment below, via web-form, through social media outlets or email us directly and confidentially at: dumpharper [at] live [dot] ca


This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in an effort to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. and intend its use to be for education and instructional purposes only. Therefore, we believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond “fair use,” you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

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@CBCNews BUSTED re #NATO vs #Ukraine vs #Russia! #GPC #NDP #LPC #CPC

We regret to inform our fellow Canadians and the rest of the World that our publicly funded broadcaster has seemingly and purposely selectively edited 2 (two) articles today with regards to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. This should be of great concern to everyone considering the implications and are calling on the RCMP to immediately conduct an investigation into this matter of National security. In addition, we would like the CBC Ombudsman, CRTC and any independent body to also launch an investigation so that those responsible may be immediately be held accountable.

This war-mongering propaganda campaign MUST stop and someone needs to be behind bars. This is not limited to those within the CBC, but also those that may be involved from the PMO as well as the Harper Regime’s Conservative Party of Canada along with any/all Opposition Members that may have knowledge of this travesty. Not only is this detrimental to the freedom of our press corp, but it is extremely damaging to our economy and the psychological well being of our citizenry.

Propaganda + Cold Wars + Free Trade = Trade Wars = Economic Wars = Currency Wars = Energy Wars = Real Hot Wars

This war against “We the People” of Canada MUST stop and we are issuing a cease and desist ultimatum. If the Opposition cannot stand by us, than they can and must stand down. We are NOT going to war for a bunch of neocon/neolib corporate globalists nor are we willing to pay the costs associated with this war you seek to start in our name. You may feel free to send your sons and daughters to fight your imaginary boogeyman and you may feel free to pay the financial costs as well, period.

Below you will find copypasta’s of what we have uncovered thus far along with a brief summary of each. Please note that these articles from the AP are really nothing more than Associated Propaganda and we have noticed and been tracking the selective editing of the AP articles published via the CBC for quite some time. These are not simply “updates”, they are narrative adjustments meant to cause confusion and conflict between viewers, readers, social media users, other independent researchers, bloggers and media the access them at different times of the day/night.

Article 1

UPDATED
Ukraine conflict: Shelling in rebel-held city kills 4
Fighting between government and pro-Russian separatists inches ever closer to the city centre

The Associated Press Posted: Aug 07, 2014 7:17 AM ET
Last Updated: Aug 07, 2014 10:17 AM ET

Sustained shelling in the main rebel stronghold in eastern Ukraine struck residential buildings and a hospital, killing at least four people and wounding 10 others, officials said, as government forces pressed forward in their campaign to rout the separatists.

Mortar fire struck the Vishnevskiy Hospital in Donetsk on Thursday morning, killing one and wounding five others, Donetsk city council spokesman Maxim Rovensky told The Associated Press.

“There was a sudden explosion,” witness Dr. Anna Kravtsova said. “A mortar round flew through the window.”

The shelling, which destroyed an array of equipment in the dentistry unit, also hit three nearby apartment buildings.

It followed a night of shelling in another neighbourhood as the fighting between the government and pro-Russian separatists is inching ever closer to the city centre. The mayor’s office said in a statement posted on its website that three people had been killed, five wounded and several residential buildings destroyed during those attacks.

The government denies it uses artillery against residential areas, but that claim has come under substantial strain in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

Pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have been fighting the Kyiv government since April. Ukraine and Western countries have accused Moscow of backing the mutiny with weapons and soldiers, a claim the Russian government has repeatedly denied.

The West has also accused Russia of most likely providing the insurgents with surface-to-air missiles that may have been used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over rebel-held territory on July 17, killing all 298 people on board.

Clashes in Kyiv

Clashes erupted in central Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, as city authorities sought to clear away the remnants of a tent colony erected by demonstrators involved in the street uprising against pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, protesters were angry about endemic corruption and wanted closer ties with the European Union.

In scenes reminiscent of that revolt, which climaxed with Yanukovych’s ouster in February, demonstrators set alight tires in their face-off against a volunteer battalion overseeing the clean-up operation.

In eastern Ukraine, government troops have made tentative progress in their strategy to retake Donetsk and other towns and cities. Armed forces have refrained from pitched urban battles, and instead favoured pushing back their opponents with artillery fire. It has led to a growing number of civilian casualties.

Vishnevskiy Hospital, one of the city’s larger medical treatment facilities, is around four kilometres from the main square. It has been used to provide treatment to civilian victims of the ongoing conflict.

“The hospital became a nightmare. This is absurd,” said 37-year old patient Dmitry Kozhur. “We came here to keep living, but now we are risking death.”

Kozhur said he now wants to join the 300,000 people that the mayor’s office says have already abandoned the once 1 million-person strong city.

As AP reporters were leaving the hospital, they heard the sound of four rounds of artillery being fired from a nearby neighbourhood under rebel control. Although it wasn’t immediately possible to confirm the sequence of events, it appeared that the shells that hit the hospital may have been a response to rebel fire.

‘New quality and quantity of arms’

Neighbours of a house struck by rockets Wednesday said their homes were also near a position used by rebel artillery forces.

http://i.cbc.ca/1.2729868.1407409768!/cpImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/original_300/ukraine.jpg  Special forces detain an activist during a clash in Kyiv's Independence Square on Thursday. (Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press)

http://i.cbc.ca/1.2729868.1407409768!/cpImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/original_300/ukraine.jpg
Special forces detain an activist during a clash in Kyiv’s Independence Square on Thursday. (Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press)

Special forces detain an activist during a clash in Kyiv’s Independence Square on Thursday. (Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press)

As the rebels struggle to push back Kyiv’s forces, fears of Russian intervention have grown. Western leaders have accused Russia of massing troops on the border with Ukraine and supplying rebels with weapons..

“We’ve noted with concern a new quality and quantity of arms and equipment flowing across the border from Russia into Ukraine, reports of shelling across the border as well as further attacks by illegal armed groups on targets in eastern Ukraine,” said Sebastien Brabant, a spokesman for the EU’s foreign policy chief.

Russia has always denied such claims.

The Ukrainian army strategy has focused on driving a wedge between Donetsk and the other main stronghold of Luhansk. Efforts to seal off the border with Russia have been thwarted as border troops come under sustained and heavy rocket fire. Ukraine says a lot of those attacks have been carried out by Russian troops, which Moscow also fervently denies.

source url: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-conflict-shelling-in-rebel-held-city-kills-4-1.2729866

Article 1 EDITED

Article 1 was “updated” and the title as well as the “wording” associated with the url was changed. In addition this update actually swapped out some images and also removed the image of the crackdown at Maidan in Kiev that is included in the above version. It may also be noteworth that there were only 8 comments when we first reviewed the article above and only 11 when we relocated it, as it was removed from the main World News page and noticed the edits and updates.

UPDATED
Ukraine conflict: Russia must ‘step back from the brink,’ NATO chief says
Shelling in rebel-held city kills 4

The Associated Press
Posted: Aug 07, 2014 7:17 AM ET
Last Updated: Aug 07, 2014 11:26 AM ET

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Thursday called on Russia to pull its troops back from the border with Ukraine and “step back from the brink.”

Rasmussen, speaking in Kyiv after NATO said on Wednesday that Russia had amassed 20,000 troops near the border and could be planning a ground invasion of its neighbour, said Russia “should not use peace-keeping as an excuse for war-making.”

The downing of a Malaysian airliner on July 17 was a tragic consequence of Russia’s “reckless” policy of supporting the separatists and seeking to de-stabilize Ukraine, he said.

Meanwhile, sustained shelling in the main rebel stronghold in eastern Ukraine struck residential buildings and a hospital, killing at least four people and wounding 10 others, officials said, as government forces pressed forward in their campaign to rout the separatists.

Mortar fire struck the Vishnevskiy Hospital in Donetsk on Thursday morning, killing one and wounding five others, Donetsk city council spokesman Maxim Rovensky told The Associated Press.

“There was a sudden explosion,” witness Dr. Anna Kravtsova said. “A mortar round flew through the window.”

UKRAINE-CRISIS/KIEV

A protester sits in front of burning barricades during clashes with pro-government forces at Independence Square in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. The latest violence in the country’s east has killed at least four and wounded ten. (Konstantin Chernichkin/Reuters)

The shelling, which destroyed an array of equipment in the dentistry unit, also hit three nearby apartment buildings.

It followed a night of shelling in another neighbourhood as the fighting between the government and pro-Russian separatists is inching ever closer to the city centre. The mayor’s office said in a statement posted on its website that three people had been killed, five wounded and several residential buildings destroyed during those attacks.

The government denies it uses artillery against residential areas, but that claim has come under substantial strain in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

Pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have been fighting the Kyiv government since April. Ukraine and Western countries have accused Moscow of backing the mutiny with weapons and soldiers, a claim the Russian government has repeatedly denied.

The West has also accused Russia of most likely providing the insurgents with surface-to-air missiles that may have been used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over rebel-held territory on July 17, killing all 298 people on board.

Clashes in Kyiv

Clashes erupted in central Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, as city authorities sought to clear away the remnants of a tent colony erected by demonstrators involved in the street uprising against pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, protesters were angry about endemic corruption and wanted closer ties with the European Union.

In scenes reminiscent of that revolt, which climaxed with Yanukovych’s ouster in February, demonstrators set alight tires in their face-off against a volunteer battalion overseeing the clean-up operation.

In eastern Ukraine, government troops have made tentative progress in their strategy to retake Donetsk and other towns and cities. Armed forces have refrained from pitched urban battles, and instead favoured pushing back their opponents with artillery fire. It has led to a growing number of civilian casualties.

‘The hospital became a nightmare … We came here to keep living, but now we are risking death.’ – Dmitry Kozhur, patient at Vishnevskiy Hospital

Vishnevskiy Hospital, one of the city’s larger medical treatment facilities, is around four kilometres from the main square. It has been used to provide treatment to civilian victims of the ongoing conflict.

“The hospital became a nightmare. This is absurd,” said 37-year old patient Dmitry Kozhur. “We came here to keep living, but now we are risking death.”

Kozhur said he now wants to join the 300,000 people that the mayor’s office says have already abandoned the once 1 million-person strong city.

As AP reporters were leaving the hospital, they heard the sound of four rounds of artillery being fired from a nearby neighbourhood under rebel control. Although it wasn’t immediately possible to confirm the sequence of events, it appeared that the shells that hit the hospital may have been a response to rebel fire.

‘New quality and quantity of arms’

Neighbours of a house struck by rockets Wednesday said their homes were also near a position used by rebel artillery forces.

UKRAINE-CRISIS/
A Ukrainian serviceman uses a pair of binoculars as he guards a checkpoint in the Donetsk region. A mortar hit a large hospital in Donetsk Thursday. (Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters)

As the rebels struggle to push back Kyiv’s forces, fears of Russian intervention have grown. Western leaders have accused Russia of massing troops on the border with Ukraine and supplying rebels with weapons..

“We’ve noted with concern a new quality and quantity of arms and equipment flowing across the border from Russia into Ukraine, reports of shelling across the border as well as further attacks by illegal armed groups on targets in eastern Ukraine,” said Sebastien Brabant, a spokesman for the EU’s foreign policy chief.

Russia has always denied such claims.

© The Associated Press, 2014

source url: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-conflict-russia-must-step-back-from-the-brink-nato-chief-says-1.2729866

Alternative AP article

It is also worth noting that the article below was edited as well midway through the day. This is proof positive that this “story” is being consistently spun in order to confuse the citizens. Propaganda 101 states that it is not wise to edit article in such a way, not only does this cause doubt to how independent the “free press” is, but it discredits any and all reports from said “free” press.

Updated: 9:50 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 7, 2014 | Posted: 9:49 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 7, 2014
Shelling in rebel-held Ukrainian city kills 4

By YURAS KARMANAU

The Associated Press

DONETSK, Ukraine —

Sustained shelling in the main rebel stronghold in eastern Ukraine struck residential buildings and a hospital, killing at least four people and wounding 10 others, officials said, as government forces pressed forward in their campaign to rout the separatists.

Mortar fire struck the Vishnevskiy Hospital in Donetsk on Thursday morning, killing one and wounding five others, Donetsk city council spokesman Maxim Rovensky told The Associated Press.

“There was a sudden explosion,” witness Dr. Anna Kravtsova said. “A mortar round flew through the window.”

The shelling, which destroyed an array of equipment in the dentistry unit, also hit three nearby apartment buildings.

It followed a night of shelling in another neighborhood as the fighting between the government and pro-Russian separatists is inching ever closer to the city center. The mayor’s office said in a statement posted on its website that three people had been killed, five wounded and several residential buildings destroyed during those attacks.

The government denies it uses artillery against residential areas, but that claim has come under substantial strain in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

Pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have been fighting the Kiev government since April. Ukraine and Western countries have accused Moscow of backing the mutiny with weapons and soldiers, a claim the Russian government has repeatedly denied.

The West has also accused Russia of most likely providing the insurgents with surface-to-air missiles that may have been used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over rebel-held territory on July 17, killing all 298 people on board.

Clashes erupted in central Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, as city authorities sought to clear away the remnants of a tent colony erected by demonstrators involved in the street uprising against pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, protesters were angry about endemic corruption and wanted closer ties with the European Union.

In scenes reminiscent of that revolt, which climaxed with Yanukovych’s ouster in February, demonstrators set alight tires in their face-off against a volunteer battalion overseeing the clean-up operation.

In eastern Ukraine, government troops have made tentative progress in their strategy to retake Donetsk and other towns and cities. Armed forces have refrained from pitched urban battles, and instead favored pushing back their opponents with artillery fire. It has led to a growing number of civilians casualties.

Vishnevskiy Hospital, one of the city’s larger medical treatment facilities, is around 4 kilometers (less than 3 miles) from the main square. It has been used to provide treatment to civilian victims of the ongoing conflict.

“The hospital became a nightmare. This is absurd,” said 37-year old patient Dmitry Kozhur. “We came here to keep living, but now we are risking death.”

Kozhur said he now wants to join the 300,000 people that the mayor’s office says have already abandoned the once 1 million-person strong city.

As AP reporters were leaving the hospital, they heard the sound of four rounds of artillery being fired from a nearby neighborhood under rebel control. Although it wasn’t immediately possible to confirm the sequence of events, it appeared that the shells that hit the hospital may have been a response to rebel fire.

Neighbors of a house struck by rockets Wednesday said their homes were also near a position used by rebel artillery forces.

As the rebels struggle to push back Kiev’s forces, fears of Russian intervention have grown. Western leaders have accused Russia of massing troops on the border with Ukraine and supplying rebels with weapons..

“We’ve noted with concern a new quality and quantity of arms and equipment flowing across the border from Russia into Ukraine, reports of shelling across the border as well as further attacks by illegal armed groups on targets in eastern Ukraine,” said Sebastien Brabant, a spokesman for the EU’s foreign policy chief.

Russia has always denied such claims

The Ukrainian army strategy has focused on driving a wedge between Donetsk and the other main stronghold of Luhansk. Efforts to seal off the border with Russia have been thwarted as border troops come under sustained and heavy rocket fire. Ukraine says a lot of those attacks have been carried out by Russian troops, which Moscow also fervently denies.

In Kiev, demonstrators confronted city workers clearing a main square of long-standing barricades in a standoff that turned violent. A group of men set light to fuel-drenched tires and remonstrated with armed men from a pro-government battalion charged with protecting clean-up workers.

Dark plumes of acrid smoke from burning rubber rose above Independence Square as workers in high-visibility vests worked fast to dismantle barricades surrounding the main stage.

The square and surrounding streets were the site of huge winter protests that led to Yanukovych’s ouster. Despite the election in May of a successor — 48-year old billionaire confectionery tycoon Petro Poroshenko — many said they would continue to squat on the square to ensure the new authorities lived up to their promise to usher in an era of transparent and accountable rule.

Many Kiev residents have fumed over the months-long sit-in, however, complaining that it severely disrupts traffic and blights the city’s main thoroughfare.

City authorities have been negotiating with the protesters to clear the square since a new mayor was elected, but have met strong resistance from the several hundred demonstrators still camped out there.

While many barricades were removed Thursday, numerous tents remain in place.

___

Peter Leonard reported from Kiev. Juergen Baetz contributed to this report from Brussels.

Copyright The Associated Press

source url: http://www.wftv.com/news/ap/top-news/3-killed-5-injured-in-east-ukraine-fighting/ngxGF/

Alternative AP article EDITED

The text and title of this version of the AP article was also changed and adjusted to the false propaganda narrative.

Updated: 2:04 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 7, 2014 | Posted: 2:03 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 7, 2014
NATO pledges support to conflict-wracked Ukraine

By PETER LEONARD

The Associated Press

KIEV, Ukraine —

NATO’s chief defied mounting Russian belligerence Thursday with a pledge to provide assistance to Ukraine, which is battling to quash an insurgency being waged by pro-Russia rebels in the country’s east.

The show of support from Anders Fogh Rasmussen comes as government troops increasingly focus their push to claw back rebel-held territory on the stronghold of Donetsk. Ukraine appears to be ratcheting up the urgency of its onslaught against the backdrop of an alleged escalation of Russian troop presence on the border.

“In response to Russia’s aggression, NATO is working even more closely with Ukraine to reform its armed forces and defense institutions,” Rasmussen said during a visit to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev.

In a sign of sagging morale among rebel forces, separatist authorities issued a desperate plea for assistance Thursday, complaining in a statement that a “critical situation has developed with the militia’s food, uniform and ammunition supplies.”

In Donetsk, sustained shelling struck residential buildings and a hospital, killing at least four people and wounding 10 others, local officials said.

Mortar fire struck the Vishnevskiy Hospital on Thursday morning, killing one and wounding five others, Donetsk city council spokesman Maxim Rovensky told The Associated Press.

“There was a sudden explosion,” witness Dr. Anna Kravtsova said. “A mortar round flew through the window.”

The shelling, which destroyed an array of equipment in the dentistry unit, also hit three nearby apartment buildings.

It followed a night of shelling in another neighborhood as the fighting between the government and pro-Russian separatists is inching ever closer to the city center. The mayor’s office said in a statement posted on its website that three people had been killed, five wounded and several residential buildings destroyed during those attacks.

The government denies it uses artillery against residential areas, but that claim has come under substantial strain in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

Pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have been fighting the Kiev government since April. Ukraine and Western countries have accused Moscow of backing the mutiny with weapons and soldiers. The West accused Russia of most likely providing the insurgents with surface-to-air missiles that may have been used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over rebel-held territory on July 17, killing all 298 people on board.

The Russian government has repeatedly denied all those charges.

More recently, Moscow has drawn accusations it is attempting to sow more instability with an intimidating show of force by dispatching what NATO estimates is 20,000 troops to Ukraine’s eastern border. That deployment has led many to speculate Russia may pursue an incursion under the guise of restoring stability to eastern Ukraine.

“I call on Russia to step back from the brink. Step back from the border. Do not use peacekeeping as an excuse for war-making,” Rasmussen said.

While stopping short of committing to direct assistance in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict, Rasmussen said that NATO would intensify its cooperation with Ukraine on defense planning and reform.

Hours before Rasmussen’s arrival, clashes erupted in central Kiev as city authorities sought to clear away the remnants of a tent colony erected by demonstrators involved in the street uprising against pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, protesters were angry about endemic corruption and wanted closer ties with the European Union.

In scenes reminiscent of that revolt, which climaxed with Yanukovych’s ouster in February, demonstrators set alight tires in their face-off against a volunteer battalion overseeing the clean-up operation.

In eastern Ukraine, government troops have made tentative progress in their strategy to retake Donetsk and other towns and cities. Armed forces have refrained from pitched urban battles, and instead favored pushing back their opponents with artillery fire. It has led to a growing number of civilians casualties.

Vishnevskiy Hospital, one of the city’s larger medical treatment facilities, is around 4 kilometers (less than 3 miles) from the main square. It has been used to provide treatment to civilian victims of the ongoing conflict.

“The hospital became a nightmare. This is absurd,” said 37-year old patient Dmitry Kozhur. “We came here to keep living, but now we are risking death.”

Kozhur said he now wants to join the 300,000 people that the mayor’s office says have already abandoned the once 1 million-person strong city.

As AP reporters were leaving the hospital, they heard the sound of four rounds of artillery being fired from a nearby neighborhood under rebel control. Although it wasn’t immediately possible to confirm the sequence of events, it appeared that the shells that hit the hospital may have been a response to rebel fire.

Neighbors of a house struck by rockets Wednesday said their homes were also near a position used by rebel artillery forces.

The Ukrainian military’s strategy has focused on driving a wedge between Donetsk and the other main stronghold of Luhansk. Efforts to seal off the border with Russia have been thwarted as border troops come under sustained and heavy rocket fire. Ukraine says a lot of those attacks have been carried out by Russian troops, which Moscow also fervently denies.

___

Karmanau reported from Donetsk, Ukraine. Juergen Baetz contributed to this report from Brussels.

Copyright The Associated Press

source url: http://www.wftv.com/news/ap/international/3-killed-5-injured-in-east-ukraine-fighting/ngxGF/

Article 2

Below are two versions of another article published and edited today by the CBC that have seemingly been scrubbed to avoid mentioning the violent crackdown in Kiev today as well as title and url “wording” changes like Article 1 above. Since it was a little more subtle, other than adding irrelevant Harper Regime Minister photo-op vote pandering dribblings, and done behind the scenes within the slideshow scripts, we’ll present both for further review of the text portion. Of special concern is the image swaps (where the text 1 of 13 is located in the article) which are explained further down. The most noteworthy is image 1, the removal of the violent crackdown in Kiev. Please note that this article is a combo of files from the AP (Associated Propaganda) as well as Reuters in cahoots with The Canadian Press.

Russia bans food imports from Canada, other countries for 1 year
Ban covers meat, fish, milk, fruit, vegetables from Canada, the U.S., EU

The Canadian Press Posted: Aug 07, 2014 5:31 AM ET
Last Updated: Aug 07, 2014 9:53 AM ET

Russia is responding to fresh sanctions from Canada, the U.S. and other countries with a ban on food imports for a year.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev says the ban covers Canada, the U.S. the European Union, Australia, Norway and covers:

Meat.
Fish.
Milk and milk products.
Fruit and vegetables.

The move announced Thursday was taken on orders from President Vladimir Putin in response to sanctions imposed over the crisis in Ukraine. The ban will cost Western farmers billions of dollars but also isolates Russian consumers from world trade to a degree unseen since Soviet days.

Russia’s sanctions will mostly affect Canada’s pork industry. Canada’s agricultural exports to Russia amounted to $563 million in 2012, according to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and most of them were frozen pork.

Canada on Wednesday slapped new sanctions and travel bans on several top Russian and Ukrainian politicians and groups with ties to Putin’s government. Those sanctions, imposed in co-ordination with the U.S. and the EU, came amid reports Russia is massing thousands of troops along the Ukrainian border.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has frequently said Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and provocative military activity in eastern Ukraine is a “grave concern” to Canada and the world.

Harper said Canada is prepared to take further actions if Putin’s government continues its military aggression.

Russian economy already showing effects

The announcement saw Russian bond yields rise to their highest levels in years and Moscow’s already reeling share prices extend a sell-off.

Agriculture Minister Nikolai Fyodorov acknowledged that the measures would cause a short-term spike in inflation, but said he did not see a danger in the medium or long term. He said Russia would compensate with more imports of products from other suppliers such as Brazilian meat and New Zealand cheese.

Russia Sanctions

A woman shops at a supermarket in downtown Moscow on Thursday. Russia’s new sanctions were made in response to sanctions imposed on Russia by the West over the crisis in Ukraine. (Ivan Sekretarev/Associated Press)

Russia depends heavily on imported foodstuffs — most of it from the West — particularly in the largest and most prosperous cities such as Moscow. In 2013 the EU’s agricultural exports to Russia totalled $15.8 billion US, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture says food and agricultural imports from the U.S. amounted to $1.3 billion.

Medvedev argued that the ban would give Russian farmers, who have struggled to compete with Western products, a good chance to increase their market share.

But experts said that local producers will find it hard to fill the gap left by the ban, as the nation’s agricultural sector has continued to suffer from poor efficiency and shortage of funds.

While the government claimed it will move quickly to replace Western imports by importing more food from Latin America, Turkey and ex-Soviet nations to avoid empty shelves and price hikes, analysts predicted that it will further speed up inflation.

Moscow will be hit hard

The damage to consumers inflicted by the ban will be felt particularly hard in big cities like Moscow, where imported food fills an estimated 60-70 per cent of the market.

Russians have relished imported food since the fall of the Soviet Union, when year-round supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables arrived and ubiquitous cheap American frozen chicken quarters became known as “Bush’s legs” after the then president.

Medvedev said Russia is also considering banning Western carriers from flying over Russia on flights to and from Asia — a move that would significantly swell costs and increase flight time. He said a decision on that hasn’t been made yet.

Protesters hold a Molotov cocktail during clashes with pro-government forces at Independence Square in Kyiv on Thursday. Tensions flared in the square, the scene of street protests that toppled a Moscow-backed president in February, when protesters still camped there clashed with city workers who tried to clear away their tents.

1 of 13

Russia may also introduce restrictions regarding imports of planes, navy vessels and cars, Medvedev said, but added that the government will realistically assess its own production potential.

Medvedev made it clear that Russia hopes that the sanctions will make the West revise its policy and stop trying to pressure Russia with sanctions.

“We didn’t want such developments, and I sincerely hope that our partners will put a pragmatic economic approach above bad policy considerations,” he said, adding that the ban could be lifted earlier if the West shows a “constructive approach.”

If the West doesn’t change course, Russia may follow up by introducing restrictions regarding imports of planes, navy vessels, cars and other industrial products, Medvedev warned, but added that the government will move carefully.

“The government understands how important such co-operation is, and naturally, we have a realistic assessment of our own capacities,” he said.

EU Commission spokesman Frederic Vincent voiced regret about the ban. He said the commission still has to assess the potential impact, and reserves “the right to take action as appropriate.”

With files from The Associated Press and Reuters
© The Canadian Press, 2014

source url: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-bans-food-imports-from-canada-other-countries-for-1-year-1.2729821

Article 2 EDITED

This article was a little more subtly edited as the day progressed. While we are still sifting through the text, the most noteworthy edit was to the slideshow (13 of 13) contained towards the end. The first 2 images were swapped out, one was related to the violent crackdown in Kiev and the other was of the situation in the hospital (see below for the urls and captions).

Russia sanctions show Putin’s ‘short-sighted desperation,’ Canada says
Ban covers meat, fish, milk, fruit, vegetables from Canada, the U.S., EU

CBC News Posted: Aug 07, 2014 5:31 AM ET
Last Updated: Aug 07, 2014 2:56 PM ET

Canada will not be intimidated by Russia’s ban on its food imports, Industry Minister James Moore said Thursday, warning that the sanctions will hurt Russian consumers more than Canadians.

“We will certainly look at the impact of these sanctions on the Canadian economy, but they will in no way cause us to have any hesitation in the principled position we’ve taken in opposing [Russian President] Vladimir Putin’s regime,” Moore said during a news conference in Montreal.

Russia responded Thursday to fresh sanctions from Canada, the U.S. and other countries with a ban on food imports for a year. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced that the ban includes Canada, the U.S. the European Union, Australia, Norway and others. Banned items include:

Meat.
Fish.
Milk and dairy products.
Fruit and vegetables.

Moore said the sanctions show the importance of expanding free trade, including the Harper government’s drive toward a free-trade deal with the European Union.

Agriculture Minister Gerry Ritz made similar comments in a statement Thursday, criticizing Putin’s “short-sighted desperation.”

“Our government will continue to put Canada’s national interests first, but we cannot allow business interests alone to dictate our foreign policy,” Ritz said.

Industry Minister James Moore

Industry Minister James Moore said Canada won’t back down in the face of sanctions from Russia. (Adrian Wyld/Canadian Press)

Russia’s move was taken on orders from Putin in response to sanctions imposed over the crisis in Ukraine. The ban will cost farmers in North America, Europe and Australia billions of dollars but also isolates Russian consumers from world trade to a degree unseen since Soviet days.

Canada had on Wednesday slapped new sanctions and travel bans on several top Russian and Ukrainian politicians and groups with ties to Putin’s government. Those sanctions, imposed in co-ordination with the U.S. and the EU, came amid reports Russia is massing thousands of troops along the Ukrainian border.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has frequently said Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and provocative military activity in eastern Ukraine is a “grave concern” to Canada and the world.

Russia’s sanctions will mostly affect Canada’s pork industry. Canada’s agricultural exports to Russia amounted to $563 million in 2012, though Jim Laws of the Canadian Meat Council said that number dropped to $260 million last year.

Laws told CBC News Network pork producers will start to feel the effects right away, with up to 1,000 container loads of pork on ships bound for Russia.

Laws was optimistic that much of the meat could be re-directed to other countries or back to Canada, but said that the redirection alone would cost the industry “quite a bit of money.”

“We’re fortunate that we have many markets for pork around the world. Last year, we sold some $3.2 billion worth of pork to over 120 different countries. Russia, however, was the fourth most important market” behind U.S., Japan and China, he said.

Geoff Irvine, head of the Lobster Council of Canada, said the Russian sanctions are “not good for Canada.”

“For lobster, Russia is a small but potentially good market. The biggest impact on seafood in Canada will be on northern shrimp, and maybe cheaper fish like Pacific hake and herring.”

Russia depends heavily on imports

Russian stock indexes initially fell by about 1.5 per cent on the news before recovering most of the losses a few hours later.

Agriculture Minister Nikolai Fyodorov acknowledged that the measures would cause a short-term spike in inflation, but said he did not see a danger in the medium or long term. He said Russia would compensate with more imports of products from other suppliers such as Brazilian meat and New Zealand cheese.

Russia depends heavily on imported foodstuffs — most of it from the West — particularly in the largest and most prosperous cities such as Moscow. In 2013, the EU’s agricultural exports to Russia totalled $15.8 billion US, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture says food and agricultural imports from the U.S. amounted to $1.3 billion.

Russia Sanctions

A woman shops at a supermarket in downtown Moscow on Thursday. Russia’s new sanctions were made in response to sanctions imposed on Russia by the West over the crisis in Ukraine. (Ivan Sekretarev/Associated Press)

Medvedev argued that the ban would give Russian farmers, who have struggled to compete with Western products, a good chance to increase their market share.
But experts said that local producers will find it hard to fill the gap left by the ban, as the nation’s agricultural sector has continued to suffer from poor efficiency and shortage of funds.

While the government claimed it will move quickly to replace Western imports by importing more food from Latin America, Turkey and ex-Soviet nations to avoid empty shelves and price hikes, analysts predicted that it will further speed up inflation.

Chris Weafer, an analyst at Macro Advisory in Moscow, said the ban will likely speed up inflation and further cloud an already grim economic outlook. “Along with higher interest rates, higher food costs will mean that households have less money to spend and that will depress the economy,” he said.

Market watchers said consumers in the expensive food segment will suffer the most, losing access to goods like French cheeses and Parma ham, but others will also eventually feel the brunt as food variety will shrink and inflationary pressures increase. With retail chains stocked up for months ahead, the ban will take time to hurt, however.

The measure led to sardonic comments across Russian online media and liberal blogs, bringing reminiscences of empty store shelves during the Soviet times, but there was no immediate indication of consumers trying to stock up.

Moscow will be hit hard

The damage to consumers inflicted by the ban will be felt particularly hard in big cities like Moscow, where imported food fills an estimated 60-70 per cent of the market.

Russians have relished imported food since the fall of the Soviet Union, when year-round supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables arrived and ubiquitous cheap American frozen chicken quarters became known as “Bush’s legs” after the then president.

Medvedev said Russia is also considering banning Western carriers from flying over Russia on flights to and from Asia — a move that would significantly swell costs and increase flight time. He said a decision on that hasn’t been made yet.

A Ukrainian army sapper shows reporters an IED that pro-Russian separatists allegedly left behind during their retreat at a checkpoint outside the eastern Ukrainian village of Nikishyne on Aug. 1.

13 of 13

Russia may also introduce restrictions regarding imports of planes, navy vessels and cars, Medvedev said, but added that the government will realistically assess its own production potential.

Medvedev made it clear that Russia hopes that the sanctions will make the West revise its policy and stop trying to pressure Russia with sanctions.

“We didn’t want such developments, and I sincerely hope that our partners will put a pragmatic economic approach above bad policy considerations,” he said, adding that the ban could be lifted earlier if the West shows a “constructive approach.”

EU Commission spokesman Frederic Vincent voiced regret about the ban. He said the commission still has to assess the potential impact, and reserves “the right to take action as appropriate.”

With files from The Canadian Press, The Associated Press and Reuters

source url: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-show-putin-s-short-sighted-desperation-canada-says-1.2729821

Article 2 Slideshow Images

Below are the original images that were in the slideshow. oddly enough they implicate the Kiev Regime. the first is from the violent crackdown that seems to be covered under a media blackout, while the second implicated the Kiev Regime’s ongoing aerial assault, bombardment and onslaught against Ukrainians in Donetsk.

Protesters hold a Molotov cocktail during clashes with pro-government forces at Independence Square in Kyiv on Thursday. Tensions flared in the square, the scene of street protests that toppled a Moscow-backed president in February, when protesters still camped there clashed with city workers who tried to clear away their tents

Local residents cry and hug each other as they sit in a hospital basement being used as a bomb shelter after shelling, in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine, on Aug. 7. Fighting in the rebel stronghold of Donetsk claimed more civilian casualties, bringing new calls from Russian nationalists for President Vladimir Putin to send in the army

People emerge the morning of Aug. 6 to inspect the rubble of damaged buildings following what was described as a airstrike by Ukrainian forces in Donetsk on Wednesday. NATO says it fears Russia is poised to invade under the pretext of humanitarian aid

A Ukrainian soldier mans a checkpoint in the eastern city of Debaltseve on Aug. 6. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday slapped a one-year ban and restriction on food and agricultural product imports from nations that have imposed sanctions on Russia over its defiant stance on Ukraine

People emerge the morning of Aug. 6 to inspect the rubble of damaged buildings following what was described as a airstrike by Ukrainian forces in Donetsk on Wednesday. NATO says it fears Russia is poised to invade under the pretext of humanitarian aid

Armed pro-Russian separatists stand guard at a checkpoint in the settlement of Yasynuvata, outside Donetsk, on Aug. 5. NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said in an emailed statement that the treaty organization was concerned Moscow could use the pretext of peacekeeping as an excuse to send troops into eastern Ukraine

Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko, second from left, meets with heads of security and force services in Kyiv on Aug. 6. Kyiv denies launching an artillery barrage and air raids against residential neighbourhoods in Donestsk and accuses the rebels of firing at civilian areas, claims that Human Rights Watch and others have questioned

A man removes debris from a ruined building on the outskirts of the eastern Ukrainian town of Slovyansk on Aug. 6

Ukrainian servicemen on board an armoured vehicle patrol the eastern Ukrainian town of Kramatorsk on Aug. 5. Airstrikes and artillery fire between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian troops in the region have brought the shadow of war closer than ever to the urban core of some of the east’s larger cities

Ukrainian servicemen fire artillery rounds against pro-Russian separatists near Pervomaisk, in the Luhansk region, on Aug. 2

A Ukrainian army sapper shows reporters an IED that pro-Russian separatists allegedly left behind during their retreat at a checkpoint outside the eastern Ukrainian village of Nikishyne on Aug. 1

Article 2 Image Swaps

Below are the 2 new replacements for images 1 and 2 that were edited midway through the day.

Boys play a game of war in the eastern Ukrainian town of Kramatorsk on Aug. 7, 2014. Russia responded Thursday to fresh sanctions from Canada, the U.S. and other countries with a ban on food imports for a year. The ban includes food stuffs like milk, fish, meat and vegetables.

Smoke billows from the flaming debris of a crashed Ukrainian fighter jet near the village of Zhdanivka, some 40 km northeast of the rebel stronghold of Donetsk, on Thursday. The the Sukhoi warplane was blasted out of the air while flying low over rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine, An AFP crew reported, with the parachute of at least one pilot opening up in the clear blue sky.

Suspiciously Missing image

The image below seems to be intended as a thumbnail related to the violent crackdown against protesters in Kiev as it is also located in the alternative Associated propaganda article presented above.

 

We welcome any and all contributions to this summary so that we may present these findings to a much wider audience as well as various local, national and international media, NGO’s, public officials and law enforcement agencies at hom,e and abroad. It is our understanding that spreading propaganda that results in terrorist activities, recruitment, harm and/or death against innocent civilians is a serious violation of local, State, Provincial, National, Federal and International laws, depending on the jurisdictions.
 


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Will #Harper’s #cdnpoli Lies re #Crimea #Ukraine Lead to War with #Russia?

There are several burning questions with no clear answers. We will explore the subject and present some grossly overlooked facts that preceded the current seemingly manufactured crisis situation in Crimea. Before things spiral into the abyss it’s very important that everybody keep cool heads considering time and time again we are told by the Harper Government that the Canadian Government is acting for the benefit of the “Ukrainian people”.

Does a lie become the truth by simply repeating it over and over?

Is Stephen Harper and John Baird’s opaque “Cold War” lies and misrepresentation of the facts regarding Ukraine leading to war with Russia or is this just self-fulfilling grandstanding by the PMO or simply a dangerous campaign stunt aimed at pandering for votes hatched within the Harper Party itself?

Is the Canadian media’s lack of due diligence in omitting facts by repeating press releases from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and reports from RFE/RL’s Ukraine/Russia/Middle East dis-information propaganda arm Radio Svoboda fueling an unnecessary rush to war?

Do these events truly signify that the Harper Government has officially ceded Canada’s sovereignty and turned over control to foreign entities?

Unfortunately there is to this point no recognition of events leading to the formation of the Government Harper’s going to visit – overturning of an agreement made on 21 February 2014.

An action motivating the Russians, but to this point totally ignored in the words of John Baird – though not in those of Christopher Westdal, a former Canadian ambassador to both Ukraine and Russia.

Does re-directing the narrative away from Kiev and towards Crimea change the facts?

This is very troubling since it really brings into question the legitimacy of Stephen Harper and John Baird among others. Another troubling aspect is the complicity with which the Canadian media conglomerates have decided to report on the subsequent events. Not only that, but if there was a voice within Ottawa that knew the truth, the secretly passed lifelong gag order officially titled “Order Amending the Schedule to the Security of Information Act P.C. 2014-165 February 28, 2014” that was quietly announced on 12 March 2013 via the Canada Gazette website would see them imprisoned for up to 14 years.


On Friday, February 21 there was agreement on positive directions for the Ukraine as related in the following live blog coverage article via the Guardian:

Ukraine crisis: deal signed in effort to end Kiev standoff
Shiv Malik and Aisha Gani in London and Tom McCarthy in New York theguardian.com, Friday 21 February 2014 23.01 GMT

The signed agreement has been translated and is now available on the German Foreign ministry’s website.

Here it is in full:

Concerned with the tragic loss of life in Ukraine, seeking an immediate end of bloodshed and determined to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, We, the signing parties, have agreed upon the following:

1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted,signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

3. Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

4. Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

5. The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

6. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation.

Kyiv, 21 February 2014

Signatories:

President of Ukraine: Viktor Yanukovych

For the Opposition: Vitaliy Klichko, UDAR, Oleh Tyahnibok, Svoboda, Arsenij Yatseniuk, Batkivshchyna

Witnessed by:

For the EU – Poland: foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski; Germany: foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier; France: foreign minister Laurent Fabius

For the Russian Federation – Vladimir Lukin, special envoy

Updated at 3.27pm GMT

source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-president-claims-deal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev

download/view: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf


The agreement was officially delivered by the Embassy of Ukraine to Canada on 21 February 2014:

February 21, 2014 an Agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine was signed in Kyiv
21 February, 22:58 Embassy of Ukraine to Canada

In result of negotiations President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders Arseniy Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok and Vitali Klitschko have signed an agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine.

The Agreement provides:

– Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now.

– Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.

– Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.

– Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014.

– New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules.

– Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

– The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence.

– The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law.

– Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares.

– Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force.

– After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine.

– The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.

The negotiations was also attended by representatives of the European Union – German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Head for Continental Europe at the French Foreign Ministry Eric Fournier and also Russian human rights commissioner Vladimir Lukin.

source: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/18110-21-lyutogo-cr-u-kijevi-pidpisano-ugodu-z-vregulyuvannya-krizi-v-ukrajini


The agreement was officially accepted and recognized by John Baird on behalf of Canada on 21 February 2014:

Canada Welcomes Agreement in Ukraine

February 21, 2014 – Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement on the current situation in Ukraine:

“Canada welcomes the agreement reached today between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders, including the Maidan council, to bring an end to months of repression and violence and hold early presidential elections.

“Canada will remain vigilant in monitoring progress under the agreement and stands ready to promote the full implementation of its commitments. We note the steps taken toward releasing former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison and continue to call for this to happen immediately.

“The measures on travel bans and sanctions announced yesterday by Prime Minister Stephen Harper will be calibrated to respond to the degree to which the Ukrainian authorities adhere to both the spirit and the letter of today’s agreement.

“All Canadians mourn the lives lost over the past several days. We remain committed to ensuring Ukraine’s path toward democracy and to ensuring that the lives were not lost in vain.”

For a full list of actions taken to date by Canada in response to the situation in Ukraine, visit Canada’s Response to the Situation in Ukraine.

– 30 –

For further information, media representatives may contact:

Media Relations Office
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada
613-995-1874
media@international.gc.ca
Follow us on Twitter: @DFATDCanada

Date Modified: 2014-02-21

source: http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2014/02/21c.aspx?lang=eng


The reaction? “EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement” U.S. said “We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise”:

22 February 2014 EU, U.S, Germany and France welcome Ukraine agreement

The White House welcomed the signing of an accord between the Ukrainian government and opposition leaders Friday.

“We support the efforts of all those who negotiated this agreement, commend the courageous opposition leaders who recognized the need for compromise, and offer the support of the United States in its implementation,” said White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in a statement released to the press.

The agreement calls for early elections and a new government.

Following the signing, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) restored the 2004 constitution.

Russia, a strong supporter of Yanukovych, was not a signatory to the agreement.

The White House again called for those responsible for the violence to be held accountable, saying it was prepared to “impose additional sanctions if necessary.”

Carney added that the U.S. will stand with the Ukrainian people “as they work to restore peace, security, and human dignity across the country and determine the future course of their nation.”

– The European Union has welcomed the agreement reached on Friday between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders.

In a written statement, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said he welcomed the agreement, describing it as a necessary compromise for a democratic, peaceful way out of the crisis.

Rompuy said the EU continues to stand by Ukraine.

“The agreement was facilitated by the important work of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and based on the persistent efforts of the last two months by High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Fule,” he added.

French President Francois Hollande also welcomed the agreement and called for a “full and timely implementation of the deal.”

“After the unacceptable, intolerable and unjustifiable violence that has plunged Ukraine into mourning in recent days, France calls for the full and timely implementation of the deal that has just been signed,” he said.

Three European foreign ministers – France’s Laurent Fabius, Germany’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski – brokered the peace deal and praised Yanukovych and the opposition for their “courage” in agreeing to end the standoff.

The agreement stipulates a return to the 2004 Constitution within 48 hours and calls for early presidential elections.

The crisis-ending agreement is expected to help end EU sanctions against Ukraine, which were agreed on during yesterday’s extraordinary meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels.

Dozens were killed in violent clashes on Thursday, according to a statement from Ukraine’s Health Ministry.

Mass anti-government protests began in November when Yanukovych refused to sign a free trade agreement with the EU amid pressure from Russia.

– Germany FM expresses cautious optimism after Ukraine deal

Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has welcomed an agreement signed today between Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders, but warned that difficulties lay ahead.

“This might have been the last chance to find an exit and end the violence,” Steinmeier said.

“Not all of the problems are solved,” Steinmeier cautioned, but added that the agreement opened the way for a political solution to the crisis.

“There is reason to look forward with confidence,” he said.

Steinmeier, together with France’s Foreign Minister Fabius Laurent and Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski carried out marathon talks with the government and the opposition after deadly clashes broke out early Thursday morning.

The three welcomed the agreement and called for an immediate end to the violence.

“The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland welcome the signing of the agreement and commend the parties for their courage and commitment to the deal. We call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation in Ukraine,” said a joint statement released by the German Foreign Ministry.

Germany’s government spokesman Steffen Seibert said Friday, “This might be the last chance for a political process to come out of this deep crisis in Ukraine.”

“We are witnessing a terrible human tragedy. Dozens of deaths within a few hours,” Seibert noted. He also said that it was the duty of all to ensure that the protests remain non-violent, adding, “It is the duty of the Ukrainian government to create the conditions for nonviolence and an opportunity for peaceful free expression.”

Seibert said the German government strongly condemned the week’s violence and Chancellor Angela Merkel was shocked by the events.

He said Merkel had a phone conversation with Viktor Yanukovych yesterday and convinced him to receive the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland as moderators of talks between the government and the opposition.

source: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/163552/eu-u-s-germany-and-france-welcome-ukraine-agreement.html


Yet the next day overthrow of the agreement and installation of a new President was accepted and is being supported as though there had been no agreement:

Putin’s frustration with West begins to show [Video]

The Globe and Mail | Mar. 04 2014

The Globe’s senior international correspondent Mark MacKinnon explains why the West should not expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to ease tensions over Ukraine.

source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/putins-frustration-with-west-begins-to-show/article17278684/


Christopher Westdal on Ukraine talks [Video]
World | Mar 14, 2014 | 9:37

CBC speaks to former Canadian ambassador to Russia and Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441788499/


Ukraine ambassador on de-escalating Crimea tensions [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 9:02

Vadym Prystaiko comments on a controversial referendum in Crimea as Russia amasses troops at the border

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441749317/


John Baird on Ukraine aid [Video]
Politics | Mar 13, 2014 | 8:21

Foreign Affairs minister discusses Canada’s $220M million loan for Ukraine

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2441750880/


PM Harper to visit Ukraine [Video]
Politics | Mar 14, 2014 | 21:10

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird says Prime Minister Stephen Harper will travel to Kyiv next weekend

source: http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2442000351/


Further Research


Manufacturing Discontent Propaganda 101. Just rinse, recycle and repeat the past…

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union: Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, December 9, 1969 Mentions a FY 1970 budget of $13,130,000 for the Radio Liberty Committee

103. Memorandum for the 303 Committee 1
Washington, December 9, 1969.

SUBJECT
United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

[1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR.
Secret; Eyes Only.]

4. Alternatives

A. The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination. On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which the program is trying to promote.

B. It could also be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities. In this event the efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American “subversion” would lose some of their credibility. This argument, however, is negated by the fact that suspicions of U.S. intentions are so deeply ingrained that any change in U.S. policy toward the emigration would have minimal impact on the conservatives. Moreover, a source of support for those in the Soviet Union who are sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration would be removed and the Soviet authorities would be able more easily to foist their own version of events on the people and be under less pressure to make reforms.

———————–

United States Policy Options

A. High Profile Support
The United States could reverse field and follow a more vigorous pro-émigré policy, which might take the form, for example, of (i) more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré activities and objectives, (ii) extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving U.S. Government assistance; (iii) adoption for the first time of a policy of open support for the independence
of national minority areas like the Ukraine.

Pro
—Blatant support of anti-Soviet émigré activities would suggest the determination of the Administration to follow a tough policy toward the USSR, exploiting any vulnerability, in the event that the USSR does not become more cooperative on major issues in dispute.
—Any substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might have some feedback in terms of defections, in acquisition of information, and in stimulating dissension inside the USSR;
—United States identification with the independence of national minority areas would strike a responsive chord in an area like the Ukraine and could strengthen nationalist resistance to Russian domination.

———————–

Minority Repression

Among many of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union, dissent is vocal and widespread. It is also vigorously repressed. In the Ukraine, the arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965 and 1966, and subsequent repressions, have been vigorously protested by leading Ukrainian scientists, artists, and writers, including Oleg Antonov, one of the Soviet Union’s leading aircraft designers.

The contempt of the Baltic people for Soviet rule remains as strong as ever. It is no longer expressed in hopeless armed resistance, as it was twenty years ago. Instead, these small nations manifest a vigorous determination to preserve their national cultures. Even the local Communist Party apparatus has sought to assert a degree of autonomy. In Estonia many works of Western literature that have never been published in Russian are printed in the native language. Two of the major underground documents recently proposing alternatives to the Communist dictatorship originated in Estonia.

source: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus1969.pdf [pdf]


NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine
R. Craig Nation
Elihu Root Professor of Military Studies
Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
June 2000
______________________________________________________________________

Introduction

1. The New NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was conceived and maintained during the decades of the Cold War as an association for collective defense in the face of a clear and present external threat. With the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, NATO appeared to many to be an alliance without a mission. In an era of revolutionary transformations, where the familiar certainties of bipolarity no longer held sway, the future of the Alliance was inevitably placed in discussion. Immanuel Wallerstein, speaking from the far left wing of the American political spectrum, pressed the conclusion to its logical extreme: “A Cold War instrument, it is not clear why NATO is now needed … The United States should stop obstructing the creation of a European army, allowing NATO to wither away.”1

The American commitment to European defense lies at the heart of the transatlantic bargain that defines NATO. It is an expensive commitment, which absorbs nearly half of total U.S. military spending.2 Washington reacted to the end of the Cold War by significantly reducing its troop presence in the European theater, lowering the number of effectives from over 300,000 in 1991 to approximately 100,000. Simultaneously, however, it made clear that at the institutional level no other organization could substitute for the Atlantic Alliance as the anchor of a new European security order. From a European perspective, though the imminent d0anger of the Cold War period was no longer in place, as a forum for defense cooperation and a means for keeping the U.S. engaged in the Old Continent the Alliance remained essential.

Survival demanded adaptation, and at its Copenhagen session in 1991 the North Atlantic Council took a first step toward revitalization with a declaration on “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe” that reiterated collective defense and transatlantic cooperation as essential responsibilities.3 As if in answer to Wallerstein, the need to keep other European security forums subordinated to NATO leadership was clearly stated, a priority that coincided with the U.S.’s March 1992 Defense Planning Guidance concept, which specified that “we [the U.S.] must attempt to prevent the emergence of any kind of exclusively European defense forces, that could finish by threatening NATO.” 4

The Atlantic Council summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 culminated a first phase of adaptation. The Council sought to redefine NATO’s military responsibilities with the publication of a New Strategic Concept that encouraged the creation of multilateral formations, coined the phrase “interlocking institutions” to emphasize the complementary role of other leading European institutions (such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Western European Union, and the Council of Europe) in the security sector, and placed a new emphasis upon mobile forces and peace operations.5 NATO’s “intact validity” as the keystone in Europe’s security arch was clearly stated.6 Finally, the Council sought to confront the potential for a security vacuum to develop in post-communist central Europe by announcing the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for formal association between NATO and the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe.7

At Rome the Alliance staked a course toward expanded out of area commitments and engagement to the east. Much of its subsequent development has been consistent with that course. In Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997 the NACC was reestablished as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), with “increased ability to give focus and weight to discussions concerning multilateral political and security-related issues.”8 With 46 members (19 NATO full members plus 27 partners) the EAPC has become a vital pillar of NATO’s aspiration to play an inclusive, pan-European role.

The NACC’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was launched at NATO’s Brussels summit in January 1994. Today, under EAPC auspices, it too has expanded to include partnership programs with 27 partners. PfP seeks to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, democratic control of armed forces, and readiness to operate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under UN or OSCE auspices as well as with NATO. It includes ambitious NATO/PfP national and “In the Spirit of PfP” exercise programs and NATO School SHAPE programs open to partner participation. Over the years it has become ever more ambitious, establishing the norm that partners should be contributors as well as recipients, moving from broad-based multilateral dialogue to bilateral relations between individual partners and the Alliance in the form of Individual Partnership Programs, and establishing a Planning and Review Process to draw partners closer to the Alliance by helping them to meet interoperability standards.9

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords assigned NATO forces, designated as an Implementation Force (IFOR) and after renewal of the mandate as a Stabilization Force (SFOR), significant peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1999, after diplomatic pressure failed to convince Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to call off his campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO waged a full-scale air war to impose a peace settlement. Since June 1999, Kosovo has been occupied by a NATO-led Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), with extensive responsibilities for maintaining public order. In 1997 the Alliance also launched a first round of enlargement by agreeing to bring Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the fold as full members, and adopted a Membership Action Plan to assist new candidates in their efforts to prepare for eventual affiliation.10

These varied initiatives had a purposeful logic. The new NATO would not be limited to collective defense responsibilities, but rather actively engaged in peace keeping and peace enforcement operations on Europe’s unstable periphery. It was moreover pledged to future rounds of enlargement on the basis of an “open-door” approach defined by rigorous accession criteria. Not least, the Alliance was committed to a process of internal reform and adaptation that sought to strengthen its European pillar and accentuate its character as an inclusive, collective security forum. NATO’s fiftieth anniversary observances in Washington during April 1999 marked an important culmination for these trends, formally welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new members and promulgating an ambitious new Strategic Concept.11

2. NATO, Russia, and Ukraine.

The Russian Federation articulated strong objections to NATO’s enlargement decision. In part to placate these discontents, and in part to sustain the momentum of enlargement by making the process more inclusive, NATO paralleled its accession talks with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with an attempt to craft special relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv. NATO’s ties with Russia and Ukraine may be depicted as a triangle, with each leg representing a significant set of bilateral interactions. But the relationship as a whole has a larger importance, and is integral to the effort to recast NATO’s post-Cold War responsibilities.

The Russian Federation has been in a state of perpetual crisis since the breakup of the USSR in 1991, and its international stature has declined radically. Russia nonetheless retains all the objective attributes of a great world power. With 80 percent of former Soviet territories it remains the world’s largest state, and largest single national repository of strategic raw materials. It is the world’s second ranking nuclear power, and despite the much publicized decline of its conventional forces, is still a major conventional military power. Russia has inherited the Soviet Union’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and possesses a critical geostrategic situation, at the core of the Eurasian heartland.

Ukraine has a population of 52 million, renowned agricultural potential, important coal, mineral, and timber resources, a substantial industrial infrastructure, and an important geographical position between the Russian Federation, the Black Sea, and central Europe. Though its experience of independence has been difficult and to some extent disappointing, it is widely viewed as a pivotal state in a region undergoing fundamental transformations.

NATO’s ties with the Russian Federation, burdened by a legacy of rivalry and distrust, are of particular salience. The Alliance’s agenda for a transformed Euro-Atlantic security order cannot be fulfilled without Russian engagement. Ukraine defines a “European Choice” as the central pillar of its foreign policy, but it is constrained by a legacy of backwardness, and by a complex relationship with its Russian neighbor. Though it is a troubled polity, as a major regional power Ukraine is too important for the Alliance to ignore.

At the very origin of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay is reported to have quipped that it was founded “to keep the Russian out, the Germans down, and Americans in.”12 None of these observations are relevant to the Alliance’s role today. Europe is no longer dependent upon the United States for core security in the way that it once was. Russia is not capable of projecting a geostrategic threat comparable to that once posed by the Soviet Union. A stronger and more purposeful Germany, willing and able to play its natural role as a bridge between East and West, would serve everyone’s best interests. As analysts like Wallerstein correctly point out, under the altered circumstances of the post-Cold War, the traditional premises of collective defense and containment are no longer sufficient to support the imposing edifice of Atlanticism.

Revolutionary changes in the security environment have not made the Alliance irrelevant, but they have posed new priorities. The fundamental challenge of the current era is not deterrence, but rather engagement on behalf of a greater Europe and Euro-Atlantic community “whole and at peace.” NATO has come toward that challenge by launching a process of internal reform, redefining core missions, and committing to enlargement. The cultivation of special relations with Russia and Ukraine, former enemies situated well outside of the Alliance’s traditional area of competence, is an integral part of the effort. If these relationships develop and prosper, the Alliance’s potential as a collective security forum can be realized to the full, and its vocation as a “zone of peace” will be greatly expanded. With Russian support, the enlargement process can go forward gradually and consistently, without becoming a source of geostrategic friction. Not least, a NATO-Russia partnership could become a critical pillar of a new world order actually worthy of the name. Positive association will provide incentives for Russia’s ongoing domestic transformation, and eventually allow the doors of the Alliance to be opened to Russia itself.

NATO’s effort to create and sustain special relationships with Russia and Ukraine faces significant challenges, but much is at stake. Should the effort fail, Europe risks to see the emergence of a new line of division between East and West that will inevitably become a source of strategic tension. Success will mean a major step toward the promise of a more peaceful world order for which victory in the Cold War once seemed a harbinger.

Ukraine Between East and West

1. A Pivotal State?

Western policy toward Ukraine has moved through several phases. Speaking in Kyiv during August 1991, on the very eve of the Soviet breakup, U.S. President George Bush cautioned Ukrainians that “freedom is not the same as independence,” and that Americans “will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”13 After 1991, relations were dominated by the problem of the arsenal that Ukraine had inherited from the USSR, which briefly made it the world’s third-ranking nuclear power. Kyiv’s reluctance to cooperate with the nuclear non-proliferation regime (to sign the non-proliferation treaty and the START I agreement, to associate with the Lisbon Protocols, and to commit to a process of denuclearization) created considerable tension.14 In the wake of Ukraine’s bout with hyperinflation in 1993-1994, pessimistic evaluations and predictions of imminent breakdown were widespread.15

With the U.S. shift toward a more assertive Russian policy after the “Zhirinovskii Shock” of December 1993 (when the Liberal Democratic party led by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii won the largest tally in voting by party list for the lower house of a new Russian parliament), and especially following the election of new Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in June 1994, Ukraine’s stature improved considerably. Kuchma committed Ukraine to denuclearization, sought to revitalize a domestic reform agenda, and strove for balanced relations between Russia and the West.16

From 1994 onward Ukraine has enjoyed the status of privileged partner, and the commitment “to see an independent, secure, democratic Ukraine survive, succeed and prosper” has been inscribed as a vital interest.17 Ukraine has come to be perceived as a “pivotal” state–one of a handful “whose futures [are] poised at critical turning points, and whose fates would significantly affect regional, and even international, stability.”18 As “the linchpin of stability in post-communist Eurasia,” it has become a centerpiece of Western policy.19

The case for casting Ukraine as a pivotal rests upon four premises. The first is that the consolidation of Ukrainian sovereignty is essential to prevent the recreation of something like the former Soviet superpower around its Russian core. Russian national security policy clearly articulates the goal of voluntary re-association of former Soviet states.20 As long as Kyiv maintains a commitment to full sovereignty, however, the premise of “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia is likely to prevail.21 “The West,” notes Taras Kuzio, “has increasingly come to understand and appreciate the strategic significance of Ukraine as the main post-Soviet country capable of preventing the re-emergence of a new Russian-dominated union.”22

Second, the point at which Russia comes to understand that Ukraine cannot be either won over, subverted, or subordinated to some kind of renewed association is also the point at which Moscow will be forced to abandon imperial fantasies and commit to the arduous but essential tasks of democratization and domestic reform. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the fundamental political struggle underway within post-communist Russia “is over whether Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a distinctly Eurasian and once again an imperial state,” and “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes and empire.” 23 Ukraine’s progress in consolidating sovereignty is thereby defined as the key determinant of the geostrategic orientation of its menacing Russian neighbor.

Third, a stable Ukraine is perceived to be important in its own right, as a large and potentially powerful state that cannot be allowed to become detached from a process of modernization and development in the region as a whole. Ukraine borders on no less than seven central and eastern European states, all of which confront comparable challenges of democratization, adaptation to the world economy, and institutional reform. Its transformation is an integral part of post-communist transition in the central European corridor stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas. Ukraine has been associated with the Central European Initiative since June 1996, it is an associate of the Forum of Black Sea Cooperation, and it pursues close bilateral relations with its regional neighbors. Ukraine’s historical and cultural ties with Poland and Russia make it a potential bridge between East and West.24 “In time,” writes Adrian Karatnycky, “a stable and democratic Ukraine, linked to democratic Europe, could act as a conduit for democratic ideas to the east; a Western-oriented Ukraine, with its large Russian population, could engage Russia to the West.”25

Finally, Ukraine is increasingly perceived to be critically situated in the emerging battle to dominate energy transport corridors linking the oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian basin to European markets. The economic viability of Caspian resources has yet to be conclusively demonstrated, but considerable competition has already emerged over the construction of pipelines. Whether Ukraine will provide alternative routes helping to diversify access, as the West would prefer, or “find itself forced to play the role of a Russian subsidiary,” remains to be seen.26 Its relevance in the effort to exploit the Caspian energy knot is not in doubt.

A heightened perception of Ukraine’s strategic importance has been manifested in intensified military-tomilitary contacts with both the U.S. and its key allies. Since 1996 Ukraine has been the third leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid, after Israel and Egypt, in addition to receiving considerable World Bank and International Monetary Fund support, and the largesse has borne fruit. In 1993-1994, with its economy in tatters, separatist movements on the rise, and relations with the Russian Federation in a downward spiral, the potential for a Ukrainian civil war, or external conflict with Russia, was widely assessed as acute.27 Today, the threat of overt hostilities seems to be minimal. Ukraine has moved peacefully through two democratic electoral cycles. >From June 1996 it has been governed on the basis of a democratic constitution. In September 1996 Kyiv began to issue its own national currency (the hyrvnya), and in January 1997 it published a National Security Concept that emphasized the goal of integration with the Western post-Cold War security system. 28 Ukraine retains considerable support from a potent diaspora, and it has established a strong international profile.

2. Ukraine’s Dilemmas of Sovereignty.

Despite these accomplishments, Ukraine remains a troubled polity, whose prospects for long-term stabilization are cloudy. Although the country possesses great potential wealth, its legacy from seventy years of Soviet power has been heavy.

Ukraine’s economy was closely integrated with the Soviet command system, and it has inherited almost all of the flaws associated with that system in full measure. The agricultural sector continues to suffer from a bitter experience under Soviet power, including a cumbersome collective farm structure that has proven difficult to dismantle. Much of Ukraine’s industrial infrastructure is outmoded and non-competitive, energy-intensive, and highly polluting. A significant portion of Soviet military-related industries were located in Ukraine, and this sector, which was formerly highly protected, has been hit hard by the loss of Soviet markets. The years of independence have seen chronic disaffection and demoralization among the industrial work force. There is also a near total energy dependence upon former Soviet suppliers, particularly the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.29

Under post-independence Prime Minister Vitold Fokin Ukraine adopted a go-slow approach to reform, on the premise that its first priorities must be the consolidation of independence and nation-building. The result was a virtual economic meltdown in 1993-1994, including hyperinflation and collapsing living standards. In September 1994 Kuchma worked out a Systematic Transformation Facility with the IMF, and in the early years of his tenure applied it with some success. The recent past has seen considerable slippage, however, and overall Ukraine’s economic transition has been abysmal, including a 60 percent decline in GDP since 1991. Privatization has not been decisively advanced, large state budget deficits have become chronic, state subsidization of non-profitable enterprises remains the norm, and living standards continue to decline. Dislocations occasioned by economic hardship will remain a possibility, and some analysts foresee little economic future for Ukraine beyond the status of an “agricultural periphery to a more advanced Russia.”30

Lacking any real experience of independent statehood prior to 1991, Ukraine has also confronted the difficult challenge of building and sustaining a national identity. Underdeveloped national consciousness has been manifested by an aggravated and sometimes antagonistic regionalism. 31 The most serious tensions have derived from a divide between Ukraine’s westernmost districts, committed to an agenda for a strongly delineated Ukrainian national idea, and the heavily Russified eastern and southern regions whose population has tended to favor closer association with the Russian Federation. According to the census of 1989, 22 percent of Ukraine’s population is of Russian descent. A significantly higher percentage may be classified as Russified Ukrainians, for whom the Russian language (or a Russian-Ukrainian melange) continues to serve as a primary vehicle of communication (nearly 50 percent of the Ukrainian population cites Russian as its first language). Fully aware of the potential problem represented by their country’s large Russian minority, the governments of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma have striven, with some success, to propagate an agenda for an inclusive Ukrainian civic nationalism. 32 Strongly contrasting regional identities persist, however, and in the event of a severe national crisis could become fonts of instability.

The Russian factor in Ukrainian domestic politics is focused in several distinct areas. First in order of extent is the Donbas, the densely populated heart of eastern Ukraine and its mining, metallurgical, and chemical complexes. The five districts of eastern Ukraine contain 34 percent of the country’s population, but they are responsible for over 45 percent of total industrial production. Only 32 percent of residents list Ukrainian as their mother tongue, compared to 66 percent who name Russian. In the core districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, native speakers of Ukrainian number 3 percent and 7 percent respectively. Since 1992, a local political agenda has been cultivated calling for the elevation of Russian to the status of an official language, dual citizenship arrangements, open borders, and closer association with the Russian Federation.

Southern Ukraine also contains districts with a significant Russian profile. The Black Sea littoral around the cities of Odesa and Kherson was originally settled by Russians in the era of Catherine the Great, and given the designation “New Russia,” a term of reference that has found resonance with contemporary Russian nationalists.

The Crimean Peninsula, historically a part of Russia and only annexed to Ukraine at the behest of Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 (to honor the three-hundredth anniversary of Russian-Ukrainian association) is probably the most significant focus for Russian nationalism inside Ukraine. Approximately 70 percent of Crimea’s population of 2.7 million is Great Russian, 22 percent Ukrainian, and 8 percent indigenous Crimean Tatars. Russian nationalism has been powerfully manifest in Crimea, and has found an echo within the Russian Federation, particularly around the status of the port city of Sevastopol. The Russian national movement in Crimea has not, however, been overtly supported by the Russian state. Elections in the spring of 1994 brought the pro-Russian Republican Movement of the Crimea to power behind president Iurii Meshkov, but Moscow refused to rally behind the movement’s separatist agenda and looked away as Kuchma pushed Meshkov aside and abolished the Crimean presidency in March 1995.

Western Ukraine presents a strong contrast to the Russified east and south. Focused on the city of L’viv, whose baroque central square is regaled by a statue of the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz, dominantly Uniate Christian, attached historically to the central European cultural zone, and only brought within the confines of the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, western Ukraine functions as the motor of an assertively anti- Russian Ukrainian national consciousness. Under Gorbachev, the Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika (Rukh) based in western Ukraine became the driving force of an Ukrainian independence movement. Since Kuchma’s election in 1994 over Rukh candidate Viacheslav Chornovil the movement has split, with one wing evolving into an almost purely western Ukrainian regional party, calling for an aggressive Ukrainianization of national institutions and greater distancing from the Russian Federation.

Ukraine contains other, smaller pockets of local and regional identity. The Zaporizhzhia district north of the Sea of Azov has a large, politically mobilized Cossack population. The Trancarpathian region (the Zakarpatska district) contains a complex ethnic mix, including a large Ruthenian minority that has resisted Ukrainianization. Chernivtsi district, formerly part of the Habsburg domains and only detached from modern Romania during the Second World War, also defends an autonomous regional identity and central European vocation. None of these smaller sub-regions is likely to threaten national unity on its own. The multiple fault lines that fracture Ukraine, however, could become considerably more unstable against the background of a generalized national or regional crisis.

A yearning for order and lost security are powerful forces pushing a portion of Ukraine’s electorate toward extremist alternatives. By 1996, one-third of the Ukrainian population was asserting support for a “Pinochet style” regime and some cities even saw the birth of Pinochet fan clubs. In the parliamentary elections of 29 March 1998, the Communist party of Ukraine became the country’s largest party with 28 percent of the vote, in a parliament (Verkhovna Rada) dominated by parties of the left, and in the 1999 presidential vote communist candidate Simonenko carried 40 percent of the national tally.33 Kravchuk and Kuchma have responded to these trends in approximately the same manner as their Russian counterparts, by crafting a presidential regime in which the executive branch possesses extraordinary power that it uses to override a hostile but effectively impotent parliamentary assembly. Like Russia, Ukraine is structured as a corporatist regime, where powerful collective entities and interest groups, working hand in glove with the presidential entourage and “party of power,” combine to constitute a power elite. Kuchma has been successful in neutralizing opposition through a combination of cooptation and divide and conquer tactics. His personal entourage has come to consist almost entirely of old friends and associates from Dnipropetrovsk, and his regime has become renowned for pervasive corruption. Kuchma’s reelection was marred by abusive use of the national media on behalf of the incumbent and coerced bloc voting, and procedures were criticized by OSCE and Council of Europe observers.34 If democratization remains a watchword of Western strategy, the case of Ukraine might give security planners pause.

3. Relations with Russia.
Of all the challenges that independent Ukraine confronts, its relationship with the Russian Federation is the most significant, both for its own future and for the future of central and eastern Europe.35 Ukraine, like Europe as a whole, cannot be secure if confronted by a hostile Russia. But Moscow will not easily be persuaded to abandon all pretenses to a “privileged” relationship with its former eastern Slavic dependency.

Economic relations between Russia and Ukraine are significant for both sides. Levels of interdependence at the moment of independence were high. Ukraine, for example, furnished over 65 percent of Soviet metallurgical capacity and 40 percent of agricultural resources, while nearly 80 percent of Ukrainian energy resources derived from Soviet sources. Dependence on Russian energy sources was to some extent balanced by the fact that the main pipeline connecting Russian natural gas fields to the European market transits Ukraine, but Kyiv is also heavily reliant upon transit revenues. Since independence, Russia has not shied away from using Ukraine’s energy dependency, the substantial debt that it has brought in its train, and general commercial dependence, as a source of strategic leverage. Kyiv has sought to reduce that leverage by negotiating higher transit fees for natural gas transfers, converting Odesa into a Black Sea oil terminal to allow diversification of supply, and rationalizing a highly inefficient oil refining capacity. The result of Russian pressing and Ukrainian resistance has been a considerable amount of strategic friction.

The issues of sovereignty over Crimea and control of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol have been particularly troublesome. On 28 May 1997 the Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental Black Sea Accords granted Moscow outright possession of 50 percent of the fleet, allowed it to purchase an additional 32 percent of the Ukrainian share in exchange for Ukrainian debt relief, and granted Moscow a twenty year lease (with the option to renew for an additional five years) over naval facilities in Sevastopol, with Ukraine retaining possession of one bay.36 On 31 May 1997 a Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership extended mutual guarantees of territorial integrity. These agreements were in principle a breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian relations, providing a blueprint for resolving the thorny issue of the fleet in the context of de jure Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. Despite the best of intentions, however, some things have been left unclear. The question of Sevastopol has great emotional resonance with Russian national opinion and has become a cause célèbre for the nationalist rightwing and its allies in the State Duma. It would be surprising if at some point in the future it was not raised again. There are also important strategic issues at stake, which technical agreements over access cannot resolve. Some kind of permanent naval basing in Crimea is vital to a continued Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. There is significant in-place military shipbuilding capacity in Sevastopol that Moscow will be loath to give up. And Crimea remains an important source of leverage in bilateral relations.37

Less concretely, but perhaps most fundamentally, a potent strain of Russian national sentiment continues to regard Ukraine as an inseparable part of a larger family of eastern Slavic nations, artificially separated from the Motherland by hostile Western powers seeking “the weakening of Russia’s strategic and economic situation in Eurasia.” 38 The most consistent expression of an alternative agenda in contemporary Russia is the geopolitical school, which portrays the entire Eurasian land mass as an organic whole within which Russian hegemony and the elusive “Russian Idea” have been historically sanctioned sources of unity and order. According to the argument, the disbanding of the Soviet imperium, inspired by the vain idea of “joining” the West, has led to a national catastrophe that only a renewed Eurasian orientation can reverse.39 Ukraine is regarded as an integral part of the eastern Slavic cultural space and of the Eurasian heartland. It is indeed a “linchpin” of regional order, but one that Russia is urged to reclaim as part of a long-term strategy to reassert itself as a protagonist in world affairs. So long as Ukraine remains economically fragile and socially unstable, such aspirations will have an objective foundation. It has been easy to make the case for Ukraine’s pivotal status as the “keystone” in the central European arch of post-communist states in transition, but difficult to define a convincing agenda for progressive change.40 Until considerably more progress toward democratic consolidation and economic reform has been made, the possibility of civil unrest, regional conflict, and backsliding on the issue of sovereignty cannot altogether be ruled out. Though the dire forecasts of 1994 have not come to pass, Ukraine’s global balance of eight years of postcommunist transition is negative, and dramatic improvement is not in sight.41

Ukraine’s fragility creates a certain imbalance in Western strategy, which rests upon a rhetorical commitment to democratic consolidation, but which must deal with a weak state not always amenable to external direction. Alexander Motyl suggests that, although Ukraine’s transition has not been notably more troubled than those of other post-communist polities in the central European corridor, it must nonetheless be described as “a mess.”42 A central question for Western policy is whether it is prudent to place so much strategic weight upon an arch in such a state of disrepair.

4. Ukraine and the West: The Role of NATO.

Despite its many problems, Ukraine clearly aspires to draw closer to the West. Russia is and will remain too weak to use coercive means to force any kind of “regathering” of purportedly Russian lands. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has revealed severe limitations as a forum for regional cooperation, and with Western encouragement Ukraine has become an active member of the so-called GUAAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) inside the CIS seeking to balance Russian influence. Bilateral relations between sovereign state actors are likely to continue to dominate the international relations of post-Soviet Eurasia. On this level, the Russian Federation can hope to exercise considerable leverage in defense of its national interests. It cannot realistically aspire to block an ongoing process of engagement with Western institutions.

Ukraine’s relationship with these institutions, and particularly the European Union (EU) and NATO, is mixed. Kyiv has repeatedly stated that its long-term strategic goal is integration with Europe. But Ukraine is a weak state, ill-prepared to contemplate full membership in European forums in the foreseeable future. The EU, with its agenda for enlargement already overloaded, has purposefully kept Ukraine at a distance.43 NATO has stepped into the breach, and in the process become Ukraine’s key institutional link to a larger European reality.

NATO has sought to address the dilemma of engaging a strategically vital but structurally fragile Ukraine by crafting a special relationship, parallel with but not identical to that defined for Russia by the May 1997 NATORussia Founding Act.44 The idea seems originally to have been put forward by the Ukrainians themselves, inspired by the fear “that Ukraine would be the compensation Russia received for acquiescing in NATO’s inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.”45 It was enthusiastically greeted by the Alliance, and has been pursued in a pragmatic, purposeful, and generally successful manner.

The Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, concluded on 9 July 1997, differed from the Russian prototype in important ways. Unlike the Founding Act, it involved no formal or informal concessions from either side, and in its original form created no standing body equivalent to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. It was in essence a political declaration that pledged the signatories to consultation and cooperation, without specifying what forms these initiatives would take.46

NATO’s special relationship with Ukraine has been enthusiastically pursued by both sides. In May 1997 a NATO Information and Documentation Center was established in Kyiv, where it has become a focal point for explaining the benefits of association with NATO to the general public. In December 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding on civil emergency planning was concluded, defining terms of cooperation in disaster preparedness and relief. Enthusiastic participation in PfP exercises has been a cornerstone of the relationship. Over 5000 Ukrainian officers have taken part in PfP activities to date, a number of interoperability directives have been fulfilled with PfP financial assistance, and a PfP Training Center is under construction at Yavoriv.47 A NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv facilitates PfP activities, and in March 2000 the Ukrainian parliament approved the PfP Status of Forces Agreement and its additional protocol, as well as the Open Skies Treaty promoting transparency in arms control. The dynamic of NATO-Russian relations has mandated the creation of an institutional focus for cooperation, designated the NATO-Ukraine Commission and broadly paralleling the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Achievements have been acknowledged by the January 2000 visit to Kyiv by NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, and by a March 2000 session of the North Atlantic Council conducted in the Ukrainian capital.

The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been free from most of the political tensions that have marred NATO-Russian relations. Ukraine has expressed a commitment to political neutrality that for the moment precludes aspirations to full membership, and Russia has not articulated strong objections to cooperation at lower levels.48 Moscow and Kyiv have in fact shared certain understandings concerning the role of NATO in the region, including opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of new member states, support for the evolution of the Alliance from a military organization devoted to collective defense toward a political forum devoted to collective security, and an agenda for the gradual construction of a pan-European security system into which NATO can be incorporated as a significant, but not necessarily dominant part.49

Neither dialogue with the EU nor the Ukraine-NATO Charter can serve as panaceas for Ukraine’s unresolved problems, or be considered as ends in themselves. The NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership has been successful because it has unfolded within clearly defined limits. By cultivating a special relationship with Ukraine with excessive zeal, the Alliance would risk to reinforce Russia’s sense of alienation and exposure, thereby conjuring up the very kinds of assertive behavior it seeks to prevent. By pressuring Kyiv to function as the keystone of a NATO-led containment posture (or giving the impression that something like this is occurring) it could exacerbate instability within Ukraine itself, and East-West division internationally. In the absence of egregious Russian misconduct, NATO’s strategic challenge is not to “win” Ukraine, but to provide reliable security assistance to a weak polity struggling to reinforce its sovereignty and a focus for the aspirations of a “European Choice.”

Ukraine is and will remain militarily exposed. It has surrendered its nuclear arsenal at Western insistence and is under pressure to foreswear the manufacture of medium range (300-500 kilometer) ballistic missile systems.50 Much of the country is a broad plain that lacks natural defensive barriers and is open to invasion from three sides. Though Kyiv was successful in establishing viable national armed forces in the wake of the Soviet breakup, subsequent military reforms have been half-hearted. Today’s Ukrainian armed forces are chronically underfunded, severely demoralized, plagued by a disproportionate number of officers in the ranks, and still not effectively subordinated to civilian control. Downsizing continues (750,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Ukraine in 1991, by 1998 force levels were at 360,000, and current plans call for a draw down to 320,000). Given the weak national economic base, the Ukrainian armed forces nonetheless remain large and unwieldy, “characterized by inertia and a general adherence to the status quo.”51 Ukraine has for the time being been denied the option that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have pursued–to reduce and restructure its national forces to complement rather than replicate NATO’s capacity in the context of a realistic prospect for eventual full membership.52

Meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine can only be provided by NATO, but there will be serious political and operational constraints to any large-scale use of Alliance forces in the Eurasian steppe. Moscow has committed itself to a national military strategy that emphasizes reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons in a phase of conventional weakness.53 Assertive military commitments in areas immediately contiguous to the Russian border will therefore pose considerable risk. Moscow is willing and able to assert meaningful pressure in close proximity to its frontiers, and in the central European corridor it can be counted upon to do so if vital interests are perceived to be at stake. Zero-sum competition for Ukraine’s heart and mind is therefore a dangerous game. “Washington’s inclusion of the region near Russia’s borders as vital US security interests or targets for expanding US influence,” writes Sergo Mikoyan, “will make managing regional conflicts in these areas more difficult, if not impossible.”54

A good example of such difficulties was provided by the August 1997 joint military exercise scheduled to be conducted under Partnership for Peace auspices and designated “Operation Sea Breeze.” The operation was originally scripted, at Ukrainian request, to depict a landing by alliance forces on the Crimean coast near Sevastopol in response to a secessionist threat. After vehement Russian protests, objections from the Crimean regional parliament, and demonstrations in the streets, the exercise was called off and rescripted.55 Deploying and sustaining ground forces in a hostile environment in southern Ukraine would be difficult under the best of circumstances. In the real world, impetus to undertake such a deployment would break down quickly in the face of strong political objections.

Bolstered by U.S. forward deployments, NATO forces have the capacity to respond to a Ukrainian request for assistance in the direst emergencies. This capacity is important and needs to be maintained and cultivated–the centrality of NATO in planning for military contingencies in Eurasia remains intact. In the absence of a real and present Russian threat, however, efforts to recast Ukraine as a geopolitical barrier are neither prudent nor necessary.

Russia has not manifested any desire to retake Ukraine by assault, and the ramifications of any such attempt would be devastating. Although they are complex and sometimes contentious, social and cultural relations between Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine and across the Russian-Ukrainian state boundary, with the partial exception of western Ukraine, are also essentially benign. Worst case scenarios involving communal or interstate violence are always possible, but highly unlikely.

Post-communist Ukraine is too fragile domestically to function as “an embattled outpost of the West.”56 Attempts to mobilize Ukraine against Russia would contribute to domestic division and make the task of nationbuilding more difficult. They are also likely to provoke unpalatable international consequences. Russian responses to Ukrainian attachment to NATO need not be limited to central Europe. The Russian periphery is vast, and an important strain of geopolitical analysis emphasizes the need for an eastern orientation and the cultivation of strategic alliances with India, China, and the Islamic Middle East. “Winning” Ukraine at the price of reinforced strategic partnership between Russia and China would not be a good bargain for the West.57

NATO’s best option is to reiterate support for the consolidation of sovereignty within Ukraine and the other new independent states and to engage on behalf of military modernization and security cooperation, but to avoid creating illusions about the prospects for full association until such time as national standards can be realistically achieved, and the regional security environment, including relations with Russia, has stabilized. This is best stated straightforwardly, rather than disguised behind false premises. Association with NATO is a positive option for Ukraine and the West, but full membership is for the moment neither practicable (Ukraine is nowhere near being ready to meet NATO membership criteria) nor politically desirable.

The most serious threats to stability today are located within Ukraine itself, in the potential for social and political unrest provoked by economic stress and political frustration. Cooperation in the security sector should not blind Western strategists to the long-term importance of encouraging democratization, development, and the growth of civil society as prerequisites for national consolidation. NATO’s policies toward Ukraine should be designed first of all to support these goals.

The economic instrument of power will be crucial. Efforts to encourage appropriate international aid and assistance, promote investment, and sponsor Ukraine’s integration with the world economy have often been frustrating, but they cannot be abandoned. In comparison with the extent of IMF, World Bank, governmental and private assistance set aside for the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s needs are modest and they can be met. Incentive packages tied to continuing reform effort will be an important impetus for positive change. Military support, including miliary-to-military contacts, nation assistance, and security assistance programs, can also make a contribution. The U.S. has taken the lead in this regard, concluding military support agreements with a number of new independent states including Ukraine in July 1993, Azerbaijan in July 1997, Kazakhstan in November 1997, and Georgia in March 1998. The U.S. and Ukraine have conducted senior leadership visits and exchanges as well as port calls; organized student visits between U.S. and Ukrainian military schools and colleges (under the IMET program); and pursued a partnership program between the Ukrainian National Guard and the National Guard of California. Ukrainian officers attend officers training programs at the George Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and over the past five years Ukraine has been an important contributor to U.N. and CIS peacekeeping operations. Together with Azerbaijan and Georgia it is preparing a specialized peacekeeping battalion. These varied initiatives reflect a serious commitment to help with a painful process of military downsizing and modernization. If sustained, they will also help to keep Ukraine anchored to the West as a security partner.58

The Russian Federation

1. The New Russia.

The Russian Federation that emerged in 1992 from the ruin of Soviet power was stripped of nearly all the elaborately constructed defenses that its Soviet predecessor assumed as a natural right. The USSR was a force unto itself in international affairs, and it left behind few if any real allies. Soviet military power was the product of an extraordinary mobilization that could not be maintained indefinitely. Under the successor regime of Boris El’tsin the Russian armed forces were drawn into domestic political struggles as an ally of the “party of power,” partially discredited as a result, starved for funds, and in effect allowed to languish by a mistrustful leadership for whom international stature was not a high priority. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the central European buffer bought so dearly during the Second World War was swept away. Simultaneously, declarations of independence in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia led to the surrender of nearly all the territorial acquisitions of Russia’s imperial and communist leaders from the seventeenth century onward. Viewed in conventional terms and from Moscow’s perspective, the break up of the USSR was a strategic disaster that left Russia ill-prepared to engage with a victorious and assertive Euro-Atlantic community.

El’tsin’s reform-oriented supporters originally sought to address the growing imbalance of power through bandwagoning association with a triumphant West. According to new Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s transition would make it an integral part of an enlarged community of Western states stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” committed to a strategic partnership with the U.S., but without sacrificing the prerogatives that geostrategic weight, cultural tradition, and economic potential made its just due.59 These were extravagant hopes, and they would soon be proven vain. Suspicion of Russia’s intentions and concern for its long-term potential were too deeply rooted in the West to dissipate overnight. Russia was too big and too troubled to integrate into existing Western institutions without fundamentally changing their nature. At the same time, Russia’s reduced stature made it difficult for her to attract substantial concessions in exchange for strategic allegiance. For its own part, Moscow yearned for a symbolic parity with the leading Western powers that her underlying power indices did not justify nor in fact permit.

Russia’s unprecedented rapid retreat from great power status has reduced her importance in the context of Western grand strategy, but with over 20,000 nuclear warheads, the great northern kingdom remains too potent to ignore.

2. Russia and NATO.

The strategic evolution of the Atlantic Alliance has been at the core of Russian concern over current Western security policy. Between 1948 and 1989, central Europe was transformed into something like a prepared battlefield for the third world war. In spite of intense militarization, however, the Soviet Union’s western marches were relatively stable. NATO’s intentions, declared and in fact, were strictly defensive. Moscow’s greatest concern was not a conventional military threat, but rather the potential spill over effect of instability within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet glacis in central Europe, built around the 20-plus divisions of the Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany, was formidable, and an adequate guarantee against external aggression. On these terms, and despite chronic wrangling, Moscow could coexist comfortably with a hostile but essentially passive NATO.

The original aspirations of Soviet reformers in the Gorbachev era were summed up by the popular phrase “the Common European Home.” 60 So certain was Gorbachev of the declining relevance of force in an interdependent world, of the need for cooperative forums for the pursuit of mutual security, and of his country’s European vocation, that he was willing to accept widely disproportionate arms reduction agreements and unilateral concessions in order to bridge the East-West divide.

Moscow’s inability to realize these aspirations during the first decade of post-Soviet reform may be ascribed to two causes. First, and most essential, is the travail of transition within Russia itself. The corrupt, demoralized, quasi-authoritarian, and war-torn regime that El’tsin has bequeathed to his successors has little that is positive to offer. Until such time as its internal demons are put to rest it will be condemned to watch from the sidelines as the European project unfolds.

Western policy also shares some of the responsibility for Russia’s failure. Though the West has maintained a rhetorical commitment to “partnership” with the new Russia, it has not sustained pro-active policies sufficient to overcome Russia’s suspicions about the real intentions of its former Cold War rivals. The Russians’ institution of choice as the foundation for a new European security order was the OSCE, where the Russian Federation is fully represented and U.S. influence is to some extent diluted, and whose idealistic charter (the 1990 Charter of Paris) is grounded in the premises of mutual security.61 NATO’s activist agenda from 1990 onward effectively precluded the possibility for the OSCE to evolve in this direction. In place of an inclusive but weak and unthreatening OSCE, whose main function would be to provide a forum for dialogue and consensus building, the Western community elevated an ambitious, U.S.-led, only partially representative, and militarily potent Atlantic Alliance bearing the legacy of adversarial relations inherited from the Cold War.

Moscow could not have been expected to rejoice in the perpetuation of what it has consistently viewed as an unrepentant Cold War rival. It nonetheless took up a seat at the NACC in December 1991, and, with some reluctance, joined the PfP in June 1994. The precipitating event in the transformation of Russian threat perceptions was the emergence of the agenda for NATO enlargement.

So far as the decision to enlarge can be reconstructed, it seems to have derived from a meeting of U.S. President William Clinton with Lech Walesa of Poland and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. during April 1993; to have been embraced by a small group of presidential advisors and pushed through the interagency process behind the scenes; and to have been promulgated as policy without any kind of public debate or consensus in place at the January 1994 NATO ministerial in Brussels. The decision was affected by a U.S. desire to address the concerns of key European allies, but driven forward by U.S. domestic political concerns.62

The decision to expand the Alliance also contained important symbolic and strategic implications. Territorial adjustments and shifts in spheres of influence normally follow decision in warfare. The absorption by NATO of what had once been a Soviet-dominated buffer zone seemed to be a clear vindication of the West’s claim to “victory” in the Cold War. Russia’s position has been that its own leaders took the initiative to end the Cold War, and that a tacit agreement not to enlarge NATO into the area of the former Warsaw Pact was an integral part of the negotiations that allowed for the peaceful unification of Germany. Part of the strategic logic of enlargement has always been that of deterrence against the potential revival of a Russian threat, interpreted in Moscow as a regeneration of a familiar containment posture designed to hem Russia in and keep her weak. No great power can be expected to rejoice when a potent military coalition draws closer to its historically exposed frontiers. Not surprisingly, the strategic implications of enlargement were regarded by Russian elites with dismay, and opposition to the initiative became a rare point of consensus across a badly fragmented political spectrum. It is not clear that any amount of Russian agitation could have reversed the momentum of enlargement once the process had been set in motion. In the event, Moscow’s immediate reactions reflected the general confusion and lack of direction that have characterized nearly all aspects of her tortured post-communist transition. In August 1993, during his first visit to Warsaw as Russian President, El’tsin stated publicly that Polish membership in NATO would not run counter to Russian interests (an assertion that was subsequently reiterated by Foreign Minister Kozyrev).63 The rest of the foreign policy establishment, however, was quick to correct the presidential “misstatement.” Thereafter Russian officials were consistent in condemning enlargement as a threat, a betrayal of the trust that made possible a peaceful winding down of the Cold War, and an attempt “to consolidate victory in the Cold War” at Russia’s expense.64

What to do about the accession process once it had begun was quite another matter. The various counter measures that were suggested–to break off arms control negotiations, to adopt a more demanding stance in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, to increase support for Cuba and other anti-American regional powers, to cultivate strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China, to use economic instruments and other sorts of pressure to block a second round of accession possibly including Ukraine and the Baltic States–were by and large rejected as unfeasible, or as steps toward self-imposed isolation.65 As a result of Russia’s critical weakness the battle of enlargement had in effect been lost in advance, and “to wave one’s fist in anger after the fight is over is nothing more than an empty gesture.”66 The only viable course of action, summarized by Kozyrev’s successor Evgenii Primakov as “keeping damage to a minimum,” was to go on record as opposed to enlargement while simultaneously accepting a limited engagement with NATO in the hopes of maintaining some kind of leverage and influence.67 On this less than promising foundation, Russia moved to discuss the entangling commitment of what would become the NATO-Russia Founding Act.68

Serious negotiations on the Founding Act began in January 1997, and concluded with the signing ceremony of 27 May 1997. Despite Russian efforts to make the agreement as formal as possible, the Act was not a legally binding document, but rather “the fruit of compromise resulting from reciprocal concession” containing “numerous ambiguities.”69 The document itself consists of a preamble and four thematic sections devoted to principles, mechanisms for consultation, areas for cooperation, and political-military issues.70 The preamble states the longrangegoal of building a new NATO reaching out to a democratic Russia, and underlines that henceforward neither party will view the other as a political enemy. In the section devoted to principles, explicit mention is made of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and additional OSCE documents, thus placing NATO-Russian cooperation in the larger framework of ideas and institutions associated with a nascent cooperative security regime.

The key mechanism for cooperation defined by the agreement is the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which is tasked to convene monthly on the ambassadorial level and bi-monthly on the level of foreign and defense ministers. The weight that the PJC is expected to carry is however left unclear, and it is expressly stated that neither side will have the right to exercise any kind of veto-power. The document names a wide range of areas where cooperation is deemed to be possible, including conflict prevention, joint peacekeeping operations, exchanges of information, nuclear security issues, arms control, conversion of military industries, disaster assistance, and the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The precise responsibilities of the Council in regard to these themes is not specified.

The final section addresses the military-security issues occasioned by NATO’s eastward expansion, including its impact on the conventional balance of forces in Europe, prospects for the permanent basing of NATO forces on the territory of new members and a related build-up of military infrastructure, and the issue of nuclear weapons. A number of implicit trade-offs and compromises paved the way for agreement in these domains. The question of conventional force limits was left to be fixed by the ongoing CFE negotiations. An American “three nos” pledge (no need, no intention, no plan) was offered to placate concern about the stationing of nuclear weapons. This amounted to little more than a pious declaration of good intentions, but both sides were willing to live with it on the basis of a shared conviction that “any such stationing would make very little military sense.”71 NATO managed to insert a statement of approval for the modernization of military infrastructure, deemed necessary to permit the deployment of large contingents. Russia achieved some face-saving concessions, but in the end NATO gave up almost no option in which it was seriously interested, maintained a strict definition of the Act as an informal and non-binding arrangement, and reiterated the assertion that Russia was receiving nothing more than a consultative voice. If damage limitation was Moscow’s first priority, the results must have been disappointing.

The essence of the Founding Act has been described as “the commitment to develop consultation, cooperation and joint decision-making, including an enhanced dialogue between senior military authorities.”72 In the first year of its existence the PJC made some progress toward achieving these goals. The foci of interactions were the regular sessions of the PJC and Joint Military Commission, accompanied by numerous high-level consultations between ambassadors, foreign and defense ministers, and chiefs of staff. The PJC convoked expert groups and working sessions on a wide range of issues such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, retraining of retired military personnel, air traffic safety, and arms control. A NATO Documentation Center on European Security Issues was opened in Moscow in January 1998, and negotiations on reciprocal Military Liaison Missions were concluded successfully. During June 1998 a conference was convened in Moscow to commmorate the first anniversary of the Founding Act and explore areas for further collaboration.

Association under the aegis of the Founding Act did not disguise Russia’s more fundamental opposition to NATO enlargement. Nor were Russian representatives entirely satisfied with the limited prerogatives that the PJC offered them. Even prior to Kosovo, Russian evaluations of the work of the Council were primarily skeptical. Complaints were raised of the purely “titular” function of Russian representatives at the military liaison mission, and of Moscow’s exclusion from Alliance planning and decision-making.73 The disillusionment associated with these frustrations should not be underestimated. Gregory Hall describes Russia’s “consistently and resoundingly negative” reactions to the limitations of the PJC as the basis for a decisive “shift in orientation away from the West.”74 The PJC nonetheless seemed to be demonstrating its relevance as a forum for dialogue and association. Foreign Minister Primakov evaluated the experiment cautiously but fairly in remarking that: “The past year has shown that we are able to cooperate on the basis of constructive engagement and confidence, and we have achieved quite a lot.”75

If the PJC was both promising and in some sense necessary, it was also inevitably fragile. In the course of 1999 the frail sprouts of Russia-NATO collaboration were nearly swept away by the storm provoked by NATO’s military intervention in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.

3. Russia, NATO, and the Kosovo Crisis.

The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army as the armed wing of Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian oppression in 1997-1998 should not have come as a surprise. A decade of egregious violations by the government of Slobodan Milosevic had left Kosovo’s Albanian majority deeply embittered, and the failure of the strategy of passive resistance crafted by shadow president Ibrahim Rugova was patent. Western capitals were nonetheless caught unprepared as violence in the province escalated through the summer and autumn of 1998. Original U.S. condemnations of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization were quickly set aside in favor of a campaign of coercive diplomacy designed to force Milosevic to pull in his horns.76 When this campaign failed to produce the desired result, the U.S. and its NATO allies, acting through the Alliance, sought to impose settlement with a campaign of graduated bombing strikes. Milosevic’s reaction to the air strikes was to up the ante by moving to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo en masse, thereby provoking a major humanitarian disaster and directly challenging NATO’s credibility. The Alliance, perhaps unintentionally, found itself locked into a large-scale air campaign with disruptive strategic implications.

Russian objections to NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict were concerned more with the precedent established than the outcome on the ground. Although Moscow has often positioned itself as a supporter of Serbian positions in the protracted Balkan conflict, it has not been willing to make meaningful sacrifices, or to court substantial risks, in support of its erstwhile ally.77 In Kosovo, however, the example of unilateral intervention by NATO, on behalf of one side in a civil conflict within a sovereign state, without UN or OSCE approval, in the name of an extremely broad and easily manipulated “doctrine” of humanitarian intervention, and in defiance of Russia’s expressed preferences, posed special challenges.

In the first phase of the conflict Russia distanced itself from the NATO initiative, pillorying the U.S. as a “new goliath” for whom “force is again the only criterion of truth,” and suspending all relations with the Alliance under the terms of the Founding Act in protest.78 With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Russian special mediator on 14 April 1999, however, hostile rhetoric was moderated. Together with the European Union’s senior Kosovo envoy, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin played a critical role in the negotiations that brought an end to the conflict on the basis of UN Resolution 1244 on 10 June. But Russian concerns about the implications of the NATO action remained intact. Moscow’s engagement in the mediation process, and willingness to participate in the KFOR were born, like acquiescence in NATO enlargement, less of enthusiasm than of a desire to limit damage.

Despite its diplomatic efforts, Moscow’s request for a separate occupation zone inside Kosovo was turned down. In reaction, an expanded Russian airborne company was brought in from Bosnia-Herzegovina on short notice on 11-12 June to occupy Priština’s Slatina airport in advance of the arrival of the KFOR contingent. The tense standoff that followed was resolved diplomatically, but the incident could easily have given rise to an armed confrontation between Russian and NATO forces–a measure of the risks involved in the strategic cat and mouse game being played out in the Balkan conflict zone. Russia emerged from the Kosovo conflict highly concerned for its strategic implications, frustrated by what it perceived as marginalization in the peacekeeping operation, and with relations with NATO in tatters.

Russia’s retrospective objections to Western policy in Kosovo have been consistent and intense.79 The decision to intervene militarily is first of all excoriated as an example of the low regard in which Moscow is held in Western capitals. The issues in Kosovo were not unambiguous. If Serbian repression was extreme, it came in response to real provocations, and in no way could the U.S. or its major allies be said to have had vital interests at stake. Unilateral intervention, in defiance of Russia, was the result nonetheless.

The Kosovo conflict is also portrayed as an integral part of a policy continuum where Russia’s own national interests are at stake. The core issue is “what Europe itself will become in the new century, with whom and in what direction it will evolve.”80 Moscow’s greatest fear is the emergence of a consolidating western Europe subordinated to the U.S. and expanding against Russia–an enlarged Euro-Atlantic community from which the Russian Federation would be effectively excluded. In order to avoid such an outcome, maintaining leverage within the central European corridor is vital. Russia is a traditional Balkan power, and it has close cultural and political ties to the region. Moreover, deeply rooted instabilities guarantee that local actors will continue to search for external sponsorship. Southeastern Europe is one of the only European regions where Moscow can still aspire to play the role of a major power, and engagement in the region has become a critical foundation for its entire European policy. NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, inspired by what Viktor Kremeniuk has called the effort “to create a Europe where Russia has no place,” is therefore interpreted as a major challenge.81

The precedent of unilateral action outside of the UN framework was particularly disturbing. The Security Council veto remains one of the few levers of power that a weakened Russia is able to call on to shape the international environment to its advantage. Well prior to the Kosovo crisis the U.S. had consistently maintained that as a regional security forum NATO should not be constrained by an absolute requirement for a UN mandate, and that under special circumstances independent action might be unavoidable. The U.S. position was not consistently supported even by its closest allies, however, and it was usually assumed that such action would only be forthcoming in the most extreme cases. In the case of Kosovo, much of the pressure for independent action was selfimposed by the extraordinary ultimatum presented to Serbia at the Rambouillet negotiating sessions.

Moscow has also portrayed the Kosovo conflict as a “trial run” for a strategic worst case scenario–the use of NATO forces, operating from forward bases in central Europe obtained as a result of the enlargement process, as an instrument for military intervention in a conflict on the Russian periphery, or even within the federation itself. In the wake of Kosovo, NATO was widely depicted in Russian strategic discourse as “the primary and by far the most serious threat not only to Russian national interests but also to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent and sovereign state.”82

The efficiency of NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia only served to reinforce Moscow’s heightened sense of threat perception. Though Yugoslavia’s conventional forces do not seem to have been degraded by the air campaign to the extent originally announced, and though without Russian mediation the war could have been much more protracted and difficult, NATO had demonstrated its capacity to function effectively as a war-fighting alliance.83 The conduct of the air war was operationally impressive, and the Alliance’s overwhelming technical edge left Serbia virtually defenseless. If Operation Allied Force was intended to intimidate, it must certainly have achieved its purpose.

Russian reactions to the Kosovo crisis have been conditioned by national weakness and limited options. Moscow did not have the capacity to prevent a decision for the use of force. Once that decision had been made, its goal became to limit damage and avoid isolation. NATO’s own strategic miscalculations were of some service in this regard. The original choice for limited bombing strikes was premised on the assumption that after two or three days of punishment, Milosevic would make discretion the better part of valor and cave in to Alliance demands. When this scenario did not play out, Russian influence in Belgrade became a significant asset in the search for a negotiated solution. Chernomyrdin’s ability to pressure Belgrade was critical to the endgame that brought the war to a close, but even here Russia was able to glean precious little advantage. Its core demand for a zone of occupation was refused, the role to which it was assigned under KFOR was modest, and it was made clear to all that NATO would call the shots on the ground inside the occupied province.

4. The Aftermath of Kosovo.

In August 1998 Russian financial markets collapsed, shattering hopes for a long awaited economic recovery. In March 1999, NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia, and in the following summer Russia launched a new military offensive against the rebellious province of Chechnya. On New Year’s Eve 2000, El’tsin resigned as Russia’s President, and in March 2000 acting President Vladimir Putin was formally elected to a five year mandate. Putin’s popularity had soared on the wings of public support for the crackdown in the northern Caucasus, widely perceived as a long overdue gesture of national reassertion. The conjuncture of these events–the discrediting of El’tsin’s reform cause as a result of fiscal collapse, the aggravation of threat perception provoked by Kosovo, the accession of a younger and more dynamic ruler, and Russia’s harsh self-assertion in Chechnya–has given rise to a new climate of relations between Russia and the West with sobering military and strategic implications.

In the months following the Kosovo imbroglio the Russian Federation issued the texts of a new National Security Concept and National Military Strategy. Although they had been in the making for some time, the texts coincided with the reformulation of priorities associated with post-Kosovo re-evaluations.84 Both documents reflect a competitive, “statist” interpretation of Russian national interests and represent a clear rejection of the liberal policies that inspired Russian security policy at the outset of the El’tsin era.85

The first variant of a national security policy issued by the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry in February 1992 placed the emphasis upon Russia’s aspiration to join the “civilized” West.86 The 1993 version of a Russian military doctrine abandoned the traditional Soviet negation of first-use nuclear options, but it did not single out external threats for special mention.87 El’tsin’s 1997 national security concept was more outspoken in asserting the need for a “multipolar” world order, but the concept presumed Russia’s role as a major power acting in concert with its peers. The 1997 Concept down played external threats, and emphasized the primacy of internal dilemmas born of poor economic performance, social frustration, and the slow pace of reform.88 In sharp contrast, the revised Concept, approved by Acting President Putin on 10 January 2000, highlights external threats, and specifically cites NATO unilateralism as a threat to world peace.89

The most challenging assertion to emerge from the texts is a new emphasis upon the role of Russia’s nuclear forces, both as a foundation for deterrence and as a means for prevailing in theater contingencies where vital interests are perceived to be at stake. In the 1993 Military Doctrine, first use of nuclear weapons was accepted in the case of attack by a nuclear armed adversary, or by a state allied with a nuclear power, and in the event that the “existence” of the Russian Federation was put at risk. The 2000 version sanctions the first use of nuclear weapons to “repulse armed aggression” by a conventionally armed adversary, even if that adversary is not bound to a nuclear armed ally. These assertions are unfortunately not merely rhetorical flourishes. Russia maintains a large tactical nuclear arsenal, and in June 1999 Russian military exercises simulating a response to conventional attack against the Kaliningrad enclave culminated with a Russian counter-attack spearheaded by tactical nuclear strikes.

President Putin was propelled into power by the “short, victorious war” in Chechnya, he has publicly committed to a doubling of the military budget, and he has stressed the importance of rebuilding Russian military power. The road back to military credibility will be a long one, but in the wake of Kosovo, the commitment seems to have been made.

Putin’s military initiatives have been accompanied by renewed commitment to pragmatic cooperation with the West, by a reassuring rhetoric of accommodation, and by an effort to reestablish a Russia-NATO connection. Russia remains significantly engaged with NATO in both SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with a commitment of 3,250 troops) and KFOR in Kosovo (where it commits some 1,200 troops), and it has cautiously revived its dialogue with the Alliance under the aegis of the Founding Act.90 A visit to Moscow by Secretary General Robertson in February 2000, including a meeting with President Putin, concluded with a joint statement pledging to “pursue a vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues.”91 Progress promised to be slow, and lack of clarity about long-term goals remained intact. On 5 March 2000, Putin provocatively remarked to the BBC’s David Frost that he “would not rule out” the possibility of Russia’s eventually joining NATO, moving Robertson to respond that “at present Russian membership is not on the agenda.”92

Expectations must be modest, but there is a viable agenda for renewed NATO-Russia collaboration. At present, much of Russia’s military hierarchy perceives the Alliance as a threat. Expanded military-to-military contacts can help dilute such perceptions and groom a new generation of Russian officers more accustomed to collaboration. Official representation for NATO in Moscow would represent an important step forward. With its own substantial military traditions and priorities firmly in place, Russia is not likely to embrace PfP in the way that its Ukrainian counterpart has done. It would however benefit from a renewal of dialogue in areas such as nuclear safety, civil emergency procedures, peace operations, and officer retraining. There is a great amount of work to be done in fixing common understandings concerning doctrinal issues, regional threats, and world order concerns.93

Cooperation is proceeding in other areas as well. Negotiations leading toward a revision of the CFE treaty were sustained despite the distractions of Kosovo and Chechnya, and on Putin’s watch they have been brought to a successful conclusion (though the war in Chechnya has prevented Russia from coming into compliance with new flank limits, and blocked U.S. ratification).94 The Russian Duma has also been brought around to ratify the START II strategic arms control treaty, though with the significant condition that the U.S. give up the effort to revise the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Putin has repeatedly asserted his desire to improve relations with Europe, and there is no need to doubt his sincerity. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner, with over 45 percent of total trade, and commercial transactions are on the rise. It is also the single most important source of direct foreign investment in Russia. Russia ranks sixth among EU trading partners, and in key sectors such as energy its role is critical.95 Over half the grants made under the EU’s TACIS program are earmarked for the Russian Federation, and many (in the areas of military training, nuclear safeguards, chemical weapons conversion, and crime prevention) are security related. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia on Corfu in 1994, and in 1998 a Russia-EU Partnership Council was created. As a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EAPC, and the PJC, Russia is already integrated into Europe’s overlapping institutional structure and does not risk isolation. Moscow cannot afford a decisive break with the West, and it is not in her interest to pursue or provoke one.

The halcyon days of “strategic partnership” are nonetheless a thing of the past. Kosovo has substantiated a focused threat that Russia will seek to neutralize with a long term commitment to rebuilding the foundations of national power, including military power. Chechnya has weakened the Western commitment to assist Russia, and outstanding issues such as the American commitment to national missile defense and the NATO enlargement agenda remain divisive. U.S. engagement on behalf of the new independent states is a source of continuing aggravation and concern. Transatlantic friction could also come into play, should Russia turn back to the old Soviet effort to leverage divisions within the Alliance to its own advantage.96

NATO’s war in Kosovo and Russia’s second round of fighting in Chechnya have probably put paid to any hopes of making the Russian Federation a functioning part of a recast Euro-Atlantic security system in the near future. The line of division that separates the Russian Federation and the West, including the “grey zone” in central Europe, but also the faultline between the U.S. European and Central Commands stretching through the Caucasus and Caspian Sea into distant Central Asia, will remain a volatile and conflict prone shatterbelt where a traditional politics of force and intimidation may have a future as well as a past.

Numerous countervailing tendencies make it unlikely that inevitable friction will sweep out of control. Russia is nowhere near to being in a position to contemplate the use of force outside the immediate vicinity of its frontiers. The interests of its dominant oligarchy do not include suicidal confrontation with great power rivals that it cannot hope to overcome. Military exposure may be rhetorically decried as intolerable, but military effectiveness is a function of many attributes, including social cohesion and morale, leadership, economic viability, technological sophistication, and national purpose, that post-Soviet Russia has not been able to sustain. The currently preferred option of increased reliance on the nuclear option is an essentially defensive expedient. In cases where Russian and Western interests have clashed, Moscow has been careful to avoid confrontation. Weakness and a concomitant lack of alternatives have pushed it, almost inexorably, toward policies of accommodation.

The most salient short-term threats to Russian national interests lie along the Federation’s southern flank. The most pressing long-term security dilemma may well concern relations with China in the Far East. On the European front, although flash points are not lacking, security challenges are likely to be much less pressing. Indeed, one might argue that despite its current weakness, Moscow confronts fewer direct challenges on its western marches at the present moment than ever before in its long history.

The West should take account of the relatively benign regional security environment in crafting its own policies. The harsher edges of Russia’s current strategic discourse give no cause for alarm–exaggerated selfassertion and distancing rhetoric are typical defensive mechanisms for weak states confronted by the real and imagined pretenses of the strong. The Putin leadership has made clear its desire to pursue a pragmatic relationship with the U.S. and its European allies. The case of Chechnya, though tragic, does not threaten the West. Russia will continue to angle for influence in the post-Soviet space, but is not in a position to use force to achieve its goal. The nuclear card in her current security doctrine bespeaks weakness, not strength. Even the NATO enlargement agenda, if pursued gradually and in the context of a positive and expanding NATO-Russian relationship presided over by a dynamic PJC, need not become confrontational. The vision of a Europe whole and at peace, embedded in a stable Euro-Atlantic community and open to cooperation with its neighbors, is a positive vision for Moscow as well.

NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine: Promise and Limits

Three years have passed since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Agreement on Distinctive Partnership, enough time for the respective special relationships to demonstrate both strengths and limitations. The agreements have clearly contributed to the overarching goals that inspired them: “to engage with Russia and Ukraine … to help them through their post-communist transition rather than abandon them to it, and to demonstrate to former adversaries that membership in European institutions was neither a dream nor a false promise.”97 The agreements are not sufficient unto themselves, however, as mechanisms for helping Kyiv and Moscow turn the corner of transition, or to integrate with the West. The NATO-Ukrainian partnership has been dynamic and successful, but on a limited scale. NATO-Russia ties have been troubled, though in the end, even under the severe strains of the Kosovo crisis, they have not snapped. The framework provided by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Charter is vitally important to the effort to forge a new Euro-Atlantic security order, but much more will be required if the process is to be seen through to a successful conclusion. The NATO-Ukraine relationship functions well within the parameters defined by Ukrainian neutrality. Kyiv needs Western assistance to promote the modernization of its armed forces, and leverage to sustain sovereignty against subtle Russian pressure. It needs reassurance in the face of the severe dislocations provoked by a difficult post-communist transition, and access to European institutions to sustain popular morale in a time of hardship. NATO has been able to offer technical assistance, positive engagement in Euro-Atlantic security structures, and long-term prospects for closer association. Its engagement with Ukraine helps reinforce geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, wards off the perception of an emerging security vacuum, and makes the Alliance a relevant actor in a vital geostrategic area.

The limits to NATO-Ukrainian cooperation derive both from Ukraine’s domestic weakness, and concern for possible Russian reactions. The threat of domestic instability will remain on Ukraine’s agenda for some time to come, and in the best of circumstances Kyiv will require a decade and more to prepare for accession to Western institutions. The Russian factor is more troublesome in the short term. In the wake of the first round of NATO enlargement, Foreign Minister Primakov spoke dramatically of a “red line” equivalent to the former Soviet border, beyond which NATO could not be allowed to penetrate. Pragmatic cooperation has already breached that line, but there is no sign that Russia has any intention of abandoning its strong opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO. For the time being, and in view of NATO’s desire to avoid confrontation with the Russian Federation, the NATO-Ukraine relationship must remain limited to nation assistance and security coordination, useful but not decisive in defining a new European security architecture.

The NATO-Russian relationship got off to a promising start, with strong backing from Russian President El’tsin. In the wake of Kosovo, and under the new direction of Putin, relations have become clouded. Putin has nonetheless initiated an attempt to rebuild the foundation of cooperation suspended during the Kosovo operations, and it is vital for the effort to succeed. NATO-Russian relations are hampered by a legacy of hostility and mistrust, Russia has little to offer the Alliance that is not of essentially symbolic value, and the search for accommodation severely constrains NATO’s range of available options. The work of the PJC has been uneven and its real achievements are modest. Nevertheless, some kind of formal relationship with the Russian Federation is absolutely necessary if a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security structure is ever to take form. Russia is a once and future great power, it is led by an astute and purposeful leader, and it has the capacity to disrupt Western security planning if its interests are not taken into account. Cultivating positive ties with Moscow will be difficult, but the effort must be made.

Whether Russia itself will be amenable to such a relationship remains to be seen. Policy council in Moscow is divided, between optimistic evaluations of the potential for collaboration with the West, and pessimistic assessments, particularly well represented within the military hierarchy, that stress the limits of such aspirations and the need for more autonomous national policies. NATO has excluded bringing the Russian Federation inside the Alliance’s decision-making cycle, and it has not hesitated to act in defiance of Moscow if circumstances are perceived to require it. These choices reduce the amount of leverage that the Alliance can hope to assert upon a hesitant Russian partner. Under Putin Moscow seems to be returning to the familiar Soviet strategy of weakening NATO by playing off inevitable transatlantic disagreements. Frustration over the course of events in Kosovo, opposition to Washington’s national missile defense program, and recent debate over the European commitment to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity provide grist to the mill of these efforts. If the Founding Act can be made to function in accordance with its original charter, it will provide space for a more self-confident Russia “to play upon allied rivalry or discord,” and for the NATO allies “to enlist the Russians by one means or another in stratagems to influence the outcome of debates.”98 Resulting friction will be a part of the price that the Alliance must pay to keep Russia engaged.

Rebuilding NATO-Russian relations on the basis of the Founding Act represents the immediate task at hand. Russia cannot simply be brought whole into Western institutions, nor is it clear that it would desire to move in that direction even if it could. Constructive engagement with the West is the only reasonable option. But NATORussian cooperation is fated to remain tentative and fragile. There is a danger, which the Kosovo crisis exposed, in trying prematurely to institutionalize a relationship that lacks underlying substance. That substance needs to be created, by emphasizing a wide variety of interactions and building on small, positive initiatives.

The materials for constructing a more hopeful relationship are at hand. The momentum of NATO-Russian collaboration is hardy, and will be furthered. The goal, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, should be “as much cooperation between NATO and Russia as possible.”99 The successful conclusion of a revised CFE treaty despite the Kosovo episode is a sign of the prospects for pragmatic cooperation in areas where both sides share mutual interests. Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR works well on the tactical level and provides a positive example of collaborative effort. To fully realize the promise of Russian cooperation with the West, however, major impediments, such as the issue of further rounds of NATO expansion, will need to be resolved. Progress in working toward negotiated solutions for unresolved flash points in the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans, and the Black Sea and Transcaucasus region will likewise be critical. NATO’s relations with Russia and Ukraine are too frail to bear the weight of these overlapping agendas left to their own devises. They are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of the kind of Euro-Atlantic collective security system that the Alliance favors. As such, however, they are absolutely vital. NATO’s cooperation with Russia and Ukraine should be pursued without unrealistic expectations, but diligently, consistently, and for the long haul.

Endnotes
1 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Foes as Friends?,” Foreign Policy, No. 90, Spring 1993, p. 156.
2 Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 8.
3 “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe: Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991,” NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Pres, 1992, pp. 22.
4 Cited in P. E. Tyler, “Pentagon New World Order: US to Reign Supreme,” The International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1992, pp. 1-2. After premature release, this document was repudiated by the administration of George Bush.
5 “Rome Declaration on Peace Cooperation,” in NATO Communiques 1991, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992, pp. 26-27.
6 Ibid.
7 The idea for the NACC had its origins in a joint declaration by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 10 May 1991. See “Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” in NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, June 1991, pp. 28-29.
8 “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Transition,” AUSA Background Brief, No. 81, April 1999, p.7.
9 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP) After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999.
10 Current Membership Action Plan participants are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
11 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Review, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. D7-D13.
12 Cited in Geir Lundestad, “ ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1996,” in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes, eds., The United States and the European Alliance since 1945, Oxford: Berg, 1999, p. 34.
13 Remarks by the President in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Washington, D.C.: Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1 August 1991.
14 Nadia Schadlow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security,” in Lubomyr A. Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 271-283.
15 See F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine: Europe’s Next Crisis?,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 6, July-August 1994, pp. 14-16.
16 Paul Kubicek, “Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 103-126, and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Presidentialism in Ukraine: A Mid-Term Review of the Second Presidency,” Democratization, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 152-171.
17 “Ukraine at Five: A Progress Report on U.S. Policy,” speech by Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State, to The Washington Group 1996 Leadership Conference, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1996, p. 2, cited from http:www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/10-11tal.htlm.
18 “Introduction,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 4. The authors limit their attention to the “traditional” Third World, but the concept is relevant to states such as Ukraine.
19 John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May-June 1996, p. 62.
20 Derek Mueller, Jeronim Perovic, and Andreas Wenger, “The New Approach to Russian Security in the Context of the Programme for Change,” Aussenpolitik , No. 1, 1998, pp. 28-31, and Leonid Maiorov and Dimitri Afinogenov, “Vazhneishie napravleniia integratsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 February 1998.
21 On geopolitical pluralism see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January-February 1995, p. 31.
22 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Relationship,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 2-3.
23 Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” p. 31, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, March-April 1994, p. 80.
24 The Polish-Ukrainian relationship has been in this regard somewhat neglected. See Ian J. Brzezinski, “Polish- Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 26-37.
25 Adrian Kartnycky, “The Ukrainian Factor,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 107.
26 James Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Trouble,” in Charles Dick and Anne Aldis, eds., Central and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects, Camberly: Conflict Studies Research Center Occasional Paper No. 37, December 1998, p. 115.
27 See the summary of U.S. intelligence assessments predicting severe social and political instability in Ukraine in Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Dire U.S. Forecast for Ukrainian Conflict,” The International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1994.
28 For the text see Uriadovyi Kur’ier, 4 February 1997, pp. 5-6.
29 Gwendolyn Sasse, “Fueling Nation-State Building: Ukraine’s Energy Dependence on Russia,” Central Asian and Caucasia Prospects Briefing No. 17, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1998.
30 John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, McNair Paper 42, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies and National Defense University, August 1995.
31 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 develops the argument expertly.
32 William Zimmerman, “Is Ukraine a Political Community?,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-55.
33 Nadia Diuk, “Ukraine: A Land In Between,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1998, pp. 97-111.
34 “Kutschma klare Wahlsieger in der Ukraine: Internationale Beobachter registrieren zahlreiche Verstösse,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 November 1999.
35 John Morrison makes the apt observation that the Russian-Ukrainian relationship represents for eastern Europe what the German-French relationship represents for western Europe. John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Friendship,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, October 1993, p. 677.
36 James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 33-50.
37 E. Cherkasova, “Sevastopol: Eshche raz o territorial’noi probleme,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, pp. 108-114.
38 Aleksei Bogaturov, “Rossiia i ‘geopoliticheskii pliuralizm’ zapada,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 12, 1994, pp. 83-84.
39 The most cogent statements of the position are by Aleksandr Dugin, Misterii Evrazii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1996, and especially Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997.
40 For the “keystone” metaphor see Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1997.
41 See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” Current History, Vol. 97, No. 621, October 1998, pp. 342-346.
42 Alexander J. Motyl, “Making Sense of Ukraine,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 1-7.
43 See the account in Sherr, “Ukraine’s New Time of Troubles,” pp. 128-131.
44 For the text see “Charter On a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” NATO Review, No. 4, July-August 1997, pp. 5-6.
45 Margarita M. Balmaceda, “Ukraine, Russia, and European Security: Thinking Beyond NATO Expansion,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45, No. 1, January-February 1998, p. 23.
46 Olga Alexandrova, “The NATO-Ukrainian Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration,” Aussenpolitik , No. 4, 1997, pp. 325-336.
47 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum, No. 167, August 1999, pp. 1-9.
48 Lidiia Leont’eva, “Aspekti psikhologichnoi borot’bi: U konteksti konteptsii natsional’noi bezpeki Ukraini,” Viis’ko Ukraini, 7 August 1997, p. 17.
49 Taras Kuzio, “Nato Enlargement: The View From the East,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 48-62.
50 Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Papers No. 55, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, October 1996.
51 John Jaworsky, “Ukraine’s Armed Forces and Military Policy,” in Hayda, ed., Ukraine in the World, pp. 223-247.
52 Stephen A. Cambone, “NATO Enlargement: Implications for the Military Dimension of Ukraine’s Security,” The Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 8-18.
53 Vladimir Belous, “Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 159-171.
54 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 116.
55 Dmitri Zaks, “Russians Bristle at NATO Sea Breeze,” The Moscow Times, 26 August 1997.
56 Anatol Lieven, “Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997, p. 70. The argument, supportive of engagement with Ukraine but tempered by restraint, is developed at greater length in Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999.
57 Bruce Russett and Alan C. Stam, “Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 3, 1998, pp. 361-382.
58 Col. Stephen D. Olynyk, USAR (Ret.), “The State of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” The Officer, November 1997, pp. 25-28.
59 Andrei V. Kozyrev, “Russia and Human Rights,” Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 282-296.
60 G. Vorontsov, “Ot Khelsinki k ‘obshcheevropeiskomu domu’,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1988, pp. 40-45.
61 Charles Krupnick, “Europe’s Intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe’s Emerging Security Structure,” European Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 30-51.
62 Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1997, pp. 706-710, and James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.
63 Kozyrev asserted that “Russia will have no objection if NATO does not take an aggressive stance in respect of Russia. This [Polish membership in the Alliance] is a matter of Poland and NATO.” Cited from Vasilii Safronchuk, “NATO Summit Seen As Shame for Russia,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 9 July 1997, p. 3.
64 See S. Rogov, “Rasshirenie NATO i Rossiia,” Morskoi sbornik , No. 7, 1997, pp. 15-19.
65 Igor Maslov, “Russia and NATO: A Critical Period,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 1-15, and Aleksei Podberezkin, “Geostrategicheskoe polozhenie i bezopasnosti Rossii,” Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 7, 1996, pp. 90-97.
66 Iu. P. Davidov, “Rossiia i NATO: Posle bala,” SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, No. 1, 1998, p. 3.
67 Primakov’s remark is cited rom S. Kondrashev, “U nas svoe litso, i my nigde ne skatyvalis’ k konfrontatsii,” Izvestiia, 23 December 1997, p. 3. See also Alexander A. Sergounin, “Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 55-71, and for a summary of the preferred Russian strategic response N. N. Afanasievskii, “Rossiia-NATO: Kurs na sotrudnichestvo,” Orientir, No. 7, 1997, pp. 9-11.
68 For a lucid and thorough evaluation of Russian reactions to NATO enlargement see J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000.
69 Youri Roubinskii, “La Russie et l’OTAN: Une nouvelle étape?,” Politique etrangérè, Vol. 62, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 553.
70 For the text in English and Russian see “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation,” European Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 158-168, and “Osnovopolagaiushchii Akt o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh. Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora,” Krasnaia zvezda, 29 May 1997, p. 3.
71 Hans-Henning Schroeder, ” ‘… it’s good for America, it’s good for Europe, and it’s good for Russia …’: Russland und die NATO nach der Unterzeichnung der ‘Grundakte’,” Osteuropa, Vol. 48, No. 5, May 1998, p. 447.
72 Fergus Carr and Paul Flenly, “NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1999, p. 99.
73 Articulated in A. Kvashnin, “Rossiia i NATO zainteresovany v rasshirenii voennogo sotrudnichestva,” Krasnaia zvezda, 4 September 1998. See also the critique in P. Ivanova and B. Khalosha, “Rossiia-NATO: Shto dal’she?,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 6, 1999, pp. 5-15.
74 Gregory B. Hall, “NATO and Russia, Russians and NATO: A Turning Point in Post-Cold War East-West Relations?,” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 25.
75 Cited in Kav’er Solana, “NATO-Rossiia: Pervyi god stabil’nogo provizheniia vpered,” Novosti NATO, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-May 1998, p. 1.
76 R. Craig Nation, “US Policy and the Kosovo Crisis,” The International Spectator, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 23-39.
77 See V. K. Volkov, “Tragediia Iugoslavii,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, No. 5, 1994, pp. 22-31, and R. Craig Nation, “La Russia, la Serbia, e il conflitto jugoslavo,” Europa, Europe, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996, pp. 171-192.
78 A. Matveyev, “Washington’s Claims to World Leadership,” International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 5, 1999, p. 53.
79 See the evaluations in Dmitri Trenin, ed., Kosovo: Mezhdunarodnye aspekty krizisa, Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 1999.
80 V. Kuvaldin, “Iugoslovenskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 9, 1999, p. 22.
81 See Kremeniuk’s intervention in “Balkanskii krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura , No. 10, October 1999, p. 42. This round table discussion provides a interesting survey of Russian perspectives on the Kosovo conflict.
82 Viktor Gobarev, “Russia-NATO Relations After the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1999, p. 11.
83 For the controversy over the effectiveness of NATO’s air war inside Kosovo see “The Kosovo Cover-Up,” Newsweek, 15 May 2000, pp. 22-26.
84 For the texts see “Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt,” Krasnaia zvezda, 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4.
85 Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 7-12.
86 See the text in International Affairs, No. 3, April-May 1992.
87 See the text in Izvestiia, 18 November 1993, pp. 1-4.
88 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5.
89 “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimaia Voennoe Obozrenie, 14 January 2000, and “Russia’s National Security Concept,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 15-20.
90 Susan LaFraniere, “Russia Mends Broken Ties With NATO,” The Washington Post, 17 February 2000, pp. A1 and A23, and Michael Wines, “Russia and NATO, Split Over Kosovo, Agree to Renew Relations,” The New York Times, 17 February 2000, p. A11.
91 “Join Statement On the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, in Moscow on16 February 2000,” NATO Review, Vol.48, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 20.
92 Cited from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0003080103.htm.
93 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces,” NATO Review, Vol. 48, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 19-22.
94 Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 6, September/October 1999, pp. 15-19.
95 Heinz Timmermann, “Russland: Strategischer Partner der Europeischen Union? Interessen, Impulse, Widersprüche,” Osteuropa, No. 10, 1999, pp. 991-1009.
96 See Iu. P. Davydov, “Rossiia-NATO: O poiskakh perspektivy,” SShA-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kul’tura, No. 1, 1999, p. 21.
97 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Rebalancing NATO for a Strong Future,” ROA National Security Report; The Officer, March 2000, p. 1.
98 Michael Brenner, Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 88.
99 “U.S. Ambassador to NATO On NATO-Russian Relations,” Security Issues Digest, No. 91, 10 May 2000, p. 4.

http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/nation.pdf [pdf]


Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a broadcaster funded by the U.S. Congress that provides news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East “where the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed”.[3] RFE/RL is supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a bi-partisan federal agency overseeing all U.S. international broadcasting services.[4]

Founded as a propaganda news source in 1949 by the National Committee for a Free Europe, RFE/RL received funds from the Central Intelligence Agency until 1972.[5][6] During the earliest years of Radio Free Europe’s existence, the CIA and the U.S. Department of State issued broad policy directives, and a system evolved where broadcast policy was determined through negotiation between the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and RFE staff.[7]

RFE/RL was headquartered at Englischer Garten in Munich, Germany, from 1949 to 1995. In 1995, the headquarters were moved to Prague in the Czech Republic. European operations have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War. In addition to the headquarters, the service maintains 20 local bureaus in countries throughout their broadcast region, as well as a corporate office in Washington, D.C. RFE/RL broadcasts in 28 languages[8] to 21 countries[9] including Armenia, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.[10]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFE Logo.png

RFE/RL official logo
RFE Broadcast Regions crop.jpg

RFE/RL Broadcast Region 2009
Abbreviation RFE/RL
Motto Free Media in Unfree Societies
Formation 1949 (Radio Free Europe), 1953 (Radio Liberty), 1976 (merger)
Type private, non-profit Sec 501(c)3 corporation
Purpose/focus Broadcast Media
Headquarters Prague Broadcast Center
Location Prague
Official languages English; programs are also available in Albanian, Armenian, Arabic, Avar, Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Bosnian, Belarusian, Chechen, Circassian, Crimean Tatar, Dari, Georgian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Pashto, Persian, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Ukrainian, Uzbek
President Kevin Klose (since January 26, 2013);[1] Dennis Mulhaupt is Chair of RFE’s corporate board (since October 2010).[2]
Parent organization Broadcasting Board of Governors
Budget $83,161,000 (FY 08)
Staff 497
Website http://www.rferl.org

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Europe/Radio_Liberty


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What is the #Harper Delegation to #Ukraine hiding from #cdnpoli? #CPC #GPC #NDP #LPC

We would like to probe and issue that will most surely have dire consequences regarding the escalating situation in Ukraine. For this summary article we will purposely exclude the propaganda that is being repeated by virtually all of the msm outlets and conglomerates as they are readily available elsewhere and more than likely already embedded into your subconscious via the unrelenting narrative. Instead we will take this opportunity to explore the darker information that has been hidden in plain sight all along.

We believe that this seemingly purposeful commission is the most troubling aspect of the Regime’s delegation that is completely outta touch with reality as the history and run up to WW1 and WW2 has shown us, it only takes one useful idiot and some carefully crafted propaganda to spark a war of epic proportions and collapse the entire global economy as well as millions of lives that are lost, displaced and impoverished for generations. Typically politicians are usually self-serving dupes serving the interests of globalist investors that hide behind the scenes as advisers.

It is also worth noting that, as far as we are concerned, the entire Harper Party along with the Opposition Party’s and all of the msm conglomerates are either intentionally and/or conveniently following the narratives from “both” sides, ignoring and/or simply ignorant of the facts on the ground as well as history and/or willingly complicit and/or being truly opportunistic capitalists by purposely suggesting that this is a battle between the “democratic” EU and the “repressive” Kremlin in this violent uprising. More simply the msm keeps reporting this as a battle being waged by Putin’s Russia to prevent Ukraine’s “integration” into the EU. If so, the Right Sector that is controlling the ground in Ukraine is having none of that as they are against any integration into either side of the equation.

Below are 5 points to ponder and as you review the information below and keep in mind that the leader of the Right Sector was also fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan at the same time that Osama bin Laden’s Muhajahadeen, predecessors to the modern day al Qaeda, were fighting the Soviets. This would seem rather important considering the seemingly never-ending and long lasting implications that the multi-trillion dollar “War on Terror” has brought forth, not to mention the countless lives and casualties of innocent civilians caught in the chaos and destruction as well as the thousands upon thousands of affected Military personnel that thought they were fighting for our collective freedom.

  • Why is the Harper Regime playing partisan games with the Ukraine issues and what are they hiding besides the neo-nazi fascist Svoboda Party and the paramilitary Right Sector’s involvement?
  • Is this simply another attempt at pandering for votes like the 9 figure pilgrimage to Israel or is something more sinister at play?
  • Why is the focus of the msm being shifted to Crimea exclusively, with daytime images, propaganda and video being repeated, and away from the radically right-wing controlled Maidan in Kiev, with nighttime images and video being repeated?
  • Why is there such an absence of any reporting from any of the other regions in a rather large and diverse country?
  • Will these unseen events eventually lead to perpetual civil wars that will spill across all borders in all nations or simply be isolated with Ukraine?

Below are several interviews that should be read, re-read and shared to really understand some of the underlying powers structures now that the Ukraine vacuum has been created. Keep in mind that this is essentially the “militia” that now controls the security services for all intents and purposes…

Interview with Dmytro Yarosh, Leader of Right Sector

7 Feb 2014

YaroshUkrains’ka Pravda, 4 February 2014, 15:59

Dmytro Yarosh, Leader of Right Sector: When 80% of the Country Does Not Support the Regime, There Can’t be a Civil War

An Interview by Mustafa Nayyem and Oksana Kovalenko (Translated from Ukrainian by William Risch)

Dmytro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, has been the least well-known figure over the past two months. Just two weeks ago, only a narrow circle of people involved with organizing the Euromaidan even knew about the very existence of the Sector and Yarosh. Today, it’s impossible not to describe events in Kyiv without mentioning Right Sector.

On January 19, after events on Hrushevskyi Street started, world media exploded with fiery scenes of young guys with Molotov cocktails and masks over their faces. Right Sector’s actions tore the term “peaceful protest” to pieces, but at the same time, Right Sector forced the regime to listen to the Maidan and repeal the January 16 laws.

The headquarters of this still informal group is on the fifth floor of the Trade Unions’ Building. Photography is forbidden in the hallway, numerous matresses are spread on the floor, next to which, besides wood and metal sticks, lay textbooks – most of Right Sector’s members are young guys of university age.

We met Dmytro Yarosh in one of the floor’s offices – two by three meters – where Right Sector press conferences usually take place. Here, too, is the fully-equipped office for the sector’s leader. Three guys with walkie-talkies, dressed in camouflage, with masks over their heads, man the office’s “reception room.”

THEY CALL ME A HAWK IN TRIDENT

What is your personal story, and what have you done with your life?

I am leader of the all-Ukrainian organization, Stepan Bandera Trident. I have been involved in public life for the past 25 years. I’m from Dniprodzerzhyns’k, in the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’ (Region). I raised the first blue-and-yellow flag in April 1989 in Dniprodzerzhyns’k.

I was one of the founders of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh). I was a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union; in 1989 I received recommendations (to join it) from Levko Luk’ianenko and Stepan Khmara in Moscow, on the Arbat, where we picketed then for the renewal of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’s activities. Since 1994, as a founder of the Stepan Bandera Trident, I have had various positions in it: first as leader of Trident’s city structure, then as leader of its oblast’ structure, then its regional one, and so on.

I was commander of the organization from 1996 to 1999, then I was chief inspector of Trident, then I became commander of the organization again, then I passed on my duties as chief commander to my successor, Andriy Stempits’kyi. I’ve actually spent a lifetime in this. I have been trained as an instructor of Ukrainian language and literature, and in 2001, I finished the Drohobych Pedagogical University in the Philological Faculty.

How did Right Sector emerge?

There was a big protest in Kyiv on November 24-25 because of the decision to cancel the Eurointegration program. In general, Trident is not an active supporter of any integration processes, but we announced that we would create Right Sector as a platform for coordinating the actions of various revolutionary-oriented groups, because to a considerable degree, from the very beginning, we were perfectly aware that we couldn’t live in the system of state structures that has existed up to now.

Right Sector fully emerged after the events of November 30, when we went out to protest on Mykhailivs’kyi Square.

It was there that we started training and getting our defenses ready. Then we were at the Maidan all the time, and we entered the Maidan’s self-defense force. Other organizations that entered Right Sector were Trident, UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self Defense), and Carpathian Sich from the Subcarpathians.

Have you conducted training before?

Yes, for 20 years. We already have a lot of generations who have been changed by it. My kids were small at one time, and now my daughter is 20 years old, and she’s spent her whole life in Trident.

Trident is an organization with narrow operations, like an order of knights. We have three specific tasks: propagandizing the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as interpreted by Stepan Bandera; raising up Ukrainian youth in a spirit of patriotism; and national defense activity, that is, defending the honor and dignity of the Ukrainian nation in all forms by all methods and means available.

In general, Ukrainian nationalism and Banderites are not narrow-minded plebs with sadistic tendencies; these are intellectuals, people who write, who publish, who are involved not just in using force. Trident is an organization that produces certain ideas.

We are not a political party. In Trident, we’re even forbidden from taking state jobs.

Serhiy Kvit, President of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, is among Trident’s well-known members. He’s my good friend and comrade. At one time, he was a sotnyk in our organization. There’s also Petro Ivanyshyn, a doctor of philology, head of an academic department at the Drohobych Pedagogical University, who was also a sotnyk.

Where exactly do these training sessions take place?

At camps throughout Ukraine: Dnipropetrovs’k, Dniprodzerzhyns’k, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad, Nikopol’ and so on. Guys get together, and they have their plan of activities for a month, for half a year, for a year. They go through training and lessons. They conduct various events aimed at the de-communization and decolonization of Ukraine.

I think you’ve heard about events from 2011, when our mobile group blew up the head of Stalin’s bust in Zaporizhzhia; that was a rather notorious thing.

We never made PR out of it. We simply do what is for our nation’s good, for our state’s good. Those of us who can do it close down drug dealerships and help law-enforcement organs (if you can call them that, because it seems to me that the police are the most active drug dealers).

Was what happened on January 19 on Hrushevs’kyi Street something planned in advance?

No, of course not. We were always on the front lines those two months. The dictatorship laws that were passed January 16 were the stimulous for these events. We couldn’t live under state rules like those. On January 19, Automaidan activists drove up, and they wanted to go to the Supreme Rada and picket it. Right Sector came up there in organized fashion when hundreds of people were already there.

We tried to talk with the police and get them to agree to let us through. They responded rather aggressively. And what happened next, you know – we committed active deeds, and our guys defended the people. And I think that what happened was very good, because if it hadn’t been for those events on the nineteenth, I don’t think the regime would have made concessions and negotiate with the opposition.

How many of your people are at the Maidan?

Around 1,500 people, along with a mobilization reserve from Kyiv. But right now, affiliates are emerging all over Ukraine. They are organizing on their own, they call themselves Right Sector, and we are working to coordinate their activities as much as possible.

How many people in general can you mobilize across the country?

I think that for now, we can already mobilize 4,000 – 5,000 people.

How do you finance your organization?

I am not involved in that issue, but it’s all financed by people. We even opened up bank cards, but they were blocked right away. And after January 19 – there’s just been a flood of help. We need everything, because we’ve been here for two months already. People bring packs of money. We keep a complete account, everything is transparent, and guys buy equipment with the money.

Tell us about your organization’s structure.

The structure will be completely finalized after these events. Right now, Right Sector is a completely orderly organization; it’s not at all an extremist one, or a radical one; in general, I don’t like the word “radical.” Right now there is a unit on the Maidan, there are units in the oblasts, and there are spontaneous groups that have emerged. We invite leaders, we talk with them, we look to see if these are decent people, and then we make decisions about them. Right now we have started coordinating our actions with those of Afghan War veterans, too. They haven’t officially entered Right Sector, but we now coordinate our activities with them completely, because I don’t bring guys together just like that.

How do you make decisions?

There are strategic decisions, there are emergency ones, and there are tactical ones. People themselves make them at all levels. Regarding strategic matters, we discuss this or that problem with a leadership group of up to 12 people, including me, and we make a decision. And all the commanders decide all the other things. For example, we have Iranian – he makes a decision in his group whether or not to send people to the barricades.

Iranian? Is he from Iran?

No, that’s just his pseudonym. All the guys have pseudonyms for obvious reasons, because we live in such a state system. For example, since 1994, I have had the code name Hawk (Iastrub) in Trident. And we have one Pylypach and one Letun. Everyone chooses his own name, just like in the Cossack Sich.

AFTER JANUARY 19, NOT A SINGLE OPPOSITION LEADER CAME UP TO SEE OUR GUYS

Do you coordinate your activities with opposition forces?

First of all, we have relations with Andriy Parubiy as Maidan commander and de-facto leader of Self Defense (Samooborona), which we formally belong to as the 23rd hundredth (sotnia), though we have over 1,500 people.

But if you talk about the entire opposition, for the most part, we have no relations with them at all. They don’t recognize our existence. It seems to me that this is a big mistake of the opposition, that they don’t consider the forces of the Afghan veterans, Right Sector, or even Self Defense.

It seems to me that even Andriy Parubiy doesn’t have such an easy time coordinating actions with the trio of opposition leaders. Because I see some of the remarks that they make there. Andriy says one thing, while the leaders say something slightly different.

For example, I’m surprised that after January 19, opposition leaders didn’t come upstairs and thank the guys. Approach people, talk with them. These are live people, and they’re good, too.

Yesterday, a television crew came by, and the cameraman said, “I was surprised. One guy was reading a textbook on materials’ resistance, while the other was fluent in English and was speaking with some foreigner. You have such great guys!”

Well, it’s true. They’re the flower of the nation. These are people who right now are sacrificing their lives and their freedom for the sake of the Fatherland. This is something else, but politicians close their eyes to it.

Though there was Vitaliy Klychko – I met with him twice, and we had absolutely normal conversations. However, the opposition often fulfills part of our demands, because they are perfectly aware of our presence, and they see that Right Sector is a certain factor to be reckoned with on the Maidan.

But didn’t you try to contact them for the sake of coordinating activities?

We had no direct contacts. I had the impression from the very start of the peaceful Maidan that they operated very much on impulse, not on a system of actions thought through. They didn’t even set up a unified headquarters. From the very beginning, we called for unity at the Maidan so that there would be no divisions between politicians, Civic Sector, and Right Sector. In all interviews I’ve had, I’ve stressed that the uprising must be unified, and that I don’t want to provoke responses from the opposition.

But everything has its limits. When the country faced a real threat of war, great distrust of opposition leaders surfaced on the Maidan. They just talked for two months. Even though they had been given a mandate – “Take it, decide things!” – they couldn’t do anything. On January 19, we went on the offensive, and they started doing something. Well, we’ll keep putting pressure on them.

As far as we understand, the Freedom (Svoboda) Party is closest to you in ideological views…

Yes. We have a lot of common positions when it comes to ideological questions, but there are big differences. For instance, I don’t understand certain racist things they share, I absolutely don’t accept them. A Belarusian died for Ukraine, and an Armenian from Dnipropetrovs’k died for Ukraine. They are much greater comrades of mine than any, sorry, Communist cattle like Symonenko, who play for Russia but are ethnic Ukrainians.

Stepan Bandera once advocated three ways of dealing with non-Ukrainians. It’s very simple. You deal with them as comrades – and this is for those who fight with you for Ukraine, regardless of their nationality. You deal with them in a tolerant way – for those who live on the land and do not oppose our struggle; thus, we treat them normally, Ukraine has a place for all. The third way of dealing with them is in a hostile way – and this is for those who oppose the Ukrainian people’s national liberation struggle. And this is in any state; any people takes exactly these positions.

Social nationalism is very complicated for me, because it is my belief that nationalism does not require anything extra; it is enough. Oleh (Tiahnybok – Ukrains’ka Pravda), too, has lately tried to go the way of traditional nationalism. Thank God. Although there isn’t much of a point talking about ideological discussions during a revolution. Finally, our guys stand at the barricades just like guys from Svoboda. This unites us.

People from the regime say that during negotiations, opposition leaders claimed that people were ready to leave administrative buildings if those arrested and prosecuted were released. Is this true?

I think the regime lied. I think that the opposition didn’t say any such thing. Before the amnesty law was voted on, we made clear our position, and it was like the same thing the opposition had said. That is, if the regime made a compromise and passed the law for a so-called amnesty drafted by the opposition, then Right Sector was ready to withdraw its fighters from Hrushevs’kyi Street and unblock the street. This would be a reasonable compromise.

This doesn’t cancel out our political demands. We must change the country at another level. The Maidan is only a Sich (a Cossack military and administrative center – WR), a training ground, but it’s not about constant fighting.

Your opponents would reply that you were the first ones to open fire and go on an all-out offensive…

No, no, no! Excuse me, Berkut special forces beat children on the Maidan on November 30, 2013. For two months, people stood at the Maidan and took no action. Then came the regime’s usual provocation – passing the laws of January 16. They started beating activists, kidnapping people. Look what they’ve done with the Automaidan.

They were the very ones who provoked this situation, and people went on the attack, because people couldn’t take it anymore. How much longer could you stand there and dance on the Maidan? We’re not sheep, Ukrainians must have some pride, and they showed that Ukrainians do have pride.

What do you think, why did Right Sector have to show up for this, why didn’t the opposition do it?

Because Right Sector is the Maidan’s most revolutionary structure. Let me emphasize: revolutionary, and not radical. Revolution is reason, a plan, action. When the people are in an uproar, you can’t avoid using this situation for the people’s own benefit. The opposition, unfortunately, is incapable of doing this, maybe because their seats in parliament are very soft and they can’t take decisive steps. We can take such a step.

Have you spoken with the opposition about this?

I’m telling you, we have no contact with them. I’ll stress it again – I am for unifying the opposition movement, the one involved in protests and in the general uprising. Thus, any explanation I give will wind up being used against me. They’ll start yelling that I’m a provocateur. If you want my honest opinion, I don’t care what they say about me. Our difference is that I’m not interested in political ratings.

Right now, representatives of opposition parties are taking part in negotiations with the regime. What do you think, can these people take responsibility for the Maidan’s actions and give some guarantees on its behalf?

That’s the problem; the Maidan doesn’t control the negotiations process. The levels of trust opposition leaders had at the beginning and now are completely different.

We demand that not only opposition leaders be in the negotiations, but also representatives from the Maidan. At least as observers. Then you can offer some guarantees and at least articulate here, to people on the Maidan, that we have this agreement reached between the regime and the opposition, and it should be carried out.

Because otherwise, there’s the impression that they agree on one thing, and then they change something among themselves, and then the result turns out to be completely different.

Our goal now is to force the opposition to go back to negotiations with specific demands and achieve a certain compromise. But this absolutely must happen with Maidan representatives.

Those Afghan veterans or Andriy Parubiy as self-defense commander can be in the negotiating group. If they invite me, I’ll go. We see nothing awful in this. We can argue our position and compel both the regime and the opposition to make an agreement, so that there will be no bloodshed, and so that the state will take different actions. I’m ready to go negotiate for this.

Let’s make this simpler. Imagine that you are in negotiations, and Viktor Yanukovych is sitting across from you. What arguments would you use to convince him to change his actions?

I would seek a compromise. I would put pressure on him, though I know he wouldn’t like that very much. I’m not sure that Yanukovych is getting reliable information. It seems to me that he has some inadequate understanding of the situation. For example, I think he doesn’t understand that 80% of the people right now do not trust the regime. I think that his advisors are giving him slightly different figures and are showing him different scenarios from the real ones.

First, I’d start out by saying that he can’t fight his own people. No one yet has defeated his own people. I would explain that those things that law enforcement are doing is a real war against Ukrainians. Second, and this is very important – I would try to explain to him that those thousands of self-defense forces that have already been formed will not give Berkut or riot police an easy time clearing the Maidan and pass through it in parade fashion.

They don’t understand that the Maidan is a phenomenon with its own army, with its own medical services, with its own structures, and that it’s already a certain state. And they won’t be able to take it over without shedding a lot of blood.

It’s already impossible to drive it away with clubs. They’ll have to use weapons, real ones, not like the ones they use on Hrushevs’kyi Street. And they’ll really get it from us, that I can guarantee Viktor Yanukovych.

All right, but what do you want? So you tell Viktor Fedorovych (Yanukvoych) that the situation is like this. What next?

A precondition for any negotiations must be the freeing of all those arrested. These people aren’t terrorists and they aren’t extremists. I think you even know some of those people. They are absolutely normal, decent people who got fed up. People should be freed. Any talk about normalizing the situation can only happen after this.

Second, the regime should stop using force. In the regions, above all. Stop kidnapping activists. This is terror against one’s own people.

They must immediately start investigating crimes that have taken place on the streets. Berkut special forces couldn’t have been shooting without the knowledge of the Minister of Internal Affairs. It’s a military structure; there has to be discipline there, a clear sense of subordination. If they were provocations, then we need to find out who was doing the shooting. Give people information, don’t be silent, don’t close your eyes to what has been going on.

Yanukovych indeed has fulfilled several of our demands regarding the government’s resignation and the repeal of the laws of January 16. But changing an existing office to another that has the prefix “v.o.” (“acting” – translator) doesn’t solve any problems.

We need to form a compromise government that could be made up of people who are not leaders of political parties, but professionals. Moreover, all those odious figures – all the Zakharchenkos, the Tabachnyks, and other politicians like them – should be replaced. This is the first step they would need to make, and it would remove the tensions immediately.

Who do you see heading the Cabinet of Ministers?

I can’t say, because I’m not an expert at forming governments. Politicians should talk about that.

But when you don’t have your own proposals, you take away all responsibility from yourself and remove yourself from political developments.

For 25 years, I’ve avoided public politics. That’s not a problem for me. Although now, we are looking into the possibility that, if there will be peace, Right Sector will grow into a political organization. All the guys have said this. For God’s sake! We can always get involved in politics. For me, they’re the flower of the nation, and they can’t be cannon fodder people use and then forget. But it’s still too early to talk about anything specific. Right Sector today can’t be narrowed down to some political matters.

But that’s exactly what it looks like right now – you’re being used: you’re standing at the barricades, while they offer government posts to Arseniy Iatseniuk and Vitaliy Klychko.

The fact is that the life of the state and the life of our people aren’t limited to a sole Cabinet of Ministers. Let them take those positions. If they invite us to help, we will. We’ll take over law enforcement, and we’ll bring order in the state. But I doubt that we’ll get even just one office.

WE WILL HAVE OUR OWN CANDIDATE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

What will you propose to Viktor Yanukovych if the revolution is victorious?

It depends on him. Some time ago, we gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and no one would touch him. Today, if he made a smart decision, we could even grant him safety in his own state. Just so there would be no war, so there would be no bloodshed. Let him stay in Mezhyhir’ia, take care of his ostriches, and no one would bother him there. But that has to be his decision.

Do you see yourself in some office?

Right now, no. I have a really good office right now – I’m leader of Trident. It’s easier for me to speak in front of members in formation, not onstage.

But that’s not an office that can change the country. What would you do in a time of peace?

If you want peace, get ready for war. We started Right Sector, and Right Sector has changed the country a little. During peace, I would continue being involved in Trident. Like I’d been doing for the last twenty years.

You understand, Trident is not a structure that has an unequivocal goal of setting up some armed conflict. No. Any kind of normal state must have state paramilitary structures that prepare youth for service in the army, which gives it a chance to mobilize a certain personnel reserve for defending the people’s interest in times of foreign or domestic peril. It’s a normal thing in most civilized countries of the world. Trident will always be relevant. Even if we have the best president and the best government.

Do you have any information regarding who’s kidnapping people?

Unfortunately, we don’t. We are trying to dig this information up, but we’ve had no luck so far. We ask the regime to activate law enforcement, its Security Service (Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU – WR), so that all investigation teams are employed in this search. Finally, [the SBU] is not as compromised in all these events as the MVS (Ministry of Internal Affairs) is. But there’s been nothing so far.

So you sincerely trust regime structures to investigate this issue?

I’m not certain that the regime is guilty of these crimes. I don’t rule out foreign special services being responsible for this. For example, the FSB (Federal Security Service). Russia always makes use of instability in Ukraine. As soon as there is instability in Ukraine, they come over here and deal with certain issues they have. Putin has said more than once that Ukraine is not a state. And I am more than convinced that up to the present, there have been plans for splitting Ukraine up into two or three, or five, or six zones of influence.

But Right Sector and its activities have been called a destabilizing factor.

It seems to me that it’s the opposite – over the last few months Right Sector has shown that it is a stabilizing factor. If it hadn’t been for Right Sector, there wouldn’t have been any negotiations, radical moods would have increased, and they would have exploded in regions as partisan warfare. Why doesn’t anyone think about that?

As for now, the situation anyway is under control, and it it is now at some negotiating stage. If they don’t reach an agreement, the risk of partisan warfare in Ukraine will sharply increase. We know Ukrainians have a very glorious tradition of waging partisan warfare. They’ve fought for decades. Only will this be useful for the state?

But aren’t you afraid that a partisan war could grow into a civil war?

There can be no civil war. When 80% of the people do not support the regime, it will be a struggle between society, the people, and the regime. And these two things make great differences between a civil war and what we are talking about. This will be a national liberation war. But we’d rather not have one. We have a state, we have a foundation for developing nation building and state building.

But a lot of people in eastern Ukraine sincerely believe that Banderites and nationalists are gathered here, and they are really convinced that they must fight this. What should we do with these people?

According to the information I have, this is a very small percentage of people. I myself am from the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’, and I completely understand the situation. These are mostly people working for hire. You saw the events near the Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast’ Administration building. There, local (Party of) Regions deputy Stupak for a year and a half got scumbags together and formed fight clubs and guard structures that, together with the police, out of “conviction” defend the Oblast’ Administration.

Did you see at least one normal citizen among those defenders of the administration building who went out there voluntarily? Or in the Crimea itself, they’ve set up units of hatted Cossacks, chauvinists, who form Black Hundreds and defend the regime. But where are the masses of people? Besides that, Crimean Tatars are completely on the side of the Euromaidan. So none of this is simple.

If you’d speak with people in the East, they’d say the same thing about the Maidan: that there is a very small percentage of sincere supporters, and that the majority are hired nationalists. Both you and they have very similar rhetoric, which in the end is very unlikely to produce a compromise.

Let’s consider some examples. The Party of Regions tried to set up an Anti-Maidan by bringing in people from all over Ukraine. Who actually has been standing there? It’s either really asocial elements or state employees and recipients of state aid who simply were forced to come. I spoke with a whole bunch of such people, and when I yelled out, “Get out, crook!” (Zeka het’!), they waved and laughed. It’s a myth that there’s some social support for Yanukovych and his regime.

The soccer ultras all over Ukraine, the ones who supported the Maidan, are clear examples of this. These are people with real ideas, from Luhans’k Zoria, Simferopil’ Tavriia, Zaporizhzhia Metalurh, Dnipropetrovs’k Dnipro, Kharkiv Metalist, and so on. How many times did Dopa and Hepa (Mykhailo Dobkin, governor of the Kharkiv Oblast’, and Hennadiy Kernes, mayor of Kharkiv – WR) try to gather those hired thugs and send them here to Kyiv, and they haven’t been able to do it. What support can you talk about? This idea about a split in the country is a big lie. There is no split. Yanukovych, bless his heart, united the country.

All the time there’s been this call made at the Maidan to the three opposition leaders to make a decision on a single candidate. Do you support this call?

It doesn’t seem that relevant because you more often hear calls to make decisions with Maidan leaders. The leaders of the resistance which is going on. The importance of presidential elections for people has gone down to second or third place.

During presidential elections – early or regularly scheduled ones – what will be your strategy: will you support someone, or will you run on your own?

We don’t rule out Right Sector nominating its own candidate for elections. But it’s still too early to talk about this.

So you sincerely believe that a candidate from Right Sector has a chance at winning across the country?

If you took at reality, there is always a chance for it. Right Sector became an all-Ukrainian phenomenon in a few weeks. It’s Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Donets’k, the Crimea. On the other hand, presidential elections can bring quite a bit of attention to our ideas of revolutionary changes for the state.

Aren’t you afraid that your electoral campaign could divide up the opposition’s electorate and lead to you being blamed for causing a split?

Listen, let this process finish, and then we’ll see what’s going on and how things are going. Fairy tales about fragmenting one’s forces, which they tell each other, is some kind of child’s play. They all know that they’re running as three separate candidates, thus breaking up forces from the very beginning.

Either you sit down and make a real agreement and fulfill what you’d agreed to do, or each should play his own game. For us, at this stage, it’s not that important to take part in presidential elections. We need peace.

The fact is that there are people who talk a lot and do little, while there are people who act and demonstrate with their sweat and blood that they can change things, that they can act, that they can achieve a result.

Right Sector is a platform for guys who have demonstrated their ability to change something, to sacrifice the gifts they have received to achieve something higher. Politicians in recent years have not demonstrated this. I don’t see them having demonstrated this kind of sacrifice, the desire and the ability to sacrifice.

So who for you is the leader of the resistance?

There is no one for now. I made an announcement that I was ready to bear responsibility for all those things that happened. This doesn’t mean that I have some presidential ambitions. I simply see that there needs to be complete coordination and control over the situation. Let politicians settle those issues for themselves. If one of them is ready to do it, then let him do it, and we will sincerely support him. But I don’t see anyone doing this.

RIGHT SECTOR DOESN’T FIGHT WITH FAMILIES

Are you aware of the fact that if you are defeated, or even if there is a compromise between the regime and the opposition, a jail cell might be waiting for you?

Yes, of course. I’ve been ready for it for the past 25 years. What can you do? That’s life. I go there but for the grace of God. What will be, will be. If there will be a criminal case, then there will be a criminal case. I am ready to fight for Ukraine. Let them try to put me in jail. Finally, we’ve yet to see who will imprison whom.

Have you been given a police summons?

No. I live here, what do I need a summons for? They don’t deliver them to the Maidan, and guys don’t let cops enter the fifth floor.

But something could happen before you’re even arrested. You could face the fate of Ihor Lutsenko or Dmytro Bulatov…

I know in whose name I’m waging this struggle. Of course, I don’t want that, I’m a living human being, and I have the instinct of self-preservation. But guys are protecting me, they go around with me, and they wear armored flak jackets.

Do you go outside the Maidan in general?

I’m rarely outside it. I won’t tell you where I go.

What is happening with your family right now?

I last saw my family for Christmas. They’re in Ukraine, but I’ve temporarily changed their residence. The fact is that all information about our addresses has been posted on the Internet, and about our families, so there is a certain danger.

But there’s also the very same information on the Internet about Berkut forces, for instance. Can you give guarantees to all law enforcement and regime officials that nothing threatens their families?

I can guarantee that Right Sector in no way will touch any child, or any family, of any law enforcement personnel, from any structure. Right Sector doesn’t fight women and children. We are not beasts from Berkut who beat up journalists and medical personnel. So you don’t have to worry – no one will be taking any actions like those. I can vouch for Right Sector.

But you still set an ultimatum… you have this demand for the Fourth (of February): either you release everyone, or there will be… Can you say what this is about? Why exactly the Fourth?

The Fourth of February is the next session of parliament. We demand that the Supreme Rada produce a document announcing the unconditional and complete freeing and rehabilitation of people arrested. And this is no amnesty, because there were no crimes committed.

We also demand the regime end any use of force – this would be kidnappings, burning cars, and so on. I think that they will listen to us. I am 90 percent certain that they will listen to us.

Otherwise, we are on the edge of a bloody conflict. I don’t rule out that people who are standing on the Maidan will conduct a very serious mobilization and go to the government offices district. And they will take it – and I am more than convinced of this – though it will be with blood, with great losses. Because we’ve been left with a pathological situation. Then all of them will be taken out: both the regime guards and Yanukovych. That’s why it’s better for them to reach an agreement with us.

Do you understand that even what you just said now can be used against you?

Yes, of course. It’s a revolution. There are two sides of the barricades – it’s a basic fact. Right now everything is being used either against us or against them.

Do you select in some way people who come to you? Do they go through some selection process?

Without a doubt. We are signing up volunteers all the time, especially during some active campaigns. Regarding criteria, you need to talk directly to the commanders. They work with people. I know exactly that they don’t take in people who are under age. Because they run in packs at age 15-16.

Do you issue people weapons (that is, ones that are not firearms)?

They show up on their own with either some baseball bats or with some sticks. We don’t equip them with them. As for the money that we get from people, we use that to buy all kinds of little shields, helmets, shields, a very big arsenal of all that stuff. They get all the necessary equipment, and then they have lessons with them.

If a person is in poor physical health, then he or she gets other work – in the kitchen, in the medical station, and so on. Our girls are great, simply great; they’ve done so much good already. They even took away the wounded during fighting, and they help us here all the time.

Regarding firearms, you called on people to bring them to the Maidan. Why have you done that?

When the MVS issued an order allowing use of firearms against people, I called on people who had legally registered firearms to join us, to create a group for supporting us with firearms in case they came to the Maidan and started shooting. I think that you can only return fire, because there are no other alternatives. But that’s only if they open fire first.

Has this unit been created?

That’s a secret, sorry.

Who has all the information that is now at Right Sector? There is a person who knows everything.

No one knows everything. The political leadership has the information.

How do you coordinate your actions? It’s not a secret that all telephone conversations are listened in on, how do you do it?

Regarding messengers and go-betweens, all the guys have walkie-talkies, but they also monitor them, and we know that. I get the impression that they have listening devices installed in all the buildings around us. Operational vehicles are in place and so on. By the way, I don’t regard guys sitting in them as enemies or something like that. They’re doing their job, and they have to do it.

Moreover, I am more than convinced that in law enforcement structures, attitudes toward the regime, the opposition, and the Maidan are very, very ambiguous. Some of them hate us, but that’s a small percentage. Others are sympathetic toward us, because we also have been conducting certain negotiations with law enforcement personnel. Guys come to us and talk. The regime is falling apart. You just need to put enough pressure on it so that they take those political steps.

There are two barricades on Hrushevs’kyi Street. Do you talk at all with Berkut forces? Do you bring them warm tea or coffee? I know that there used to be such initiatives.

I don’t know if we bring them right now. Earlier, when they blocked us in at the Maidan itself, we gave them food. I was against this, not because these cops, these guys, are not friends. They’re also Ukrainians, they simply are on the other side of the barricades. They serve the enemy. But it’s not worth doing. The more they are driven crazy by not getting enough food and so on, the less chances there are that they will go on the offensive and on the attack, and begin beating people like they’ve done several times. Thus, out of purely pragmatic reasons, I don’t think that we should bring them sandwiches or coffee.

source: http://seansrussiablog.org/2014/02/07/interview-dmytro-yarosh-leader-right-sector/


Exclusive: Leader of Far-Right Ukrainian Militant Group Talks Revolution With TIME

Simon Shuster / Kiev @shustry
Feb. 4, 2014

Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor, a coalition of ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, stands with some of his fighters at the scene of the worst clashes last month between the group's fighters and police in Kiev.
Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor, a coalition of ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, stands with some of his fighters at the scene of the worst clashes last month between the group’s fighters and police in Kiev. Maxim Dondyuk

In his first interview with foreign media, Dmitro Yarosh, leader of the far-right militant group Pravy Sektor, says he and his antigovernment cohorts in Kiev are ready for armed struggle

Take the smell of an army barracks, add a bit of char and gasoline, and you’d have a rough idea of the air on the fifth floor of the House of Trade Unions, the headquarters of the revolution in Ukraine. When protesters first occupied the building in December, their leaders divvied up its floors among the political parties and activists involved in the revolt. Since then, the only floor off-limits to journalists has been the fifth, which houses the militant arm of the revolution, Pravy Sektor (Right Sector), the coalition of right-wing radicals that grew out of the uprising. They had good reason to avoid publicity. After their violent clashes with police last month, their members could face years in prison if the ruling government survives the revolt.

But on Sunday night, their leader Dmitro Yarosh agreed to give his first interview to a foreign media outlet. It was not so much an act of vanity as a political coming-out. He has clearly grown tired of being the movement’s anonymous enforcer. In recent days, as a negotiated end to the crisis has started coming into view, the need for a military wing of the revolution has diminished. And so has the trust in its upper ranks. The mainstream opposition leaders, like the former world boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, have faced growing pressure to distance themselves from Pravy Sektor, which the U.S. State Department has condemned for “inflaming conditions on the streets.” Increasingly marginalized, the group has grown much more assertive and, in some ways, has started going rogue.

In his interview with TIME, Yarosh, whose militant brand of nationalism rejects all foreign influence over Ukrainian affairs, revealed for the first time that Pravy Sektor has amassed a lethal arsenal of weapons. He declined to say exactly how many guns they have. “It is enough,” he says, “to defend all of Ukraine from the internal occupiers” — by which he means the ruling government — and to carry on the revolution if negotiations with that government break down.

But so far, those negotiations have been making significant strides toward resolving the crisis. On Tuesday, the parliament began debating a sweeping reform of the constitution, while allies of President Viktor Yanukovych suggested for the first time that he is ready to consider early elections. Both moves would mark a major breakthrough. But Yarosh, watching from the sidelines, has begun to doubt whether the negotiators have the interests of his men at heart. “This whole peaceful song and dance, the standing around, the negotiations, none of it has brought real change.” Dozens of his men, he says, remain behind bars after their street battles against police two weeks ago.

With that in mind, Yarosh and another militant faction began a parallel set of negotiations over the weekend. On Monday, they claimed to be in direct talks with Ukraine’s police forces to secure the release of jailed protesters, including members of Pravy Sektor. Mainstream opposition leaders said they had not authorized any such talks. At the same time, Yarosh has demanded a seat at the negotiating table with the President. Once again, he was flatly denied. His ideology, it seems, is just too toxic to let him in the room.

But neither can Klitschko and his fellow politicians easily sever their ties with Pravy Sektor. The group serves some of the uprising’s most essential functions. Its fighters control the barricades around the protest camp in the center of Ukraine’s capital, and when riot police have tried to tear it down, they have been on the front lines beating them back with clubs, rocks, Molotov cocktails and even a few catapults, in the mold of siege engines of the Middle Ages. Around the country, its fighters have helped seize government headquarters in more than a dozen cities. “Pravy Sektor has proved its loyalty to the ideals of freedom,” Yarosh says. “Now we needed to present this movement as a source of leadership.”

In any kind of fair election, that would be nearly impossible. Pravy Sektor’s ideology borders on fascism, and it enjoys support only from Ukraine’s most hard-line nationalists, a group too small to secure them a place in parliament. But taking part in the democratic process is not part of Yarosh’s strategy. “We are not politicians,” he says in his office, a pack of Lucky Strikes and a walkie-talkie on the table in front of him, while a sentry in a black ski mask and bulletproof vest stands by the door. “We are soldiers of the national revolution.” His entire adult life has been spent waiting for such a revolution to “steer the country in a new direction, one that would make it truly strong, not dependent on either the West or the East.”

Through all his years in the nationalist movement, Yarosh, a 42-year-old father of three, says he has never had any form of occupation apart from his activism. The son of two factory workers, he was born and raised in a provincial town in eastern Ukraine, and became involved in the nationalist underground in the late 1980s, just as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Nearly all of the satellite states of the USSR, from the Baltics to Central Asia, were then pushing to break away from Moscow’s control, and in 1988, Yarosh joined one of the more radical groups fighting for an independent Ukraine.

The following autumn, months after the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan, Yarosh was drafted into the Red Army, a common form of punishment for political activists at the time. He was stationed briefly in Belarus before being transferred to Siberia, where he served as a guard at strategic missile sites. The Soviet doctrines of unity between Russia and Ukraine did little to soften his views. “If anything, the army made me more convinced that my path is correct,” he says. When Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Yarosh went on hunger strike to demand a transfer to the newly established Ukrainian army. His commanding officers ignored him.

In 1994, a few years after he was discharged and returned to Ukraine, he joined a right-wing organization called Trizub (Trident), and slowly climbed its ranks before assuming leadership in 2005. Along with several other far-right groups, Trizub formed the core of Pravy Sektor when the current uprising broke out in Ukraine two months ago. Its main adversary has always been Russia, although it also has little patience for Western influence on Ukraine. “For all the years of Ukraine’s independence, Russia has pursued a systematic, targeted policy of subjugation toward Ukraine,” Yarosh says. “So of course we will prepare for a conflict with them,” he adds, especially after Russia’s recent invasion of another one of its former satellites, Georgia. “If they stick their faces here like they did in Georgia in 2008, they’ll get it in the teeth.”

So far, his jabs at the leaders of the opposition in Ukraine have not been quite as pointed. He has accused them of vanity and ineffectiveness, but he has also observed the truce they called a week and a half ago to allow their negotiations to proceed. “Not a single Molotov cocktail has gone flying since then,” he says proudly. “A truce is a truce. They want to negotiate, let them negotiate.” But as Yarosh realizes, he and his men have staked a great deal on the outcome of these talks.

If the ruling government holds on to power, Pravy Sektor could be forced to take the blame for the violence that left dozens of police officers in the hospital two weeks ago. “All those criminal charges are already waiting in the prosecutor’s office,” he says. On the other hand, if the opposition forms a new government, they are not likely to carve out a place for Yarosh and his men in the halls of power. So it is no surprise that he has begun to show some political initiative.

For the past two decades, he has been waiting and preparing for the start of the “national revolution,” and now that he finds himself at the head of its armed division, he does not seem ready to let it pass peacefully away, at least not on anyone else’s terms. “People have gotten in touch with us from around the country, saying, ‘Guys, don’t let us down. Take us to victory, to independence, if the other leaders are incapable of that,’” Yarosh says. “So if the time has come for an active struggle, I am ready to carry it to the end. I am not afraid of that responsibility. I see no reason to hide my face.”

source: http://time.com/4493/ukraine-dmitri-yarosh-kiev/


Dmitry Yarosh, the Man Who Claims Victory in the Ukrainian Revolution, Speaks

By / March 12, 2014 4:33 PM EDT

3.12_Ukraine
A leader of a once obscure right wing group is now at the center of a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters

Newsweek spoke with Dmirtry Yarosh, 42, a leader of the once obscure right wing group that is now at the  center of a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States

Q: Is it true that you have been training Right Sector forces for over 20 years?

A: I was training paramilitary troops for almost 25 years. Although we just came out of the revolution, my guys are continuing military training all across Ukraine, ready to cleanse the country of the occupiers.

Q: How many are you?

A: I cannot give you the exact number, as our structure and divisions are constantly growing all over Ukraine, but over 10,000 people for sure. We have certain preconditions for our recruits: patriotism and other criteria for proper behavior.

Q: Are you aware that a Moscow court is trying you for calling for terrorist actions against Russia?

A: That is Putin’s idea. He is a political corpse.

Q: Do you have many war veterans in your ranks? Are your forces a part of Ukraine’s army?

A: As soon as Russia declared the war we recruited retired officers, generals of the interior ministry and security agencies. We are coordinating our actions with the council of the National Security and Defense, as well as with the army’s General Headquarters. We are currently negotiating to put our forces on a proper legal footing.

Q: If the Crimea population decides to become a part of Russia at the referendum on Saturday, what will be Right Sector’s reaction?

A: Right Sector, together with all other Ukrainian citizens, are ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity by all possible means. In case the Kremlin decides to attack us, they will have a major partisan war on  Ukraine territory.

Q: Do you think Ukraine has enough forces to defend itself?

A: I am realistic about the pitiful conditions of our military forces, including Right Sector. Our army is many hundreds of times weaker than Russia’s army so it’s important for Ukraine to do everything to resolve the crisis through negotiations.

Q: Why do you call your organization paramilitary? are you armed just with Kalashnikov’s or do you also have more serious weapons?

A: As in any army, we have specialists trained to shoot S-300 missiles. In case of a partisan war, there  will be shooting from every house.

Q: Do you realize that the majority of Russians including cultural and intellectual leaders support Putin’s actions in Crimea because they see you as a leader of a fascist, radical movement? Are you ready to become the reason for the end of years of Russian-Ukrainian friendship?

A: Unfortunately, Russia is largely brainwashed. Ukrainian nationalists have nothing to do with fascism. The powerful Russian propaganda machine knows what it’s doing. The beliefs of Right Sector are against chauvinism. We base our views on nationalist ideas. The proof is that 40 per cent of our members speak Russian; Jews and other nationals feel comfortable in our forces.

Q: What then makes your movement “Right”?

A: We believe Ukraine deserves to have its own national state. That is what makes our movement “Right.”

Q: Was your book “Nation and Revolution” — where you defined your movement’s enemies as the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church — a prediction of “the liberating war” of the Ukrainian nation?

A: The book is a collection of my articles that was criticized when it first came out. But now we see that it predicted many events that have now happened. I would advise Russian citizens to start their struggle against Putin’s fascist regime. That would be the best guarantee of friendship between Russian and the Ukrainian people. So long as Putin is in power, Russian imperialism will always be putting improper pressure upon Ukraine.

Q: Why do you refer to the Russian president, who enjoys high popularity ratings, as a “fascist”?

A: Putin built up his power by fascistic methods. He ignored the constitutional rights of Russian citizens. In Russia, police beat up those taking part in mass protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg. That smells of fascist methods to me. They arrest protesters carrying anti-war signs. That is fascism.

Q: It is broadly believed in Ukraine that the revolution would not have happened without Right Sector. What kind of revolution was it?

A: We had a nationalist revolution to create a state where Ukrainian people would be the master of their own destiny in their own land. Until now, we have had an occupying regime. We’ll do everything to give our people full freedom, justice and a share of the nation’s wealth.

Q: Your men are all over the center of Kiev. Why do you and your men wear black uniforms?

A: This is not an official uniform. We bought uniforms sold to security guards. I have taken professional advice about strengthening our security. We have been given information that some Russian forces are interested in kidnapping, arresting or liquidating me.

Q: Who  is it that is shooting on the Maidan every night?

A: That is not my people. My men never use their weapons unless there is a specific need.

Q: You are running for president. What special attributes do you have that qualify you to be a politician? Do you think you have a chance to win the presidential election?

A: I graduated from university, specializing in Ukrainian language and literature. I never intended to be a politician. But since January 19 this year, I have been responsible for all the events. We have seen two miracles happen already: politicians have not betrayed the revolutionary spirit of the Maidan; and we won the revolution. I expect one more miracle  to take place at the presidential election.

Q: Did your movement support Chechen insurgencies in Russia?

A: We supported the first Chechen war against Russian empire. We sent a delegation to Chechnya. We helped treat the Chechen wounded here. And we publish Chechen books.

Q: Did you really call for Islamic insurgencies to support Ukraine in the war against Russia? Did any of your men meet with the Chechen insurgency leader Doku Umarov?

A: I didn’t say that. I am not sure. When we were helping Chechnia, Doku Umarov was just an ordinary field commander. We are not supporters of the Islamist war against defenseless women and children.

Q: Yesterday, Ukraine’s former president Victor Yanukovych said the new leadership is going to raise Bandera flag that is considered fascist in Russia.  Is that true?

A:  We stood under red and black flags throughout the revolution. Red Ukrainian blood spilled on the black Ukrainian earth –  that flag is the symbol of the national revolution. I am convinced that this flag will bring us freedom.

Q: Who finances you? Do you think the West is going to support Ukraine?

A: As a matter of principle l do not take money from oligarchs as we do not want to be dependent. We received some US dollars from the Ukrainian Diaspora. Otherwise the entire country supports the Right Sector.

I am sure that if Russians bombed Kiev — and we believe there is 50/50 chance that will happen — NATO will not come to fight for Ukraine. Europe has betrayed Ukraine many times. We are not counting on them. We can only count on our own forces and our ingenuity.

source: http://mag.newsweek.com/2014/03/28/exclusive-dmitry-yarosh-man-who-launched-ukrainian.html


In Ukraine, New Government Must Reassure Jewish Community

Abraham H. Foxman
National Director, Anti-Defamation League
Posted: 02/28/2014 2:35 pm EST Updated: 02/28/2014 2:59 pm EST

The Ukrainian Jewish community is nervous. The ultra-nationalist Svoboda party, with its history of anti-Semitism and platform of ethnic nationalism, won more than 10 percent of the vote in October 2012, shared the political leadership of the Maidan revolution over the past months, and just this week received three ministries in the new Ukrainian government.

While Svoboda’s leaders have refrained recently from making anti-Semitic statements, it is troubling that Oleksandr Sych, Svoboda’s chief ideologue, was named vice prime minister. Sych’s speeches over the years have focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism, which he says is exemplified by Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s. Bandera was at times aligned with the Nazis during World War II and was complicit in mass killings of Jews and Poles by Ukrainian partisans.

Sych has also said that Ukrainian nationalism is threatened both by “the Communist Russian regime and liberal Europe.” How ironic that he was brought to power by a revolution sparked by former President Viktor Yanukovych’s sudden refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union.

Interestingly, the armed nationalist groups that fought on the Maidan against government troops and police have made important gestures toward the Jewish community this week.

Dmitro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, met with Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and told him that their movement rejects anti-Semitism and xenophobia and will not tolerate it. He said their goals were a democratic Ukraine, transparent government, ending corruption, and equal opportunity for all ethnic groups.

The day before, Ukrainian Jewish journalist Eleonora Groisman interviewed Sergei Mischenko, the leader of “Spilna Sprava,” and told him that Ukraine’s Jews were worried about the nationalists. Mischenko responded that Jews will not have any problems and shouldn’t worry. He went on to say, “On the Maidan there were Jews with us who served in the Israeli Defense Forces. We got along excellently and fought shoulder to shoulder.”

In November 2013, not long before the anti-Yanukovych protests began, ADL honored Metropolitan Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky, a spiritual leader of Ukrainian Catholics who headed the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church from 1900 until his death in 1944. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was posthumously awarded ADL’s Jan Karski Courage to Care Award for his undaunted heroism in saving Jews from the Holocaust.

After lauding Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s actions, I said:

I want to make one last point, regarding the situation today in Ukraine. There is a strong and growing Ukrainian nationalist movement. It faces a choice of role models: the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera, who declared an independent Ukrainian state on June 30, 1941 in Lviv, when the Nazis drove out the Soviet army, and the next day began murdering Jews. Or it can be inspired by the Ukrainian nationalist Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who wrote on July 1, the day after the state was declared, that the new government should exercise – quote — “wise, just leadership and measures that would take into consideration the needs and welfare of all citizens who inhabit our land, without regard to what faith, nationality, or social stratum they belong.” The Ukrainian nationalism of Andrei Sheptytsky, one of compassion, even love, for his Jewish neighbors, is one that Jews around the world can embrace and support. And we ask all who are inspired by the Metropolitan’s actions and words to help oppose the destructive Banderite strain.

Will Vice Prime Minister Sych renounce Bandera and embrace Europe? Will Svoboda accept Jews as full-fledged Ukrainians and follow the welcome assurances of the armed nationalists? Or will the promises of Right Sector and Spilna Sprava be overtaken by the ethnic nationalism of Svoboda?

Meanwhile, security is being upgraded at Jewish institutions. Over the past several weeks, two Jews in Kiev were violently attacked and Molotov cocktails were thrown at a synagogue in Zaporozhe. Some Jewish leaders have even raised the possibility of a mass exodus from Ukraine.

The future of the Ukrainian Jewish community could depend on the choices made by Svoboda and the actions of Ukraine’s democratic leaders.

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, together with UDAR leader Vitaliy Klichko, brought Svoboda into the opposition coalition in 2012. Now, having brought Svoboda into the government, it is up to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to ensure that anti-Semitism is not tolerated and that democratic norms are adhered to. By sending that message to the people of Ukraine now, the prime minister will reassure the Jewish community and set an admirable example.

Guiding Ukraine’s nationalists to adopt the path of Metropolitan Sheptytsky will be a major test of Ukraine’s democratic development and an important step forward for the country. If achieved, the future of Ukraine’s Jewish community may be bright, not bleak.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abraham-h-foxman/in-ukraine-new-government_b_4875833.html


It is also worth noting that after exploring the various groups/boards/sites it seems that Svoboda element has been overlooked and not mentioned much in the msm because they, along with the “modern” NeoNazi factions while still being fervently anti-Semetic and anti minority, have seemingly allied and self identified themselves with the “modern” far-right Zionist, NeoCon and Wahhabi/Salafist factions as they admire their ultra Nationalistic ideologies and violent strategies…


Ukraine: “Right Sector” Leader Dmitry Yarosh Meets with Israeli Ambassador, Pledges Allegiance to the Jewish Race

Andrew Anglin
Daily Stormer

February 28, 2014

"We exist only to serve you, oh Chosen Ones, oh Masters of Earth." -Pravy Sektor leader Dmitry Yarosh to the Jews

“We exist only to serve you, oh Chosen Ones, oh Masters of Earth.” -Pravy Sektor leader Dmitry Yarosh to the Jews

From the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution late last year, I have taken a staunchly pro-Russian, anti-coup position.  Throughout the course of events, it has become more and more undeniable that the entire situation was one created and managed by subversive Jews, for the purpose of weakening Russia by tricking the Ukraine into joining the European Union.

However, many nationalist activists remained supportive of the revolution, promoting it on the internet as a positive thing, even after it was discovered that Vitali Klitschko, the most prominent leader of Maidan, is a Jew, that the American Jew Victoria Nuland was playing a role in planning the operation, and that IDF agents were responsible for managing much of the terrorism against the elected government of the Ukraine.

The average age of the revolutionary footsoldiers of Pravy Sektor is about 17. I would never blame these boys for not knowing any better.

The average age of the revolutionary footsoldiers of Pravy Sektor is about 17. I would never blame these boys for not knowing any better, as they likely did not have access to the information we have had access to.

Though it was discouraging to me to see so many who consider themselves supportive of the nationalist cause voicing their support for this Jewish power-grab, I understood that people were excited to see nationalist symbols among the protestors, and thus made the decision to indulge in a fantasy about a “National Socialist Revolution” in the Ukraine.

This week, that fantasy can be seen clearly for what it is, as Dmitro Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor (Right Sector) has met with the Israeli ambassador to the Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and pledged his allegiance to the Jewish race.

Abe Foxman: Pravy Sektor fanboy
Abe Foxman: Pravy Sektor fanboy

As Abe Foxman writes in the Huffington Post:

Dmitro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, met with Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, and told him that their movement rejects anti-Semitism and xenophobia and will not tolerate it. He said their goals were a democratic Ukraine, transparent government, ending corruption, and equal opportunity for all ethnic groups.

Abe closes with this:

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, together with UDAR leader Vitaliy Klichko, brought Svoboda into the opposition coalition in 2012. Now, having brought Svoboda into the government, it is up to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to ensure that anti-Semitism is not tolerated and that democratic norms are adhered to. By sending that message to the people of Ukraine now, the prime minister will reassure the Jewish community and set an admirable example.

Guiding Ukraine’s nationalists to adopt the path of Metropolitan Sheptytsky will be a major test of Ukraine’s democratic development and an important step forward for the country. If achieved, the future of Ukraine’s Jewish community may be bright, not bleak.

The Israeli embassy in the Ukraine released a press statement on the meeting:

February 26, 2014 the Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine, Reuven Din El, met with the leadership of the “Right sector” movement, including its figurehead, Dmitry Yarosh.

The leaders of the movement informed the Ambassador about their position on the future of Ukraine, and stressed that they follow a tolerant policy on national issues.

Dmitry Yarosh also stressed that all hateful rhetoric, especially anti-Semitism, was not only condemned by “the Right Sector,” but that they would continue to fight it through all legitimate legal means. The aim of the movement is to build a democratic Ukraine, establish government transparency, combat corruption and provide equal opportunities for all nations and peoples; they intend to unify the people and build a state ruled by the people.

The parties agreed to establish a hotline to prevent provocations and coordination issues that arise.

The leaders of the movement stressed that any manifestation of chauvinism and xenophobia would be punished.

So there you have it.  It turns out I was in fact more correct than even I had understood, having previously allowed that the leaders of Pravy Sektor could have themselves been confused.  Well, when you meet with Israelis and pledge to defend the Jews and punish anyone who dares question them, you aren’t confused – you are a shill.

Though it is possible that the boys out fighting on the streets will stand up and oppose their leaders pledging their lives to the defense of the Jewish people, I see it as highly unlikely.  No, this is all going to go exactly how the Jews planned it – the Ukraine will enter the EU, take on massive debt, and eventually be totally destroyed.

What We Can Learn

Hopefully, after the debacle of reckless support being irresponsibly thrown behind this Jewish operation by various sectors of the activist community, no doubt ending with a lot of people feeling very foolish, we can learn something for the future.

The most obvious thing to note here is that it is not only possible, but highly probable, that a group wearing nationalist symbols is being managed by Jews.  They understand that the most effective way to neutralize the opposition is to become the opposition.  As such, when a group claiming to be nationalist is engaging in behaviors which are inconsistent with the symbols they wear, their actions should be considered more relevant than what they are wearing.

When the actions conflict with the t-shirts, you have a duty to judge the actions over the t-shirts.

Remember this: When the actions conflict with the t-shirts, you have a duty to judge the actions over the t-shirts.

The bottom line is that serious opposition will not endorse Jewish revolution, in the way that both Svoboda and Pravy Sektor did when they refused to question the Jews who were managing the revolution.  We should also note that when you see Jews openly endorsing an allegedly nationalist organization, as they did with the alleged nationalists in the Ukraine, you should assume that they know something that you don’t know.

Thankfully, the fact that so many in the internet activist scene supported this Jewish coup did not have any effect on its outcome.  The Jews would have won here whether or not you supported them, or condemned them as I did.  However, it will not be long before your support does matter, and if you decide to support an openly Jewish-driven revolution, the consequences will be dire.

If we truly wish to stand in opposition to the Jewish parasite, we must be wise as serpents, and not fall into the traps they lay.

source: http://www.dailystormer.com/ukraine-right-sector-leader-dmitry-yarosh-meets-with-israeli-ambassador-pledges-allegiance-to-the-jewish-race/


Here is a follow up to the original post/interview above courtesy The Saker…

Meet the (real) new authorities in the Ukraine, example #1
Published on Feb 25, 2014

Forget Klitchko, Iatseniuk, Tiagnibok or Tymoshenko. Though they all have some degree of popular support, what they don’t have is power. The real authorities in the Ukraine is the so-called “Right Sector”, their leader, Dmytro Yarosh, and his brownshirts. This video shows the reaction of one of these gentlemen, a certain Alexander Muzychka aka “Sashko Bilyi”, a veteran of the war against Russia in Chechnia, addressing a meeting the administration of the Roven region in the northeast of the Ukraine. Mr Muzychka, upon being informed that the new (official) authorities in Kiev have decided to collect unregistered weapons, addressed the meeting with the following words:

Who of you wants to take my assault-rifle away?
Who of you wants to take my pistol?
Who wants to take away my pistol, my assault-rifle or my knives?
If somebody wants to take them, let him come near and try!

Needless to say, none of the politicians in the room said a single word.

This is the new regime in the Ukraine. And this is not going to change any time soon. The Ukrainian military is a joke and exists only on paper. The Ukrainian police has almost totally vanished and the only force which now has a monopoly on violence are the neo-Nazis.

The US and EU can really be proud of themselves. This is indeed a stunning success for “democracy”.

The Saker

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7FH2kgjtfU


Here is a follow up to the above video re: Alexander Muzychko

A Nazi leader Alexander Muzychko humiliates a public prosecutor (Rivne, Ukraine)
Published on Feb 27, 2014

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5vSCGSvf3U


Ok, at some point the topic needs a perspective that will never be spoken of nor seen by the vast majority. This is the point of our exploration into this ugly situation that is unfolding and hidden in plain sight. Surely the source, content and details will be offensive to most but please consider reviewing the following few comments courtesy the white supremacists at Stormfront message boards. Be sure to inform your elected politicos on all 3 sides, especially the Regime loyalists, that we know more than they do and sooner or later they will be brought to account considering the Right Sector does not intend to allow EU integration either…

New heroes of Ukraine. Nationalists in Ukraine uprising. Right Sector.

“Right sector – against the regime and integration”

Thread for collecting best interviews, articles, videos and anything else that explains: who are nationalists fighting on the frontlines of Ukraine Uprising, what are their organizations, ideologies, goals and motivations. Who are their leaders, heroes and martyrs. Why do they fight to the death?

Топик для сбора правдивой информации о героях Украинского Правого сопротивления. Кто их герои и лидеры, какова идеология ключевых организаций, какие причины заставляют их бороться насмерть против Хануковича?
__________________
Essential read: WhiteNationalism.com TOO White History
White-friendly movies to promote (imdb etc); Black inventions myths

Dog “racism” – not obliged to follow the white-lies of the human world, the world of canines offers obvious parallels. Study rates dog breeds by intelligence. Insurers profile “aggressive breeds”. Note: “[..] less genetic difference between dogs, wolves and coyotes than there is between the ethnic groups of the human species […]”.
Academic anti-racism? Charlatans and wishful thinkers.”I have used Boas’s study to fight what I guess could be considered racist approaches to anthropology,” said Dr. David Thomas, curator of anthropology at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. “I have to say I am shocked at the findings [of it being wrong].”

Diversity is: no cohesion, no trust, no consensus, no freedom, invasive statism, dystopia, entropy. Some of the most tyrannical, repressive and unfree societies were/are some of the most “diverse”.

source: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1025158/


While “our” elected leaders, especially the Regime’s hand selected delegation as well as those from the rest of the “western” world might like to point in only one direction, EU integration as opposed to closer ties to the Kremlin, when placing blame for the violence and seem to be fixated on the events that spawned from WW1 and WW2…

re: New heroes of Ukraine. Nationalists in Ukraine uprising. Right Sector.
Copying from the big Ukrainian thread

Published on Feb 21, 2014

The Great Ukrainian Reconquista: What is the Right Sector fighting for?

We, the warriors and commanders of the Right Sector are actively fighting the regime, remembering the heroism of King Svyatoslav the Courageous of Kyiv, King Danylo of Galicia, of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the warriors of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; implementing the right of a people to rise against injustice; and aware of our responsibilities before the dead and injured heroes of the Maidan.

For the right of every Ukrainian to human dignity…

For a fair criminal trial of Berkut and other dogs of the occupational system…

Against the humiliation and impoverishment of the Ukrainian people…

Against the war of the government with its own people…

For responsible voters and politicians…

For the election of judges…

Against corrupt and marginal democracy…

Against degeneracy and totalitarian liberalism…

For traditional folk morality and family values…

For Ukrainian families having many children…

For a spiritually and physically healthy youth…

Against a culture of consumerism and eroticism…

Against any form of “integration” on terms dictated from outside of Ukraine…

For unity and worldwide greatness of the Ukrainian nation…

For a great Ukrainian and European Reconquista… Everything is only beginning! From our Maidan, the rebirth of Kyivan-Rus/Ukraine commences, the rebirth of Europe commences.

Glory to Ukraine!

Glory to our heroes!

source: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t414368/


Sorry friends, but sometimes we need to look directly into their eyes to see what lies within their minds in order to fully understand their ultimate intentions…

The Ukraine riots should be called the 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine
The 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine

I wrote an article for discussion on the blatantly Jewish origins of these riots in Ukraine. It is self-evident, it cannot be denied, Russia has even stated that it was caused by ‘international’ influences, it is quite literally the 2nd Jewish War on Ukraine!

Quote:
The majority of protests occurred after the Ukrainian government refused to ratify or participate in the discussion of legislation from November the 21st 2013, that would have moved Ukraine into further trade deals and political union with the collapsing European Union… As outlined in an article the day the trade deal between the EU and Ukraine was de-facto rejected: The Jewish ‘community’ or kabal in Ukraine was staunchly in favour of joining the EU in order to subject the Ukrainian people to another phased Holodomor…Jewish supremacists in Ukraine, including the various unofficial chief Rabbi’s of Ukraine called for Ukraine to enter the EU, this call was not adhered to and subsequently many Jewish-supremacists inside Ukraine and through the United states took it upon themselves to instigate, fund and organise mass-riots and demonstrations against the pro-Ukrainian independent President and government of Ukraine…

Quote:
Like Syria this conflict has been instigated by foreigners allegedly by 100% percent, primarily as a result of subversion organised by Jewish-activists, Jewish front-groups and Jewish political figures on an international level

Read the full article…

If anyone has anything else that they believe needs to be said on the riots, just state such, I might edit the article with more information as time goes on, or write another one, if there is enough of a demand for more coverage.
__________________
Nationalist Ásatrú News
Nationalist News – Ásatrú Inspiration

All encompassing professional news service and more: economics, demographics, criminology, racial realism, exposing the causes, promoting and providing the infrastructure for the courageous solutions, -telling the straight truth-.

http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1019607/


Here is the “Read the full article” referenced above…

Article author: Nationalist Ásatrú News / Published: 23rd Æfterra Jéola 2014 / 23rd day After Yule 2264.RE

The 2nd Jewish war on Ukraine

(UPDATED -1800hrs- 23/1/2014)


In-between 10,000-40,000 anti-government protestors, demonstrators and rioters led by Jewish protest leaders and organizer’s have led continual protests in Kiev through Wednesday night and today especially that have caused the confirmed death of in-between 2* and 5 Ukrainian people and has left thousands injured and with hundreds of serious injuries including severe burns and fractured bones many thousands of protestors have been hurt, who following the vile orders of often-times Jewish organizers have led these nieve protestors into violent confrontations with riot police and military drafted riot police.

Dozens of state police have also been critically or seriously burned and injured, with over 80 police officers having been hospitalized and over 200 injured and millions of pounds equivalent has been lost in the loss of national productivity, property damage and the enormous policing costs primarily in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. The majority of the rioting occured and is still occuring (albeit at lower concentrations) around Maidan square and Europe square in Kiev.

*The two confirmed deaths were as a result of bullet wounds, the Kiev police issued a statement that they were not carrying any metal bullet (as opposed to rubber bullet) ammunition. The opposition leaders are now split as to whether violence is the way forward, with some calling for more violent protests, Jewish opposition leaders such as Vitali Klitschko (not even a Ukrainian, but is a Jew from Kyrgyztan) was calling instead for a nation-wide general strike.

Like Syria this conflict has been instigated by foreigners allegedly by 100% percent, primarily as a result of subversion organised by Jewish-activists, Jewish front-groups and Jewish political figures on an international level

Why are there protests in Ukraine?

The majority of protests occurred after the Ukrainian government refused to ratify or participate in the discussion of legislation from November the 21st 2013, that would have moved Ukraine into further trade deals and political union with the collapsing European Union.

As I outlined in an article the day the trade deal between the EU and Ukraine was de-facto rejected: The Jewish ‘community’ or kabal in Ukraine was staunchly in favour of joining the EU in order to subject the Ukrainian people to another phased Holodomor.

Although this might sound like an outlandish statement to make, the EU, through the free movement of people, coupled with the Jewish ambition for the EU to accept Turkey as an EU member state would, undeniably and inevitably result in the comparative demographic genocide of the Ukrainian and all European people if it were to continue unabated.

Jewish supremacists in Ukraine, including the various unofficial chief Rabbi’s of Ukraine called for Ukraine to enter the EU, this call was not adhered to and subsequently many Jewish-supremacists inside Ukraine and through the United states took it upon themselves to instigate, fund and organise mass-riots and demonstrations against the pro-Ukrainian independent President and government of Ukraine.

The protests had also been occurring before the rejection of the EU trade deals, this was primarily once again as a result of Jewish-supremacist instigation as Ukraine was moving towards further alliances and trade deals with Russia. There is a culture of anti-Russian sentiment inside Ukraine from the general population, as many Ukrainians still remember and lived through the end years of the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus some have been fooled into thinking alliances and trade deals with Russia would be a return to the Soviet Union days.


This is the opposite of the truth (and thus it is no surprise that we find Jewish supremacists promoting the opposite of the truth), as “The EU is the new Communism” (in this video Farage also promises Racial nationalist’s unstoppable return to power that even he cannot stop) and it is being increasingly acknowledged as such in Western Europe.

The Ukrainian government has already accused the EU and American efforts of attempting to subvert Ukraine. It is evident that the protests in Ukraine started literally minutes after EU integration talks ceased.

This fact alone proves that there is an epidemic of systematic anti-Ukrainian (and ultimately anti-white, as shown via the above argument) motivation behind the organizers of the recent protests, which have taken advantage of nieve and uninformed protestors and has, as all Jewish-supremacist revolutions or attempted revolutions do, resulted in the death of numerous Europeans already as of the time of publication of this article.

The fact that the Ukrainian public do not widely speak English has made it harder for them to be made aware of the horrific nature of the EU as revealed in our cultural discussions and in France, Scandinavia and Greece.

This has subsequently made it easier for Jewish-supremacists to play both sides of the political debate in Ukraine, stirring up fears of Russia (and Putin) by using anti-Russian and then anti-Soviet arguments at the same time, in front of different audiences, to create widespread anti-government sentiment over numerous sides of the political spectrum and debate within Ukraine. Although the silent majority (the small middle class and educated folk especially) of Ukrainians are still in support of Ukrainian independence from the EU, but as in all Jewish-supremacist revolutions or cultural upheaval attempts, the silent majority are always sidelined, for the interests of Jews themselves.

The Ukrainian anti-government protestors need to realize they are mistakenly on the side of communism, Jewish-supremacists and Globalist forces by demonstrating against their own freedom as a sovereign nation. Ukrainians need to wake up to the sheer idiocy of protesting against their own freedom, in the name of ‘freedom to be in the EU’.

This predicament of small proportions of Ukraine fighting against their own interests whilst thinking they are standing up for them, is akin to all the Jewish-supremacist manipulations, such as arguing for diversity which means less diversity (white genocide and multi-cultural nothingness) or arguing for equality, which actually means less equality (with more money going to Jewish bankers and the gab between the rich Jewish bankers and everyone else increasing until serfdom).

The anti-Ukrainian government protests and the recent ‘ultimatum’ for new elections is akin to the US pressure exerted on Russia, after Putin’s 1st successful re-election last election cycle, where democratic legitimacy means nothing to do with democratic legitimacy but whether that democratic government fully supports the Jewish-supremacist geo-political objectives or not.

The anti-Ukrainian protests are thus an attempt, to try to deny Russia a key geo-political, economic and military ally in Ukraine, in a wider, well-established anti-white effort to surround, isolate and attempt to destroy Russia on behalf of Jewish financial and racial interests who still hate the Russian people (as European people) for their defiance and destruction of communism in the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Some intelligent and well-informed Ukrainians have instead protested and surrounded the US embassy in Kiev, against the US (via Jewish-supremacists based in the US administration through figure-heads such as Kerry, McCain and Schumer*) subversion in Ukraine.

Several Nationalists in Ukraine have also used the protests as sufficient cover in order to engage in protesting at Jews and Jewish Synagogues, having correctly identified the cause of the current anti-Ukrainian disturbances. Some Nationalists have also taken part in demonstrations albeit for entirely different reasons. There are numerous pictures of well-equiped nationalists taking part in the riot in very small numbers.


The symbol on the shield there is quite evidently an Odin rune, the symbol of the Nordic and Germanic God Odin, the religion of our ancestors is popular throughout nationalist circles even in non-Northern European nations such as Ukraine and Russia and such persons as expected are on the frontlines, using the protest as cover for their own operations and to satiate their anger at the Ukrainian regime for its anti-protest laws and rampant corruption from Christian and Jewish political leaders. (Right) Look closely, that is a German Flecktarn jacket, popular with nationalists, and I can bet only nationalists are as well prepared and armoured as that person there.

The semi-nationalist and anti-interventionist policies of Vladimir Putin, is another reason why Ukraine is being pressured, via internal subversion to move away from Russia, because Russia (and China) are the only major powers who pose a colossal threat to Jewish-supremacist globalist ambitions.

These Jewish ‘opposition leaders’ (much like the foreign backed opposition leaders of Syria*) have made the ludicrous assertion that President Viktor Yanukovych has to call early elections within 24 hours from today (23/1/2014) or face massive protests.

*The same divide and rule (through internal subversion and the creation of factions) tactic resulting in the creation of “provisional” or opposition leaders or factions in countries opposed to Jewish-supremacist geo-political and racial objectives is blatantly clear.

Although it seems that many political factions are attempting to seize the moment, created by Jewish-international subversion, ironically even nationalists, as the above picture demonstrates are seeking to make an impact in their own way. It is likely that the Jewish international media may use pictures such as this to attempt to blame the whole protest on Nationalists, when it is a well-established fact that in previous Ukrianian riots it is Jewish thugs (or often-times Christian) and Jewish communists who are always the violent criminals in such events, nationalists are out on patrol to prevent the Jewish thugs from completely controlling the direction and messages of the protests, this is evident from the protestors denounciation of the so-called opposition leader of Yatsenyuk and others.

“You, Mr. President, have the opportunity to resolve this issue. Early elections will change the situation without bloodshed and we will do everything to achieve that,”

One of many opposition leaders, Arseniy Yatsenyuk in front of 40,000 people, whom he turned up to claim to represent.

The allegedly racially Jewish and evidently pro-Jewish opposition leader (one of many) Yatsenyuk has openly sought to escalate the violence and urge nieve Ukrainians to literally kill themselves in the face of Ukrainian police for Jewish interests by stating that:

“tomorrow we will go forward together* And if it’s a bullet in the forehead, then it’s a bullet in the forehead, but in an honest, fair and brave way”

*”Forward together” being an age old Jewish-communist phrase, but it will not be Jewish-subversives taking bullets to the forehead but European Ukrainians who will be killed for the sake of these Jewish-subversives and pro-EU (pro-white genocide) subversives like Yatsenyuk.


The Russian state Duma has also issued a unanimous statement warning western powers from continuing their incitement of the Ukrainian crisis, although in reality these Western powers, are almost entirely Jewish-supremacists, and their Communist and Socialist slave-followers in the EU commission.

‘On aggravation of the situation in Ukraine’

“In essence, there are attempts to forcefully overthrow the legitimate power institutes in the country… It is regrettable that all these events are provoked and used by representatives of the political opposition who cynically call themselves supporters of democracy… The State Duma again warns that the external pressure on Ukraine and artificially imposing the geopolitical choice of EU association are unacceptable,”

-Russian MPs of the Duma, by unanimous declaration.

The Duma, also ‘expressed readiness to boost the cooperation with the Ukrainian parliament – the Vekhovna Rada – in order to further develop the partnership between nations’ -according to RT.

This statement in this context, could be an indication of Russian willingness to intervene in Ukraine if the protests reach any serious military proportions, in what is obviously a Russian declaration of intent to stand by the true interests of Ukraine and its elected democracy.

It is reported that Military-grade Armoured Personnel Carriers are now on several streets of Ukraine with further mobilization inevitable, in what is evidently an increase in the response to the violent Jewish-supremacist-instigated protests.

*When looking someone up on Wikipedia go straight to the ‘Early life and education’ section and that will allow you to see whether someone is publically Jewish or not in a few seconds, subsequently this normally tells you all you need to know about their ideology, racial interests and motivations.

The Ukrainian people should remember the Holodomor and the majority-Jewish perpetrators who designed, created and then staffed the Soviet government responsible for the genocide of over 7 million Ukrainians in the 1930s and realise that allegedly the very same ethnic culprits who were behind the Holodomor are rallying against their nation once again, turning neighbour against neighbour, friend against friend, in a war that only benefits and can only benefit Jewish interests through what would be the destruction of Ukraine under the EU and the further attempts to isolate Russia.

Jewish-Supremacists have declared that Ukraine should be forced along with their agenda, to its own destruction long-term or be reduced to civil-war in the short-term, this is what malign Jewish-subversion looks like in reality in the videos below, behind the facade of media control and PR, this day the smell of burning flesh and ruined lives fills the air of our nations.”

Keep positive, Keep practical, Keep persevering.

source: http://nationalistasatrunews.com/complete-chronological-archive/the-2nd-jewish-war-on-ukraine.html


Here is a couple of short Right Sector propaganda videos…

Right Sector. The Great Ukrainian Reconquista (English subtitles)
Published on Feb 21, 2014
Rostyslav Ivanyk

The Great Ukrainian Reconquista: What is the Right Sector fighting for?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Inu_-0dcSU

Right sector. Ukrainian Revolution 2014
combat907
Published on Feb 12, 2014

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJmHIXVK95Y

Since the association to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was mentioned by Dmytro Yarosh in the interview, this video may offer some more insight that may be rather important…

Greek Catholic (Uniate) Clergyman in Ukraine calls to kick out Blacks, Jews and Russians
Andre Fomine
Published on Feb 24, 2014

A Sunday sermon by Rev. Mikhaylo Arsenych delivered in 2010:

“Today we are really ready for a revolution.
Would the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army tolerate Tabachnik and Yanukovych today?
The only effective methods of combat are assassination and terror!
The right way to communicate with the enemies is to fire at them!
Our message to them is the message of death by hanging. We’ll send all communists to the gallows-tree in our forest!
The message is our cry for vengence — take your weapon and chase all fear!
It is not a good time to be afraid!
We have been waiting for 20 years!
The situation will get better only if each of us makes a contribution to the construction of our national state.
We must first knock down the old house, and then build the new one.
We must rebuild our political regime and create a new sovereign state.
Only then will we live in our own country – in a country that takes care of our needs.
We want to be masters in our own house and decide for ourselves.
We want to be sure that our children will go to Ukrainian school.
We want to be sure that no Chinese, Negro, Jew or Muscovite will try to come and grab our land tomorrow!
Our success depends on each of us. We shouldn’t waver, we must keep covered todays political regime. The ground will be burning under their feet, like our torches are burning today!
Our hand must be firm! Glory to the Ukraine!”

ANALYSIS: http://orientalreview.org/2014/02/24/the-ukraine-neo-nazi-criminal-state-looming-in-the-centre-of-europe/

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5EXdbzIDEk


While we choose to not post additional links, there are literally dozens upon dozens of rather graphic and gruesome videos and hundreds of self-fulfilling articles posted by the militants themselves that have not been shown nor discussed via the msm conglomerates. We suggest that everyone begin to question everything you see and hear from the various politicians, analysts, think tanks and their profiteering propaganda outlets.

Keep in mind that while we hope we are incorrect, just like the “War on Terror” they are all selling the illusion of spreading peace, prosperity and democracy.

Before jumping to conclusions or on any bandwagons and remember that the People of Ukraine may not be aware of what lies ahead and what lies ahead will not be good considering it has all been based on lies and deception by modern day snake-oil salesman.


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

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#Harper + @PMO_MacDougall = #PMO + #CPC = #cdnpoli #CourtJesters?

An interesting question about Stephen Harper’s, Harper Government Prime Ministers Office popped up today and was percolating non-stop for some reason. What is up with Stephen Harper’s, Harper Government Director of Communications, Andrew MacDougall (@PMO_MacDougall)?

Maybe it’s just us, but this guy seems to still struggling with post-puberty in high school. Without jumping to conclusions, we thought it might be more appropriate to solicit your opinions and observations.

Let’s Explore

Below you will find screenshots of recent Tweets from some other official government “press departments” along with Stephen Harper’s, Harper Government Director of Communications, Andrew MacDougall (@PMO_MacDougall) including:

  • Jay Carney (EOP) @PressSec – The official twitter channel for President Barack Obama’s Press Secretary – The White House, Washington DC
  • UK Prime Minister @Number10gov – The official twitter channel for Prime Minister David Cameron’s office – 10 Downing Street
  • PMOPressOffice @PMOPressOffice – The official Twitter account of the Prime Minister of Australia’s Press Office – Parliament House

Stephen Harper’s, Harper Government Director of Communications, Andrew MacDougall @PMO_MacDougall

Stephen Harpers Harper Government Director of Communications Andrew MacDougall at PMO_MacDougall
Stephen Harpers Harper Government Director of Communications Andrew MacDougall at PMO_MacDougall

Jay Carney (EOP) @PressSec

Jay Carney EOP at PressSec - The official twitter channel for President Barack Obamas Press Secretary - The White House, Washington DC
Jay Carney EOP at PressSec – The official twitter channel for President Barack Obamas Press Secretary – The White House, Washington DC

UK Prime Minister @Number10gov

UK Prime Minister at Number10gov - The official twitter channel for Prime Minister David Camerons office - 10 Downing Street
UK Prime Minister at Number10gov – The official twitter channel for Prime Minister David Camerons office – 10 Downing Street

PMOPressOffice @PMOPressOffice

PMOPressOffice at PMOPressOffice - The official Twitter account of the Prime Minister of Australias Press Office - Parliament House
PMOPressOffice at PMOPressOffice – The official Twitter account of the Prime Minister of Australias Press Office – Parliament House

Let’s Decide

Based upon the content contained within the Tweets of comparable peers, the official Harper Government is…

British police clash with anti-greed protesters in London

Sat Oct 20, 2012 10:56PM

British police have made several arrests as officers clashed with anti-capitalist protesters during a huge demonstration against the coalition governments austerity policies in central London.
British police have made several arrests as officers clashed with anti-capitalist protesters during a huge demonstration against the coalition government’s austerity policies in central London.

The demonstration dubbed “A Future That Works” was organized by Trade Union Congress (TUC) and attracted hundreds of thousands of people across Britain, local media reported.

The anti-greed protesters called on the government to adopt an alternative economic strategy that puts jobs and growth first.

The TUC chief, Brendan Barber said the message of the Saturday’s protest was that “austerity is simply failing”.

“The government is making life desperately hard for millions of people because of pay cuts for workers, while the rich are given tax cuts,” he said.

Unions, anti-war campaigners, left-wing leaders, community groups and other activists joined the demonstration against reductions to public sector spending in London’s streets.

The cuts are claimed to be aimed at reining in the UK’s huge debt, which stands at more than one trillion pounds. Britain borrowed 13 billion pounds in September alone.

The UK government was also accused of leaning towards rich people, when earlier this year, it reduced income taxes for the country’s wealthiest citizens.

The coalition is said to be cutting taxes for millionaires and raising them for everyone else in the country.

“It is one rule for those at the top and one rule for everyone else”, said Labour Party chief Ed Miliband, who addressed the demonstrators at London’s Hyde Park.

MOL/HE

continue reading source: http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/10/20/267864/march/


Remember, politics is a contact sport, like hockey, so please feel free to add quick contributions, observations and relevant information as a comment below!

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The ‘plebs’ row is a mere sideshow to destructive Tory incompetence

Nothing will divert David Cameron and George Osborne from their great enterprise – an austerity to wither the state

By
guardian.co.uk
Saturday 20 October 2012 12.17 BST

Former chief whip Andrew Mitchell
Whether the former chief whip Andrew Mitchell called police plebs or not doesn’t matter – people believe he did. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

Did Andrew Mitchell say the dread word “plebs”? After a long month of failing to deny it, it hardly matters. Today a full set of monster headlines shriek David Cameron‘s class calamity. The police wrote it in their official log and that’s who people believe. Plebs never sounded like a word police officers would invent in a stitch-up.

According to the Daily Telegraph deputy editor, Benedict Brogan, Mitchell’s fellow MPs believed it because they often heard him use the word in everyday conversation. That’s all we need to know – and everyone knows it already. That’s how they think and how they talk. We all know it’s true because that’s how they govern – not for “the other half”.

There are truths and myths – and sometimes the myth wins because it represents a truth. Margaret Thatcher never quite said “there is no such thing as society”, but she nearly did, she might have done and she acted as if she thought it. So, to her enemies, it came to symbolise all she stood for.

Cameron so badly lacks social antennae to warn him how his class looks to most voters that he failed to know by gut instinct what most people saw: the moment “plebs” was out, Mitchell was Ebola to be cast out before he contaminated the whole tribe. Those around Cameron who called it a gaffe or a faux pas utterly failed to understand that most people say “fucking” when angry, only this tiny cadre of upper-class yahoos ever say or think “plebs”. With that one word Mitchell, the silver-spooned Lazard’s investment banker, let slip the dogs of class war.

The curious incident of George Osborne’s first-class train ride only matters because it plays on the same story board. “We’re all in this together” doesn’t travel with plebs, but pays £189.50 to avoid hoi polloi. If chancellors rarely go second class, that’s beside the point. For the added luxury of parking his bottom on an exclusive seat, he spent more than two and a half times what he makes unemployed people live on for a whole week, for food, heating, travel, everything.

After Osborne’s benefit cuts, which the Institute for Fiscal Studies says are almost without international precedent, he plans to take yet another £10bn from those with the least. Disability benefits are next, worse cuts to the poorest households, while he eases top taxes for the people like him and Cameron in the world of mega-wealth. That insouciance is what makes them unfit to govern, unfit to decide who suffers most in these hard times.

Beside that imagery of class conflict, their comical ineptitude is only a sideshow. Born to rule? Whatever happened to the playing fields of Eton? Far from winning the battle of Waterloo, these scions turn government into Napoleonic defeat, with no enemy more dangerous than their own incompetence. They trip over their own shoelaces before they reach the battlefield, double fault all their own serves, knock themselves senseless before they leave the blue corner.

Learning nothing, they get worse with every passing month: Cameron’s energy price bungle defies explanation, beyond carelessness, ruled by an indolent arrogance that can’t be bothered to consult anyone. From badgers , buzzards and forests to pasties and caravans, details bore them. The NHS will sink them.

In the grand pile-up, it only added a hint of tabasco that Osborne was travelling on the west coast mainline, the contracts for which were mangled partly due to his Whitehall cuts in senior staff. Resurrecting (Etonian) Sir George Young as chief whip reminds us it was he who dashed to privatise rail chaotically in the first place. Surely no scriptwriter would dare add in that 1982 British Rail poster of Young and his children with BBC presenter Jimmy Savile?

But don’t be fooled: on the big things, they care. Follow the money, follow the dogma. Nothing has diverted Cameron and Osborne from their great enterprise – an austerity to wither the state and harrow the ground where it once stood. Anarchic creative destruction is not collateral damage, it’s part of the purpose. That louche, laid-back lackadaisical air is only the affectation of Flashman politics. The “Thrasher” Mitchell interlude reminds us that however badly their government ends, havoc for others is an experiment without personal risk to them.

continue reading source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/20/plebs-sideshow-destructive-tory-incompetence

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The end of the New World Order

The upheavals of the early 21st century have changed our world. Now, in the aftermath of failed wars and economic disasters, pressure for a social alternative can only grow

By
The Guardian
Friday 19 October 2012 18.00 BST

lehman-new-world-order
Culture shock … the collapse of Lehman Brothers ushered in the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s. Photograph: Linda Nylind for the Guardian

In the late summer of 2008, two events in quick succession signalled the end of the New World Order. In August, the US client state of Georgia was crushed in a brief but bloody war after it attacked Russian troops in the contested territory of South Ossetia.

The former Soviet republic was a favourite of Washington’s neoconservatives. Its authoritarian president had been lobbying hard for Georgia to join Nato’s eastward expansion. In an unblinking inversion of reality, US vice-president Dick Cheney denounced Russia‘s response as an act of “aggression” that “must not go unanswered”. Fresh from unleashing a catastrophic war on Iraq, George Bush declared Russia’s “invasion of a sovereign state” to be “unacceptable in the 21st century”.

As the fighting ended, Bush warned Russia not to recognise South Ossetia’s independence. Russia did exactly that, while US warships were reduced to sailing around the Black Sea. The conflict marked an international turning point. The US’s bluff had been called, its military sway undermined by the war on terror, Iraq and Afghanistan. After two decades during which it bestrode the world like a colossus, the years of uncontested US power were over.

Three weeks later, a second, still more far-reaching event threatened the heart of the US-dominated global financial system. On 15 September, the credit crisis finally erupted in the collapse of America’s fourth-largest investment bank. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers engulfed the western world in its deepest economic crisis since the 1930s.

The first decade of the 21st century shook the international order, turning the received wisdom of the global elites on its head – and 2008 was its watershed. With the end of the cold war, the great political and economic questions had all been settled, we were told. Liberal democracy and free-market capitalism had triumphed. Socialism had been consigned to history. Political controversy would now be confined to culture wars and tax-and-spend trade-offs.

In 1990, George Bush Senior had inaugurated a New World Order, based on uncontested US military supremacy and western economic dominance. This was to be a unipolar world without rivals. Regional powers would bend the knee to the new worldwide imperium. History itself, it was said, had come to an end.

But between the attack on the Twin Towers and the fall of Lehman Brothers, that global order had crumbled. Two factors were crucial. By the end of a decade of continuous warfare, the US had succeeded in exposing the limits, rather than the extent, of its military power. And the neoliberal capitalist model that had reigned supreme for a generation had crashed.

It was the reaction of the US to 9/11 that broke the sense of invincibility of the world’s first truly global empire. The Bush administration’s wildly miscalculated response turned the atrocities in New York and Washington into the most successful terror attack in history.

Not only did Bush’s war fail on its own terms, spawning terrorists across the world, while its campaign of killings, torture and kidnapping discredited Western claims to be guardians of human rights. But the US-British invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the inability of the global behemoth to impose its will on subject peoples prepared to fight back. That became a strategic defeat for the US and its closest allies.

This passing of the unipolar moment was the first of four decisive changes that transformed the world – in some crucial ways for the better. The second was the fallout from the crash of 2008 and the crisis of the western-dominated capitalist order it unleashed, speeding up relative US decline.

This was a crisis made in America and deepened by the vast cost of its multiple wars. And its most devastating impact was on those economies whose elites had bought most enthusiastically into the neoliberal orthodoxy of deregulated financial markets and unfettered corporate power.

A voracious model of capitalism forced down the throats of the world as the only way to run a modern economy, at a cost of ballooning inequality and environmental degradation, had been discredited – and only rescued from collapse by the greatest state intervention in history. The baleful twins of neoconservatism and neoliberalism had been tried and tested to destruction.

The failure of both accelerated the rise of China, the third epoch-making change of the early 21st century. Not only did the country’s dramatic growth take hundreds of millions out of poverty, but its state-driven investment model rode out the west’s slump, making a mockery of market orthodoxy and creating a new centre of global power. That increased the freedom of manoeuvre for smaller states.

China’s rise widened the space for the tide of progressive change that swept Latin America – the fourth global advance. Across the continent, socialist and social-democratic governments were propelled to power, attacking economic and racial injustice, building regional independence and taking back resources from corporate control. Two decades after we had been assured there could be no alternatives to neoliberal capitalism, Latin Americans were creating them.

These momentous changes came, of course, with huge costs and qualifications. The US will remain the overwhelmingly dominant military power for the foreseeable future; its partial defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan were paid for in death and destruction on a colossal scale; and multipolarity brings its own risks of conflict. The neoliberal model was discredited, but governments tried to refloat it through savage austerity programmes. China’s success was bought at a high price in inequality, civil rights and environmental destruction. And Latin America’s US-backed elites remained determined to reverse the social gains, as they succeeded in doing by violent coup in Honduras in 2009. Such contradictions also beset the revolutionary upheaval that engulfed the Arab world in 2010-11, sparking another shift of global proportions.

By then, Bush’s war on terror had become such an embarrassment that the US government had to change its name to “overseas contingency operations”. Iraq was almost universally acknowledged to have been a disaster, Afghanistan a doomed undertaking. But such chastened realism couldn’t be further from how these campaigns were regarded in the western mainstream when they were first unleashed.

To return to what was routinely said by British and US politicians and their tame pundits in the aftermath of 9/11 is to be transported into a parallel universe of toxic fantasy. Every effort was made to discredit those who rejected the case for invasion and occupation – and would before long be comprehensively vindicated.

Michael Gove, now a Tory cabinet minister, poured vitriol on the Guardian for publishing a full debate on the attacks, denouncing it as a “Prada-Meinhof gang” of “fifth columnists”. Rupert Murdoch’s Sun damned those warning against war as “anti-American propagandists of the fascist left”. When the Taliban regime was overthrown, Blair issued a triumphant condemnation of those (myself included) who had opposed the invasion of Afghanistan and war on terror. We had, he declared, “proved to be wrong”.

A decade later, few could still doubt that it was Blair’s government that had “proved to be wrong”, with catastrophic consequences. The US and its allies would fail to subdue Afghanistan, critics predicted. The war on terror would itself spread terrorism. Ripping up civil rights would have dire consequences – and an occupation of Iraq would be a blood-drenched disaster.

The war party’s “experts”, such as the former “viceroy of Bosnia” Paddy Ashdown, derided warnings that invading Afghanistan would lead to a “long-drawn-out guerrilla campaign” as “fanciful”. More than 10 years on, armed resistance was stronger than ever and the war had become the longest in American history.

It was a similar story in Iraq – though opposition had by then been given voice by millions on the streets. Those who stood against the invasion were still accused of being “appeasers”. US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld predicted the war would last six days. Most of the Anglo-American media expected resistance to collapse in short order. They were entirely wrong.

A new colonial-style occupation of Iraq would, I wrote in the first week of invasion, “face determined guerrilla resistance long after Saddam Hussein has gone” and the occupiers “be driven out”. British troops did indeed face unrelenting attacks until they were forced out in 2009, as did US regular troops until they were withdrawn in 2011.

But it wasn’t just on the war on terror that opponents of the New World Order were shown to be right and its cheerleaders to be talking calamitous nonsense. For 30 years, the west’s elites insisted that only deregulated markets, privatisation and low taxes on the wealthy could deliver growth and prosperity.

Long before 2008, the “free market” model had been under fierce attack: neoliberalism was handing power to unaccountable banks and corporations, anti-corporate globalisation campaigners argued, fuelling poverty and social injustice and eviscerating democracy – and was both economically and ecologically unsustainable.

In contrast to New Labour politicians who claimed “boom and bust” to be a thing of the past, critics dismissed the idea that the capitalist trade cycle could be abolished as absurd. Deregulation, financialisation and the reckless promotion of debt-fuelled speculation would, in fact, lead to crisis.

The large majority of economists who predicted that the neoliberal model was heading for breakdown were, of course, on the left. So while in Britain the main political parties all backed “light-touch regulation” of finance, its opponents had long argued that City liberalisation threatened the wider economy.

Critics warned that privatising public services would cost more, drive down pay and conditions and fuel corruption. Which is exactly what happened. And in the European Union, where corporate privilege and market orthodoxy were embedded into treaty, the result was ruinous. The combination of liberalised banking with an undemocratic, lopsided and deflationary currency union that critics (on both left and right in this case) had always argued risked breaking apart was a disaster waiting to happen. The crash then provided the trigger.

The case against neoliberal capitalism had been overwhelmingly made on the left, as had opposition to the US-led wars of invasion and occupation. But it was strikingly slow to capitalise on its vindication over the central controversies of the era. Hardly surprising, perhaps, given the loss of confidence that flowed from the left’s 20th-century defeats – including in its own social alternatives.

But driving home the lessons of these disasters was essential if they were not to be repeated. Even after Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terror was pursued in civilian-slaughtering drone attacks from Pakistan to Somalia. The western powers played the decisive role in the overthrow of the Libyan regime – acting in the name of protecting civilians, who then died in their thousands in a Nato-escalated civil war, while conflict-wracked Syria was threatened with intervention and Iran with all-out attack.

And while neoliberalism had been discredited, western governments used the crisis to try to entrench it. Not only were jobs, pay and benefits cut as never before, but privatisation was extended still further. Being right was, of course, never going to be enough. What was needed was political and social pressure strong enough to turn the tables of power.

Revulsion against a discredited elite and its failed social and economic project steadily deepened after 2008. As the burden of the crisis was loaded on to the majority, the spread of protests, strikes and electoral upheavals demonstrated that pressure for real change had only just begun. Rejection of corporate power and greed had become the common sense of the age.

The historian Eric Hobsbawm described the crash of 2008 as a “sort of right-wing equivalent to the fall of the Berlin wall”. It was commonly objected that after the implosion of communism and traditional social democracy, the left had no systemic alternative to offer. But no model ever came pre-cooked. All of them, from Soviet power and the Keynesian welfare state to Thatcherite-Reaganite neoliberalism, grew out of ideologically driven improvisation in specific historical circumstances.

The same would be true in the aftermath of the crisis of the neoliberal order, as the need to reconstruct a broken economy on a more democratic, egalitarian and rational basis began to dictate the shape of a sustainable alternative. Both the economic and ecological crisis demanded social ownership, public intervention and a shift of wealth and power. Real life was pushing in the direction of progressive solutions.

The upheavals of the first years of the 21st century opened up the possibility of a new kind of global order, and of genuine social and economic change. As communists learned in 1989, and the champions of capitalism discovered 20 years later, nothing is ever settled.

This is an edited extract from The Revenge of History: the Battle for the 21st Century by Seumas Milne, published by Verso. Buy it for £16 at guardianbookshop.co.uk

continue reading source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/19/new-world-order

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British Tories Look to Canadian Cousins for Help with Ethnic Voters

British Tories Look to Canadian Cousins for Help with Ethnic Voters

Britain’s Conservative Party, now heading that country’s minority coalition government but envious of Canada’s federal Tory majority, is preparing an ambitious outreach effort among the U.K.’s ethnic minorities—long-time backers of the Labour Party—in a strategy that’s directly modelled on the Jason Kenney-led campaign credited in recent elections with convincing key Asian-Canadian communities to abandon their traditional allegiance to the Liberals.

British news reports have quoted officials from Prime Minister David Cameron’s governing Conservatives saying the party’s bid to achieve a parliamentary majority will only succeed if—like Prime Minister Stephen Harper—Cameron can broaden the Tories’ appeal among immigrants from India, Pakistan and elsewhere.

At the centre of the Conservatives’ wooing of Canadian ethnic minorities has been Kenney, Harper’s minister for the Department of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism. The Calgary MP is renowned for attending countless ethnic festivals across the country, waving the Conservative flag and cementing new bonds between the party and various immigrant communities—especially in politically strategic ridings around suburban Toronto.

Both the Independent and Daily Mail newspapers are reporting that Cameron intends to send his political secretary, Stephen Gilbert, to meet with Kenney to learn more about how British Conservatives can increase their support among so-called BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) voters, as they’re categorized in British political parlance.

“If we want to win a majority—we need the support of everyone who shares our values—whatever their background,” said Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, co-chairman of Britain’s Conservative Party and a minister without portfolio in Cameron’s cabinet.

“But at the moment, there is often a big mismatch between the ideals and aspirations of ethnic minority voters and the party they vote for. We need to learn from centre-right parties in other countries how to attract (voters) who share our values but haven’t traditionally voted Conservative,” she told the newspapers. “And we need to go out and persuade those voters that a Conservative government is the best way of fulfilling their aspirations for themselves, their families and their communities.”

Warsi, the first female Muslim minister in the British government, has been an outspoken defender of religion as an important bastion of conservative values in society. High levels of religious faith, belief in traditional family values and support for a strong law-and-order agenda are seen by British political observers as potential common ground between longtime Conservative supporters and ethnic minorities.

The Runnymede Trust, a British think tank that conducts research and advocacy on race issues, issued a report in February that explored the political views among Britain’s five principal minority groups—those with Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African backgrounds.

The study showed that “black and minority ethnic people remain highly supportive of the Labour Party, with 68 per cent voting Labour. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats—coalition partners in the current government—got only 16 per cent and 14 per cent of the BME vote respectively.”

Runnymede Trust recently criticized the Conservativeled government’s “integration” strategy as focused more on assimilating ethnic minorities to “British values” rather than promoting multicultural diversity.

“It appears that the government does not view integration as a two-way process,” said an open letter co-authored by Runnymede in March and signed by 18 other racerelations organizations. “We are also concerned that (the integration policy) was put together without proper consultation with ethnic minority organizations.”

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Cameron and Obama ended the neocon era. But the era of Assad goes on

David Cameron and Barack Obama buried the neocons in Washington. But the west will pay a price for the quiet life

By
The Guardian
Wednesday 14 March 2012 21.20 GMT

Barack Obama welcomes David Cameron
Barack Obama welcomes David Cameron during an official arrival ceremony on the south lawn of the White House in Washington today. Photograph: Mark Wilson / POOL/EPA

It is as easy to be distracted by the outward glamour of a prime ministerial visit to Washington as it is to fail to discern its occasional real inner substance. Both things apply in the case of David Cameron’s White House talks with Barack Obama. On one level they were the very embodiment of the self-indulgent vacuity of which Simon Jenkins wrote here. On another, they marked the end of a chapter in modern history.

On Wednesday in the White House they buried the neocons. Or, to put it rather more carefully, since neoconservatism has been through many contrasting incarnations and the term is widely misused, Cameron and Obama marked the imminent close of the phase of US-UK foreign policy that began after 9/11 with the coming together of American imperial power and British support for the active promotion of democracy and liberal institutions, particularly in the Muslim world.

Of course, like most attempts to draw a line in the sand of history, this one is approximate and inconclusive in many ways. The Afghanistan campaign which, along with the jihadist threat, is one of the few constants of the past decade, is not over yet. There will still be nearly 70,000 US troops in Afghanistan at the turn of this year and 9,000 British until late next, with an “enduring commitment” beyond that. The interventionist reflex, the wish to nurture liberal institutions as a counterweight to jihadism, and the sheer ability to act with greater military effectiveness than most rivals will all continue to shape US and UK foreign policy in the Muslim world and elsewhere for as far ahead as the eye can see.

Meanwhile, for all the buddiness of the US visit and the Churchillian rhetoric of their Washington Post op-ed piece this week, the two leaders do not march in lockstep anyway. Obama put it with utter clarity in Wednesday’s White House press conference. Britain and America are different economies in different places. The one nation is an indisputable first-rank world power. The other is a leading second-rank one that cannot act unilaterally even if it wanted to. The US is bound into the Middle East, in particular in relations with Israel, in ways that do not apply to Britain to the same degree. Cameron was more committed to intervention in Libya and is keener on intervention in Syria than Obama.

Yet, even when all these and many other provisos are taken into account, Wednesday was still the end of an era. Over Afghanistan – despite all the talk about the upcoming Nato summit, the handover to Afghan security forces and Obama’s claim that there will be “no steep cliff” of rapid pullout at the end of 2014 – the aim is withdrawal. Recent killings of Brits and by Americans and Wednesday’s audacious attack inside Camp Bastion are all harbingers of that. “People get weary,” said Obama, in a moment of frankness. The pullout will happen because the voters have lost the will to fight.

The similar surface noise over Iran and Syria also conceals a deeper current, a long withdrawing roar of disengagement. Cameron and Obama dwelt less on Iran and Syria than they did on Afghanistan. That’s partly because there is less they can do there, even the Americans, certainly the British. The Washington Post joint article emphasised that there is time and space to pursue a diplomatic solution in Iran, buttressed by stronger sanctions. There is not an iota of ambiguity in the toughness of the language, but the unspoken reality is that Obama would do almost anything to avoid getting trapped into a military strike against Iran. That doesn’t mean that it won’t happen. But it does mean that he thinks, rightly, that it would be a mark of failure if it did.

In Syria the limits of engagement are even more stark. At the White House press conference, Obama spoke about aid to the opposition, about pressure on the regime, about mobilising the nations and tightening the sanctions. Cameron threatened the Assad dynasty with the international criminal court. It all sounds like action, and it is all useful incremental stuff. But it is action at a distance, with strict limits. It is not intervention, because the international order has a collective interest in inaction and because the costs – not least the political costs at home – are deemed too high.

All this is, in very large part, the politics of where we are now. Faced with all three of these grim situations at once – a decade-long losing struggle against a feudal patriarchal narco-state, the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of a paranoid revolutionary theocracy, and the readiness of a corrupt Arab socialist autocrat to kill his own people for the sake of the revolution – it is hardly surprising that Obama and Cameron hold back. Who’s to blame them for doing so? The historic failure in Iraq leaves them little choice. But so does the fragility of the global economy. Even if the US and the UK were faced with only one of the three problems, Iraq and the recession would make them think twice.

A large part of all of us breathes a huge sigh of relief at this. The post-George Bush era finally beckons. Withdrawal from Afghanistan means no more pointless deaths of young soldiers, no more massacres, insults and acts of desecration against Afghans – at least by Americans. Western nations think in instant gratification terms and short timescales and this has all gone on too long. The west has had enough of fear and shame and hard times, of making enemies out of strangers and realising that getting people to change their ways is harder than it first seemed. People get weary, just like Obama said.

Another part of us, though, ought to reflect on what is being lost by this overwhelming collective disengagement. The disengagement is happening because the mistakes – crimes if you prefer – of the past have created a collective war-weariness that has now become a collective war-wariness. It is natural to want the conflict to end.

Who wouldn’t? It’s not wrong to want a quiet life, but how right is it when it comes at a price that someone else will inevitably have to pay? That wasn’t acceptable to earlier generations who scorned non-intervention in Spain or Abyssinia. Obama and Cameron closed the door on the George Bush era on Wednesday, to the general relief of the world. But the era of Mullah Omar, Ayatollah Khamenei and Bashar al-Assad goes on, posing questions that will one day have to be answered.

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continue reading source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/14/cameron-obama-ended-neocon-era

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Bush, Gog and Magog

Bush, Gog and Magog

Just when you thought it couldn’t get crazier, a well-sourced story claims Bush invaded Iraq because of Bible prophecies

Here’s a story we should all be ashamed of missing: George W Bush attempted to sell the invasion of Iraq to Jacques Chirac using biblical prophecy.

In the winter of 2003, when George Bush and Tony Blair were frantically gathering support for their planned invasion, Professor Thomas Römer, an Old Testament expert at the university of Lausanne, was rung up by the Protestant Federation of France. They asked him to supply them with a summary of the legends surrounding Gog and Magog and as the conversation progressed, he realised that this had originally come, from the highest reaches of the French government.

President Jacques Chirac wanted to know what the hell President Bush had been on about in their last conversation. Bush had then said that when he looked at the Middle East, he saw “Gog and Magog at work” and the biblical prophecies unfolding. But who the hell were Gog and Magog? Neither Chirac nor his office had any idea. But they knew Bush was an evangelical Christian, so they asked the French Federation of Protestants, who in turn asked Professor Römer.

He explained that Gog and Magog were, to use theological jargon, crazy talk. They appear twice in the Old Testament, once as a name, and once in a truly strange prophecy in the book of Ezekiel:

And the word of the LORD came unto me, saying,
Son of man, set thy face against Gog, the land of Magog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal, and prophesy against him,
And say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal:
And I will turn thee back, and put hooks into thy jaws, and I will bring thee forth, and all thine army, horses and horsemen, all of them clothed with all sorts of armour, even a great company with bucklers and shields, all of them handling swords:
Persia, Ethiopia, and Libya with them; all of them with shield and helmet:
Gomer, and all his bands; the house of Togarmah of the north quarters, and all his bands: and many people with thee.

Who are all these people? The best opinion is that like all Bible prophecy, it is a mixture of wish-fulfilment and contemporary (iron age) politics. Some of it at least seems to refer to the turmoil brought about by Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC (unlike Bush, Alexander actually conquered Afghanistan). But they have been for the last two hundred years the subject of increasingly excited evangelical fanfic, especially in America; in the 70s and 80s, Gog was meant to be Russia. Ronald Reagan seems to have believed that.

But with Reagan, the prophecy appreciation part of his brain functioned quite independently of the part that started wars (there’s nothing in the Old Testament about Nicaragua or even Grenada). Bush seems to have taken the threat of Gog and Magog to Israel quite literally, and, if this story can be believed, to have launched a war to stop them.

Can it be believed? We have calls out to Professor Römer and to the Protestant Federation of France. I’ll report back if or when they get back to us. But Römer story was published in the Lausanne University magazine in 2007, and looks perfectly credible there. It was repeated independently in a French book of interviews with Chirac this spring. I’m certainly inclined to believe it myself: it makes as much sense as anything else about Bush’s policy in Iraq.

There is one last twist to the story. The prophecy concludes in a way that should make even George W Bush flinch: having set his hooks in Gog, Magog, Meschech, Tubal, old Gomer, Togarmah and all, and dragged them to attack Israel, what does God do to defend his chosen people? First he gets mad:

My fury shall come up in my face.

And then he gets even:

For in my jealousy and in the fire of my wrath have I spoken, Surely in that day there shall be a great shaking in the land of Israel;
So that the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the heaven, and the beasts of the field, and all creeping things that creep upon the earth, and all the men that are upon the face of the earth, shall shake at my presence, and the mountains shall be thrown down, and the steep places shall fall, and every wall shall fall to the ground.
And I will call for a sword against him throughout all my mountains, saith the Lord GOD: every man’s sword shall be against his brother.
And I will plead against him with pestilence and with blood; and I will rain upon him, and upon his bands, and upon the many people that are with him, an overflowing rain, and great hailstones, fire, and brimstone.

Is that really what a true defender of Israel would wish to happen there? If there was anyone who suffered such things as a result of Bush’s war, it was the poor Iraqis. Tricky stuff, the word of the lord.

original source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2009/aug/10/religion-george-bush